MAYIBUYE iAFRIKA? DISJUNCTIVE INCLUSIONS AND BLACK STRIVINGS FOR CONSTITUTION AND BELONGING IN ‘SOUTH AFRICA’

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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that the work presented in this thesis is my own, except where reference is made to the work of others.

Signed

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ABSTRACT

With a focus on South Africa, I employ the phenomenological approach from an African perspective to analyse strivings for constitution (to constitute an inclusive polity, and etymologically, *constare* ‘to stand together’) and belonging (affectively and materially). In this postcolony, these strivings can be discerned in perennial protests by impoverished black communities for an inclusive democracy and for social goods; in contestations around land redistribution and against institutionalised forms of social ‘invisibilisation;’ and in calls for the valorisation of life-worlds different from the western. I contend that these strivings should be understood from the perspective that settler colonial constitution-making processes presaged “death of the land” (*ilizwe lilestone*); that is, the shattering of the socio-cultural worlds of indigenous peoples. The outcomes of this processes were ‘native’ pariahdom, homelessness and worldlessness. Accordingly, the original impulse of anti-colonial struggles was *Mayibuye iAfrika* (‘Return’/’Re-member’/ ‘Resurrect’ Africa).

My two-fold thesis is, firstly, that perennial protests by marginalised communities are impelled by the fact that post-1994 constitutional re-arrangements did not rise to the decolonisation challenge of re-membering the land/world. These re-arrangements have thus perpetuated homelessness, pariahdom and worldlessness. Secondly, I demonstrate that the cause of this failure is partially the fact that ruling party elites - who were beneficiaries of partial inclusion into the settler-constituted polity - failed to overcome their liminal-status induced conditions of double consciousness and racial melancholia. The result is that they elaborated terms of constitution and belonging whose eventual outcomes are, on the one hand, assimilation of ‘native’ elites into the white-dominated world, and on the other, continuing pariahdom and worldlessness for the majority.

In Part I, I show that South African anti-colonial leaders based their vision of constitution and belonging on W.E.B. Du Bois seminal manifesto for how people of African descent could achieve liberation and world-reclamation. I argue that this manifesto leads to elite nationalism, a dearth of national consciousness and that it ultimately perpetuates the inherited world of apartness. The main insight from this Part is that quests for post-colonial constitution-making ought to be geared towards re-membering and (re)constituting the historically-colonised world on spiritual, social and material planes – the three realms of African belonging in the world. In Part II, I propose decolonising constitution-making processes centered on politics of *Mayibuye* understood here as creolising homemaking and re-membership of the world. I do this by advancing Es’kia Mphahlele, Steve Biko and *Abahlali baseMjondolo*’s interconnected praxes of *Afrikan* humanness, Black Consciousness and *Abahlalism*. I contend that these praxes are faithful to the *Mayibuye* exigency because they, respectively and together, propose ways of re-membering the triadic world and of (re)constituting an all-inclusive polity based on African humanness.
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INTRODUCTION

We remain committed to a struggle for a world in which everyone counts

[Abahlali baseMjondolo, 2014. My emphasis]

Strivings for Constitution and Belonging in the “new” South Africa

On 26 September 2009, dozens of heavily-armed men attacked a meeting of the Kennedy Road Development Committee (KRDC). The KRDC is a founding affiliate of Abahlali baseMjondolo (Abahlali), a social movement of shack-dwellers based in Durban, South Africa. A section of the marauding assailants set upon an all-night Abahlali Youth Camp while another made its way to shacks belonging to the president and deputy president of Abahlali. Kennedy Road Informal Settlement (Kennedy Road) resembled a war zone after the attacks: three people were dead, dozens of people were injured, over 1000 people were displaced, shacks belonging to Abahlali organisers were burnt down, and the invaders had occupied Abahlali’s headquarters. All of this, it was alleged, took place under police watch and complicity (Amnesty International, 2009: n.p.; Chance, 2010: 2). Witnesses further alleged that the attackers self-identified as members of the ruling party, the African National Congress (ANC). Police subsequently arrested twelve members of the KRDC; none of the assailants were ever arrested. The arrested members of the KRDC spent months in police custody. S’bu Zikode, the president of Abahlali, spent several years living ‘underground’ in safe houses, unable to return to his home.

The attack on Abahlali marked a significant departure from the way the ruling party ordinarily engaged with social movements of impoverished black people. In the past, ANC and state-officials have dealt with these movements through a mixture of patronage, co-optation, vilification and by arresting organisers of protests. As many commentators recognised at the time, this was the first time the ANC, through its local groups, attempted to destroy an entire movement and autonomous community (Mgxxitama, 2009: n.p.; Friedman, 2009: n.p.). Tellingly, the day after the attack on and dislocation of Abahlali the Provincial Minster of Safety and Security declared Kennedy Road “liberated” (Tolsi, 2009: n.p.).

I open with this vignette because it highlights conflicting interpretations and enactment of liberation in “post-Apartheid” South Africa. At a more profound level, this episode neatly captures the main premise of this dissertation. The premise of this dissertation is that black people’s strivings for liberation, constitution and belonging persist in the “post-Apartheid” era. By ‘constitution,’ I do not mean a legal instrument. Rather, I return to the etymology of this term (constare - ‘to stand together’) as well as the decolonisation imperative to constitute a post-segregationist society. As I show in chapter 1, this
decolonisation impulse was motored by a nineteenth-century anti-colonial rallying cry, *Mayibuye iAfrika* (‘Return Africa’/‘Re-member Africa’). Proponents of the *Mayibuye* vision strove to implode the world constituted by colonists and to (re)constitute a world in which everyone will have a sense of belonging. By ‘constitution-making’ I, therefore, have in mind collective efforts aimed at establishing a substantially different kind of polity. As far as advocates for a decolonised world are concerned, such efforts are aimed at (re)establishing an all-inclusive and humane polity. Based on this understanding, this dissertation proposes that ongoing struggles of *Abahlali* and certain other movements of structurally ‘invisibilised’ people ought to be understood as strivings for constitution and belonging.

By strivings for ‘belonging,’ I do not have in mind struggles impelled by a yearning to identify with or to be accepted by a specific or particularised community or identity. To be clear, then, by ‘struggles or demands for belonging,’ I do not mean strivings impelled by a sense of South Africanness based on ideas of autochthony and nativism. On the contrary, the strivings for constitution and belonging that I am concerned with here are, to my mind, decolonising because they are based on explicit and active deconstruction of notions of autochthony and of fixed, exclusive and bounded identities. It is with this objective in mind that I have opened this dissertation with the vision and praxis of constitution and belonging of *Abahlali baseMjondolo* (lit: ‘dwellers of shack-settlements’). This thirteen-year old movement of over 50 000 members is a multi-ethnic organisation that also admits into its ranks people from other parts of Africa. This movement’s central campaign for *Umhlaba, Izindlu, neSithunzi* (Land, Housing and Dignity) emerges out of the syncretic spaces that are shack-settlements and is based on an explicit rejection of the conjuncture of citizenship and nativism. This is to say that *Abahlali* reject the idea that citizenship rights should only be bestowed upon ‘sons and daughters of the soil’. Relatedly, *Abahlali*, and the kindred movements of constitution and belonging that I discuss in Part II, seek to deconstruct the notion of a pure and coherent African identity that is constituted by and constitutes an own world. Rather, for *Abahlali* and its allies, the post-1994 struggle for constitution and belonging involves collective efforts aimed at ending the persisting world of apartness and (re)constituting a world in which everyone will have sense of affective and material belongingness.

Flowing from the above outline, the central claim of this dissertation is as follows: post-1994 struggles of *Abahlali* and its allies are decolonising praxes of constitution and belonging because they seek to re-member and (re)constitute the world without the coordinates of autochthony and nativism. I contrast these strivings with the ANC’s vision of constitution and belonging. I argue that the ANC’s vision was not decolonising because it was driven by the contradictory impulses of nativism and integration into the settler-constituted world. The outcome of this paradoxical vision is a “post-Apartheid” world in which black elites have been assimilated into a historically white world while the majority of inhabitants
continue to suffer non-belongingness, homelessness and ultimately, worldlessness. Seen in this way, therefore, Abahlali’s campaign is part of black people’s historical striving against the fact that settler colonisation shattered the world and rendered conquered people pariahs of ‘South Africa,’ the settler-constituted world. I will shortly explain my use of the concept of ‘world’. For now, I would like to indicate that phenomenology from an African perspective apprehends the world in a triadic manner comprised of spiritual, social and material realms. One of the original claims of this dissertation is the contention that fidelity to the decolonisation exigency of Mayibuye iAfrika (‘return Africa’/‘re-member Africa’/‘resurrect Africa’) would involve (re)making the world on all these three realms.

This dissertation is divided into two Parts. In Part I, I analyse dominant black visions of constitution and belonging with the aim of showing that these visions are elitist visions that ultimately perpetuate a world of apartness. My main objective in Part II is to put forward what I consider to be black counter-hegemonic visions of constitution and belonging with the aim of showing that these visions seek to remember the world to ensure plural co-existence. Part I focuses on the following three aspects. First, I analyse the ANC’s vision through the lens of W.E.B. Du Bois’s concept of double consciousness read together with Sigmund Freud’s explication of melancholia. Second, I show that ANC leaders’ ambivalence (an outcome of double consciousness and melancholia) vis-à-vis the settler-constituted world accounts for their inability and/or unwillingness to stay faithful to what I show to be the original exigency of the anti-colonial struggle in South Africa, namely, the restoration, (re)constitution and re-membering of the shattered worlds of historically conquered people (the Mayibuye iAfrika exigency). Finally, I locate the ANC’s vision in Du Bois’s seminal manifesto of constitution and belonging. I contend that Du Bois’s very influential manifesto leads to elitist nationalism, a dearth of national consciousness, and it eventually perpetuates the homelessness and worldlessness of non-elite people.

My main contribution in Part II is also three-fold. First, I dip into the archive of ‘South African’ counter-hegemonic visions to put forward Es’kia Mphahlele (born: 1919), Steve Biko (born: 1946) and Abahlali’s (founded: 2005) inter-connected praxes of constitution and belonging. I have selected these visions because they all seek to overcome the problematics of double consciousness and melancholia. I will show that these visions are united in their insistence that the route(s) towards constitution-making/homemaking is via the psychic and spiritual homecoming(s) of historically conquered people. Second, I show that these decolonising visions are aimed at de-constituting and (re)constituting the world at spiritual, social and material levels - the three realms of African mode of belonging in the world. The most important insight here is that these interconnected praxes demonstrate that the Mayibuye/re-membering exigency is not an abstract imperative. Rather, this historical desideratum is a concrete and indispensable decolonisation imperative because it is directed towards a holistic re-membering and (re)making of the world. The Mayibuye/re-membering exigency is a call to
(re)constitute the spiritual world devastated by the irruption of the world of colonisers leading to cosmic disharmony, psychic dislocation and cultural subjugation; the social world historically shaped by anti-black racism and other institutionalised forms of discrimination; and the material world marked by economic inequality, landlessness and homelessness. Finally, I demonstrate that Mphahlele, Biko and Abahlali’s interconnected politics of Afrikan humanness, Black Consciousness and Abahlalism propose that a post-colonial constitution (‘foundational law’ in this case) should be undergirded by the philosophy of African humanness and that it is through African humanness that the collective task of ceaselessly (re)creating and re-membering the world could take place.

This study diverts from two sets of analyses that have come to dominate interpretations of post-1994 social movement struggles in South Africa. One set of analyses regards perennial protests of movements of impoverished people as revolts against economic neoliberalism and for a decommodified or socialist society (see in general, Zuern, 2011; Dwyer & Zeilig, 2012). A more recent set of analyses adopts a wider lens and reads these struggles as resistance against a dearth of democracy and for participatory forms of democracy (see in general, Hart, 2013). As I have already hinted above, this dissertation proposes to read post-1994 struggles of many, not all, social movements of impoverished people as historically-based strivings for constitution and belonging in the terms I have set out above.

My diversion with the abovementioned lines of enquires is, however, not a wholesale repudiation of them. I merely wish to deepen these analytical frameworks. As I have outlined above, the constantly burgeoning literature on post-1994 social movement struggles focus mainly on economic and/or democratic causes. This focus is not inappropriate. Indeed, protests by impoverished people’s movements and communities have become an ubiquitous feature of the political landscape in South Africa. Protestors engage in disruptive, and often violent, marches and forms of direct action demanding inclusion in decision-making processes and basic services such as water, electricity, health care and housing. These organisations and disparate communities stage over 2 000 protests annually— one of the highest rates of social protests in the world (Alexander et al.: 2015: 5).

At one level, it is correct to frame these protests as acts of resistance against the state’s overwhelmingly neo-liberal macro-economic framework. The implementation of this framework has aggravated the socio-economic legacy of Apartheid, resulting in massive social dislocation. A few statistics will suffice to make the point. A 2015 report by the Statistician-General showed that 55,5 percent of South Africans lived below the poverty line, while one in four people lived with chronic hunger (Frye, 2017: n.p.). The National Planning Commission (2011: n.p.) has also reported that income inequality remains endemic with the richest 20 percent of the population earning approximately 70 percent of the Gross Domestic Product. A poverty trends report by the Statistician-General also underscored high levels of racial inequality. This report indicated that in 2015 an average annual household income for a household
headed by a white person was five times more than that of a household headed by a black person (Frye, 2017: n.p).

The second aspect of the political context that provokes social protests is the lack of democracy at the local government level. In order to enhance participatory governance at local government level, the Local Government: Municipal Structures Act of 1998 makes provision for the establishment of ward committees in metropolitan and local councils. The main functions of ward committees are to act as the interface between the community and the municipality, to provide advice to the councillor, and to make recommendations on any aspect of their ward. The way the system of local government works in practice hollows out participatory democracy. Firstly, various studies have found that the agendas of ward committees are ‘colonised’ and ‘hijacked’ by political parties and intra-party factions (see in general, Piper and Deacon, 2008; Hicks and Buccus, 2007). Secondly, municipalities are not meaningfully engaging local communities when drafting medium- and long-term development plans, annual budgets and other priorities of municipalities (Mohamed, 2006: 43). The sphere of local government is thus characterised by non-responsiveness and the systemic marginalisation of the voices of the most impoverished sector of the society. Community protests and social movement-driven activities are thus impelled by impoverished people’s lived experiences of impoverishment, abandonment, and invisibility. Impoverished black people thus continue to be assailed by feelings of being pariahs subjected to, “permanent physical exclusion from society and its cities from the discussions that are taking place in society” (Zikode & Nsibande, 2010: n.p.).

Abahlali has distinguished itself from other movements and organisations by declaring that although their short-to-medium term demands are for land, housing, and the upgrading of shack settlements; their long-term vision is that of a world, “where everyone counts” (Zikode, 2012: n.p.). Abahlali’s vision of constitution and belonging is thus in stark contrast to that of most impoverished people’s organisations. Two most important elements distinguish Abahlali from the latter organisations: (i) these organisations accept the discourse of post-Apartheid, and (ii) they thus mobilise their “poor” subjectivity (their being ‘the poor of the poorest’ in popular lexicon) to demand basic services and integration into the “new” South Africa. The reason why the state sought to suppress and destroy Abahlali is that this movement’s praxis, as we shall shortly see, is predicted on a rejection of the discourses of “new” South Africa and “post-Apartheid”. This dissertation thus reads Abahlali’s strivings as strivings motivated by the idea that a post-Apartheid world is yet to come.

At its boldest, my argument is that Abahlali and its allies are engaged in a struggle to realise the decolonisation imperative of Mayibuye iAfrika - the imperative to ‘resurrect’, ‘restore,’ ‘return,’ remember the world. In this regard, I will show that Abahlali is part of a long lineage of counter-hegemonic visions of constitution and belonging stretching back to the chiefs and kings who first
resisted the colonial challenge in the eighteenth and nineteenth century and all the way to the Pan-Africanist Congress of Azania in the 1950s, the Black Consciousness Movement of the late 1960s and 1970s and “People’s Power” community organisations of the mid-1980s. I argue that these disparate movements and traditions can be brought under the banner of decolonisation because they did not struggle for desegregation, democratisation and thus the transformation of the settler-constituted world. Rather, they desired to end the settler-constituted world and to re-member their subjugated world(s).

The Historical Imperative to Re-member the World

Was my freedom not given to me then in order to build the world of the You?

[Frantz Fanon, [1952] 2008]

To re-emphasise, however, in my reading, these movements’ politics of homemaking and belonging jettisoned politics of nativism. This is what made their strivings decolonisation as opposed to simply being anti-colonial. I will explain the distinction between these two impulses in Part I. For now, it suffices to say that the visions that I have brought together in Part II are decolonising contra perpetual anti-colonial because they understand the imperative of ‘returning Africa’ to mean the twin imperative of (re)forging a syncretic national consciousness and of re-membering the African world(s) that is part of the world with other worlds. This unwieldy phrasing is my attempt at conveying my main thesis. The thesis defended in this dissertation is that ongoing struggles of Abahlali and its allies respond to the fact that post-1994 constitutional re-arrangements did not rise to the decolonising challenge of re-membering the triadic world shattered by settler colonisation. Understood in this way, Abahlali’s struggle is a decolonising struggle aimed at re-membering and (re)constituting the world.

The thesis advanced in this dissertation is two-fold. The first aspect of my main thesis (chapters 1-2) is the argument that settler constitution-making attempted to shatter the socio-cultural worlds of conquered people; hence *ilizwe lile!* (‘the land is dead!’) lamented conquered people in the nineteenth century (Jordan, 1980: 102; Mostert, 1992: 854). The ‘land was dead’ in the sense that conquest and various other processes aimed at securing the being-belonging and being-becoming of settlers dismembered the onto-triadic community comprised of the living, the yet-to-be-born and the living dead/continuing persons. Indigenous people thus experienced settler constitution-making as metaphysically and existentially dislocating.

This dissertation puts forward the argument that the most devastating and enduring consequences of colonisation and settler constitution-making are cosmic dislocation and thus worldlessness. To miss this insight - as critiques inspired by Marxist, neo-Marxist, liberal and critical race theory do - is to be an
unwitting accomplice to the continuation of the settler-constituted world as well as the subjugation of African lifeways and their worlds. The first aspect of my two-fold thesis thus implies the contention that post-1994 constitutional re-arrangements did not rise to the historical imperative of “resurrecting” the world(s). In this regard, I will show that the shattering of the world(s) of conquered people led to creation of an elite stratum of colonised people.¹ These elites belonged neither to the hegemonic world of colonists nor to that of colonised people. The in-between positionality of these elites saddled them with double consciousness and melancholia. I argue that these conditions together with the resultant state of ambivalence account for these leaders’ failure and/or unwillingness to propose decolonising visions aimed at imploding the extant world and re-membering the world(s) of conquered people. Chapter 1 is devoted to an exposition of the history of ‘de-worlding’ and to a contextual explication of the concepts of liminality, double consciousness, melancholia and ambivalence. Chapter 2 applies these concepts to an exploration of dominant forms of black strivings for constitution and belonging.

Having shown that the latter strivings perpetuate worldlessness, the second aspect of my main thesis (chapters 3-5) develops the argument that decolonising praxes of constitution-making seek to (re)constitute and re-member the world to enable historically conquered people to once again be part of the world with other worlds. A close reading of the praxes of Es’kia Mphahlele, Steve Biko and Abahlali serves to confirm this point. I contend that nativism is inimical to decolonising praxes because these praxes are based on the philosophy of Ubuntu/African humanness. I will demonstrate that this philosophy prescribes forms of being-belonging, being-becoming and constitution-making that are based on what Édouard Glissant (1999: 120) refers to as ‘poetics of the diverse’ and ‘poetics of relation’.

Understood in this way, I argue that the Mayibuye imperative is the imperative to re-member worlds that were destroyed by European conquest in order for historically conquered people to regain world belongingness. This interpretation of reclamation of the world is inspired by Jean-Luc Nancy’s following description of ‘a world’ and ‘the world’: “a world is a multiplicity of worlds, the world is a multiplicity of worlds” (Nancy, 2007: 109).

The praxes of redemptive returns, constitution-making and belonging that I promote here are thus contrary to the ones propagated by ‘return to Africa’ movements of the nineteenth century (Martin Delany, Edward Blyden, Alexander Crummel) and by Garviyism, the early Négritude movement and dominant forms of Pan-Africanism in Africa in the twentieth century. The latter visions insist that the route towards re-existence, rootedness and reclamation of the world is through “de-linking” from the hegemonic Euro-American world and (re)establishing an own autonomous world (‘The Indigenous World’/‘the Black World’/‘The Pan-African World’). Using the lens of African humanness, I contend

¹ The following definition of ‘elites’ suffices for the purpose of this introductory chapter: “a stratum of the population which, for whatever reason, can claim a position of superiority and hence a corresponding measure of influence over the fate of the community” (Nadel cited in Crowder, 1968: 384).
that dominant black visions of constitution-making and belonging perpetuate death of the world. More importantly, I argue that these visions ultimately reprise colonialist discourse, the very source of death of the world.

Put inelegantly, my argument is that dominant black visions of constitution and belonging are ultimately un-African. In chapter 2, I will mobilise studies that demonstrate that the African world is ‘traditionally’ a multiplicity of worlds that is part of the world because it assimilates edifying elements from other worlds. For example, Jean Comaroff and John Comaroff’s studies of the history of the colonisation of the Southern Tswanas are very useful for this argument. These studies show that evangelists and missionaries were the ones who sought to convert the acquisitive, eclectic and open world of the Tswanas into a self-contained world that is radically different to the (superior) world of Europeans (Comaroff and Comaroff, 1991: 246). This insight and those of Mogobe Ramose (2007) and Jean-Loup Amselle (1998) show that the African world and African identity were never based on notions of boundedness, purity and self-segregation. Based on these insights, I posit that it is not staging a “return” if such a gesture purports to return to a bounded up and perpetually antagonistic world vis-à-vis other worlds and the world. Such a “return” perpetuates the worldlessness of historically displaced and conquered people. On this score, I agree with critiques advanced by V.Y. Mudimbe (1988, 1994), Anthony Appiah (1992) and Achille Mbembe (2002). Where I part company with these post-structuralist critics is when they reject the idea and the possibility of the existence of the African world(s). If we accept the notion that the world is made up of various worlds, it follows that we must also accept the idea that a person can only be part of the world from their own world. I will thus contend that critics who dismiss movements for the renascence and re-membering of the world(s) of Africans consolidate the colonialist project of rendering Africans worldless and homeless. Wole Soyinka summarises this point very well:

Man exists….in a comprehensive world of myth, history and mores; in such a total context the African world, like any other ‘world’ is unique. It possesses, however, in common with other cultures, the virtues of complementarity. To ignore this simple route to a common humanity and pursue the alternative route of negation is, for whatever reason, an attempt to perpetuate the external subjugation of the black continent (Soyinka, 1990: xii. Emphasis mine).

Following this line of argument, I contend that quests for ‘re-worlding’ are valid decolonisation quests, and accordingly that post-1994 struggles of Abahlali are historical strivings for the (re)constituting of home and thus the world. For a historically conquered people, the quest for a home is not simply a quest to recover the home that was destroyed by colonisation. Rather, home is a place where such people can (re)create spaces of homelessness (Freud’s heimlich) and rootedness to be able to chart routes towards world belonging. The following observation by Njabulo Ndebele gives a contextual explanation to this historical yearning for a home and a world: “there must be relatively few South Africans who can still
point to a home that they associate with rootedness” (Ndebele, 1996: 28). Ndebele made this observation upon returning to South Africa after twenty years in exile. He mourned the fact that he could not show his children the house he grew up in. The Apartheid government had demolished his parent’s township after it rezoned their area into an exclusively Coloured/“mixed race” people’s area. Ndebele and his children’s exilic and worldless condition thus persisted. As Ndebele notes above, uprooting, mass removals and de-homing were pervasive conditions of black people under colonialism and Apartheid. Today, many impoverished black people are still land hungry and homeless. They live under conditions of material and existential insecurity in “squatter camps” with the threat of violent evictions and uprooting constantly hanging over them (see in general, Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions, 2008). Therefore, the quest for home is an unyielding yearning because home for historically scattered and displaced peoples is, “(a) place(s), (a) space(s), feeling(s), practices, and/or an active state of being in the world” (Mallet, cited in Femke, 2010: 27). To have a home is thus to gain a sense of worldliness. In the preface to Belonging: A Culture of Place, bell hooks explains this longing via this personal reflection: “like many of my contemporaries, I have yearned to find a place in this world, to have a sense of homecoming, a sense of being wedded to a place....” (hooks, 2000: 2).

However, does the search for home and for rootedness still make sense in today’s globalised world? Lewis Gordon (2000b: 379) is of the opinion that the search for ‘home’ in a world of multicultural and multifaceted belongings is ultimately a ‘hopeless ideal’. Writing in Perils of Belonging, Peter Geschiere (2009: ix) warns that struggles for belonging are dangerous nativist projects because they are impelled by discriminatory ideas about who is a ‘native’ and who is a ‘non-native’. Despite these cautions, yearnings for belonging and longings for home continue to predominate the consciousness and struggles of descendants of the transatlantic slave trade, European conquest, of economic and political refugees and of millions of impoverished people who do not have secure tenure in the countries of their birth. As Ndebele and hooks intimate above, for these people having a home is a prerequisite for regaining rootedness and for reclaiming world belongingness.

In addition to these historical reasons, quests for homemaking are fundamental for Abahlali and other movements of historically marginalised people because home is a space where one belongs because one is able to actively participate in its never-ending construction. In a comprehensive study of belonging and politics of belonging, Nira Yuval-Davis (2012: 201) thus confirms that belonging extends beyond state citizenship to encompass participatory dimensions of membership in political communities. Moreover, as we will see in Part II, Mphahlele, Biko and Abahlali’s praxes of belonging demonstrate that quests for constitution and belonging do not necessarily have to lead to (unconscious) desires to assimilate into the dominant world or to succumb to fixed and dominant ideas about national identity. The motivation behind beginning and ending this dissertation with a focus on Abahlali is thus
to illustrate that struggles for constitution and belonging are precisely struggles for polyvocal, syncretic, multi-sector and ceaseless (re)constitution of home and world.

**Being Liminal in the “new” South Africa: Striving against UnFreedom**

Another reason I have, therefore, opened this dissertation with the vignette above is to highlight contradictions between elite and non-elite conceptions of and horizons of emancipation and constitution. On the one hand, post-1994 perpetual protests by impoverished black people are indexical of the notion that the formal end of Apartheid did not herald the era of emancipation, homecoming and inclusive nationhood for the majority of black South Africans. On the other hand, the state regards these challenges as treacherous because it deems them to be unwarranted and threatening the stability of the “new” polity. More pertinently, as the Provincial Minister suggests above (that the settlement has been liberated after the violent eviction of *Abahlali*), ruling elites consider the business of liberation and of constitution-making to be the exclusive purview of the state. In chapter 2, I will trace this elitist and salvationist posture to the Du Boisian manifesto of constitution and belonging.

The Provincial Minister’s elitist stance is rooted in ruling party officials and other elites’ determination that 1994 represents freedom-time and thus the culmination of black strivings for liberation, constitution and belonging. *Abahlali* retort that the strivings of black people continue, and must continue, because liberatory processes of re-membering (*Mayibuye*), nation-becoming and transition towards a humane polity have, at best, stalled. Accordingly, *Abahlali* have termed the current political and constitutional dispensation a dispensation of “UnFreedom” (*Abahlali*, 2006b: n.p.). For *Abahlali*, UnFreedom is a liminal space and time between Apartheid and post-Apartheid. From this perspective, historically colonised people have undergone only two stages of *rites de passage* as classically elaborated by Arnold van Gennep: detachment (from settler domination and formal Apartheid) and then marginality (*liminen*) but are yet to reach the third stage of transition leading to rebirth (Turner, 1979: 235-236). If the first two central concepts of this dissertation are those of world/worldlessness and home/homelessness, the third pivotal concept is that of liminality.

My contention that post-1994 black strivings for constitution-making/homemaking are dynamic strivings for re-membering, homecoming and worldliness is enabled by a reading that transcends the embrace of liminal positionality found in some post-modernist and/or post-colonial critiques. For instance, Stewart Motha (2012: 146) affirms the liminal space for being, “a space of traversal where the past is reinscribed and questioned thus opening the possibility of reinventing both the present and the future”. Motha suggests that it is in this space of in-betweenness where possibilities for post-Apartheid being-becoming and being-belonging can take place. Motha’s affirmation of the interstitial accords with
Homi Bhabha’s (2005: 54) acclamation of the space between the worlds and cultures of colonisers and the colonised. For Bhabha, this ‘Third Space of enunciation’ is a transformative space because it opens up possibilities for deconstructing fixed identities created and imposed by colonialist discourse. In this reading, homelessness positionality is a condition of possibility for subversive “becoming otherwise” (Motha, 2010: 287). Similarly, Edgar Pieterse and Frank Meintjes (2004: 3) hail interstitial identities and social processes for being harbingers of post-Apartheid living (see also in general, Viljoen & van der Merwe (eds.), 2007; Motha & van Marle, 2013). Lastly, writing in the context of the USA, Fred Moten (2013: 756) posits that blackness is a ‘fugitivity’ that refuses that which has been refused, namely, assimilation into hegemonic society. This, suggests Moten, is what makes blackness revolutionary. Abdul JanMohamed (1992: 218) also asserts that border-living or ‘homelessness-as-home’ is a fecund space for black intellectuals to be in because this where counter-hegemonic visions of constitution and belonging can emerge from.

This dissertation employs the concept of liminality in its classical anthropological sense. From this perspective, liminality is a debilitating state that merits only disavowal and resistance. As JanMohamed already pointed out in Manichean Aesthetics (1983: 254), this is because liminality is a state of involuntary marginality imposed by the Manicheanism of Apartheid. Expounding on the Invention of Africa (1988), Mudimbe also explains that the reason why the history of colonialism continues to exercise power over Africa is not only that colonialism produced Africa as a ‘Dark Continent’ - an unfathomable, self-contained, detached and discrete world. The enduring power of colonialism is that colonialism also transformed this continent into a marginal entity; an intermediate space between underdevelopment and development (represented by western modernity). More pertinently, the ‘colonising structure’ had the effect of producing marginal societies, cultures and human beings (Mudimbe, 1988: 4). In this understanding, ‘post-independence’ liminality is emblematic of coloniality/neo-colonialism.

It is on the basis of this understanding of the liminal being a debilitating and dehumanising space that Abahlali have organised to resist and overcome the dispensation of UnFreedom. Accordingly, every year on 27 April, South Africa’s official Freedom Day, Abahlali and its allies stage a “mourn UnFreedom Day” rally. Writing on the twentieth anniversary of the supposed denouement of Apartheid, Abahlali summed up their members’ experience of unFreedom, neo-Apartheid and the ongoing dehumanisation of impoverished black people as follows:

Twenty years after apartheid we live like pigs in the mud, our children die of diarrhoea, we are forced into transit camps at gun point, the police beat and shoot us in the streets and the assassins kill us with impunity. If we stand up and demand that our humanity is recognised we are removed from the housing list and placed on the death list (Abahlali, 2014: n.p. My emphasis).
From this vantage point, to be rendered liminal is to be rendered anachronistic and thus non-existing and discardable. In this regard, the president of Abahlali implores marginalised people to resist UnFreedom because people who find themselves in this space and time are treated as if they are “beneath the law” (Zikode, 2011: n.p.). Another leader of Abahlali adds that a person trapped in the liminal is a humanoid whose, “life and voice does not count” (Figlan, 2012: n.p.). From the vantage point of members of Abahlali, then, the “post-Apartheid” positionality of involuntary marginality - a state of being interned in the “dark corners of society” (Zikode, 2011, n.p.) - is a positionality of radical homelessness. By radical homelessness I am suggesting that liminal individuals and groups continue to be trapped in a zone that Fanon called a “zone of non-beings” (1963, 37-38). It is of no small significance that Abahlali consistently link the notion of having a voice with that of having a life. Abahlali is here bringing attention to the fact that marginalisation from structures of governance, exclusion from the realm of civil society and structural invisibility are markers of being thought of and treated as less than human. Abahlali, therefore, conclude that even under conditions of constitutionalism and the ubiquitous rights-talk, “…if you are poor and black you can be killed with impunity …” (Abahlali, 2016: n.p.).

Therefore, the stimuli behind Abahlali’s creation of autonomous and humane communities are their members’ lived experiences of persisting non-belongingness and thus dehumanisation. However, it is important to emphasise that denial of belongingness and even relegation to a ‘zone of non-beings’ never result in total exclusion or absolute invisibility. On this point, Mbembe (2004: 288) observes that the apartheid city could never totally exclude black people. In spite of, or because of, the totalising intentions of architects of colonial and apartheid cities, black people were always present on the margins and in shadows of the white city. Mbembe (ibid.) terms this situation a situation of ‘disjunctive inclusion’. This dissertation moves from the premise that in this current situation of UnFreedom, the majority of black people continue to be victims of disjunctive inclusion. Indeed, the endless mushrooming of “squatter camps,” “slums” and shantytowns on the edges and borders of cities is one obvious manifestation of disjunctive inclusion into the ‘new world’. The situation of a majority of black people is thus one of enervating spatial, temporal, and perhaps, ontological liminality. This dissertation employs the notions of ‘exile’ and ‘pariahdom’ to capture this positionality and to move away from Mbembe’s celebration of ‘disjunctive inclusion’ and of “underworld” living. I will shortly expound upon my usages of notions of ‘exile’ and ‘pariahdom’. For now, I want to postulate that disjunctively

2 Strictures of space prevent me from discussing Abahlali’s description of the various incidents that led them to draw this conclusion. Abahlali described their members’ lived experiences of being regarded as having ungrievable lives in a 2016 press statement entitled “The struggle for human dignity continues in the shadow of death”. This press statement together with Abahlali’s constant refrain that impoverished black people “do not count” accords with Judith Butler’s description of an ungrievable life. Butler describes such a life as one, “…that cannot be mourned because it has never lived, that is, it has never counted as a life at all” (Butler, 2015: n.p.).
included persons continue to experience the South African world as an uncanny world, a world of homelessness, rootlessness and unhomeliness. However, and this is very important, just as I posit that it is a mistake to celebrate the liminal positionality of shack-dwellers, backyard dwellers and people who live in the shadows of central business districts. I also contend that it is a fundamental misreading of Abahlali’s mission to conclude that Abahlali’s struggle against disjunctive inclusion is aimed at achieving full inclusion or integration into the dominant South African world. Rather, as I have already proposed, Abahlali’s struggle should be understood as a decolonising struggle because it seeks to deconstitute the extant world of apartness and to (re)constitute an inclusive world based on African humanness. This is the fullest import of the epigraph at the head of this chapter.

Overview of Chapters and Objectives of the Study

This dissertation seeks to achieve four objectives:

(i) To propose an analysis that locates post-1994 struggles of Abahlali and certain other black social movements in the longue durée of settler colonisation and ‘de-worlding’;

(ii) To put suggest a decolonising framework for constitution and belonging that seeks to realise a post-segregationist polity, a creolising national consciousness and a holistic, continual (re)constitution of the world;

(iii) To explore the constitutional implications of the decolonisation injunction to ‘return’ and re-member the land/world (the Mayibuye exigency); and

(iv) To apply the interconnected concepts of liminality, double consciousness, racial melancholia and ambivalence to the character and motivations of prospective constitution-makers.

Firstly, I aim to show that the struggles of Abahlali and its allies should be understood as responses to the fact that settler colonisation presaged the severance of the cosmic connection between the land, non-human beings and the onto-triadic community. Settler constitution making, therefore, resulted in ‘death of the land’ (ilizwe lifile). As I will explain further on in the next chapter, I adopt a phenomenological approach from an African perspective to advance the thesis that ‘death of land’ signified death of the triadic world comprised of the spiritual, social and material realms. In this new anti-black world, conquered people found themselves not only interpellated as sub-humans with ungrievable lives; more profoundly, they found themselves worldless. Therefore, I aim to show that the gravest legacy of settler constitution-making is not simply ‘a world cut into two’, as Fanon (1963) 37-38 once proposed. Rather, the most insidious outcome of settler colonisation is a situation of no-world. To invoke Jean-Luc Nancy’s declamation in another context (2000: xiii), this is because the settler colonial world, “is a world that does not even manage to constitute a world; it is world lacking in world, and lacking in the
meaning of world”. The world here understood as, initially, the in-between space that arises whenever human beings are in each other’s presence:

Wherever human beings come together – be it in private or socially, be it in public or politically – a space is generated that simultaneously gathers them into it and separates them from one another…Wherever people come together, the world thrusts itself between them, and it is in this in-between space that all human affairs are conducted (Arendt, 2006; 106).

However, from an African phenomenological perspective being in the world takes place on the three planes I mentioned above. This dissertation warns that the pitfall of focusing only on the social world as per Arendt’s useful definition above is that it might lead to a situation where anti-black racism and other forms of discrimination have been attenuated but the spiritual world continues to be shattered and the material world remains one structured by economic inequalities. To be sure, the spiritual world takes primacy over the social world in the African worldview. This is because this world, “consists of the Supreme Being, the deities or divinities, ancestors, various spirit powers, the human being and nature” (Dovlo, 2009: 72). Conquest, dispossession, and the irruption of western modernity shattered this world. The project of decolonisation is thus incomplete until the spiritual world has been sutured. I will formulate this case in Part I (chapters 1 and 2).

The three interrelated visions of constitution and belonging that I put forward in Part II aim at the holistic (re)making of the world because they attend to all these realms of African belonging in the world. This is the second objective of the study. The first chapter of Part II (chapter 3) focuses on what Mphahlele calls ‘first exile’ (psychic and spiritual alienation) and his proposal that the premier decolonisation task is the dual task of attaining spiritual liberation and (re)suturing the spiritual world. Overcoming ‘first exile’ leads to spiritual independence and enables a person to declare that they know what they are, namely, an umuntu (a human being) with cosmic belongingness. Mphahlele, however, recognised that this is not the end of the matter. He understood that in the inter-subjective social world, the anti-black racist will still treat a historically colonised person as less than human being and that institutionalised racism will still continue to be a problem. Mphahlele thus borrowed Black Consciousness tactics to further his African humanness strategy. Turning to the social world, I will focus on Biko’s proposal for overcoming institutionalised racism, internalised inferiority, and what he calls the ‘totality of the white power structure’ in the second chapter of Part II (chapter 4). Biko argued that Black Consciousness tactics will lead to a more Ubuntu-centered society. Finally, both Mphahlele and Biko discerned that re-membering the spiritual world and (re)making the social world count for nothing if the material conditions of the majority of citizens remain the same. In the final chapter (chapter 5), I will thus put forward Abahlali’s vision for the radical transformation of the material world in a quest for a world ‘where everyone counts,’ a humane world.
Flowing from the above, my third objective is to explore the constitutional implications of “death of the land” and of re-membering/‘resurrecting’ the land/world. In this respect, Part I is devoted to showing that settler constitution-making and various other processes aimed at securing the being-becoming and being-belonging of settlers ‘killed the land’ in the sense of dismembering the triadic world and interrupting the being-becoming of conquered people. In Part II, I then put forward a potential framework for (re)constituting the land/world. This Part of this dissertation proposes that decolonisation - and thus the re-membering of own worlds as route towards returning to the world (Mayibuye) - would, in the first place, mean engaging in all-inclusive constitution-making processes aimed at producing a constitution (“foundational law”) that would be constituting in the sense of (i) re-membering the triadic world, (ii) forging a home for everyone, and (iii) laying a framework for world belongingness.

Such a constitution would be emancipatory to the extent that it lays down a framework for terminating what I consider the original sin in the founding of South Africa, namely full belonging for the minority of citizens and disjunctive inclusions for the majority of the population. Such a constitution would be liberatory if it removes obstacles that prevent diverse sections of society from contributing to never-ending processes of homemaking and world-creation. I aim to show that in this way a post-colonial constitution (‘foundational law’) would be facilitative of the project of returning to and returning the world because the world is, “that in which there is room for everyone: but a genuine place, one in which things can genuinely take place…(Nancy, 2007: 42. Original emphasis). As Glissant, the preeminent theorist of creolisation, might put it, such a constitution would thus be licencing world-creation and inclusive belongingness in the world because it would be based on ‘poetics of the diverse’ and ‘poetics of relation’. The concept of creolisation is thus the fourth significant concept in this dissertation (along with the concepts of world/worldlessness, home/homelessness and liminality). I will show that decolonising visions of constitution and belonging reject autochthony and nativism in favour of collective processes of forging a creolising national consciousness, homemaking and world-creation. My use of this concept follows the following description of processes of creolisation proposed by Jane Gordon: “…in political terms, we could understand creolisation as the generalising of a shared, public will forged by individuals as they articulate what they seek in and through collectives that comprise a polity…” (J. Gordon, 2014: 4).

The fourth objective of this dissertation is to insert the interconnected concepts of liminality, double consciousness, racial melancholia and ambivalence in analyses that investigate the character and motivations of prospective constitution-makers. The aim here is to move away from analyses that focus on the allege betrayal committed by post-colonial leaders and those that put too much emphasis on the power wielded by ex-colonising countries and on structural factors thus denying the agency of these leaders. In this regard, chapters 1 and 2 develop the argument that an overwhelming reason why ANC
leaders ushered in a neo-colonial world is because these elites did not reckon productively with their condition of double consciousness and melancholia. More pertinently, I pin point this failure as well as the debilitating state of ambivalence as the main causes of these elites’ disinclination to put forward decolonisation visions. In chapters 3 and 4, I put forward Mphahlele and Biko’s voyages of disalienation and proposals for exiting liminal worlds in order to be able to (re)make the world.

Mphahlele and Biko’s proposals are germane to addressing what I reckon to be the premier constitutional paradox for historically colonised people. The enigma of homemaking/constitution-making for victims of settler colonisation is that in order to (re)constitute home they ought to undergo processes of individual and collective rebirth themselves. The imperative for psychic (re)constitution and spiritual renewal is especially acute for the elite stratum of the historically colonised group. As we shall see in Part I, the colonised elites are often historical beneficiaries of liminal inclusion into the settler-constituted world. The paradoxical concept of ‘liminal inclusion’ is my attempt to account for the in-between status of this group vis-à-vis the rest of the conquered people. Colonial authorities often granted “exempted natives” status to these elites thus enabling them to claim some rights that were reserved for colonists. This positionality saddled these elites with an enervating sense of ambivalence with regards to the hegemonic world and its discourses. Thus rather than mourning the loss of their land/world and seeking to re-member them, these elites became preoccupied with their condition of social liminality. When colonial governments reneged on assimilation promises they made to these elites, these elites became riddled with racial melancholia. My discussion of the consequences of this condition on quests for constitution and belonging will rely on Freud’s classic distinction between mourning and melancholia together with Fanon’s discussion of the ‘abandonment neurosis’ that assails individuals who grew up thinking that they are of the white world. I aim to contrast the latter politics of melancholia with Mphahlele, Biko and Abahlali’s decolonising politics of mourning.

One of the central claims of this dissertation is that the melancholic leader’s failure to overcome his or her racial melancholia and state of double consciousness results in such a putative homemaker unwilling or unable to propose terms of homemaking that would enable everyone to acquire a sense of material and affective belongingness in the “post-colonial” polity. Having shown that most anti-colonial elites found themselves imprisoned in a liminal zone (chapter 1), I will then in chapter 2 attempt a re-reading of the personal histories of Pan-African and Négritude leaders to show that the failure or unwillingness on the part of these leaders to work towards their own psychic and spiritual (re)constitution accounts for their ultimately neo-colonial visions. The suggestion here is that these leaders could not make home because they were not home themselves. In chapters 3 and 4, I show that Mphahlele and Biko’s decolonising and post-segregationist visions were grounded on their personal odysseys of disalienation and homecoming. To be sure, this twofold movement of overcoming liminal living and ‘returning’ to,
actual or invented, home-culture underlines all movements of African rebirth and reclamation of worldly belonging. It is in this context that Amilcar Cabral (1973: 45-47), the venerated liberation leader of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde Islands, legendarily propagated for a “return to the source;” a return that ‘re-Africanises’ the alienated leader. This message can also be detected in what I read as Kenyan writer Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o’s self-explanatory tetralogy on the theme of Mayibuye: Decolonising the Mind (1986), Moving the Centre (1993), Re-membering Africa (2009), and finally, Globalecistics (2012).

One of the leitmotifs of this dissertation is thus the theme of exile: psychic and spiritual exile, physical exile from homeland, cultural exile from ‘traditional’ home-culture and exile from the world. I have thus formulated a provisional typology to analyse the options available to exiled leaders and activists. To realise the fourth objective of exploring the impact of the exilic condition of elites on quests for constitution-making, I have formulated the following provisional typology of the options available to exiled activists. I propose that the option(s) that an exiled activist chooses will, to a large extent, determine whether they formulate a vision that results in a neo-colonial world of apartness or a vision that leads to a humane and all-inclusive post-apartheid world. Here is my provisional typology: To be functional in the world that has created him or her but rejects and excludes him or her, an exiled person is faced with at least three choices. First, he or she might seek further acculturation and assimilation. This will amount to a conscious effort to transform his or her condition from that of an exile to that of an immigrant. This would involve struggles for integration. Second, he or she could inhabit the slaver/settler-created house but refuse self-renunciation and assimilation. This possibility would involve performing acts of appearances and disappearances with the view of arrogating the fruits of the master’s house whilst staying enduringly in its shadows. To adopt the second possibility is to embrace the exilic condition and transform it to that of fugitivity. The third possibility open to the subjugated pariah is to refuse the putative permanence of the coloniser’s or enslaver’s world, to reject its teleological economy, rather desire its death. This possibility would involve a quest to de-link from that world and not simply retreat to its holes, shadows and borders like a fugitive. Rather, it would often mean initially opting for physical exile, fashioning belonging elsewhere, and forging insurgent strategies. I will apply this tentative typology to try to make sense of how the main protagonists of each chapter of this study arrived at their respective visions of constitution and belonging; namely, Solomon Plaatje and other founders of the ANC (chapter 1), Du Bois and Thabo Mbeki (chapter 2), Mphahlele (chapter 3), Biko (chapter 4) and Abahlali (chapter 5).

Theoretical Approach

The unique theoretical contribution of this thesis is that it is centered around a fusion of two theoretical approaches, namely, a decolonisation approach to constitutionalism and a phenomenological approach from an African perspective. The fusion of these two theoretical approaches enables me to both
transcend dominant approaches to the problematic of constitution and belonging in postcolonies and to propose a framework for a holistic post-colonial constitution-making. I have constructed a decolonisation/decolonial approach to constitutionalism by drawing upon insights emanating from settler colonial studies, decolonial theories and most importantly, the living archive comprised of critiques and approaches advanced by African scholars and activists both during the eras of formal colonialism and today. Based on these resources, a decolonisation critique demonstrates that most processes of constitution-making and constitutional reforms actually facilitate the onset of neo-settler colonialism in the sense of perpetuating the institutional, socio-economic and cultural arrangements that were produced during settler colonisation. As I will demonstrate in Part I of this dissertation, in such a neo-colonial situation the majority of historically colonised people find themselves still cast as outcasts of the putatively new world. Phenomenologically-speaking, they, therefore, find themselves once again without a world.

Finally, a note on the title of the dissertation. I have already defined the concepts of disjunctive inclusion, constitution and belonging. I have taken the first part of the title, Mayibuye iAfrika, from a prevalent anti-colonial rallying cry and manifesto of African nationalists. As I have already mentioned, African nationalists suggested that the problem of colonialism and settler colonisation was ilizwe lifile (‘death of the land’) and that the solution was Mayibuye iAfrika (‘Return Africa’/‘Re-member Africa’/‘Resurrect Africa’). I have put this vision as a question in the title. I have done so for four reasons. Firstly, this dissertation is an enquiry into whether post-1994 constitutional re-arrangements have re-membered and returned the land/world. Secondly, I am contemplating whether the aforementioned decolonisation approach (as opposed to liberal, critical race theory, and neo-Marxist approaches) is a useful lens to analyse contemporary black strivings for constitution and belonging. Thirdly, I am questioning whether politics of irredentism and redemptive returns are truly post-Apartheid or whether they could lead to another (nativist) world of apartness. Finally, I am wondering whether there is a way of re-membering the worlds of historical colonised people and of revalorising “non-western” lifeworlds without withdrawing into an own world, but rather to reimagine the Mayibuye exigency as an imperative to ceaselessly forge a creolising national consciousness and of reclaiming cosmopolitan belonging in the world.

The theme of redemptive returns is thus another central leitmotif of this thesis: remembering, re-membering, returning, disalienation, re-suturing, remaking, homecoming and ‘re-worlding’. However, as might have become clear thus far, by ‘return’ I do not mean the process of going back to a pre-colonial world or culture. Rather, I mean collective processes aimed at re-membering and re-worlding in own terms to enable historically conquered peoples to reclaim belonging in the world. This reading is in line with Edward Said’s vision of Palestine as both, “…a place to return to and…. an entirely new place, a vision of partially restored past and of a novel future” (cited in JanMohamed, 1992: 226.
Decolonising visions of constitution and belonging would agree with this suggestion because they do not only deconstruct notions of autochthony and nativism. These visions also deconstruct ‘Africa’ and thus the idea that re-existence means regaining the “original African world”.

This deconstruction is based on an understanding that, firstly, there is no pure, detached, and untainted African world to go back to. Secondly, that “Africa” is an externally imposed appellation and perhaps identity. The African world and African identity that decolonising writers and activists propagate is thus the sort of identity that Stuart Hall stresses in his essay ‘who needs identity?’ (2000: 15). It is an identity sous rature - no longer adequate to reflect ‘Africa,’ and yet because it has not been superseded dialectically it is necessary for African-centered belonging-in-the-world. In this dissertation, Africa will thus appear under erasure. ‘Returning’ is thus also a deliberate catachresis.

**Overview of Thesis**

What are the constitutional implications of the decolonisation call, *Mayibuye iAfrika*? The thesis defended in this dissertation is that contemporary contestations around lack of constitution (etymologically, *constare* ‘to stand together,’ and historically, the imperative to constitute an inclusive polity) and belonging (affectively and materially) can only be resolved through constitutional re-arrangements aimed at re-constituting “South Africa” on the spiritual, social and material planes – the three realms of African belonging in the world. Such processes of (re)constituting and re-membering Africa (and thus fidelity to the decolonisation call *Mayibuye iAfrika*) are only possible when constitution-makers undergo their own processes of disalienation, rebirth, and of returning from liminal worlds. Such voyages would enable these elites to contribute to processes of “African renaissance,” creolising national consciousness, nation-becoming and towards pluriversality. My original contribution is to propose decolonising constitution-making/homemaking processes inspired by Es’kia Mphahlele, Steve Biko and *Abahlali baseMjondolo*. I argue that Mphahlele, Biko and *Abahlali*’s interconnected praxes of Afrikan Humanness, Black Consciousness and Abahlalism rise to the decolonising challenge because they, respectively, seek to re-member and (re)make the spiritual world, the social world and the material world and in that way terminate the pariahdom and worldlessness of historically conquered people.
PART 1

CHAPTER 1: THE ORIGINAL SIN IN THE CONSTITUTION OF SOUTH AFRICA
AND THE MELANCHOLIC CONSTITUTION VISIONS OF TRANSCULTURAL
LEADERS

Awaking on Friday morning, June 20, 1913, the South African native found himself, not actually a slave, but a pariah in the land of his birth [Sol Plaatje, 1916]

Introduction

Solomon Tsekisho Plaatje (1876-1932) opens the first chapter of his *Native Life in South Africa* (“Native Life”) (1916) with the above statement. Plaatje wrote most of the manuscript for *Native Life* in 1914 aboard a ship to England. Plaatje was travelling with a team of four other leaders of the South African National Native Congress (SANNC, later called the ANC). This deputation’s mission was to entreat the British government to nullify the South African Natives Land Act of 1913. Plaatje hoped to publish the book as soon as he landed in England and to use it as part of his deputation’s political campaign. In the prologue, Plaatje writes that his book aims to, “…describe the difficulties of the South African natives under a very strange law…” (2007: 15).

The implementation of this law had resulted in “natives” being, “…driven from home, their homes broken up, with no hopes of redress, on the mandate of a government to which they had loyally paid taxation without representation” (Plaatje, 2007: 17). Plaatje, therefore, inflected his narrative of de-homing and homelessness with the language of the American Revolution and of the discourse of natural rights emanating from the western world in order to situate the SANNC’s plea and the situation of African people within an international and transnational dialogue and locality. More specifically, Plaatje wished to show that the effects of the Natives Land Act were not simply to de-territorialise, dispossess, and scatter “natives” without redress. As we shall see, according to Plaatje, this “very strange law” had, more importantly, induced physical, social, psychic, and spiritual estrangement. As Plaatje apprehends it in the epigraph above, the outcome had been not so much slavery but a form of life perhaps much worse: a form of life of pariahdom and thus worldlessness in one’s own land.

The aim of this historical and theoretical chapter is to introduce and illuminate the interlinked themes and concepts I have just alluded to namely, “native” non-belonging, pariahdom, unhomeliness and worldlessness as constitutive of the South African polity. Furthermore, I wish to demonstrate that
disjunctive inclusions into the settler-constituted polity led to the emergence of transcultural leaders such as Plaatje. More pertinently, I will focus on these elites’ liminal status-induced conditions of racial melancholia and ambivalence to show how these conditions shaped their visions of constitution and belonging. I begin chapter 1 with a focus on Plaatje both because Plaatje was a co-founder of the ANC and most importantly, because, in my reading, he formulated an existential phenomenological critique of the Natives Land Act, a pivotal piece of legislation in the colonial project of de-worlding conquered people. Plaatje’s seminal critique sought to demonstrate that the founding of South Africa portended the shattering of the world on spiritual, social and material planes. Finally, the historical significance of Plaatje is that in Plaatje we see that the ANC’s vision of constitution and belonging was ultimately grounded on a demand for the integration of African elites into the extant polity and, unwittingly, the non-belongingness of “raw natives”.

1.1 Resisting Constitutionally-sanctioned Pariahdom and Worldlessness

1.1.1 Against ‘death of the land’

Uneven processes of conquest, land dispossession and colonisation in the territory that became South Africa gained momentum in 1657 when the Dutch government ratified a policy of permanent white settlement in the Cape (Mostert, 1992: 129). From 1779 to 1879, settler-invaders unleashed Wars of Dispossession against indigenous peoples that culminated in dispossession of lands; outlawing of pivotal African customs and traditions; fracturing of clans; and the general stupefaction of the worlds of indigenous peoples. Indigenous peoples regularly declaimed that “the land is dead” (ilizwe lifile) in response to these processes of colonisation and the irruption of the world of colonists (Jordan, 1980: 102; Mostert, 1992: 854). This cry sought to convey the sense that conquest and colonisation heralded dislocation on three planes of African belonging-in-the-world. First, conquered people experienced disharmony, racial subjugation and generalised mutual resentment in the social world. Second, they experienced land hunger, destitution and loss of an ancient relation with non-human beings in the material world. Most importantly, ilizwe lifile was a cry to the gods because disorientation on the material and social planes were felt to have negatively affected both the inner and the inter-subjective spiritual world. This is to say that the onto-triadic community constituted of the living, the yet-to-be-born (on whose behalf the living take care of the material world) and the living-dead (who assure stability and abundance on the material realm and perform ethical and juridical functions to ensure virtuous relations amongst the living) was thrown into disharmony. It is from this perspective that we should understand conquest, colonisation and settler homemaking as portending ‘the death of the land’ and thus worldlessness.³

³ The notion that conquest and colonisation represent “death of land” in this sense can also be discerned in the mythology of Aboriginal people of “Australia”. Aboriginal people explain that the period of conquest and
By 1879, settler-invaders had managed to subjugate all indigenous kingdoms. This final military conquest accelerated colonisation in the form of the political domination of black people, racial proletarianisation, and the irruption of western modernity. This new reality gave impetus to the rise of African proto-nationalism and for calls for the land to come back. Anti-colonial chiefs and kings encapsulated this call in the pervasive anti-colonial rallying cry, *Mayibuye iAfrika* (‘Africa come back’/‘Resurrect Africa’). In this opening chapter, I wish to explore the following question: What was different about the Native Land Act of 1913 that impelled Plaatje to posit that it was at this moment that indigenous people became pariahs in their own land? Furthermore, what exactly did Plaatje mean by pariahdom?

1.1.2 Against colonialist discourse

Plaatje’s *Native Life in South Africa* arose out of his investigative journalism into the impact of the Act on indigenous people. Having traced the history of the Act from its bill form to its final enactment, Plaatje then devoted chapter three of his book to a detailed analysis of the provisions of the Act. He concluded that the main objective of the Act was to, “prevent natives from ever rising above the position of servants to the whites” and that, ultimately, the promulgators of the Act sought, “the complete arrest of native progress” (2007: 57-58). In other words, Plaatje understood that the objectives of the Act were to entrench a Manichean world and to interrupt the being-becoming of indigenous peoples. According to Plaatje (2007: 58), the Act was a fulfilment of a “native prophesy” which predicted that the founding of the settler-created country will be followed a law that will criminalise and outlaw African humanity and belonging. In terms of this Act, Africans could only purchase land in Scheduled Native Areas. These Areas represented seven percent of the territory of South Africa. Furthermore, the state could forcibly move “native” families who were deemed surplus to labour requirements to these Areas. “Natives” who refused to become farm servants or were unwilling to move to these Areas (“concentration camps,” “human incubators”) became “fugitives,” “outcasts,” “unfortunate nomads,” “roving wanderers” and “exiles” (2007: 365, 349, 63-74, 104).

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irruption of the world of settler-invaders (‘Wild Time’) led to the death of “Wanggala Time” or Dream Time. David Samuel Trigger (1985: 132-132) explains that Wanggala Time, “contains within it the earliest of all known time, the creative time when the major features of the physical and social universe were shaped”. Wild Time then represents “death of the land” in the sense that it marks the end of Wanggala Time because, “it is the disruption of social and spiritual order” (Trigger, 1985: 133). In her magisterial account of the circumstances surrounding the killing of an Aboriginal man by a white police officer in 2004 in Palm Island, Northern Australia Chloe Hooper (2008: 56) located this killing in the history of on-going colonisation and pariah status of Aboriginal peoples in Australia. She thus refers to the inhabitants of Palm Island as, “refugees from Wild Time” (ibid.). She explains the manifestation of *ilizwe lifile* in the following terms: “We [European-Australians] knew that land was central to Aboriginal identity, that they saw themselves as inseparable from the land. No land meant no Dreaming, and no Dreaming meant no identity, no meaning. Wild Time was, among other things, a violent religious upheaval. It meant the smashing of those stained-glass windows in the night sky” (ibid.).
Plaatje’s chronicle of *Native Life in South Africa* aimed to demonstrate that the impacts of the Act went beyond land dispossession, mass scattering, and the socio-economic bondage of the conquered. Ultimately, the Act produced Native Life as a form of life that was, “deprived of the bare human rights of living…” (Plaatje, 2007: 31). From Plaatje’s perspective, therefore, the Act did not simply legalise a form of slavery; it produced something even more insidious: pariahdom. Plaatje’s description of the elements of pariahdom – servitude status, denationalisation, requirement to have a travel permit to be in South Africa, dislocation and incessant wandering and deprivation of basic human rights - is in line with Hannah Arendt’s much later use of the same concept. Arendt observed that German Jews in the 1930s, very much like South African “natives”, had, “neither rights nor a country, are citizens of no nation – *pariahs*” (Arendt, 2007: 75. Original emphasis). In Arendt’s existential phenomenological analysis, then, to be a pariah is to suffer worldlessness (Feldman, 2007: lxvi).

To the best of my knowledge, Plaatje was the first theorist to expound on constitutionally-sanctioned pariahdom. He did this in the context of demonstrating that the Natives Land Act was pivotal to the realisation of the objectives of the constitution that founded South Africa in 1910. Plaatje’s unique contribution was to recognise that the ultimate aim of settler colonialism, in contrast to colonialism without settlement, is to shatter the autochthonous worlds of the indigenes and in their wake to impose that of settler-invaders. Unlike the colonialist, the colonist leaves home with no intention of returning; he or she aims to create a new home elsewhere. In these uneven processes of very violent de-homing and homemaking, settler-invaders seek to displace, delegitimise, and suppress indigenous perceptions of the world, ways of knowing, relationship with the surrounding environment, and spiritual anchorages. In a phrase, the settler aims to efface “the native’s” way(s) of being in the world. More than that, if ‘the world’ is understood as, “…a form of relating or being-with…” settler colonisation and its Manichean logic produce “natives” with the intention of expelling them from the world of fellow humans (Cheah, 2008: 30). As Plaatje understood it, the Natives Land Act accelerated and perfected colonisation understood as dehumanisation and the production of “natives” as pariahs of the new world.

It is with this understanding in mind that Plaatje mobilised the lexicon of natural rights and the discourse of rationality to resist his people being cast as outcasts of the world. Plaatje was aware that at the heart of the aforementioned worlding and de-worlding processes was the irruption of western modernity into the world of the conquered. Western modernity is that long fifteenth century phenomenon whose condition of possibility is the violent expansion and universalisation of Europe and Eurocentrism; and at the other end, the dispossession, dislocation and, ultimately, ‘invisibilisation’ of the rest of the world. In the logic of western modernity, the colonised are ‘colonisable’ because they are not endowed with thinking capacity (Ramose, 2002: 526). This is because in this logic, unlike Descartes “non-westerner” does not think and, therefore, he or she is not (Maldonando-Torres, 2007: 252). This is also the condition of possibility for the expulsion of the colonised from the world of the Same.
According to colonialist discourse, “non-western” populations (“savages” and “primitives”) can only be in the world of humans as dispensable tools of western modernity. However, and more importantly, colonialist discourse is always suffused with an ethic of horizontal and vertical differentiation. This ethic holds that “non-western” peoples can never be as human as people of the west; and at the same time, following the logic of divide and rule, that some “non-western” people or “tribes” or castes are better than other “non-westerners,” and can become westernised through western tutelage (Acheraïou, 2008: 216-217). It is this latter group of “natives” that appropriate Christian mission philosophy and the values of the Enlightenment to resist invisibility and what I am here calling de-worlding discourses.

The point here is that more than just simply protesting the Act, Plaatje and members of his group – all Christians and western-educated – undertook their deputation to the Imperial government to resist their interpellation as sub-humans and outcasts of the world. Even more critically, they also sought to remind citizens of the Metropole that colonised worlds and colonising worlds are co-constitutive. Their reasoning for the latter proposition was that colonised peoples have contributed as much as any British subject to the making of Great Britain and the western world. Towards this end, very much like Caliban’s appropriation of Prospero’s language in William Shakespeare’s *The Tempest* (see L. Gordon, 2008: 3, and in general, Ashcroft, 2009), Plaatje appropriated the legal and literary language of the British to resist invisibility as well as constitutional attempts to produce him as a pariah. Plaatje was, therefore, aware that his narrative of resistance had to extend beyond simply countering colonial laws and their impacts. To be effective, his account had to challenge the whole gamut of colonialist discourse since it was this discourse that produced “natives” and the latter creatures’ specific form of life: a pariah life divested of worldly belongingness. Plaatje was thus unambiguous that his...

...appeal is not on behalf of the naked hordes of cannibals who are represented in fantastic pictures displayed in the shop windows in Europe, most of them imaginary; but it is on behalf of five million loyal British subjects who shoulder ‘the black man’s burden’ every day... (2007: 18-19).

In contesting the Natives Land Act, and thus the Union constitution indirectly, Plaatje thus staked his and his people’s belonging to a common humanity and a shared imperial citizenship. Plaatje’s decision to write the first-ever English novel by a black African, *Mhudi* (published in 1930 but written in 1919), was, therefore, impelled by this aspiration of countering a dehumanising and de-worlding discourse. Plaatje wrote *Mhudi* (Setswana for fog) during a three-year sojourn overseas with the intention that it was to be a fictional accompaniment to *Native Life*. Plaatje sought to show that his people fit the Aristotelian criterion of being human, namely, endowment with rationality. Thus Plaatje (1978: 21) declared in the preface that his objective was, “to interpret to the reading public one phase of ‘the back of the Native mind’”. More specifically, Plaatje used *Mhudi* to demonstrate that before the arrival of settler-invaders his people (the Barolong) had already constituted a civilised society and had an
unwritten constitution that was geared towards ensuring societal harmony, that was opened to assimilating edifying foreign influences, and that commanded that non-nationals must be treated with hospitality (Couzens, 1978: 7-12).

On the one hand, Plaatje, therefore, wielded the sword of literature to rebuff the coloniser’s history and to affirm his people’s story in order to establish historical belonging and worldliness. On the other hand, Plaatje, similar to Caliban and to Friday in Daniel Defoe’s *Robinson Crusoe*, used the self- arrogated tools and norms of western modernity (rationality, literacy, equity and natural rights) to expose the paucity of the much-proclaimed British sense of fairness and to excoriate the colonial legal order for its inherent duplicity. Thus in 1921 (republished in 1976), he published a booklet entitled *The Mote and the Beam: An Epic on Sex-Relationship ‘Twixt White and Black in British South Africa*. Plaatje appropriated the title of Jesus’s discourse on judgementalism to make the case that behind colonialis discourse, its civilising justification and legal system lay bad faith, double standards and often white uncivilised behavior. To sum up, Plaatje understood that to challenge constitutionally-sanctioned pariahdom, he had to produce works of fiction and non-fiction that contested and undermined the discourse that undergirded this constitution. This is the first insight that we can draw from Plaatje’s critique. For the aforementioned reasons, the insight here is that struggles against lack of constitution and deprivations of belonging must begin with a frontal attack on colonialis discourses. Such an attack would be geared towards refusing a discourse that legitimises colonisation, dehumanises conquered people, causes self-alienation and naturalises the settler-constituted world as the only desirable world. As we shall see in this chapter and the next, Plaatje’s New African contemporaries as well as their New Negro exemplars recognised this imperative. However, their ambivalence towards the white world resulted in them failing to undertake a thoroughgoing critique and refusal of colonialis discourse. I posit that it is this failure that partly contributed to these leaders’ proposals of neo-colonial visions of constitution and belonging.

I will now return to Arendt and her explication of pariahdom and worldlessness in order to explicate this first insight. In *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (1973) Arendt seems to summon colonialis discourse with approval to justify the colonisation and de-worlding of Africans. Arendt’s main explanation for why the Boers conquered Africans and dispossessed them of their land in the territory that later become South Africa is that these Europeans did not believe that Africans belonged to the human world or the world of the Same. According to Arendt, the historical worldlessness of Africans

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4 In *Mhudi* Plaatje has one of the Barolong Chief explain this hospitality as follows: “my home is his home, my lands are his lands, my cattle are his cattle, and my law his shield” (cited in Couzens, 1978: 7).
5 Plaatje thus closed his booklet with the following parting shot: “And as it is true that white men brought Christianity and civilisation to Bechuanaland, it is also true that the first authenticated cases of rape, murder and suicide in Bechuanaland were the work of a white man” (Plaatje, 1976: 92).
was evidenced by the fact that Africans had not conquered nature and fabricated anything useful to “Mankind”:

What made them [the Africans] different from other human beings was not at all the colour of their skin but the fact that they behaved like a part of nature, that they had not created a human world, a human reality… (Arendt, 1973: 192).

Arendt later elaborated further on the connection between lack of capacity or willingness to fabricate things of the world and worldlessness. Arendt (2005: 106-107) argued that people who did not produce “useful things” were not part of the world (even as they were part of the earth) because the world and the world of things are the result of the fact that human beings produce things. In The Human Condition (1998: 136), Arendt posited that people who had not yet developed the capacity or desire to fabricate and produce things ‘of the world’ could be considered worldless because worldliness, “is the capacity to fabricate and create a world” (cited in Janover, 2011: 28). With this short background, we are able to better appreciate Arendt’s colonialist assertion above that because Africans were natural men who, “behaved like a part of nature… they had not created a human world, a human reality”.

In the case of South Africa, Arendt reports that otherisation and invention of race hierarchy were the only way Boer colonisers could make sense of, and pacify, African “savages”: “Race was the Boers’ answer to the overwhelming monstrosity of Africa – a whole continent populated and overpopulated by savages…” (Arendt, 1973: 192). If we put this in Arendtian discourse, and at the risk of belabouring the point, we could say that the Europeans’ compulsion to dispossess Africans of their lands, to “kill” their worlds, and to produce them as pariahs flowed from the idea that African humanity could be undermined because Africans were not “builders of worlds or cobuilders of a common world” (Arendt, 1973: 590-591). Inspired by this discourse, Europeans regarded Africans to be outcasts of the world. Eurocentric cartographers were, therefore, following and buttressing this discourse when they drew the amity lines in the late sixteenth century. These uni-versalists sought to carve the globe into two with “non-Europeans” relegated to the world of non-humans.

Colonialist discourse is thus based on what Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2007: 45) refers to as “abyssal thinking”. This thinking tends towards de-worlding because it interpellates those on the “other side” of the abyssal line as “invisible, unintelligible, or irreversibly discardable” (Santos, 2004: 165). This discourse thus figures the latter peoples as “non-existent” (ibid.) To not exist, Jean-Luc Nancy explicates in The Creation of the World or Globalization, is, “to no longer be in the world“ (as summarised by Raffoul & Pettigrew, 2007: 5).

Here is where I am going with this: inspired by a tradition of thinking stretching from Plaatje to Fanon and Nancy, I interrogate ‘abyssal thinking’ as the motor behind settler-colonial constitution-making. In
Plaatje’s existential-phenomenological reading, the Natives Land Act was made possible by and in turn buttressed a discourse which figured Africans as conquerable and deprivable of ‘bare human rights of living’ because they had contributed nothing to the world. They could thus be relegated to the ‘other side’ of the line.

To be sure, in “The Jew as Pariah: A Hidden Tradition” Arendt (2007: 275) proposed that Jewish writers and intellectuals have contributed to the western world by weaving, “the strands of their Jewish genius into the general texture of European life”. It is on this basis that Arendt asserted that there was no basis to render Jewish people worldless. Conversely, Arendt seemed to argue that Africans are deserving of pariahdom and worldlessness because they had not contributed anything to the world of humans. In a phrase, Africa was, “the Dark Continent where the savages were numerous enough to constitute a world of their own, a world of folly,” writes Arendt (1973: 191). Arendt’s ethnocentric interpellation of Africa as a continent of darkness, a continent made up unproductive and dispensable species has characterised Eurocentric thinking from the age of Enlightenment up to today (see for e.g., Eze (ed.), 1997).

Plaatje’s insistence that Africans are not ‘naked hordes of cannibals’ and his deliberate inter-textual strategy of mobilising the language of the American Revolution, of the Enlightenment tradition, of Christian evangelism and of Victorian romantic literature were his defences against worldlessness. These tactics together with his translation and performance of plays by William Shakespeare; his sojourn ing in England to give speeches, to interact with white and black politicians, and to briefly teach at the University of London was his way of performing belongingness to Great Britain and of demonstrating that Africans do not constitute ‘a world of their own’. This is to say that Plaatje’s resistance was directly against this latter attempt to de-world Africans because, as the translators of Nancy’s Creation of the World paraphrase, there is no independent world: “…if one ‘leaves this world,’ it is not to attain another world; it is simply no longer being-in-the-world, no longer being in a world, no longer having a world. To that extent “this world” is the only world” (Raffoul & Pettigrew, 2007: 5. Original emphasis).

To recap, Plaatje elaborated a critique of conquest and settler constitution-making that understood that conquest and colonisation produce pariahdom and worldlessness as far as conquered “natives” are concerned. To resist these outcomes, Plaatje followed a three-pronged strategy. First, he sojourned on ‘this side’ of the abyssal line as a way of enacting and claiming mobility, visibility, existence, and worldliness. Second, he sought to prove that his people are loyal Imperial subjects who contributed immensely to the co-building of the world through what he called the “black man’s burden”. Lastly, and relatedly, he demonstrated that Africans can master the tools of literacy and that they have thus co-
authored civilised discourse and its world-producing capabilities. Crucially, black intellectuals and politicians adopted these strategies to enact belonging elsewhere and to constitute another world, namely, a Pan-African or Black Diasporic World.

1.2 De-homed, Unhomed and Worldless in the White Man’s Polity

The genius of Plaatje was to show that a radical refusal of settler-colonial constitution and its laws would involve a radical challenge of their underwriting discourse. It is important to remember that this discourse is based on a dichotomising system (savage versus civilised, primitive versus modern, human versus not-yet-human) that underlined nineteenth century anthropological discourses. In his seminal *The Invention of Africa: Gnosis, Philosophy, and the Order of Knowledge* (1988: 5-16), Mudimbe thus shows that colonialist discourse was aimed at fabricating the African as the negative figure of the Same. As far as South Africa is concerned, in *Race and the Construction of the Disposable Other* Magubane (2007: 180) points out that anthropological discourses and Enlightenment ideas influenced Jan van Riebeeck and his crew’s supremacist attitude. Colonialist discourse was thus behind these first settler-invaders’ attitude of “misanthropic skepticism” - to use Nelson Maldonado-Torres’s characterisation (2007: 245) - vis-à-vis the Khoekhoe in the Cape and, later, with respect to other indigenous people in the rest of the territory.

The second invasion by the British in 1806 led to a resolute campaign to assault the being-becoming and being-belonging of indigenous peoples. This onslaught sparked 100-years of Wars of Resistance mounted by the Xhosas on the frontier. The Xhosas, as was the case with other people facing colonial challenge, understood settler-invasion as world-shattering. They thus deployed their knowledge systems, cosmologies, ancestral spirits and everything else that anchored them to the three realms of African belonging-in-the-world (Mazrui, 2006: 477). The powerlessness of indigenous weapons and of the gods to resist material, social and spiritual conquests created conditions and the understanding that the land was being “killed”. More than just physical displacement, the conquered, therefore, experienced metaphysical and existential dislocation.

As I mentioned in the previous section, the final War of Dispossession took place in 1878, and in 1879 the two groups of settlers (the Dutch and the English) were able to subjugate all indigenous chiefdoms and alienate their lands. Soon after this military triumph, the British and the Boers signed a treaty of peace which paved the way for the establishment of the Union of South Africa. Herein a germane

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6 A tentative suggestion can be made that with this three-pronged strategy, Plaatje – court interpreter, newspaper editor, political orator, teacher, pamphleteer, translator, novelist, and an intercessor and an itinerant between the worlds of the indigenous peoples and that of the colonists, a traveller between the settler colony and the metropole – sought to also world and hybridise the western world and its seemingly one-sided discourse.
historical point in relation to contemporary strivings for constitution and belonging: The question of the belonging of “natives” (the “Native Question”) dominated discussions before the United Kingdom’s House of Commons and at the 1909 Convention on the Constitution of South Africa. The main bone of contention was how to insert “natives” into the soon-to-be-established country without undoing the “racial” compromise between the English and the Boers. Thus a fundamental question became, “what was to be the future for Africans in a country that Europeans had adopted as a ‘white man’s country’?” (Magubane, 1996: 293). In this regard, British and Boers constitution-makers answered in the negative the question whether the Union constitution should extend the restricted franchise that Africans historically enjoyed in the Cape Colony to the rest of the envisaged Union. The reasoning here was that Africans, westernised or not, did not emerge out of civilisation unlike, “the white man, [who] even if poor or ignorant, was born into a community with a long civilised past behind it…” (Krüger, 1969: 35-36). Colonialist discourse in the terms I have been discussing thus overdetermined the constitution of the country and polity settlers baptised as South Africa.

The 1910 Constitution of the Union of South Africa was, therefore, a racial contract par excellence. A “racial contract”, as conceptualised by Charles Mills (1997), is a contract that does all that a social contract does but refracted through the prism of whites versus “non-whites”, those endowed with humanity and those who subsist below the line of the human. The objective of such a contract is to establish a racial oligarchy (Mills, 1997: 11). In the context of settler state-formation, the purposes of a racial contract are to found a settler polity, reify settler-invasion, legitimise white domination and put into practice the originary discourse that considers the conquered to be below the world of human beings. With this historical background, we can better appreciate why the Natives Land Act of 1913 was a pivotal piece of legislation in these processes of constitutionally-sanctioned production of “native” pariahdom. This Act legalised land dispossession, segregation, mass removal of Africans to “tribal” reserves, and as Plaatje’s evocative vignettes of “roving wanderers,” internal “exiles” and “outcasts” revealed, above all, this Act sought to de-world conquered peoples.

It is thus no coincidence that Plaatje apprehended this piece of legislation in Freudian terms. His task, we would recall, was to, “…describe the difficulties of the South African natives under a very strange law…” (2007: 15). A “very strange law” is a law that is both uncanny and portending of the uncanny because it secures the opposite of heimlich which is a sense of, “belonging to the house…not strange…homely” (Freud, 2003: 124). By describing the Act in these Freudian terms, Plaatje sought to drive home the point that the Act did not only make, “the natives homeless in South Africa” (Plaatje, 2007: 335); it actually did much more. This law also brought about a pervading sense of unheimlich/unhomeliness. “To be unhomed,” Homi Bhabha (2005: 13) has elucidated, “is not [just] to be homeless…” This is because unhomeliness is a sudden condition of feeling disoriented in the world (Freud, 2003: 124). In “The world and home,” Bhabha (1992: 141) thus further explains that the word
‘ unhomely ’ describes, “the estranging sense of the relocation of the home and the world in an unhallowed place”. Plaatje’s opening sentence - “awakening on Friday, June 20, 1913, the South African native found himself, not actually a slave, but a pariah in the land of his birth”— accords with Sigmund Freud and Bhabha’s formulations because it seeks to convey the idea that the coming into operation of this uncanny law turned, “those of us who are simply ‘Natives’ of the country, and who cannot claim the arrogant designation of ‘white South African’” (Plaatje, [1921] 1976: 89) into outcasts of the new world. “Natives” awoke to find themselves without a world after their home and their sense of being-in-the-world had been befuddled. They found themselves homeless and besieged by the unhomely. From an existential-phenomenological perspective, the conquered also apprehended their situation as that of being without a world.

Writing most of the manuscript abroad a ship between the settler colony and the metropole (he celebrated this “mid-ocean” region as a “floating island” of racial harmony and cultural interaction, Boehmer, 2002: 141), Plaatje defined the Act in terms that sought to convey to his readers that this piece of legislation portended the shattering of the worlds of indigenous peoples on all three realms of African belonging-in-the-world. Thus Plaatje, firstly, showed that the impact of Act on the material world of Africans was to turn Africans into squatters, wanderers and landless paupers. Secondly, on the social plane, the Act’s objectives of segregation and mass removals concretised the world of apartness. These actions brought Plaatje’s integrationist vision of both settlers and indigenous peoples living in mutual recognition and cooperation into disrepute. Indeed, one of Plaatje’s cherished ideals was that of social integration and of South Africa being a home to all who live in it (Asmal, 2007: xiv). Lastly, Plaatje’s field notes showed that the Act represented the shattering of the spiritual world of Africans because the operation of the Act resulted in psychic alienation and world-disorientation. The latter consequences were the result of Africans being dislocated from ancestral lands, their ensuring mass wandering and the general stupefaction of families and clans.

Further substantiation for my contention that Plaatje’s narrative of homelessness and unhomeliness is also a narrative of worldlessness on all three planes can be discerned from the fact that Plaatje modeled Native Life after W.E.B. Du Bois’s The Souls of Black Folk (1903). More specifically, in the prologue to Native Life, Plaatje specifically referred to chapter nine (“Of the Sons of Master and Man”) of Du Bois’s book. In that chapter, Du Bois described race relations in the American South with a focus on how socio-legal techniques proscribed racial contact. What would have appealed to Plaatje is that in addition to analysing the economic and political suppression of black Americans, Du Bois honed in on the social and spiritual implications of racial segregation. Du Bois (1986a: 487-490) invoked his most inventive literary device, “the veil of colour,” to describe the sense of invisibility and psychic alienation suffered by black Americans. Du Bois mourned that the American South was a world divided into two in which there is no “common humanity and a common destiny” resulting in “a writhing of spirit”
(1986a: 488, 487). In this way, Du Bois revealed to his readers that Jim Crow laws adversely affected the material, social, and spiritual worlds of black folk. Therefore, Plaatje aligned himself with Du Bois, and prophetically with Freud, to convey the insight that the consequences of the Act were not simply land dispossession and homelessness. More insidiously, this pivotal Act unhomed Africans and produced them as pariahs. As we have seen, pariahs are people who are worldless on the material, social and spiritual planes. In his most hyperbolic moments, Plaatje (2007: 105) thus figured the world-shattering impacts of the Natives Land Act as a, “stealth war of extermination”.

In *Native Life* Plaatje, then, told the story of the situation and condition of Africans in this new unhomely world; a world whose original sin is one, “of emerging and becoming without [the African] and against [the African]” (Mariátegui cited Santos, 2013: 27). However, it is not the entire story to claim that South Africa emerged on the basis of “natives” being outside the walls constituting its polity. As John Dube, the president of the SANNC and the head of its deputations to England, pointed out when bemoaning the constitution that founded South Africa, the calamity was not so much that the new polity emerged and became completely without Africans. The real tragedy was rather that in the new constitutional arrangement Africans were both dispossessed, rendered invisible, subjugated and incorporated, “as mere aliens in the land of their birth and ancient origin” (cited in Hughes, 2011: 146). From the vantage point of Plaatje and his fellow SANNC leaders, the original sin in the constitution of South Africa was/is, therefore, the sin of liminal inclusion as explained in the introductory chapter above.

**1.3 Leadership-in-the-Liminal**

**1.3.1 The melancholia of transcultural elites**

To fully describe the psychosocial ramifications of being made internal exiles in the land of one’s own birth and ancient origin, Plaatje reached for another term that Sigmund Freud would later popularise. Plaatje clarified in the prologue that his, “is but a sincere narrative of a melancholy situation” (2007: 15). Why and how did this colonisation lead to melancholia? Freud’s “Mourning and Melancholia” (1955) is useful in this regard. Freud explains that mourning is useful because it forces the patient to undertake reality-testing which will reveal that the lost object is indeed gone and that it is time to withdraw the libido from the lost object and invest it in a new object (Freud, 1955: 244). In melancholia, however, the grief is limitless because the loss is not only unconscious in the sense that the patient cannot articulate exactly what he or she has lost. The main problem is rather that the patient, “knows whom he has lost but not what he has lost in him” (Freud, 1955: 245. Original emphasis). The key difference between the two conditions is that, “in mourning it is the world that has become poor and empty; in melancholia it is the ego itself” (Freud, 1955: 246).
Reading through Plaatje’s narrative it is not clear exactly what it is that Plaatje believes he and his contemporaries have lost. From his analysis of the circumstances surrounding the enactment of the Act to his critique of the Act itself to his extensive and evocative field notes describing the actual consequences of this piece of legislation we gain an understanding that Plaatje was concerned with the fact that the Natives Land Act prohibited African peoples from buying land in the Union. Plaatje was also troubled by the fact that the Act precluded Africans from “squatting” on “European” farms unless they were contracted as poorly paid servants. As a result, “natives” had become “roving wanderers” and “exiles” in the land of their birth. However, throughout his narrative Plaatje never explicitly mentions the other grand iniquities of conquest and colonisation: subjugation of autochthonous sovereignties, land dispossession, white supremacy and enforced racialisation. Indeed, it is as if the supersession of autochthonous homes were not objects worth mourning for. Rather, as I show below by way of reference to the distinction that Freud draws between mourning and melancholia, Plaatje and his contemporaries were more concerned about the fact that the founding of South Africa had come to mean that they are being relegated to the status of ‘raw natives’. This concern, as we shall see, had a decisive influence on Plaatje and fellow ANC leaders’ political consciousness.

At the same time, Plaatje does not, indeed could not, mourn the loss of full belonging to the new constitutional polity. Despite his resistance and his wish for the settler polity to be all-inclusive, he must have been aware (as per the “native prophesy” he referenced) that the founding of South Africa was always going to be on the basis of institutionalised exclusion of “natives”. The situation buttressed by the Act was melancholic, then, because the object that Plaatje deemed lost was also not the (new) world that had irrupted onto his ‘traditional’ world. Rather, it was the inner world of his ego that had been affected. His ego was shattered and cleaved because as a “civilised” but racialised person, he was now forced to exist within and behind the Du Boisian “veil”. Enforced racialisation together with institutionalised estrangement had resulted in psychic alienation leading Plaatje to not so much mourn the loss of a sense of South Africanness or to be nostalgic about the seemingly shattered world of his ancestors. Instead, and similar to black Americans in Jim Crow USA, Plaatje was forced to wonder to himself: in the world inaugurated by the 1910 constitution and fortified by the Act, “What am I?” (L. Gordon, 2015: 128. Original emphasis). Having demonstrated that colonialist discourse was the pivotal instrument in “the killing of the land” and further that its uncanny legal order produced homelessness, the unhomely and worldlessness, in the rest of the chapter I wish to focus on how internal and external alienation shaped the political jurisprudences and constitution visions of native leaders.

To gain a better understanding of Plaatje’s “sincere narrative of melancholia” it is useful to understand how Plaatje and other SANNC leaders located their belonging and identity prior to the founding of South Africa. In *Native Life* Plaatje (2007: 68), wrote that when he and his black contemporaries were growing up (in the late 1880s), “we lived in a happy South Africa that was full of pleasant anticipations,
and now – what changes for the worse have we undergone! For to crown all our calamities, South Africa has by law ceased to be the home of any of her native children...”. The fact that Plaatje (who bore an English name and a Dutch surname and was raised on a German mission station) referred to native life as a life of happy belonging in and to South Africa even before South Africa was born indicates that Plaatje believed that he was of the white world and thus of the South Africa-to-be. To be sure, Plaatje was elected the first Correspondence Secretary General of the SANNC and chosen to be the spokesperson of the second and third deputations to England both because of his relentless investigative journalistic efforts and because Plaatje and the rest of the leadership of the SANNC were ‘exceptional natives’.

All members of the SANNC deputation were westernised Africans who were first-generation or second-generation converts to Christianity and who had received western education from a young age. Plaatje and his contemporaries, therefore, grew up as badumedi/amakholwa; that is, “believers” of the power of the Word of God and of the potency of the written word. Hlonipha Mokoena (2011: 20) explains that an ikholwa identity was more than just a religious identity; it was a political and social identity. Above all, amakholwa believed that their identity and their recognition as such should result in bestowal of citizenship rights as British subjects (Mokoena, 2011: 21). At the very least, the expectation and the main demand of amakholwa were that they ought to be treated differently vis-à-vis the rest of the (“uncivilised”) African masses.

In the Natal colony and in the Cape colony, to varying extents, amakholwa did receive rights and privileges not granted to other “native” subjects, making this group, “a kind of colonial and black aristocracy” (ibid.). In terms of Law no. 28 of 1865, amakholwa of the Natal colony could even apply for exemption from being subjected to the Native Code. Reverend Dube, the leader of the SANNC and a “native” who was also raised on a mission station, was one such “exempted native”. In his exemption application form Dube, who was just returning from studies in the USA, declared that he wished, “to be governed by civil laws because he was civilised” (cited in Hughes, 2011: 55). ‘Exempted natives’ received most of the citizenship rights bestowed upon colonists. It is important to note, therefore, that the belonging and being-in-the-world subjectivity of Plaatje and other leaders of the SANNC were predicated on their being accorded a distinct legal place in the settler world. This scheme of including some natives and excluding others was a product of conquest and the ethic of differentiation that Amar Acheraïou, above, speaks of. This form of governmentality resulted in the emergence of hybrid figures – elites who had their feet in both the old worlds and new world; and as a result did not belong fully to either the world of colonisers or to that of the colonised.

By hybrid figures, I do not mean “mixed persons” whose identity and being are products of a fusion of the worlds of the colonisers and the colonised. Rather, I mean, as do Ashcroft et al (2000: 139) elucidate,
new transcultural figures. These figures are new because they are formed in what Homi Bhabha (2005: 54) calls the Third Space of enunciation. This is an in-between space between the cultures/homes of the conqueror and the conquered. It is important to point out that this terrain does not simply refer to a space of cross-cultural, cross-pollination of the colonising and colonised cultures. Such categorisation would elide the power relations inherent in colonial penetration (Ashcroft et al., 2000: 139). As Ashcroft et al. (2006: 137) further explain, and as I have noted in my discussion of de-homing and unhoming processes above, hybridity occurs, “…when settler-invaders dispossess indigenous peoples and force them to ‘assimilate’ to new social patterns”. This result in a state of being liminal. The colonised elites were thus caught in a double bind. Double bind because, on the one hand, the choice to stay in their subjugated and calcifying culture meant that their being-becoming could be severely hampered (JanMohamed, 1983: 5). On the other hand, if they endeavored to assimilate into the colonising culture they would be deracinated from home-culture while simultaneously prevented from becoming full members of the hegemonic culture. This liminal status is caused by the fact that the Manichaeism of colonialist praxis implies both forceful incorporation as well as enforced marginality of both calcified cultures and incorporated peoples (Mudimbe, 1988: 1-2; JanMohamed, 1983: 254).

Liminal positionality and subjectivity thus resulted in a deep sense of personal and collective dislocation and estrangement - a sense of being wedged in a disconcerting interstitial zone. African people who left their communities to attend westernised schools were thus caught in-between two worlds. Zacharia Keodirelang Matthews, the first black South African to attain a South African university degree and the president of ANC-Cape Colony, explained this lived experience of debilitating liminality in the following terms: “we were being taught to live in two worlds, or at least to divide our spirit between two quite different ways of life, the one in reality abandoned forever, the other offering us no real chance to thrive and grow in a new way” (Matthews, 1983: 15. My emphasis). At the same time, educators, Matthews (1983: 45) adds, offered western knowledge, “on the basis of through-going white supremacy” which encouraged converts to despise their own culture and society (1983: 45). Converts were thus encouraged to aspire to be of the white world. However, assimilation into white society was impossible. These colonised transcultural figures thus underwent only two stages of van Gennep’s rites de passage (detachment and liminen).

Liminality is caused by the fact that whereas colonialism is not primarily interested in the creation of minions for western modernity preferring to see the relationship between the conquerors and conquered as an endless struggle between barbarism and civilisation, “settler colonialism mobilises peoples in the teleological expectation of irreversible transformation” (Veracini, 2010: 99). This transformation is

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7 Fernando Ortiz, a Cuban anthropologist, came up with the concept of transculturation. Following Ortiz, Mary Louise Pratt (cited in Attwell, 2005: 17) defines transculturation as the process, “whereby subordinated or marginalised groups select or invent from materials transmitted to them by a dominant or metropolitan culture”.
intended to create mimetic figures: the “reformed, recognizable Others…that is almost the same, but not quite” (Bhabha, 2005: 122. Original emphasis). Ralph Ellison explains that these mimetic persons are invisible to both the white/colonisers’ world and the world of colonised and/or non-educated people – they thus became, “different and of a different world” (cited in Rampersad, 2007: 48). These reformed, almost-but-never-quite-white figure, then, inhabited (to use an imprecise term) neither the autochthonous world nor the new world.

1.3.2 Legal liminality and melancholic nationalism

To relate this liminal positionality to constitutional issues, let us now return to Plaatje and his contemporaries. Plaatje and other ‘exempted natives’ wished to belong to colonial civil society, to be governed by the British legal order, and to acquire rights flowing from that legal system. However, successive colonial governments frustrated this longing. The political consciousness of these figures was shaped by these rejections. In the Natal Colony exempted elites started a newspaper to campaign against the regime of legal liminality that they were being subjected to. Heather Hughes (2011: 105) describes this legal liminality as, “the legal wilderness which exempted Africans were forced to wander, released from customary obligations but denied full rights as colonial subjects”. In 1875 “exempted natives” thus submitted a petition to the governor of the Natal colony demanding that their position of non-belonging and liminality be resolved. They specifically requested the governor to pronounce on their status as British subjects, the law that applied to them, and indeed which moral order they belonged to:

Now here is our lament…We fled from Zulu country because of fearing Kafir Law…But now the Government wishes to drive us back again by saying that we ought to serve our old law which drove us from Zululand…We came here being young, and now are grown older – here is the question: - How can a man become of the English? (cited in Mokoena, 2011: 22).

Drifting in the psychic, social and legal wilderness; wedged in a debilitating Third Space but not wishing to go back to “Kafir” homes these transcultural elites asked: how may they complete the rite of passage? Their plea was for a constitutional scheme that would enable them to exit the liminal world and become of the white world. Parenthetically, it is important to emphasise, as is clear from the above petition, that promises of mission philosophy and of western Enlightenment did not blind transcultural elites to the fact that they could never become English. They could only hope to become of the English; that is, almost the same but not quite but more edified.

Of more significance is the fact that the political jurisprudence and constitutional vision of this native leadership arose from within this space of legal and social liminality. Towards the late nineteenth century transcultural elites in the Natal colony had set up a civil society organisation called
Funamalungelo (‘demand/desire rights’). In the Cape Colony, they formed various Native Vigilance Associations to advocate for the defense of their ‘national rights’. By ‘national rights’ these elites meant the defense of rights that they believed were due to them in the colonial polities. It is this specific form of melancholic nationalism – nationalism not based on politics of irredentism but one borne in and conditioned by the Third Space – that became trans-ethnic, nationwide, and radical.

From their vantage point in the Third Space, these leaders considered the law to be both the main object of their oppression and the main weapon for defending their rights and for crafting a sense of belonging. The following 1892 declamation encapsulates both the prevailing anxiety about law’s potency to unhome transcultural beings and a growing fracture amongst “native” elites between the majority that still held on to promises of assimilation and those who evinced a nascent black nationalism:

> It is very well for [white] politicians to be complaining about the existence of blacks, for this is what might have been expected in Africa – a black man’s country. We should have thought that coming to a black man’s country, Europeans would accommodate themselves to their surrounds and try to make worthy neighbours of the Natives instead of fretting and fuming over their large number and legislating with a view to get rid of them off the face of the earth (cited in Magubane, 2004: 176)

Thus even before the founding of the Union of South Africa in 1910 the political consciousness and the terms of being-belonging of these elites were already being conditioned by their status as legally ‘liminalised’ and socially ‘invisibilised’ beings. In the rest of this historical chapter, I aim to substantiate one part of this Part of the dissertation’s two-fold argument which is that the constitution visions and terms of belonging of these elites were impelled by a sense of melancholia and not that of mourning.

1.4 New African Ambivalence

1.4.1 Resisting invisibility and the ‘Segregation Fallacy’

In line with the aforementioned political consciousness and increased radicalism, towards the end of the century these elites altered their social identity from a kholwa/believer identity to an explicitly trans-ethnic political identity that they designated “New African”. These reformed Africans were, however, still seized by a “civil imaginary” in that they held on to the promise that their conversion to Christianity and attainment of western education would convince colonial governments to recognise their humanity, extend civil rights to them and eventually integrate them into the South African polity (de Kock, 2004: 117). Thus, their minds, similar to the minds of their New Negro exemplars, reached out, “…as yet to nothing but American [South African] wants, American ideals [South African liberal] ideals” (Locke, 1925: 4). The unyielding demand of this group was a demand for, “equal rights to all civilised men”
These elites thus internalised the colonising discourse, accepted the legitimacy of the settler-constituted world and had jettisoned the decolonisation imperative of Mayibuye (‘return Africa’/‘resurrect Africa’).

Alas, the 1910 constitution made it clear that South Africa was to be a White Man’s polity and that the new country would be founded on the basis of structural exclusion of African peoples. Constitutional ‘invisibilisation’ of indigenous peoples was especially arduous on transcultural elites. Unlike the previous ‘ethnic of differentiation’ adopted by missionaries and the liberal government of the Cape Colony, the Union government adopted what we can call an ethnic of communalism with regard to all indigenous persons. In terms of this policy, westernised or not, all indigenous people were “natives” and the state will treat all “natives” in the same manner. The Natives Land Act was a pivotal apparatus in this new ethic because it laid out a framework for racial segregation, mass removals and thus enforced ‘tribalisation’.

For our purposes, it is important to realise that constitutionally-enforced communalism is a manifestation of an aspect of colonialist discourse that Lewis Gordon terms a discourse of anonymity. “Anonymity” here does not simply mean being nameless. Rather, anonymity refers to a form of epistemic limitation in terms of which people racialised Black are generalised (L. Gordon, 2000: 381). Therefore, when it comes to the Black – whether westernised or ‘raw’ - there was no desire to know more. Gordon reminds us that ‘invisibilisation’ is a consequence of an unresolvable puzzle at the heart of the conquest project: conquered land always comes with people (L. Gordon, 2000: 378). The challenge that settler colonial constitution-makers face is what to do with conquered people when the...

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8 These elites regularly insisted that a distinction be drawn between themselves (“civilised men”) and the rest of the native masses (“raw natives”) (see the minutes of the South African Native Affairs Commission, [1905]1972: 42-45).

9 We can thus understand the decision of colonised and enslaved people to establish newspapers, to author enslaved persons’ narratives, and to pen works of fiction to be impelled by a need to counter anonymity and its de-worlding consequences. This is because, “black rootlessness and homelessness [are] inseparable from black namelessness” (West, 1999: 105). Crucially, as we saw with Plaatje, this imperative to manifest worldly presence through writing as self-disclosure and as consciousness-raising lay in a symbiotic relation with the constitutional campaign to “defend rights”. This dual law and literature task is outlined by I.W.W. Citashe (1982: 15) in this 1880 poem:

Your cattle are gone, my countrymen!
Go rescue them! Go rescue them!
Leave the breechloader alone
And turn to the pen.
Take paper and ink,
For that is your shield.
Your rights are going!
So pick up your pen.
Load it, load it with ink.
Sit on a chair.
Repair not to Hoho
But fire with your pen.
majority of them have not been exterminated. More importantly, what to do when, as was the case in South Africa at the turn of the twentieth century (Krüger, 1969: 22), colonists were already dependent on “natives” and had incorporated them as servants in domestic households, farms and mines? In a fruitless attempt to resolve this aporia, conquerors and enslavers accepted de facto incorporation while elaborating means of implementing de jure invisibility and social misrecognition. The eponymous narrator in Ellison’s Invisible Man (2001: 3) memorably articulates the manifestation of this legally-sanctioned invisibility in the following words:

I am an invisible man. No, I am not a spook like those who haunted Edgar Allan Poe; nor am I one of your Hollywood-movie ecotoplasm. I am a man of substance, of flesh and bone, fiber and liquids – and I might even be said to possess a mind. I am invisible, understand, simply because people refuse to see me…That invisibility to which I refer occurs because of a peculiar disposition of the eyes of those with whom I come in contact.

Plaatje’s lament, therefore, was that in spite of, or because of, the fact that the conquered were always present in the white world, socio-legal attitudes suddenly render their presence an Absence (L. Gordon, 1999: 99). The founding of South Africa in 1910 constitutionalised the liminal status of transcultural elites and thus their anonymity and invisibility. For transcultural elites, the new communalist framework meant that the foundational law, similar to the situation with respect to black Americans during the era of Jim Crow, suddenly declared them a “misbirth” (Du Bois, 1986c: 923). In this regard, Plaatje’s approving reference to Du Bois’s essay on “Of the Sons of Masters and Man” is significant.

In that essay, Du Bois bemoaned the fact that segregation in the South of the USA had destroyed previous contact and being-togetherness of masters and house-servants. Such contact and bonds of affection, Du Bois (1986c: 489, 481) wrote, had engendered both sympathy and mutual understanding. Du Bois (ibid.) argues that mutual exposure had also shown that Negroes could assimilate the culture of western civilisation and function as equals in the white world (ibid.). Du Bois’s main complaint was that socio-legal machinations that emerged after the First World War sought to lump civilised Negroes, “with the lowest of their people” (Du Bois, 1986c: 491). This “drawing of the color-line” had resulted in feelings of betrayal, abandonment and spiritual turmoil (Du Bois, 1986c: 490). The drawing of the color-line and the lumping together of Africans were also sources of the melancholia of New Africans of South Africa. Thus, in The Segregation Fallacy and other Papers: A Native View of some South African Inter-racial Problems (1928), John Davidson Jabavu (England-educated educationist, newspaper editor, and the founder of the All-African Convention) lamented the fact that the social contact between educated Africans and educated whites had been legislatively proscribed, and that educated Africans were now forced to live in the periphery of the polity with uneducated Africans. Echoing Du Bois, Jabavu agitated for a policy that would enable western-educated, urban-based Africans to be fully included in the colonial polity. His reasoning was that these Africans had undergone
a “metamorphosis” and had thus made, “a steady transition from communalist tribalism into democratic individualism” (Jabavu, 1928: 8,9).

This then is the sincere tale of melancholia that Plaatje wished to describe to his readers. As I have already pointed out, Plaatje did not impugn the Act for consolidating land dispossession or for its completion of the subjugation of indigenous sovereignties. His protest was rather that the ultimate intention of the Act was to halt “native progress”. The “native progress” that Plaatje and amakholwa were concerned about was personhood as being-becoming borne out of the fundamental tenets of the kholwa belief system: belief in individualism and private property; and of land purchase as a means of self-improvement, modern subjectivity and a sense of belonging in the world. The Act impeded the being-becoming of New Africans because it prohibited Africans from purchasing land. Furthermore, by massing transcultural elites with the rest of the conquered peoples the Act depersonalised African elites and rendered them invisible. The point here is that the melancholia of New Africans was caused by the fact that they were not sure what they have lost within themselves in this new world. More pertinently, these feelings of liminality, invisibility and pariahdom obscured the object of the grief of transcultural elites. It calibrated it to a desire to demand visibility and recognition, civil rights, and socio-economic opportunities in the settler-created world.

1.4.2 Racial Melancholia

In this regard, Magdalena Zolkos (2011: 197) reminds us that in Arendt’s formulation of pariahdom does not so much concern exclusion and subjugation in the strict sense of the word. Rather, pariahdom is about felt socio-economic inequality. Freud (1955: 248) also explains that the melancholic patient’s self-regard does not so much concern feelings of, “ugliness or weakness, or with social inferiority”. Above all else, the melancholic fears becoming poor (ibid.). Similarly, transcultural elites who established the SANNC (mainly overseas-trained lawyers and petit-bourgeoisie) feared that the bifurcated structure of the Union held the possibility of them being reduced to the ranks of uneducated and “uncivilised” Africans and thus of being pauperised (Mandaza, 1991: 77; Lodge, 1983: 2). Thus Pixley ka Seme, the main founder of the SANNC (which later became the ANC), explained that the formation of the SANNC was motivated by a need to form a national union with the objective of, “defending our [state-granted] rights and privileges” (cited in Thema, 1953: n.p. My emphasis). My contention is that dominant African nationalism of the early twentieth century was melancholic, shaped as it was by fears of elite nationalists being relegated to the status of “raw natives” and being impoverished. The emancipatory vision flowing from this fear was conditioned by feelings of being forever interned in the liminal space.
Feelings of being betrayed and of being abandoned thus predominated amongst New Africans. In *Black Skin, White Mask* (2008: 54) Frantz Fanon borrows from Réne Maran’s novel about a character named Jean Veneuse to illustrate the “internal melancholy” that assails a black person who suffers from what Fanon, following Germaine Guex, calls an abandonment neurosis. The neurosis is caused by a sudden realisation that despite growing up in the white world, the white world will always reject the transcultural person. Fanon (2008: 46) surmises the cause of Veneuse’s melancholia as follows: “Jean Veneuse is a Negro. Born in the Antilles, he has lived in Bordeaux for years; so he is a European. But he is black; so he is a Negro. There is the conflict”. Veneuse is a liminal being *par excellence* because in addition to being abandoned and rejected by the white world, “…the black [world has also] virtually repudiated me. That is precisely my position” (cited in Fanon, 2008: 53). Herein lies a pertinent point my thesis: in Fanon’s psychosocial analysis, rather than “restructuring the world” the melancholic elite, “will try to elevate himself to the white man’s level” (Fanon, 2008: 59-60).

In a very useful expansion that accords with Fanon’s psychosocial analysis, David Eng and Shinhee Han (2000: 668) reconfigure Freud’s diagnosis from individuals to groups to refer to a condition they call “racial melancholia”. Based on their clinical observations of Asian-American students in the USA Eng and Han (2000: 671) explain that racial melancholia is caused by feelings of betrayal and estrangement that arise when assimilation processes remain suspended or unresolved. Confirming Fanon’s hypothesis, Eng and Han report that racial melancholia leads to a splitting of the psyche of the unassimilable racialised figure. Therefore, to paraphrase Freud, it is not the world that has become poor, it is the ego of this figure that has suffered. Suffering from abandonment neurosis and yearning for white recognition and assimilation, these figures often seek to appropriate tools of the dominant society.

In the case of New Africans, the issue was exacerbated by their desire to integrate into a polity that was based on racialisation, radical segregation, and invisibility of all Africans. As Eng and Han (2006: 671) observe, the difficulty here is that the melancholic elite both knows and does not know that he or she is part of the larger group. To continue the fight for assimilation he or she is, therefore, forced to forget or deny widespread racism and institutionalised exclusion lest he or she admits to himself or herself that he or she wishes to join a racist society (ibid.). Their political outlook is thus overdetermined by ambivalence. Freud (1955: 251) has confirmed that ambivalence is a key trait of melancholia. Ellison (2001: xxxi-xxxii) also affirms that *Invisible Man* suffers from ambivalence because he or she both wants to belong to the dominant world and at the same time he or she resents this ‘invisibilising’ world. The result is a split of the consciousness of this hybrid-but-liminal person. He or she becomes what Stanley and Derald Sue call a Marginal Man (cited in Eng and Han, 2000: 675). A key question is the following: in what ways could the Marginal Man overcome or reckon with ambivalence in order to outline a constitution vision that will end the world that has both created and rejected him and her? The thesis I defend in this dissertation is that the consequences of the melancholic leader’s failure to
overcome his or her melancholia and attendant ambivalence results in this putative constitution-maker unwilling or not able to propose terms of homemaking that would enable everyone, and not just the “civilised,” to feel a sense of material and affective belonging.

1.5 The Spiritual Strivings of Liminal Leaders: Double Consciousness and Assimilationist Desires

I would like to end this chapter by relating the liminal status and melancholic condition of transcultural elites to their constitution vision. Being partially westernised and no longer being altogether African, the Marginal Man often wishes that hybridity implied more, not less-than. It was in reference to this liminality and associated psychic dismemberment and unhomeliness that in the opening essay of *The Souls of Black Folk* (1903) (a book, as we saw, served as a model for Plaatje’s *Native Life*) Du Bois meditated on the “spiritual strivings” of people of African descent. These strivings are impelled by the fact that colonialist discourse and its constitutional structure do not permit a person of African descent to attain a third stage of aggregation in the sense of fully belonging to the world and culture he or she has been incorporated into. Hybridity for these individuals does not manifest in an edifying doubleness. Rather, having both feet in the two cultures hybridity for liminal individuals implies a duality. Thus, to be a colonised or oppressed hybrid person is to always be at the brink of being torn asunder by, “two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings, two warring ideals in one dark body” (Du Bois, 1986c: 364-365).

The colonised or ex-enslaved transcultural figure is, thus, not only in a state of vacillation with regard to the colonial culture, he or she, similar to Venuese, is also in a state of incongruity with regard to the home/ancient culture.\(^\text{10}\) In this regard, Keodirelang Matthews (an overseas-trained anthropologist, lawyer, educationist, and until 1952 a member of the National Executive Committee of the ANC) recalled that when he started to attend school, “I entered another world” (Matthews, 1983: 16). The convert thus lost a sense of mooring to his or her original community and world while gaining the knowledge and values of a far-away world. Matthews explained the sense of unhomeliness and dislocation from the world that flow from this act of cognitive deracination in the following manner:

> To be sure, the introduction to all of this came in a framework of total acceptance of things that had nothing to do with our own lives, our history, or our languages. Nothing we learned gave dignity to these things of our own… I remember nothing of my years in this school that touched any deeper awareness of the problems of our place in this world… (Matthews, 1983: 17. My emphasis)

\(^{10}\) Some indigenous people derisively referred to these converts as *amakhafala* (‘those spat out’) (Hughes, 2011: 9).
As we have seen, colonialist discourse encourages the liminal-figure to reject his pre-school life-world, “…or at least to divide our spirit between two quite different ways of life” (Matthews, 1986: 15). As Freud would have it, these externally and internally alienated figures found themselves suddenly not able to relate to the world. The world lost all its coherence resulting in the fracturing of the ego and a divided consciousness that is unable to merge the colonisers’ and the colonised frames of reference (Irele 1992: 209). It is important to re-emphasise that homeless and melancholic elites often adopt hegemonic discourse and political praxis. That is, to attain recognition and visibility, the black-skin-white-masked leader often appeals to dominant political jurisprudence and the western grammar of dignity. As Du Bois (1986c: 364) notes, the spiritual striving of the transcultural elite is impelled by a sense of double consciousness, “the sense of always looking at one’s self through the eyes of others, of measuring one’s soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity”.

In the case of colonial South Africa, the more the colonial state imposed policies of segregation and forced ‘tribalisation’, the more transcultural elites affirmed their place in western modernity and identified themselves fully with the colonising culture and the civilising discourse (de Kock, 2004: 117). For this group, “belief in the superiority of European culture was basic to its world view, and its goals were unabashedly assimilationist” (Gerhart, 1978: 34). Over and over again, ANC spokesmen asserted that they are as mature and civilised as any [white] South Africans and thus they were deserving of recognition, incorporation, and equal opportunities in the Union (Gerhart, 1978: 38). According to ANC leaders, the key contradiction was thus not colonisation and “the death of the land”. To be sure, these leaders took the legitimacy of the state, and arguably of the settler-created world, for granted (Motlhabi, 1984: 40-41). The ANC’s constitution vision was thus predicated on the understanding that self-determination ought to result in liberal democratisation and integration.

That the ANC’s constitutional vision was based on Du Boisian double consciousness comes through clearly in its first concrete elaboration of a constitution for a future South Africa. In 1943, directly inspired by the Atlantic Charter, the preamble to the ANC’s Bill of Rights proclaimed that, “we, the African people in the Union of South Africa, urgently demand the granting of full citizenship rights such as are enjoyed by all Europeans in South Africa” (ANC, 1943: n.p.). The leadership of the ANC, mostly Christian liberals, had thus imbibed the notion that the human rights discourse is the only legitimate grammar of dignity and that the bouquet of rights enjoyed by Europeans in South Africa and abroad were the most desirable. This understanding found concrete expression in the ANC co-sponsored Freedom Charter of 1955. This Charter opens with the historically significant words: “South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white” (Congress of the People, 1955: n.p.). Following from this declaration, Charterists could only make a call for equitable sharing of the land; and not the supersession of the settler-created polity.
With this liberal, but multi-racialist, Charter the ANC made it clear that it upheld the legitimacy of the state, it had renounced land reclamation, and the historical mission of revalorising subjugated indigenous life-worlds. The strategic focus of ANC leaders was on inclusion and democratisation. Furthermore, the Charter’s opening declaration and the assertion that, “our people [black and white] have been robbed of their birthright to land, liberty…,” (Congress of the People, 1955: n.p.) made it clear that for the ANC and its allies the goals of (re)conciliation and integration took precedence over historical and structural realities. More specifically, from its years in exile up to the 1990s when it returned to the country, the ANC continued to accept the legitimacy of the South African state and its international legality and only protested the legitimacy of the white minority government (Alexander, 2002: 46). Although rhetorically the ANC will later accept its communist allies’ characterisation that the South African situation is that of “Colonialism of a Special Type;” neither for the communists nor for the ANC did that characterisation commit it to campaign for self-determination understood as full land reclamation and the restoration of subjugated indigenous sovereignties (Mafeje, 1986: 98-99). *Mayibuye iAfrika* (‘Return’/’re-member’ Africa) was, therefore, not a key concern for the transcultural elites of the ANC.

**Conclusion**

The aim of this chapter was to introduce the main themes animating this dissertation. Plaatje’s existential-phenomenological interrogation of the constitution of the Union of South Africa as productive of “native” pariahdom and invisibility justify my premise that issues of belonging, both from a rights and duties perspective and from that of affectivity, are issues of constitution-making. Ultimately, the constitutional vision and terms of belonging elaborated by the dominant strand of transcultural “natives” reflected their melancholia and ambivalence. The rallying cry of ANC leaders – “equal rights for all civilised men” – was thus a melancholic cry flowing from their condition of double consciousness. I have argued that a melancholic constitution vision is ultimately assimilationist, elitist, and thus not geared towards imploding the settler-created world and “resurrecting the land”. Following from this, I hypothesise that this constitution vision would, in the putatively post-colonial polity, ultimately reprise colonialist discourse’s ‘ethic of differentiation’ and render non-elite “natives” unhomely and perhaps worldless.

Finally, I have argued that the task of “resurrecting the land” on the material, social and spiritual planes is a fundamental constitutional task if the original sin of settler colonial constitution-making is to be expatiated and the realities of “native” pariahdom and non-belonging are resolved. In the next chapter, I show that Thabo Mbeki, *de facto* prime minister to Nelson Mandela and president of South Africa from 1999 to 2008, understood this task very well. As I will show, Mbeki understood that from the
perspectives of both constitution-making and nation-building the key challenge is how to achieve re-birth, self-definition, and African reclamation of belonging-in-the-world.
CHAPTER 2: THE CONSTITUTION LEGACY OF PAN-AFRICANISM:
POTENTIATED DOUBLE CONSCIOUSNESS OR RACIAL MELANCHOLIA?

I am an African.
I owe my being to the hills and the valleys...the seas and the ever-changing seasons that define the face of our native land...
I owe my being to the Khoi and the San...
I am formed of the migrants who left Europe to find a new home on our native land...
In my veins courses the blood of the Malay slaves who came from the East...
I am the grandchild of the warrior men and women that Hintsa and Sekhukhune led, the patriots that Cetshwayo and Mqhepu took to battle, the soldiers of Moshoeshoe and Ngungunyane...
My mind and my knowledge of myself is [sic] formed by the victories that are the jewels in our African crown...
I come of those who were transported from India and China...
Being part of all these people, and in the knowledge that none dare contest that assertion, I shall claim that - I am an African...
[Thabo Mbeki, 1996. Original emphasis]

Introduction

The previous chapter focused on two main interrelated themes: (i) Colonialist discourse and settler constitutionalists attempts to de-world “natives;” and (ii) the emergence of transcultural elites as well as these elites’ visions of constitution and belonging. I showed that the visions of these elites were melancholic visions that emerged out of, and lingered in, an unedifying liminal space. The setting for my contemplation of these issues was the period of colonial and Apartheid constitution-making. In this chapter, I shift the narrative to the early “post-Apartheid” era. This is a period when transcultural elites were charged with founding an inclusive post-segregationist polity. My main objective in this chapter is to complement the preceding historical and conceptual chapter by buttressing my thesis that the constitution visions of transcultural leaders were, in diverse but similar ways, visions borne of melancholia.

The main insight I wish to convey in this chapter is that even when these elites occupied state office they continued to elaborate terms of homemaking that did not constitute a rupture with the fundamental character of the original sin of settler colonisation. I have contended that the original sin in the constitution of South Africa is that of full belonging for the minority of citizens and disjunctive inclusions in respect of the majority of the population. I will demonstrate that this constitutive iniquity persists in the “post-Apartheid” era. This persistence is in spite of explicit and laudable attempts by “post-Apartheid” leaders to link constitution-making and nation-building processes to the project of
ending conditions that produce pariahdom and de-worlding nationally and globally. If in the previous chapter I focused more on the influence of colonialist discourse in shaping both the emergence of transcultural “natives” as well as their terms of resistance, in this chapter I shift the focus to the agency of these leaders to understand why they reiterated the fundamental terms of this discourse. I aim to show that the reason why these leaders reprised colonialist discourse and a situation of no-world is because they failed to exit the liminal zone, overcome melancholia and re-suture with home-culture. A fundamental requirement here is the ability to potentiate double consciousness. This route is Paget Henry’s proposal for how transcultural leaders could overcome alienation and internalised inferiorisation. This chapter and the contemporary constitution failures I outline here clear the ground for the next Part of the dissertation in which I offer the disalienating, homecoming, homemaking and uBuntu-inspired constitution visions of Es’kia Mphahlele, Steve Biko and Abahlali baseMjondolo.

I start the inquiry in the present era with an exploration of the disjuncture between, on the one hand, the goals of Thabo Mbeki’s “African Renaissance” and “unity-in-diversity” constitution-making and nation-building projects; and on the other hand, contemporary lived experiences of pariahdom, unhomeliness, and worldlessness. After locating Mbeki’s philo-praxis in the Pan-Africanism tradition, in section two I try to make sense of the aforementioned neo-colonial outcomes by exploring the impulse behind Pan-Africanist homemaking and world-making endeavours. Through an intellectual biography of W.E.B. Du Bois, I will investigate whether Pan-Africanist constitution-makers ever succeed in what I show are their avowed goals of overcoming internal alienation and exiting the liminal world in order to (re)constitute the world. Du Bois interests me because he is the main progenitor of twentieth-century Pan-Africanism and its politics of redemptive returns and reclamation of world belongingness. More pertinently, Du Bois deserves extensive study because his manifesto of how people of African descent can defy the “colour line,” achieve liberation and thus attain world belongingness directly influenced New Africans of South Africa. In section three, I return to South Africa to show that the main bequests of the constitution legacy of Pan-Africanism, as elaborated and implemented by Mbeki, are elite nationalism, lack of national consciousness, and thus the persistence of “native” pariahdom and worldlessness. The final chapter will offer Abahlali’s counter-hegemonic vision of constitution and belonging. Drawing on and transcending visions initially formulated by Mphahlele (chapter 3) and Biko (chapter 4), Abahlali’s on-going struggle is a struggle to de.constitute the current world in which the majority of inhabitants continue to experience homelessness, unhomeliness, rootlessness and worldlessness. Therefore, whereas this final chapter of Part I presents elite praxes of constitution and belonging, the final chapter of Part II counters with a non-elite praxis for the realisation of the Mayibuye desideratum; the exigency of re-membering and remaking the triadic world.
2.1 Neo-Apartheid and Cultural Liminality in Thabo Mbeki’s New South Africa

In May 1996, the Constitutional Assembly of South Africa’s first democratically-constituted parliament finally reached agreement on the text of the “Final Constitution”. Constitution-makers were quick to proclaim that the adoption of the Constitutional Bill marks, “…the birthday to the South African rainbow nation” and that, “[t]his is the day South Africa is truly born” (Cyril Ramaphosa cited in Oswin 2007: 96). The epigraph at the head of this chapter is an extract from a speech that Thabo Mbeki, then deputy president to Nelson Mandela, gave when he addressed parliament on that occasion. As is clear from that extract, Mbeki used that occasion to draw a link between the putatively new foundational law and what for him were unfolding processes of post-Apartheid belonging and becoming.

The enduring brilliance of Mbeki’s speech lies in the fact that Mbeki did not aver much with regard to the text of the Constitutional Bill or what the process of its drafting and adoption heralded for the consolidation of democracy. Rather, Mbeki used this occasion to, firstly, assert that the Final Constitution will consolidate the process of nation-becoming and that in this regard autochthony, migration, and settler-invasion should now be considered immaterial historical factors. Secondly, Mbeki’s performative utterance was a declaration that the Final Constitution of the new South Africa signals the death of the Manichaean world. In its ruins will rise a post-racial world characterised by an all-embracing, hybrid conception of Africanness.

Mbeki’s appropriation of an identity (an identity that, as Mudimbe showed in the previous chapter, was invented by the order of knowledge of colonisation as the negative figure of the Same) was a gesture of deconstruction, resistance to de-worlding, and a staging of re-existence in the world. In what ways did Mbeki assert this reclamation of belonging in the world? In the first place, Mbeki submitted that the new constitution must indeed be a constitution in the sense of constituting a home to which all members of the “rainbow nation” could belong. In addition to the constitution facilitating inclusive homemaking and thus ending the state(s) of disjunctive inclusions and homelessness, Mbeki seemed to argue that the constitution will also bring to end the other three outcomes of settler constitution-making and concomitant pariahdom; namely, namelessness, unhomeliness, and rootlessness. Thus, secondly, Mbeki’s declaration that no one can contest his assertion that “I am an African,” the opposite of being an Invisible Man, was an attempt to counter namelessness, depersonalisation, and invisibility inherent in official colonialist designations such as Kaffir, Native, Bantu and the Black. Mbeki the politician assumed the mantle of a traditional praise poet to proclaim that he knows who he is and what his place in the world is.

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11 The current constitution of South Africa is commonly referred to as the Final Constitution because it replaced the Interim Constitution that was in force between 1993 and 1996.
Thirdly, and related to the foregoing, in Mbeki’s worldview political independence and collective processes of nation-building are occasions to end both the State and a state of unhomeliness. This is because these processes will unfold under a framework of a constitution that, for him, is homegrown, homemaking and thus not uncanny. In this regard, Mbeki also reminded the world that being a transcultural person he has co-constituted the settler-imposed world even if this world sought to unhome him and turn him into a liminal being. Finally, Mbeki’s mobilisation and owning of the multifaceted history of conflict, complicity, resistance, of western modernity, Pan-Africanism, and, more significantly, of cosmopolitan relations and hybrid identities formed, if repudiated, in the settler colony were declarations of intent to terminate states of, real or imagined, rootlessness of historically colonised and enslaved peoples. Understood in this way, it is clear that for Mbeki the Final Constitution of the “new” South Africa was absolutely fundamental to the task of terminating ‘Native Life in South Africa’.

Mbeki’s personal gesture of self-definition and self-reclamation of world belongingness preceded by a year his introduction of a collective self-definition and self-discovery programme. He termed this programme the African Renaissance programme. Mbeki (2002a: 72) outlined the rationale for this national programme as follows: “We speak about the need for the African Renaissance in part so that we ourselves, and not another, determine who we are, what we stand for, what our vision and hopes are, how we do things…” An important point to note here is that with this official programme Mbeki also proposed that the project of constitution-making must always be supplemented by and undergirded by a national ideology and a cultural rediscovery project if it is to be faithful to the holistic (that is, on all three realms) imperatives of Mayibuye iAfrika. How did Mbeki’s African Renaissance seek to achieve this three-fold re-membering Africa?

Firstly, Mbeki linked the imperative of post-colonial re-humanisation with the project of reconstituting the material world explaining that within the framework of the African Renaissance poverty eradication and material development go together with, “the assertion of our pride as human beings…” (Mbeki, 2002f: 125). Secondly, Mbeki posited that this national programme and its goals of African self-definition and self-discovery are means of countering colonialist discourses and its Manichean social world. Mbeki thus argued that, “the only manner of reclaiming and recovering our self-identity, self-respect and self-worth [is to] correct the distortion that we are subhuman” (cited in Gevisser, 2007: 323).

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12 This goal also applied to descendants of colonists. In this regard, in praise of The Native Intelligence of Thabo Mbeki (2007: 65) Ronald Suresh Roberts asserts that the impulse behind Mbeki’s poem-speech is “native magnanimity”. Roberts is, however, quick to add that Mbeki’s magnanimity is not a blank cheque. Rather it is a gesture that demands white people to root themselves in Africa: “…at the heart of Mbeki’s magnanimity is also an appeal for contemporary whites to move from living ‘on’ Africa, to a life ‘in’ Africa” (ibid.).
Finally, and above all, Mbeki implied that programme of African Renaissance was geared towards “the spiritual strivings” that Du Bois spoke of. In this regard, Mbeki thus proposed that, “the beginning of our rebirth as a Continent must be our own re-discovery of our soul…a journey of self-discovery and the restoration of our own self-esteem” (Mbeki cited in Gevisser, 2007: 323). Therefore, for Mbeki and proponents of the African Renaissance, resurrecting Africa and realising the rebirth of Africans were necessary if the maladies of double consciousness, psychic alienation, and spiritual exile were to be overcome. Understood in this way, Mbeki’s (re)constitution vision aimed to counter the historical de-wording of Africans on all these three pivotal realms. More importantly, and similar to Plaatje, Mbeki insisted that the only decisive way Africans could achieve reclamation of worldly belongingness was if they mounted a frontal attack on colonialist discourses and their ‘invisibilising’ narratives. Mbeki thus urged Africans to rebel against these discourses by rediscovering and celebrating their own histories and by insisting on their immemorial belongingness-in-the-world. Counter-archiving will prove that Africans were not historically or naturally outcasts of the world. He put it in the following way: “Africa’s history, her culture, her works of art [have] the possibility to communicate the message that none need to think that anyone of us is anything other than part of one interdependent humanity” (2002a: 100).

For Mbeki, then, the emancipatory spirit of Mayibuye iAfrika dictated that the rebirth of the world of South African “natives” should be linked to the rebirth of Africa. Therefore, if the foundational law of the new South Africa and the national programme of African Renaissance were means of dismantling the world of apartheid domestically, in its guise as a lynchpin of Mbeki’s continental diplomatic policy the African Renaissance was geared towards ending a situation Mbeki dubbed “global apartheid” (cited in Bond, 2013: xi). Towards this end, Mbeki formulated a continental programme entitled the Millennium Partnership for the African Recovery Programme (the MAP). With the MAP Mbeki sought to re-imagine and remap Africa’s place in the world with the aim of forging new terms for the re-integration of Africa into the global economy and ‘the world’ (Mbeki, 2001: n.p.). Subsequently, Mbeki merged his MAP with the then Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo’s Omega Plan to create the New African Initiative. In 2001, under the aegis of this Initiative the self-explanatory New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) was established.

It should be clear from this brief introduction why Mbeki – who was singularly influential in crafting the image, vision, ideology, and institutional framework of the “new” South Africa as de facto prime minister during the Mandela presidency and again as the country’s president from 1999 to 2008 - is a person of interest for my main thesis. Mbeki is a meaningful figure because returning to South Africa after almost forty years in physical exile he sought to link the intersecting “post-Apartheid” imperatives of constitution (reconciliation, “unity in diversity,” equal rights for all, and post-segregationist nation-
building) with those of belonging (universal citizenship, hybrid Africanness, Pan-Africanism, and a renewed integration of Africans into ‘the world’).

However, in 2008 Mbeki’s presidency ended in humiliation when his party recalled him from office. Mbeki’s party opponents accused him of, amongst other things, manipulating state institutions against his party rivals; of alienating “the masses;” and crucially, of being a “black Englishman in tweed jackets” given to quoting Shakespeare and W.B. Yeats to befuddle detractors (Gevisser, 2008: 735). Mbeki’s erstwhile allies also accused him of working with World Bank consultants to parachute in a Washington Consensus-aligned macroeconomic policy framework that had deepened socio-economic inequalities and entrenched the inherited world of apartness. Even more significantly, in 2008 pervasive Afrophobic attitudes against non-nationals from other parts of Africa finally boiled over into nationwide pogroms in which 62 people were killed. Mbeki’s project of inaugurating a rebirth and a renewal of the polity to make it a place in which the ex-conquered no longer felt like pariahs ended, therefore, in a catastrophe.

What went wrong? As I have outlined briefly above, critics levelled two types of criticism against Mbeki: a critique related to his disconnected personality and a critique of his socio-economic policies. One set of critics pointed to Mbeki’s alleged aloofness and alienating style of leadership. These critics reproached Mbeki for suffering from illusions of grandeur in that he believed that he is, “erudite, intellectual, a philosopher-king” who would descent from on high to save the benighted masses (Seepe, 2002: n.p.). Drawing from the discussion in the preceding chapter, the criticism here was that Mbeki was a disconnected elite suffering from double consciousness. Mbeki’s most vociferous critics asserted that the bedrock of Mbeki’s proposed social contract (the Growth, Employment, and Redistribution programme, “GEAR”) was a neoliberal programme that deepened black poverty thus contradicting Mbeki’s self-declared mission of dismantling the inherited world of apartness. Indeed, Mbeki had in 1996 observed that South Africa remained a country of two nations: “one of these nations is white, relatively prosperous…The second and larger nation of South Africa is black and poor...” (Mbeki, 1998: 68-70). In practice, Mbeki’s “reverse GEAR” (as detractors labelled it) controverted this correct analysis. This neo-liberal policy also rendered constitutional promises of social justice and substantive equality hollow. Mbeki’s detractors thus concluded that his African Renaissance flagship programme was, “...not curative but palliative, calculated to distract South Africans from what really ails them: grinding poverty, increasing unemployment, crumbling social services; an ever-increasing gap between rich and poor” (Givisser, 2007: 325).

Similar to their domestic counterparts, Mbeki’s continental critics contended that his continental projects of renewal and reclamation of belongingness-in-the-world (the African Renaissance, the NEPAD programme, and the nascent African Union which he played a leading role creating)
perpetuated neo-colonialism and “global apartheid”. These critics alleged that Mbeki worked with North-based consultants to impose market-based reforms with the intention of making Africa attractive to new forms of imperial exploitation (Bond, 2003: 14-16). If the objectives behind Mbeki’s continental policy was to usher in Africa’s rebirth and dismantle “global apartheid,” critics retorted that in reality Mbeki had supplied “…a glossy, New South Africa ‘shine’ to the chains of global apartheid” (Bond, 2003: xi). Ultimately, similar to his domestic critics, Mbeki’s continental critics focused on Mbeki’s personality. They bemoaned the fact that Mbeki’s major flaw was that he was an alienated and alienating leader; or as per the sub-title of Adekeye Adebajo’s book, Mbeki was Africa’s Philosopher King (2016b).

To sum up, Mbeki did not succeed in his self-declared goals of (re)constituting South Africa to become a land where the historically excluded and estranged could also feel a sense of material and affective belongingness. Adebajo (2016a: n.p.) thus surmises that, “Mbeki’s dream of Africa’s renaissance belied South Africa’s schizophrenia” and that by the time Mbeki was removed from office a defining trait of South Africa was a sense of “cultural limbo”. In a phrase, Mbeki’s new South Africa was still a space of namelessness, homelessness, unhomeliness, and rootlessness.

2.2 The Melancholic Impulse behind Pan-Africanist Homemaking and World-Remaking Agendas

I argue that Mbeki’s failure to contribute to the re-constitution of South Africa and to ‘resurrecting Africa’ is illustrative of a predicament that assails most transcultural Pan-Africanist leaders as I will demonstrate in this section. Their predicament is that their militant rhetoric of collective self-definition, self-discovery, and the crafting of a self-steering “Black World” belie the fact that they are still overwhelmed by the Du Boisian problematic of double consciousness. The preceding discussion points to the fact that Mbeki’s interrelated projects of resistance, self-definition and re-existence were natural engagements with what Du Bois termed the “spiritual strivings” of conquered and enslaved peoples. As Plaatje hints with his approving reference to Du Bois’s work, Du Bois suggested that the end of these strivings would be reached when the world has been reconstituted on the spiritual, social, and material planes. This is an agenda that Mbeki embraced and sought to pursue. My main objective in this section is to explore whether this Du Boisian manifesto of constitution and belonging facilitates an overcoming of liminality and the attendant problematic of double consciousness or whether this framework is still impelled by racial melancholia and thus unable to inspire quests for the re-manifestation of a world of plural co-existence. Du Bois’s pioneering manifesto will serve as a comparator vis-à-vis the constitution visions I advance in Part II of this dissertation. In particular, Du Bois’s manifold home-seeking quests and constitution visions serve as an entry point to my exploration of the impulse behind transcultural
elites’ quests to reconstitute their polities and to remake the world. I will compare and contrast this impulse with that of Mphahlele, Biko, and *Abahlali* in Part II.

### 2.2.1 The Du Boisian manifesto

We would recall that Du Bois elaborated his theory of double consciousness in the context of an anti-black world that had both made black Americans and repudiated them. In these circumstances, Du Bois posited that the hybrid identity of black Americans was a curse – a doubleness that rather than resulting in self-consciousness splits the psyche and divides consciousness. It bears emphasising that this situation was particularly uncanny for those black Americans who, as Du Bois (1986a: 492) would have it, had been “uplifted” to the standard of “American civilisation”. These “uplifted” individuals existed in two worlds: one world composed of racially discriminated people whose habits, customs, and ideals were shaped by the memory of slavery and institutionalised discrimination; and another world, “which I came to call the white world” (Du Bois, 1986a: 653). A transcultural black person was denied both belonging and humanity in the latter dominant world: “I was not an American; I was not a man… [but simply] a coloured man in a white world,” Du Bois lamented (ibid). According to Du Bois (1986a: 681), an educated black person was, therefore, a person alienated from both the white world and the black world; a creature not belonging to both worlds but existing in a “double environment”.

Existing not so much in two worlds but in an unhomely space, the ‘liminalised’ person had to grapple with internal contradictions that manifested as, “two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings, two warring ideals in one dark body” (Du Bois, 1986a: 364-365). The spiritual striving of a “coloured man” was thus a striving against this doubleness. This doubleness caused inner and external alienation as the hybrid-liminal figure struggled with both what he or she was (a person or a ‘coloured man’) and who he or she was (a Negro or an American? Or was he or she both?). In his 1897 milestone discourse on belonging, identity, and constitution Du Bois posed this riddle in the following terms:

> What after all, am I? Am I an American or am I a Negro? Can I be both? Or is it my duty to cease to be a Negro as soon as possible and be an American? If I strive as a Negro, am I not perpetuating the very cleft that threatens and separates black and white America? Is it not my only possible practical aim the subduction of all that is Negro in me to the American? (Du Bois, 1986i: 821)

As is clear, this question is also an inquiry into nationality, nationhood and racial justice. In *The Souls of Black Folks (The Souls)* (1903), Du Bois will argue that the end of spiritual striving can be found in a third path beyond historical calls for “Black Zionism” and assimilation. The task, as Du Bois saw it, was not to seek conjunction with Africanness to the exclusion or suppression Africanness. Neither is the ideal to cease being a Negro and seek to become an American. Rather, the disalienating quest was to become, “both a Negro and an American” (1986a: 365). However, Du Bois found that the
constitutional landscape and social attitudes prevented a subjugated transcultural person from enjoying a, “proud, enduring hyphenation” (Lewis, 1993: 281) in a “multiracial democratic America” (West, 1999: 97). The resultant states of homelessness and unhomeliness were often encapsulated in this cry of pariahs: “Why did God make me an outcast and a stranger in mine own house?” (Du Bois, 1986a: 364-365). Being in this state of internalised and external non-belonging the colonised mind of the transcultural person - unlike the “uncolonised mind” of a non-modern person (Nandy: 2011: 72) - is forced to confront this exilic condition. Du Bois’s own spiritual striving(s) would take him from walking the hallowed corridors of Harvard University as one of the first black American PhD candidates to a transformative sojourn in Germany to being buried on African soil in independent Ghana as a revered pioneer of the Black Diasporan/Pan-African World. Du Bois’s quests included the seemingly paradoxical identities of being a Europhile cosmopolitan, a tactical Black Nationalist, an internationalist of ‘the darker races of the world’, and a Marxist cosmopolitan.

This brings us back to my tentative typology of the options available to a person produced as pariah. In the introductory chapter, I proposed a typology comprised of the following three paths: (i) to seek further acculturation and thus assimilation into the dominant house; (ii) to adopt a fugitive stance with the intention of arrogating the fruits of the hegemonic house without seeking to be part of it; and (iii) to undertake ‘voluntary’ physical exile with the intention of returning as a revolutionary determined to dismantle the master’s house. I will relate this provisional typology to Du Bois’s vision of emancipation.

It should be clear that Du Bois’s proposed third path eschewed the traditional accomoditionist posture most notably typified by Booker T. Washington. Du Bois’s constitution vision was also at odds with Frederick Douglass’s later vision of “radical assimilationism” (cited in Lewis, 1993: 356). To gain a better understanding of Du Bois’s response to the existential riddle he posed above and to accurately trace the evolution of his seminal manifesto we would need to take a step back to a time before Du Bois proposed this hyphenated solution (the Negro-American proposal).

Whereas in The Souls (1903) Du Bois seemed to reject an assimilative immigrant deportment (the first possibility in my typology), his answer to his 1897 riddle was still very ambivalent. In that 1897 speech, “The Conservation of Races” (The Conservation”), Du Bois (1986i: 815) strenuously postulated that white people and black people are members of two distinct races of differing blood and history. The struggle and destiny of black American was, therefore, “not absorption by the white Americans” (Du Bois, 1986i: 820. Original emphasis). Rather, the distinct mission of black Americans was to conserve their race and in that way to be in a position to make a unique contribution to the USA nation.

Du Bois’s ambivalence and contradictions become evident when we consider his vacillations regarding the nature of black identity and black belonging. On the one hand, he claimed that the “black race” is
intrinsically American: “We are Americans, not only by birth and by citizenship, but by our political ideals, our language, our religion. Further than that, our Americanism does not go” (Du Bois, 1986i: 822). ‘Further than that,’ black Americans belonged to a membership of a “vast historic race” made of different blood, history, and culture and must, therefore, constitute themselves into a separate race in an equal and democratic USA (ibid.). On the other hand, Du Bois also implied that the black “race” is a separate “nation”. To this end, he posited that if there is broad agreement about the country’s laws, language, and religion and if economic justice is guaranteed, “there is no reason why, in the same country and on the same street, two or three great national ideals might not thrive and develop…” (Du Bois, 1986i; 821-822). Du Bois’s manifold vacillations makes it difficult to work out what “America” was to Du Bois: was it a nation, a country, a race, a culture, or a world? As we shall see in the next Part of the dissertation, the answer to this question is pivotal in the formulation of struggles of de-constitution and (re-)constitution. It would seem that the 1897 Du Bois believed that “America” was a country and a world constituted by two main races with irreconcilable identities. In this country and world, the black race was subjugated and pushed below the line of the human. For Du Bois, it was, therefore, important for “the black race” to take pride in their race, conserve it, and strive for constitutional and legislative amendments that will assure for them equal belonging in a multiracial USA (see Du Bois’s proposed Academy Creed: 1986i: 825). It is interesting to point out that already in 1897, Du Bois displayed Pan-Africanist sensibilities. This is because Du Bois (1986i: 820) disclosed that his long-term wish was for the black race in the USA to conserve its racial identity so as to make its unique contribution to the USA society and in that way become “the advance guard” of “Pan-Negroism” worldwide. However, Du Bois was not clear what ought to happen to this race of ‘different blood and history’ when all these objectives have been achieved.

In the same year that Du Bois made this proposal (a proposal that could be understood as that of multiracialism, multi-nationalism, and multiculturalism) Du Bois published his most famous essay, “Strivings of the Negro People.” He would later retitle it as “Of Our Spiritual Strivings” (“Strivings”) and include it as the lead essay in the The Souls. With this widely-circulated and cited essay, Du Bois established himself as the premier intellectual concerned with the exilic condition of Americans of African descent. A shift in Du Bois’s constitution vision can be discerned in this essay. In this essay, Du Bois proposed that the end of the strivings of the ‘Negro race’ would be attained when socio-legal attitudes and constitutional arrangements are transformed in a way that would enable black people to assume a hyphenated identity and belonging; that is, to become Negro-Americans. Whereas in “The Conservation” Du Bois adopted the prevailing scientific method of the study of races; in “Strivings” he adopted an existential-phenomenological approach to the study of racism and the structural denial of black belonging. This approach enabled Du Bois to re-examine and eschew his conservationist manifesto. His focus shifted to tracing exactly when and how he “lost” his belonging to the mainstream USA world and to confront the psychosocial impacts of living behind the veil. This personal reckoning
would put him in a position to valorise his identity and fight for his right as a co-constitutive creator of the USA world.

Du Bois thus opened “Strivings” with the following meditation on pariahdom and worldlessness: “Between me and the other world there is ever an unasked question…How does it feel to be a problem?” (Du Bois: 1986a: 363). In his unique threnodic tone Du Bois informed the reader that the sudden realisation that he was not of the USA world dawned on him in a wooden schoolhouse when a white girl rejected his advances. It was then that he realised that he was, “shut out from their world by a vast veil” (Du Bois, 1986a: 364). He was a being entombed behind ‘the veil’. Furthermore, and consequently, he came to realise that existence behind the veil deprived him of identity and self-consciousness. This is because the dominant world, “only lets him see himself through the revelation of the other world” (Du Bois, 1986a: 364). This realisation led to a crucial insight. The insight was that the foremost spiritual striving of a behind-the-veil creature is a striving, “to attain self-conscious manhood” (Du Bois, 1986a: 365). We can discern a decisive shift in perspectives between “The Conservation” and “Strivings”. In the latter essay, his concerns extended beyond racial subjugation and the conservation of ‘the race’ as a means of resistance. In “Strivings,” Du Bois conveyed an appreciation of the fact that subjugated persons often lacked subjectivity and identity. Therefore, the struggle for constitution and belonging had to start there. I would like to suggest that this is the first crucial insight of the Du Boisian manifesto. The insight here is that before striving to de-constitute and (re)constitute the world, the would-be leader ought to first return to himself or herself.

As I have already hinted, the existential questions inherent in strivings for disalienation are questions of namelessness, rootlessness, homelessness, and unhomeliness. They are, in other words, questions of constitution and belonging in the terms I have so far laid out. A close reading of Du Bois’s constitution vision reveals that the resolution of the latter questions rested on three pillars: (i) the struggle to overcome the internalised condition of alienation which manifests in a doubled and thus divided consciousness; (ii) the quest to valorise “Negroness,” and subsequently Pan-African identity; and concurrently (iii) campaigns for constitutional and international law reforms to reconstitute the world in order to guarantee, in practice, universal citizenship rights. The first two pillars are interlinked in that a subjugated person can only overcome liminality and double consciousness when he or she refuses assimilation and thus self-renunciation. This move is dependent on a revalorisation of “Negroness” that is shown to not be inferior, or superior, to any race or identity. Having reclaimed his or her own humanity as a self-conscious person (the ‘what’ imperative), a subjugated but coming-into-self-consciousness person would then be in a position to persecute the struggle against enforced racialisation and concomitant pariahdom. Only then could the exiled person be in a position to assert equal belongingness as a citizen of the world (the ‘who’ exigency).
I aim to undertake two tasks in the rest of this section. First, I will take what I regard as the three pillars of the Du Boisian manifesto—disalienation, rediscovery and valorisation of group identity, and the struggle to remake the world—in turns in order to tease out the Du Boisian legacy. Secondly, I will outline what I regard as the pitfalls of the Du Boisian manifesto. My main contention will be that although Du Bois’s tripartite gesture of belonging and constitution is valuable, and perhaps indispensable; in execution, Du Bois bequeathed to Pan-Africanist leaders a model of a philosopher-king constitutionalist.

2.2.2.1 The first pillar of the Du Boisian manifesto: overcoming psychic alienation and regaining personhood

Du Bois’s first insight was that behind-the-veil people lack self-consciousness because they have internalised racist stereotypes about themselves. In Du Bois’s own case, he was not conscious of the material reality of the veil when he was growing up. He recalled that, “the colour line was manifest and yet not absolutely drawn” (Lewis, 1993: 18). His initial reaction to the awareness that he existed behind the veil was not to try to dismantle the veil or to assimilate into the world beyond the veil. Instead, he sought to soar high above ‘the veil’ by living, “above it in a region of blue sky and great wandering shadows” (Du Bois, 1986a: 364). This precocious black boy graduated at the top of his predominately-white high school class, received his first degree at a leading black university (Fisk University), and was admitted to Harvard University. However, Du Bois will later realise that this transcendental posture—beyond supine assimilation and maddened insurgency—was quixotic and actually perpetuating of worldlessness. Du Bois confessed that this was the case because, “…for the worlds I longed for, and all their dazzling opportunities were theirs, not mine” (1986a: 364. My emphasis). The lived experience of daily racial slights, denial of life opportunities and of being prohibited from using certain public amenities forced Du Bois to realise that he was just a highly educated person still imprisoned within and by the veil.

This realisation brought about another awareness. The awareness was that the experience of being interned on the underside of the world came with its own advantages. Specifically, this positionality and subjectivity proved advantageous for the elaboration of inventive solutions regarding the (re)constitution of society. This is because a person who exists behind the veil is gifted with an ability to see the world from a unique perspective. Du Bois described this gift as a gift of “second sight” (1986a: 364). As I will demonstrate throughout the course of this dissertation, ‘second sight’ is an indispensable instrument for voyages of disalienation and for projects of world de-constitution and (re)constitution. This is because ‘second sight’ serves both external and internal functions. Externally, this gift facilitates a re-evaluation of the world from its margins and borders. Such a standpoint can enable the racial melancholic to realise that what he or she thought he or she has lost and what he or
she assumed he ought to desire is in reality repugnant. Such a realisation can lead to an elaboration of a post-assimilationist constitution vision. Internally, and related to this external function, ‘second sight’ can empower the racialised figure to recognise that their consciousness is structured by the white gaze and its anti-black colonialist discourse. Such a recognition may cause a racialised person to appreciate that his or her “self-apprehension” is, to a significant extent, determined from without. More importantly, such an understanding makes it possible for the subjugated person to realise that politics of race consciousness are nonsensical because race consciousness, at this juncture, may be a consciousness that is imposed from without. Consequently, to overcome racial melancholia and to attain self-conscious personhood a subjugated person would need to cease seeing himself or herself through the gaze of the dominant world. The first task in the struggle for constitution and belonging is thus the twin striving for disalienation and attainment of self-consciousness. I propose this task as the first pillar of the Du Boisian manifesto for constitution and belonging.

Du Bois suggested that one way of sharpening ‘second sight’ is via education. It should, however, be obvious that if the main route towards bringing this potential gift to fruition is through (hegemonic forms of) education and pedagogy, then ‘second sight’ is itself a double-edged sword. As we saw in the previous chapter, this is because formal education and dominant pedagogy are often geared towards entrenching the internalisation of colonialist discourse. The route of education could, therefore, lead to further psychic alienation and loss of identity. Despite these risks, Du Bois’s life journey indicates that this route has the potential to enable a person of divided consciousness to overcome internalised inferiority, attain self-conscious selfhood, and begin to realise that to belong to the world he or she must be himself or herself. Indeed, Du Bois found that the long journey of education, “…at least gave leisure for reflection and self-examination; it changed the child of Emancipation to the youth with dawning self-consciousness, self-realisation, self-respect” (Du Bois, 1986a: 368). “In those sombre forests of his striving,” Du Bois continued, “his own soul rose before him, and he saw himself – darkly as through a veil; and yet he saw in himself some faint revelation of his power, of his mission” (Du Bois, 1986a: 368). That mission was that he would need to rediscover himself if he was stage full belonging to the world (ibid.). From this disalienated standpoint, the racialised figure can then begin the process of identity-formation, and consequently, be in a better position to prosecute the struggle to de-constitute the world. 13

13 This move can also be discerned in Aimé Césaire’s A Tempest (1969); a rewriting of Shakespeare’s The Tempest. Césaire’s Caliban deploys ‘second sight’ to refuse the lie of colonialist discourse, to come back to himself, and thus initiate the process of decentering his subjugator:

Prospero, you’re a great magician:
you’re an old hand at deception.
And you lied to me so much,
about the world, about myself,
that you ended up by imposing on me
an image of myself:
2.2.2.2 The second and third pillars of the Du Boisian manifesto: Inventing group identity and (re)constituting the world

Black people’s historical experiences of homelessness, unhomeliness, namelessness, and rootedness impel them towards quests to reconfigure their group identity. As we saw in the section above, this was the inspiration behind Mbeki’s projects of self-definition and rebirth. In this reconfiguration, blackness or Africanness move from being an imposed niggerised or kaffirised identity towards a proud, self-asserted identity. Paget Henry explains the necessity for this move as well as the link between the first and the second pillars in the following words:

DuBoisian double consciousness results from the Africana subject having to exist for a self-consciousness that racialised itself as white…With regard to the psyche, the new division was created by the shattering and contesting of the “We” or the collective identity of the Africana subject. It was shattered by the caricature image of “the negro” as the polar opposite of “the white” that existed and continues to exist in the mind of the European and the Euro-American (Henry, 2006: 6).

It, therefore, becomes imperative for the becoming-self-conscious person to resist and disavow an imposed group identity. This refusal must necessarily involve an invocation of a proud history of immemorial belonging-in-the-world and of being a co-contributor to human civilisation. Similar to the move Césaire’s Caliban enacts in A Tempest, the aim of such an undertaking is to implode an internalised sense of inferiority, historical invisibility, and ‘nobodyness’. As I will demonstrate throughout this dissertation, a proud group identity can be homely and world-securing. Relatedly, I will show that an evocation of a particular, but not particularised, group consciousness is indispensable to the projects of homemaking, of forging a creolising national consciousness, and eventually for an elaboration of a global consciousness and belonging.

Let us come back to Du Bois. In the period between the late 1800s and the early 1900s, Du Bois deployed the fruits of ‘second sight’ to realise the three pillars of his vision of constitution and belonging. After PhD studies and intense periods of personal transformation in the USA and in Germany, Du Bois felt empowered enough to declare that he had discovered his “manhood”. He subsequently made it his mission to “uplift” the black race and to forge Pan-Negro consciousness. The publication and reception of The Souls in 1903 brought Du Bois to national prominence. In that same

underdeveloped, in your words, undercompetent that’s how you made me see myself!
And I hate that image...and it’s false!
But now I know you, you old cancer,
And I also know myself! (Césaire, 1992: 64).
year, he published a programme outlining the responsibility of educated/“college-bred” Negroes. In this essay, “The Talented Tenth”, he insisted that black educated people should, “…be made leaders of thought and missionaries of culture among their people” (Du Bois, 1986d: 861). In 1904 he published “Credo,” his second landmark statement of belonging and constitution. Du Bois’s “Credo” was a rejection of Booker Washington’s strategy of gradual racial equality, a reiteration of his belief in the existence of two equal races which, however, are “made of one blood,” and a proclamation of his belief, “…in pride of race and lineage and self”. Du Bois also went on to assert the non-negotiable “Negro demand” for universal political and civil rights to enable the full integration of black Americans into the USA polity.

To fulfil this vision, in 1905 Du Bois organised the first USA-based civil rights movement of the twentieth century in the form of the Niagara Movement. He also began putting together plans for *Encyclopaedia Africana* from 1909 with the intention of bringing together his civil rights campaign work with the work of achieving historical rediscovery, group consciousness, Pan-African awareness, and thus the affective upliftment of black Americans. He co-founded the National Negro Committee (later called the National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People, “the NAACP”) in 1909. In 1910, he became the NAACP’s Director of Publications and Research charged with editing the trailblazing and very influential *Crisis: A Record of Darker Peoples* magazine. He published *The Negro*, a sweeping study and a spirited defence of African and African-American history and civilisations, in 1915. From 1919, Du Bois increasingly combined his national civil rights advocacy work and his pan-Negro consciousness-raising project with that of Pan-African consciousness-forging and liberation. To this end, he took charge of organising Pan-African Congresses assuring his followers that the struggle of Africans on the continent and of people of African descent globally were linked in that the political liberation of the former is crucial for black American psychological confidence, spiritual belonging, and group consciousness (Lewis, 1993: 565). We can surmise that Du Bois’s sought to use his formidable intellect and moral courage to almost singlehandedly mould and valorise Pan-Negro and Pan-African identities and consciousness. He sought to deploy ‘second sight’ and the benefits of personal self-discovery to conscientise and to invent a proud black identity with the hope of reforming the USA and the world. The three pillars of Du Bois’s philo-praxis coalesced in this manner.

However, Du Bois was not able to spark a mass movement, or in reality shape the racial consciousness of the majority of black Americans. The collapse of The Niagara Movement is an example of the limitation of Du Bois’s praxis. The Movement folded after only five meetings. Elliot M. Rudwick has argued that this organisation became defunct because, “the doctrine of the talented tenth…. isolated its members from the masses psychologically and ideologically and encouraged ‘an empyrean view’ of human rights…” (cited in Rampersad, 1990: 99). Transcultural elites’ assessment of human rights was empyrean because it was not premised on the idea that rights found in the constitution must be fought
for through mass mobilisation and direct actions. This view dovetailed with the Talented Tenth’s belief that positively enshrined rights and existing institutions were enough to secure the being-belonging of black Americans.

2.2.3 The pitfalls of the Du Boisian manifesto

2.2.2.1 The first critique of the Du Boisian manifesto: An assimilative vision

This “empyrean view” reveals a crucial aspect of the Du Boisian manifesto, and it provides a source of my first critique. My first critique of the Du Boisian manifesto is that Du Bois and his fellow Talented Tenth travellers considered the USA, as country and as a polity, to be legitimate and desirable. For these civil rights agitators, all that was missing were processes of desegregation and integration. Hence the Movement made the following demand and affirmation in its 1906 Declaration: “We claim for ourselves every single right that belongs to a freeborn American...The battle we wage is not for ourselves alone but for all true Americans...” (cited in Lewis, 1993: 330). It is in this regard that Cornel West (1999: 97) discerns that one of the foundations of Du Bois’s political philosophy is “American optimism”. However, as Marcus Garvey (Du Bois’s bitterest rival in black quests for constitution and belonging) could have also pointed out, “American optimism – in the ugly face of American white-supremacist practices – warrants, if not outright rejection, at least vast attenuation” (West, 1999: 99).

My first critique in relation to what I regard as the third pillar of the Du Boisian manifesto ((re)constituting the polity and the world) is, therefore, that Du Bois’s emancipatory vision was not driven by the exigency of overhauling the whole edifice that is the USA. Du Bois believed that robust moral and intellectual critiques of racism and segregation, an appeal to the conscience of white liberals, and legally-sanctioned demands for civil and political rights would reform the polity and terminate the exilic status of black Americans. My contention is that such a constitution strategy is one marred by racial melancholia. Racial melancholia assails individuals who grew up thinking that they are of the white world or those who believed in promises of assimilation into whiteness. From the previous chapter, we would recall that racial melancholia is a concept that David L. Eng and Shinhee Han borrow from Freud’s elaboration of the distinction between mourning and melancholia. Freud explained that grief that is impelled by melancholia is unending because the patient knows the object that he or she has lost but does not know what exactly he or she has lost. Freud determines that what the patient has actually lost is the inner world of the psyche. Fanon invoked the example of the fictional character of Jean Veneuse to make sense of the ‘inner melancholia’ of these individuals. For Fanon, these ‘black skin-white mask’ figures suffer from internal alienation and external exile that manifest in a condition of abandonment neurosis. Finally, Freud and Fanon highlight the fact that these individuals are unable to
“reconstruct the world” because they are saddled with a persistent form of ambivalence as far as the object of grief is concerned.

As I have discussed in preceding passages, members of the Talented Tenth exhibited ambivalence as far as the hegemonic USA world was concerned. To be sure, the hyper-awareness of being Marginal and Invisible Men motored the constitution and belonging visions of these elites. The contention here is that, similar to their New Africans successors, the problematic of invisibility was the premier grievance of these transcultural leaders. To be explicit, my critique here is that the emancipatory vision of Du Bois and his fellow black elites was geared towards the being-belonging of black hybrid-liminal individuals. In this regard, commenting on the mainstream society’s embracing of Ellison’s The Invisible Man James Baldwin (2014: 147) asks: “Invisible to whom? Are we [black people] invisible to one another?” Understood from that perspective, as Baldwin (2014: 107) further implies, subjugated people who are obsessed with their felt experience of invisibility have as the horizon of their striving assimilation into a shallow and ethically-corrupt American life. Applying this to our critique, we may say that the message here is that Du Bois and the Talented Tenth’s constitution vision and terms of belonging flowed from their marginal existence and obsession with their own sense of invisibility.14 Theirs vision, similar to that of amakholwa and their grievance against the ‘segregation fallacy,’ was a reactive constitution vision emerging out of the liminal world.15 The contention here is that the telos of their constitution vision was less radically to (re)constitute society but to be visible in the dominant world.

The failure to elaborate a decolonial third pillar is linked to the failure, or reluctance, to reckon properly with the second pillar - the valorisation of actually-existing forms of belonging and identity of the ‘masses’ of subjugated people. Such a reckoning would enable an expansion of the emancipatory vision beyond elitist quest for recognition, visibility and integration into mainstream society. Following from this, it is clear that a prerequisite for realising all these three pillars is the willingness to reach beyond ‘second sight’. That is to say that if ‘second sight’ contributes to individual processes of disalienation and self-reclamation of personhood, an additional sight is required to contribute to the valorisation of group identity. An augmentation of ‘second sight’ would enable popular-democratic quests for the

14 Thus in the afterword to Larry Neal and LeRoi Jones’ (editors) Black Fire: An Anthology of Afro-American Writing (1968) Neal conceded that Invisible Man is a profound piece of writing. However, he went on to protest that the novel had only minimal resonance with the actual world of black people: “we know who we are, and we are not invisible, at least not to each other. We are not Kafkaesque creatures stumbling through a white light of confusion and absurdity” (cited in Rampersad, 2007: 452).
15 During the height of the flowering of Black Consciousness poetry in 1970s South Africa, Mafika Gwala (2009: 95) similarly sneered that, “Ralph Ellison lived a marginal existence with his white friends and came out with the idea he was an ‘invisible man’".
reconfiguration of group identity and an elaboration of a radical de-constitution and constitution agenda. Moreover, as we shall later see, popular-democratic quests are routes toward national consciousness and nation-becoming.

The first function of insurrectionary potentiation of ‘second sight’, to use Paget Henry’s characterisation (2012: 79), is, therefore, that such a potentiation shifts the strivings of historical subjugated people from a demand for “absorption” into the extant world (see the 1906 Second Declaration of Principles of the Niagara Movement) towards a popular and democratic struggle to end the world and its various abyssal lines. Henry (2006: 8) suggests that one way of achieving what he calls “potentiated second sight” or potentiated double consciousness is, “…through the recovery of a significant measure of first sight, that is, the ability to see oneself as an African as opposed to ‘the negro’ that the white mind was constantly producing and projecting”. Therefore, whereas the first pillar (overcoming internal alienation) is realised through enlivening the gift of ‘second sight’ through further formal education; the route towards achieving potentiated double consciousness is through staging a return to Africanness or Negroness. As I discussed in the introductory chapter, this two-fold gesture (overcoming liminality and double-consciousness and staging a ‘return’ to home-culture) also powers the constitution and belonging visions of all movements for rebirth of the African world.

2.2.3.2 The second critique of the Du Boisian manifesto: A salvationist forging of group identity

This brings us back to the riddle that is Du Bois. Similar to the roots and routes question that Countee Cullen asks of his “Heritage” (1925), Du Bois will later, in Dusk of Dawn (1940), wonder what Africa is to him. For our purposes, we need to take a prior step and ask: when Du Bois propagated for Negroness in the context of his proposal of a hyphenated identity, to what extent was he recovering his ‘first sight’? Put differently, in addition to asking what “America” is to Du Bois, we must first ask: what was Negro to/in Du Bois?

Firstly, we would recall that Du Bois claimed not to feel or experience the effects of the “colour line” when he was growing up. Du Bois (1986b: 638) also described the surrounding culture of his childhood

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16 In the opening stanza of this poem, Cullen (2005: 1443) – a prominent protagonist of the movement of Harlem Renaissance of the 1920s and, for a time, Du Bois’s son-in-law – poses the question in the following manner:

What is Africa to me:
Copper sun or scarlet sea,
Jungle star or jungle track,
Strong bronzed men, or regal black
Women from whose loins I sprang
When the birds of Eden sang?
One three centuries removed
From the scenes his fathers loved,
....What is Africa to me?
as, “…not African so much as Dutch and New England”. Furthermore, as David L. Lewis (1986: 53) points out in the first of his magisterial two-volume biography of Du Bois, in all his autobiographies Du Bois has little to say about the black community from whence he came. It is as if black people were a mystery to him. For instance, Du Bois recounts that he was repelled by the frenzy and outpouring of images when he visited a black church whilst a student at Fisk. As Cornel West (1999: 91) observes, it was as if Du Bois was, “an anthropologist visiting some strange and exotic people.” For his part, Du Bois (1986a: 681) confessed that formal education and social ambition engendered feelings of superiority in educated black people versus other black people.

Secondly, Lewis’s (1993: 148) insistence that Du Boisian scholars ought to forefront Du Bois’s “proud hybridisation” is a very significant intervention. Du Bois was proud of his mixed ‘racial heritage’. Thus when Du Bois applied for a grant to study in Germany he inserted a post-script explaining that he forgot to mention that he is, “…one half or more a Negro, and the rest French and Dutch” (cited in Lewis, 1986: 107, 120). In Darkwater: Voices from the Veil the fifty-year-old Du Bois foregrounded his hybrid origins announcing that he was born with, “a flood of Negro blood, a strain of French [and] a bit of Dutch…” (cited in Lewis, 1993: 26). What we have here then is a profile of a person who did not identify with a specific race. To be sure, there is nothing wrong with taking pride in “racial hybridisation”. What is of significance is not only that Du Bois did not regard himself as belonging to the world of ‘the black race”. The fact of the matter is that he held this world in slight derision. When he cast his eyes upon this world he saw, in contradistinction to the world of “the white races”, a mass of ignorance, disease and inefficiency in governance (Du Bois, 1986a: 681-682). As Cornel West points out, in Du Bois’s epoch-making work, The Souls, “…there are eighteen references to ‘black, backward, and ungraceful’ folk, including a statement of his intent to scatter civilisation among a people whose ignorance was ‘not simply of letters, but of life itself’” (West, 1999: 90).

The point here is that Du Bois’s appropriation and forging of Negroness was a reaction to rejection. His was an identity forged from within the liminal world of invisibility. Indeed, it was only in college that Du Bois became a Negro. At Fisk University Du Bois came across proud smart boys of, “my own world” (cited in Lewis, 1986: 64). “Henceforth,” Du Bois professed, “I was a Negro” (cited in Lewis, 1986: 72). From that moment onwards, Du Bois developed a quasi-religious faith in his race (Lewis, 1986: 66). Understood in this way, Du Bois’s missionary zeal with regards to the task of valorising black identity was a compensatory gesture that emerged from feelings of and a lived experience of estrangement from ordinary black people (Rampersad, 1990: 88). It would seem, therefore, that Du Bois’s fashioning of the second pillar was driven by feelings of melancholia and abandonment. These feelings had, indeed, caused what he identified as a nagging sense of “spiritual isolation” (cited in Lewis, 1993: 55-56).
The point of this excursion into Du Bois’s Negro-becoming is to, first of all, propose that Du Bois’s blackness was impelled by racial melancholia. Secondly, and more importantly, this excursion is important because it enables me to make the case that this locus of enunciation constrained the frame of Du Bois’s proposal for hyphenated identity and belonging. One pole of this proposed third path (American in Negro-American) was an external identity forged by mainstream society to the exclusion of black Americans. The other pole (Negro in Negro-American) was an invention and a conception framed by black American elites. Their locus of enunciation was thus a liminal space that E. Franklin Frazier in his famous study of The Black Bourgeoisie (1965: 25) called a “world of make-believe”. It was thus Negroness alien to the one conceived and daily performed by “un-uplifted” black Americans. Finally, this was a group identity that Du Bois and the Talented Tenth figured would arise - and be worthy of recognition, acceptance, and integration - after transcultural black elites had cleansed it of its backwardness and uplifted it to the standard of “American civilisation”. My second critique of the Du Boisian manifesto, is therefore, that Du Bois’s elaboration of the second pillar was based on an elitist and salvationist fashioning of group consciousness.

Given the above, Arnold Rampersad’s (1990: 87) conclusion that in the early twentieth century Du Bois was “profoundly accomodationist” than even Booker T. Washington is a fair assessment. To Washington’s declamation of the degradation of black art and spirituality, Du Bois added culture and proclaimed that black culture could only be elevated by the Talented Tenth (ibid). West (1999: 89) thus assesses that, “Du Bois was first and foremost a black New England Victorian seduced by the Enlightenment ethos and enchanted with the American Dream”. “In short”, West (1999: 90) continues, “[Du Bois] was reluctant to learn fundamental lessons about life – and about himself – from [ordinary black people]”. Ultimately then, Du Bois and his Talented Tenth contemporaries had limited faith in the capacity of ordinary black people to organise and to elaborate strategies to de-constitute and (re)constitute the world. Rather, the Talented Tenth, similar to their New African counterparts, harboured notions of the civic and social immaturity of ordinary Africans in the USA and in Africa (Lewis, 2000: 114). We need to pause and absorb a crucial insight here regarding the connection between the third and second pillars, and thus the connection between my first and second critiques: an integrationist agenda in respect of the third pillar (reconstituting the polity) always goes together with an attitude of denigrating the life-worlds of the majority of the “un-uplifted” subjugated peoples. This is the most adverse outcome of the aforementioned incapacity to deepen ‘second sight’ and develop it into ‘first sight’.

What is the relevance of this biographical discussion for questions of constitution and belonging in Africa? It bears repeating that, after he displaced Washington and Garvey, Du Bois became the USA’s leading black public intellectual and leader in the first half of the twentieth century. Through his political leadership of numerous civil rights organisations and via his fiction and non-fiction writings,
Du Bois sought to mould and evoke Negroness and to articulate a framework for Pan-Negroness. Moving from this standpoint, in his convening of Pan-African Congresses, a task in which he threw himself with commendable dedication, he called forth and framed Pan-Africanness. It is not by accident that Du Bois was widely regarded as a sort of a “Pan African Moses” (Lewis, 1993: 8).

To some extent, Du Bois’s social elitism, the optimism he conferred on the extant world, and concomitantly his fetishisation of the USA Constitution and existing international law instruments were replicated in the constitution praxis of Pan-Africanism. Similar to the Niagara Movement and the NAACP, Du Bois’s Pan-African Congresses were, “…upper class in structure and piecemeal in agenda” (Lewis, 2000: 114). On the one hand, declarations of Pan African Congresses were radical in that they highlighted and condemned colonial excesses and demanded civil and political rights for colonised peoples. On the other hand, as is clear from the Second Manifesto of the Pan African Congress, this gathering of elite black people moved from the premise that African elites needed to uplift, “…backward and suppressed groups” (cited in Rampersad, 1990: 153).

2.2.3.3 The third critique of the Du Boisian manifesto: Attachment to colonialist discourse and a reiteration of a world of apartness

Two main deleterious consequences flow from a top-down conceptualising of Negroness and Africanness. The first consequence is a salvationist conceptualisation of group identity. A salvationist conceptualisation negates the project of crafting group consciousness from below and from a diverse set of individuals and sectors. I have already dealt with this consequence in preceding passages. The second pitfall of an elitist approach to group identity is the danger of an absolutist understanding of racial and cultural identities. This is my third and final critique of the Du Boisian manifesto. My contention here is that an absolutist conception of identity is an outcome of a failure to cultivate potentiated double consciousness and to learn from non-liminal people’s performance of their identities. As I will show, an absolutist conceptualisation of group identity runs contrary to the lived experiences of creole identities among non-elite black people in the USA and of cultural syncretism in Africa.

In one of the earliest incisive studies of the origins of Pan-Africanism, Collin Legum (1965:16) confirmed that Pan-Africanists struggle with ambivalence and that, “this spirit of ambivalence proclaims the inability of Negroes to disengage themselves from the West, even for those who feel their rootlessness within its society”. I contend that this inability extends to an apparent inability to completely disengage from a discourse that considers “the black race” and “the white race” distinct and antithetical identities. By this I mean that even in the process of forging group belonging to overcome rootlessness and namelessness, the racial melancholic is ambivalent about delinking from the framework of a discourse that has historically moulded his or her identity. More pertinently, an inability,
or unwillingness, to take a distance from colonialist discourse leads to an ambivalent response to the question whether people of African descent are part of a shared humanity or whether they are a people unique and apart – inhabitants of a so-called Black World.

In the case of Du Bois, he made speeches, wrote books and staged theatre performances that demonstrated “Negro contribution” to civilisation. This was part of his project of moulding a proud Negro consciousness. However, as we saw above, Du Bois and members of the Talented Tenth configured Negroness at a distance from the lived experiences of non-liminal black people. The Negroness that Du Bois fashioned was thus for most part an essentialist identity based on irreconcilable differences between the “black race” and the “white race”. This essentialism often extended to the idea that each race has, or should have, a distinct and coherent consciousness. This understanding can be discerned even after the methodological shifts that Du Bois undertook after “The Conservation”. Indeed, Du Bois’s (1986a: 365) assertion that the ends of the spiritual strivings of a fragmented person would be when he or she merges his or her “double self into a better and truer self” is an intimation that Du Bois did not accept the possibility of edifying doubleness. As Doris Sommer (2005: 175) has persuasively argued, it would seem that for Du Bois, a “truer self” would be a self with a “coherent consciousness” rather than a self endowed with a consciousness that dwells in the tension of hyphenated consciousness. Furthermore, it would appear that Du Bois’s “truer self” is also not a self whose consciousness is a product of the amalgamation of two streams of consciousness. Thus while Du Bois sometimes declared that black people are part of the American society and that they have contributed to the constitution of “American” identity he often spoke as if black Americans’ double inheritance is a problem. Ernest Allen (1997: 51. Original emphasis) thus regrets that,

…rather than celebrating an authentic ‘dual consciousness’ as a tool for achieving enriched cultural or political synthesis, or as a platform for generating multiple levels of understanding – in other words, as a potential solution in whole or in part – Du Bois treated the question of “twoness” chiefly as a (real or imaginary) problem, even as he affirmed the desirability of preserving certain of its (unspecified) parts.

As is well known, this disavowal of dual consciousness is one of Du Bois’s enduring legacy. This legacy can be detected in the work of black cultural activists who are vexed with questions of cultural mimicry and group alienation. The founders of the USA Black Arts Movement exemplified this posture of renunciation. For example, Amiri Baraka [nee LeRoi Jones], one of the founders of this Movement, proposed that the de-constitution of the USA was impossible without the de-constitution of the self that the dominant USA world had produced. Thus writing of and writing off his earlier self, “LeRoi,” Baraka instructed his heir as follows:

> When I die, the consciousness I carry I will
to black people. May they pick me apart and take
the useful parts, the sweat meat of my feelings. And leave
On the other hand, we find black existentialists who took a contrary view; even as they accepted notions of black invisibility and subjugation. For example, one of Ralph Ellison’s consistent themes was the imperative to embrace and celebrate black people’s ‘dual inheritance’. We find this insistence in Ellison’s brilliant 1963 rejoinder entitled “The World and the Jug”. Ellison argued that whilst it is true that black people suffered oppression and institutionalised marginalisation, it did not follow that black people were hermeneutically sealed from the USA world by a steel jug. The main thesis advanced by Ellison (1995: 124) was that “Negro Americans” (his term) originated in and evolved in the USA. Consequently, Negro Americans’ had shaped mainstream USA culture, both borrowing from it and influencing it. The fact that ‘Negro Americans’ have been rendered invisible did not negate this point. Ellison (1995: 130-131), therefore, rejected Du Boisian double consciousness if by this it was meant that “Negro Americans” are so acculturated or alienated that they have forgotten who they are. More specifically, Ellison argued that ‘Negro Americans’ were less a racial group than a hybrid people who constituted a sub-culture of the USA society. Ellison was, therefore, dismissive of Black Nationalist tendency to denounce cultural hybridity and inter-culturality. Concomitantly, Ellison derided black militants’ commandment that black people must search for and recover a pure Negro consciousness or value system. He (1995: 123) charged that instead of accepting the inherent hybridity of the USA experience, race consciousness writers imposed an image of a “prefabricated negroes” that did not exist in reality. For our purposes, it is clear that this imposition flows from a failure to develop ‘third sight’ or to recover first sight as proposed by Paget Henry and Amilcar Cabral. As far as Du Bois is concerned, on the one hand he celebrated the gift of ‘second sight’ as one of the advantages of existing in a liminal space. On the other hand, he seemed to disavow both in-betweenness and duality.

Although Du Bois was not a racial purist and an anti-mulatto, in his political praxis, not social life, he seemed to believe that cultural hybridity and dual consciousness would lead to non-belonging and spiritual unhomeliness. Thus whatever political differences separated Du Bois and Garvey, ultimately, both leaders, “…saw the world as comprising separate cultures, each reflecting a distinct heritage and demanding freedom of expression” (Rampersad, 1990: 149). In the case of Du Bois, he moved from

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17 Recalling the comments in footnotes 14 and 15 above, it is perhaps important to point out that Ellison’s avowal of double consciousness did not mean that he himself had recovered his ‘first sight’ and was striving for the radical de-constitution and (re)constitution of the USA. From a young age, Ellison self-consciously estranged himself from the world of black people. He was, in the words of the then exiled South African poet Keorapetse Kgositsile “the ‘original’ displaced man” (cited in Rampersad, 2007: 435). The resulting ‘inner melancholia’ might well explain Ellison’s inability to complete a second novel. Furthermore, as Cornel West regrets, “Ellison became such an American nationalist” (cited in Rampersad, 2007: 549). The point here is that there is thus no inherent contradiction between embracing dual consciousness and having assimilationist desires. Conversely, as we shall see, there is also no necessary contradiction between disavowing dual consciousness and harbouring integrationist desires.
asserting a ‘proud hybridisation’ to identifying with a particular race. It would seem that Du Bois’s insistence on apprehending dual inheritance as a poisoned chalice was an antagonistic riposte to mainstream USA society’s denial of his ‘proud hybridisation’. Light in complexion and a Europhile, Du Bois’s reaction to this rejection was to throw himself with religious fervour into racial consciousness. In “The Song of the Smoke” (1914) he would thus proclaim: “I will be black as blackness can/The blacker the mantle, the mightier the man!” (cited in Echeruo, 1992: 680).

Du Bois suffused his Pan-Africanism with this predicament of double consciousness and hyper-awareness of invisibility (Lewis, 2000: 39). His message to peoples of African descent intimated that they needed to demarcate clearly the cultural and racial differences between themselves and their colonisers. Such a delineation was necessary, so the argument went, if Black Folk were to overcome psychic alienation, cultivate a proud group consciousness, and thus be in a position to tear down the veils that rendered them invisible and subjugated. However, as George Ciccaricollo-Maher points out (2009: 380), doubleness and thus divided consciousness, “…is more acute among those who hold out the ultimately contradictory hope for the permeability of the veil”. These are Marginal Men in Eng and Han’s elaboration of racial melancholia. These liminal beings end up producing ‘prefabricated negroes’ who are the opposite of the lived reality of ordinary black Americans or Africans. On the one hand, these elites’ politics of otherness is a reaction to enforced racialisation and consequent feelings of being rootless, nameless, unhomely, and homeless. On the other hand, these leaders impose a consciousness and an identity on non-liminal people. This imposition is epistemic, psychic and spiritual violence against people who might not be experiencing feelings of invisibility, divided consciousness, and worldlessness. The most important point to note here is that aggressive alterity together with an absolutist conceptualisation of ‘race’ or ‘culture’ are symptoms of melancholia. These positions denote an ambivalence stance towards colonialist and racialist discourses. This has always been case when Africana people began formulate politics of otherness in the nineteenth century.

To be sure, Du Bois’s own influential ideas about racial identity and racial and cultural belongingness had their roots in nineteenth century quests to valorise African culture and ‘the African Personality’. Du Bois’s indebtedness to the ideas of the originators of Pan-Africanism, such as Edward Blyden and Alexander Crummel, is evident in his writings on African civilisation and history. Du Bois also republished the writings of these two Pan-Africanists in Crisis. In 1909, he wrote a letter to Blyden requesting Blyden’s assistance for the compilation of Encyclopaedia Africana. In The Souls (1986a: 512-520), he devoted an entire chapter to Crummel holding him up as a pioneer who constructed terms of belonging-in-the-world that black people could take pride in. In the rest of this section, I wish to show that one of the legacies of Du Bois’s Pan-Africanist precursors is an aggressive dependency upon colonialist discourses. I borrow the concept of “aggressive dependency” from Ali Mazrui. This is Mazuri’s (1977: 34-35) characterisation of a posture of an African epistemological and political rebel
who fails to develop an “autonomous African mind”. The dependency is aggressive because the militant’s attachment and conditioning by colonialist discourses appear in projects that profess to rebel against these discourses. My exploration of dominant forms of Pan-Africanism’s attachment to colonialist discourse relies on Anthony Appiah and V.Y. Mudimbe’s post-structuralist readings.

Anthony Appiah has argued that Crummel’s (1819-1898), and thus Du Bois’s, valorisation of Pan-African identity reiterates the colonialist discourse it seeks to rebel against. Appiah (1992: 3) contends that Crummel (a black American priest, politician and academic who was a missionary in Liberia and later returned to the USA to establish the first independent black independent Episcopal church) arrogated the right to speak for, act, and campaign on behalf of Africans because he insisted that Africa was the home of all Negroes. Crummel’s singular guiding vision was thus race and this vision guided his influential articulations on African nationalism, the unity of the “black race” and his call for black people in the diaspora to return to Africa. Crummel believed in the notion of racial purity, and together with Blyden, he set up a political party in Liberia to campaign against mulattos (Frenkel, 1974: 280). Appiah thus contends that these Pan-Africanists took their conception of blackness from the racist scientific conception of race that was in vogue in the late nineteenth century.

Let us now turn to Edward Blyden (1832-1912). It was Blyden who first came up with what I regard as the early Du Bois’s unarticulated premise of and attendant racial politics of ‘distinct but equal’. Blyden (born to ex-slaves in Danish West Indies and died a statesman in Sierra Leone) was an outstanding intellectual of the black transnational world, a world he was the principal inventor of. Blyden formulated and promoted themes of black consciousness, black pride, African self-rule, pan-Africanism, and the contentious notion of “the African Personality” in books such as The Vindication of the Negro Race (1857), The Negro in Ancient History (1869), Christianity, Islam, and the Negro Race (1888), African Life and Customs (1908) (see Frenkel, 1974: 277; Mudimbe, 1988: 111, 122; 188; Neuberger, 1985: 154). Blyden’s most enduring contribution to dominant forms of Pan-Africanism and Afrocentrism was his development of the ideology of radical alterity. Blyden developed this ideology in reaction to prevailing Eurocentric notions that Africans were signs of initial primitiveness. Blyden strongly rejected the ethnocentric thesis because it implied that races are proceeding on the same historical path, with other races playing catch up. The following passage sums up the influential foundations of Blyden’s philosophy:

There is no absolute or essential superiority on the one side, nor absolute or essential inferiority on the other side. It is a question of difference of endowment and difference of destiny... The two races are not moving in the same groove with an immeasurable distance between them, but on the parallel lines...They are not identical, as some think, but unequal; they are distinct but equal (cited in Mudimbe, 1988: 118. Mudimbe’s emphasis).
As we can see, Blyden’s strategy was to escape the ‘inferiorisation’ of Africans by absolutising the differences between the Self and the Other. The strategy here is to discursively transport Africans from their position on the underside of the uni-verse/Euro-American world to their own universe, a Black World. Leopold Senghor, the first president of Senegal and one of three principal founders of the Négritude movement, expressed this move in poetic form:

For myself I have nothing to fear I am before
Adam I belong neither to the same lion
nor to the same tree I am of another warmth and of another cold
(cited in Irele, 2003: 40).

From the Biblical to the zoological to the climatic, Senghor invoked and evoked all manner of figures and affects to overplay his dissimilarity in order to deny the charge that the African is a defective European. This was pivotal to his evocation and valorisation of négritudity. Senghor’s main inspirations in this regard were USA New Negro discourses as well as the ethnological research he read in Paris.

In the case of Du Bois, although he was influenced by Crummel and Blyden he was erudite enough to attempt a move away from the unsustainable scientific conception of race that permeated his earlier articulations of blackness. Du Bois later attempted to ground the second pillar of his manifesto on a more socio-historical conception of Pan-Africanness. This change comes through in his Dusk of Dawn autobiography (1940). Du Bois now asserted that the ties that bind black people together was a common history of enslavement, colonisation, and racial discrimination (cited in Appiah, 1992: 40-41). This socio-historical conception is the premier basis for contemporary discourses of Pan-Africanism. Appiah is unimpressed by this basis. For Appiah, this conception still does not indicate that Pan-Africanists have delinked from colonialist discourse. The socio-historical explanation, Appiah (1992: 41-42) maintains, does not fully account for Du Bois choice to identify with Africans on the continent. To support his argument, Appiah marshals as evidence the same passage above wherein Du Bois sought to move away from the discredited scientific conceptualisation of race. In this passage, Du Bois added that “the heritage” of slavery and racial subjugation, “binds together not simply the children of Africa, but extends through yellow Asia and into the South Seas” (cited in Appiah, 1992: 40-41). This being the case, there is no reason why Pan-Africanists need to fashion their belonging and identification exclusively with Africa and ‘Africans’. Ultimately, these Pan-Africanists write as if they are forced to make a choice between Africa, on the one hand, and other suffering people, on the other. Appiah surmises (1992: 42) that this ‘choice’ is imposed by the very racism Africans suffer from and struggle against. The main functions of this choice and identification (almost akin to Zionism) is to use race as a basis for moral solidarity and (following Blyden, Crummel, Martin Delany, Garvey and Du Bois) to argue that the slogan ‘Africa for Africans’ means that only Negroes/people of African descent can claim
Africa as their home. Thus “Negro,” a category invented by ‘the white man’ to racialise and thus dominate “non-whites,” was given a central place in black quests for constitution and belonging.

Mudimbe makes similar arguments in The Invention of Africa (1988). Mudimbe contends that from Blyden to post-colonial African leaders and theorists, African politics of otherness have sought to escape ethnocentric discourses by reinventing Africa and Africans as ‘distinct but equal’. Mudimbe (1988: x) shows that “African” discourses of otherness are ultimately based on what he calls the “colonial library;” namely, anthropological and Christian scholarship. In a follow up book, The Idea of Africa (1994: 52-55), Mudimbe demonstrates that the ‘colonial library’ was based on ethnological reason. Ethnology is a study of extracting, refining, and isolating types in society. The upshot of thinking from the colonial library is thus the view that Africanness and Europeanness are distinct, and even antagonistic, cultures and ways of being-in-the-world. More specifically, and more germane to the ultimate goals of colonialist discourse (production of “non-western” pariahdom and worldlessness), this dominant form of African alterity tends to answer the lie of colonialist discourse with another lie that ultimately disavows human affinity and global conviviality (Mbembe, 2012: 253).

The intention behind dominant forms of African politics of otherness is, therefore, to forge African consciousness, and thus discursive and political self-determination, by purging (or more accurately, by proclaiming to purge) the European consciousness and heritage. This purging, a la Amiri Baraka (nee LeRoi Jones) above, is said to be integral to the realisation of the first and second pillars of a decolonial vision of constitution and belonging. The hope here is that politics of radical alterity would defeat the malady of double consciousness by averting colonialist epistemological ordering and discursive subjectivisation. Mudimbe and Appiah disagree. Mudimbe (1988: 79) counsels Africans to embraces the fact that western epistemologies and the traumas of slavery, Apartheid, and colonisation form an intractable part of Africa’s modern heritage. To renounce this multiple heritage is to impoverish oneself. Appiah (1992: 72), similar to Ellison above, also asserts that the quest to bracket off the colonial experience and the impact of cultural contact is a deceitful quest. Appiah and Mudimbe’s advice is that a vision and praxis that embrace these experiences and heritages is a much more powerful form of post-colonial epistemological vigilance because it would avoid new forms of bad faith and self-denial.

Appiah and Mudimbe’s proposals of pro-active synthesis thus transcend constitution and belonging visions that conceptualise ‘African renaissance’ and (re)constitution enterprises as quests for a ‘coherent consciousness’. Appiah and Mudimbe proposals thus substitute the search for a supposedly originary “coherent consciousness” for one that Ngũgĩ (2012: 41) terms a “unified consciousness”. These proposals are in a sense, then, motored by an avowal of duality. That is to say that they are inspired by a need to embrace double consciousness in order to potentiate it. From this perspective, the desiratum to remember and re-member Africa ought to be driven by a mature and authentic programme
that recognises and embraces the fact that the modern African is an “inheritor of two worlds” (Ngūgĩ, 2012: 41). From the perspective of constitution and belonging visions based on active synthesis attempts to eradicate western influences are thus misguided nativism.

For purposes of my main thesis, as I will shortly show, nativism is itself a symptom of racial melancholia and thus an attitude of aggressive dependency on the west masked in militant language. The most serious consequence of nativism is that it ossifies and cages in African cultures and identities. Such an ossification reiterates colonialist praxis. From the previous chapter, we would recall that the settler constitutionalist produces “the native” during the course of settlerisation and the imposition of the Euro-modern world. “The native” is a creature expelled from history, frozen in time and space, and wedded to “tribal” customs and traditions. Such a humanoid is incapable of assimilating edifying influences from elsewhere. “The native” thus lacks transcendence and cannot evolve and ‘develop’. The point here is that what is often apprehended and invoked as “native culture” is often colonialist invention.

As Nicholas B. Dirks (1992: 3) reminds us, colonialists deployed cultural technologies to conquer societies. Colonialists achieved this by reconfiguring conquered societies to create new categories and oppositions between the coloniser and the colonised, European and African, modern and traditional, West and East and so on. Therefore, it was the colonising structure that disarticulated the “chain of societies” to create distinct religions and ethnic groups (Amselle, 1998: xiii). This process led to what Paul Gilroy (1993: 2) terms “cultural insiderism” which is an over-integrated conception of culture based on immutable, ethnic differences.

More to the point, nativism and its purging schemes are colonialist because they contradict the essence of African cultures and ontologies. In this regard, Mogobe Ramose (2007: 310-311) has shown that one of the fundamental differences between these cultures and Eurocentric cultures is the fact that the latter cultures are based on “bounded reasoning”. To valorise and protect identity from this perspective is to operate from, “…within completely closed and sealed boundaries [which] … do not allow for the possibility of change of identity resulting from external influences” (Ramose, 2003a: 142). In contrast to this, African humanness commands that African identities must be based on the logic of permeability of boundaries. Openness is mandatory because the fundamental philosophy unifying all cultures associated with Africa is the idea that to be a human being is to recognise the humanity of other persons.

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18 Or more accurately, as per Ali Mazrui’s self-explanatory book title The Africans: A Triple Heritage (1986), some Africans must work with the fact that they are inheritors of three worlds comprised of the indigenous world, the western world, and the Islamic world.

19 Achille Mbembe (2002: 254) defines “nativism” as a mode of African self-writing that relies on a “metaphysics of difference” whose point of departure is that, “…Africans have an authentic culture that confers on them a peculiar self irreducible to that of any other group. The negation of this self and this authenticity would thus constitute a mutilation.”

20 This is in addition to the fact that there is nothing originary about culture and tradition; they are always invented and reinvented from inside and outside.
and to establish human relations with them (Ramose, 2005: 272). A condition of possibility of being a human be-ing (Ramose’s appellation to emphasise the idea of perpetual motion and openness) is, therefore, to always be in the process of becoming by always reaching out of oneself and culture (Ramose, 2005: 41).

Culture as a collective be-ing is thus also always in motion. The essence of an African way of life, is therefore, a repugnance towards stagnation, boundedness, completeness, and absolutism. The highest ambition of cultures associated with Africa is rather the attainment of cosmic harmony and wholeness. This is to say that the striving here is for humanness and Africanness rather than for humanism and Africanism. An important insight here is that because African humanness demands openness and wholeness, and because Africans are never in a “normative coma” even as exist under conditions of conquest (L. Gordon, 2015: 129), Africans remain Africans even when they adopt norms and values from those they encounter. This insight does not mean that cultures associated with Africa lack boundaries and hence distinctiveness. As Ramose points out in the context of African ontologies, the boundary… underlines the originary relationship of complementarity subsisting between the ‘I’ and ‘the other’. In this way, ‘be-ing’ constitutes boundary as the recognition of the ineradicable network of complex relationships between and among beings; the ‘I’ and ‘the other’ as the human being and other beings as well. On this view, the community of ‘be-ing’ already exists in potency and is actualised by the concrete existence of diverse human and other beings on planet Earth, including the continually unfolding pluriverse (Ramose, 2013: 30. My emphasis).

It could thus be concluded that absolutism and the search for ‘coherent consciousness’ and uniqueness are actually un-African. Jean-Loup Amselle has brilliantly demonstrated this insight in his very important book, Mestizo Logics: Anthropology of Identity in Africa and Elsewhere (1998). Amselle (1998: 1) contrasts ‘ethnological reason,’ or ‘bounded reasoning,’ with “mestizo logics,” which is “…a continuist approach that would emphasise an originary syncretism or lack of distinctness”. Amselle’s (1998: xiv) study shows, that contrary to colonialist and nativist understandings, African cultures are based on, “originary syncretism…mixture is originary”. The message here is that post-colonial constitution projects would be reflective of a decolonised consciousness only to the extent that they avoid the trap of ethnological reasoning. The projects of disalienation and liberatory group consciousness should thus aim to rediscover the lived experiences of openness and syncretism/syncretness’ (see also, Comaroff and Comaroff, 1991: 199-246).

There are thus two broad arguments against manifests of constitution and belonging that consider quests for rebirth and reclamation of a belonging-in-the-world to be impossible without the aforementioned purging and absolutising strategies. The first broad argument is that the disavowal of historical influences, cultural intermingling, and multiple heritages is unrealistic and impoverishing.
Such a disavowal is a reflection of what F. Abiola Irele terms “a pathology of alienation” (Irele, 1992: 214) - in our terms, a symptom of racial melancholia. The second argument is that such putatively cultural revivalist projects are actually reflections of still colonised mindsets and a replication of colonialis praxis of constitution. This is because such projects reiterate the fiction of race and they negate the fundamental character of non-Eurocentric cultures in that they are based on bounded reasoning and cultural stagnation. More importantly, these projects contradict the spirit and ethical prescription of African humaneness (contra ‘African humanism’).

To sum up, the aim of this section was to demonstrate that Pan-Africanism has been the main vehicle that “New World” Africans have assembled in the context of having been rendered rootless, homeless, unhomed, and nameless. These ideology and vision were carried forward and adapted by spiritually and physically-exiled African elites in their struggles for visibility, belongingness, self-determination, and homemaking. In this regard, Du Bois’s triple gesture of disalienation, cultivation of group consciousness, and the (re)constitution of the world proved indispensable. I have been concerned to argue that African quests to overcome pariahdom and worldlessness would need to be vigilant not to repeat the pitfalls of the Du Boisian manifesto. Pan-Africanism would, therefore, need to be re-imagined into Pan-Africaness if it aspires to serve as a catalyst for African re-birth and African reclamation of belongingness-in-the-world as well as to the never-ending project of pluralistic world (re)constitution. Pan-Africaness is a third path beyond colonialist interpellation and nativist Pan-Africanism. This is the path that Thabo Mbeki sought.

2.3 Pan-Africanism in the ‘new South Africa’: No Rebirth, No National Consciousness

I would like to end this final chapter of Part I with an exploration of the influences of the Du Boisian manifesto on South Africa’s post-1994 (re)constitution project. This exploration will be guided by two questions. Firstly, why did South Africa’s project of constitution and belonging fail? Secondly, why did Mbeki’s third path prove to be a cul-de-sac? To recap the discussion in the introductory section above: having outlined the original sin in the constitution of South Africa in chapter one, my objective in the first section of this chapter was to demonstrate that Mbeki set for himself the task of ‘resurrecting Africa’ on all three planes of African belonging in the world, namely, the spiritual, the social, and the material. Towards this end, Mbeki sought to underwrite the ‘Final Constitution’ with a national ideology that would ensure collective self-discovery, rebirth, and the inculcation of a proud identity and consciousness. My conclusion in that section was that Mbeki’s “African Renaissance” programme proved incapable of terminating “native” pariahdom and worldlessness. In this section, I am concerned to investigate the reasons why Mbeki’s constitution and belonging vision and praxis re-enacted a world of apartness, and thus continuing strivings for constitution and belonging.
The previous section revealed that Pan-Africanism is an ideology of redemptive returns fashioned by black people in the ‘New World’. It was subsequently imported into the continent by transcultural Africans. Similarly, Mbeki’s African Renaissance was a philo-praxis of an outsider. The roots of Mbeki’s African Renaissance programme can be found in the observations he made when he came back from exile. Mbeki complained that black South Africans were a dislocated people. According to Mbeki, black people in South Africa were not only burdened with a slave mentality; they had also become a de-cultured people with no ethical framework. Going around South Africa, Mbeki claims to have come to the shocking realisation that, “these South Africans are not quite African, they’re European” (cited in Gevisser, 2007: 324). African Renaissance was thus Mbeki’s attempt to craft a national identity and to come up with a set of ethical norms for a people that needed to be reborn. In the rest of this section I aim to demonstrate that the reasons why this hope never materialised is because Mbeki committed the same mistakes that often derail the Du Boisian manifesto of constitution and belonging. To recap, I outlined three pitfalls of this manifesto: (i) an inability to elaborate a post-assimilationist de-constitution agenda due to the transcultural leader’s inability to take leave of the liminal world; (ii) a top-down conceptualisation of group, and eventually national, consciousness; and finally, (iii) a conceptualisation of identity that shows ambivalence towards colonialist discourses. I will proceed to take these pitfalls in turn.

2.3.1 Mbeki’s failure to ‘return to the source’ and a top-down forging of national consciousness

The geneses of Du Bois’s Pan-Africanism can be traced to his discovery that he lived in a ‘double environment’ and thus lacked a sense of belonging. Similarly, the inspiration behind Mbeki’s vision of constitution and belonging originate, ultimately, from his own sense of disconnection. Mbeki’s public justification for the imperative of African rebirth was that Africans in South Africa had become de-cultured and deprived of a frame of reference. In truth, as he told his biographer, his programme of rediscovery and (re)constitution was inspired by both a sense of, “national and personal disconnection” (cited in Gevisser, 2007: 324). Mbeki’s sense of personal disconnection and his estrangement from home-culture began in his childhood. Mbeki’s parents conferred on him a sense of in-betweenness. Mbeki’s parents defied strictures of tradition, culture, and class: they came from two different ethnic groups; they shunned Christianity and church people even though they were also westernised and highly educated; and they did not partake in the qaba (the unconverted “raw natives”) lifeworld even though they lived with and interacted with Amaqaba (Gevisser, 2007: 6-7). Physically and culturally the Mbekis thus existed in an in-between world. They were, in Mark Gevisser’s (2007: 61) words, “…in a no man’s-land between the two cultures: they were able to mix in both worlds but belonged, ultimately to neither”. Furthermore, as he revealed to his biographer (Gevisser, 2007: 6-7), Mbeki’s feelings of homelessness and rootlessness were exacerbated by the fact that he was sent into exile. Mbeki’s exilic
condition began at the age of eight when his parents separated him from his siblings and send him to attend school in another town. The ANC later identified Mbeki as a future leader of a free South Africa and sent him to England for further education. He returned to South Africa after forty years in exile. This brief background shows that Mbeki’s personal background is one of liminal existence - physically, culturally, and perhaps, spiritually. Accordingly, while Nelson Mandela busied himself with the national project of reconciliation, Mbeki worried that individual and collective projects of post-colonial being-belonging and being-becoming would be impossible if Africans did not rediscover their historical belongingness and self-identity. Mbeki put in this way, “…unless we are able to answer the question: Who were we?, we shall not be able to answer the question: What shall we be?” cited in Gevisser, 2007: 16).

My contention that Mbeki’s African Renaissance was ultimately a striving for his own personal rebirth finds support in the fact that, “Mbeki first started talking about an ‘African Renaissance’ publicly at around the time he was ‘called back home’ by the elders of his clan” (Givisser, 2007: 18). At home, Mbeki’s elders narrated the history of his people from the nineteenth century up to then. His reaction was as follows: “why have we been distant from this fascinating history? It was never part of us, that kind of rootedness...I said: ‘I really must study all of this’” (cited in Gevisser, 2007: 7). It was this poignant encounter that provided the seeds of Mbeki’s agenda of constitution and belonging. To put it in Henry’s terms, Mbeki’s elders were, therefore, coaxing him to go beyond ‘second sight’ and to rediscover his ‘first sight’. This ‘first sight’ would enable Mbeki to reckon with his feelings of personal disconnection and thus re-suture with home-culture. Mbeki’s elders were thus inviting him to exit the liminal world and to ‘return to the source’. It is important to remember that ‘the [primary] source’ for Cabral is found amongst people who are not completely ensnared by western modernity. From Cabral’s perspective, as we saw in the previous chapter, the originators of Pan-Africanism never returned to ‘the source’ because their cultural revivalist praxis relied on the colonial library. In the case of Mbeki, Gevisser (2007: 728) reports that the cornerstone of Mbeki’s African Renaissance was Martin Bernal’s three volume study entitled *Black Athena: The Afroasiatic Roots of Classical Civilisation* (1987-1991). Therefore, indigenous sagacity was not a source that Mbeki appealed to in order to retrieve “rootedness” and thus be able to enact a reclamation of belonging-in-the-world. Mogobe Ramose (2000: 58) has thus also advanced the thesis that Mbeki’s project could not lead to the rebirth of Africa because Mbeki did not dip into the African counter-archive and the modern lived experiences of people not educated in the western paradigm. Ramose (2000: 56) thus charges that Mbeki’s African Renaissance programme was not an instantiation of rebirth because its gaze was still fixed on the North. Furthermore, and relatedly, Mbeki’s Pan-Africanist philosophy adhered to a linear conception of history: from the European Renaissance to the African Renaissance. In this regard, Maboge More (2002: 65) asks: “Can African self-understanding be explicated in terms of and using European categories such as
‘renaissance’?” Mbeki’s “northbound gaze” (Ramose, 2000: 58) can thus be regarded as evidence that Mbeki’s Africanism betrayed his ambivalence towards historicism and Eurocentric/colonialist discourses.

It is no wonder, then, that Mbeki’s critics claimed that he was an alienated and alienating philosopher-king. For his part, Mbeki, similar to Du Bois and Frederick Douglass (Rampersad, 1990: 172), regarded himself as a “prophet-in-the-wilderness” whose burden was to drag his nation towards (western?) modernity by adopting unpopular but correct policies (Gevisser, 2007: 735). Similar to Africana missionaries such as Blyden and Crummel, Mbeki returned from physical exile convinced that his manifesto of constitution and belonging will ‘resurrect the land’. However, as Seithlhamo Motsapi notes, returning leaders such as Mbeki were actually still wedded to colonialist modes of constitution and governing. In the name of regeneration and modernisation, these “new blacks” imposed Euro-American schemes that heralded unhomeliness and led to dystopia:

& so the new blackses arrive…
from the fiery splash of pool
  pits they preach us redamp
  shun from the dust
  of the old ways
their kisses bite
like the deep bellies of computers
the gravy of their songs
smells like the slow piss of culculatahs.

& so
the new blackses arrive
& promise us life beyond the bleed
of the common yell
they promise us new spring
for the slow limp
of our heads

meanwhile
the ladder finds the sky at last
heart or herd slinks to the waters
mbira grows into a synthesiser
the songs ask for more sugar
& my salt sets sail for babylon
(Motsapi, 2002: 3).
We can thus conclude that Mbeki’s ‘African Renaissance’ presented the first two pitfalls of the Du Boisian manifesto: it was motored by a salvationist outlook; and as we saw in section one above, his constitution and belonging projects were ultimately integrationist and ineffectual in achieving his self-declared goals of ending domestic and global apartheid. The final argument that I need to make is to show that Mbeki’s self-acclaimed third path reiterated the ‘distinct but equal’ discourse. This argument is indispensable to my argument that the ANC’s post-1994 vision of constitution and belonging reprised a world of apartness.

2.3.2 Mbeki’s hybridisation as a discourse of ‘distinct but equal’

Mbeki declared his third path as follows:

_The Constitution whose adoption we celebrate constitutes an unequivocal statement that we refuse to accept that our Africanness shall be defined by our race, our colour, our gender or our historical origins_ (Mbeki, 1996: n.p.).

With this refusal, Mbeki proposed to transcend both nativist and colonialist conceptions of identity. He thus sought to disarticulate the conjunction between race and belongingness. For Mbeki, the constitution’s opening statement that, “the Republic of South Africa is one…democratic state founded on the following values…non-racialism….” (Section 1(b)) as well as its entrenchment of cultural and religious freedoms was proof positive that being African in South Africa ought to be apprehended in a capacious manner. “Diverse people unite!” thus decrees the motto on the new national coat of arms that Mbeki unveiled on Freedom Day, 2000. Mbeki and other constitutionalists thus proclaimed that the ‘final constitution’ does away with historical antagonisms relating to identity by giving birth to a “Rainbow Nation” – a hybrid nation. It would thus seem that Mbeki’s proposal was a proposal for rebirth and nation-becoming based on the principle of “originary syncretism”. I aim to show that such a supposition is incorrect.

Firstly, Mbeki was incorrect to assert that the constitution decrees a de-racialised notion of Africanness or that the constitution does away with separateness based on identities. The fact is that the ‘final constitution’ recognises the existence of racial and distinct cultural categories. Under the imperative of recognising ‘cultural differences,’ the constitution entrenches freedoms and rights based on disparate and bounded cultural and religious identities. Furthermore, constitutionally-mandated legislation such as the Employment Equity Act of 1998 explicitly recognises the existence of “black people” for purposes of affirmative action programmes. Secondly, as Denis-Constant Martin (2006: 165) points out, Mbeki’s 1996 speech sought to overcome the old divisions of the past and to call forth a history of hybridity. However, Mbeki, “did so in a manner that still relied on the old vision of a society composed by the _juxtaposition of discrete groups_, the change being – and it was not small change indeed – that
they are now treated equally” (ibid. My emphasis). In any case, lawmakers understand the notion of hybrid nationhood in oppositionist terms. In this respect, section 1(b) of the Broad-based Black Economic Empowerment Act of 2013 elaborates that “black people” is a, “generic term which means Africans, Coloureds, and Indians”. Therefore, Africans are not “Coloureds” or Indians. Conversely, South Africans of Indian descent and “Coloured” people (a nefarious ‘racial’ category that includes Khoi and San people, and also people who are descendants of often violent sexual relationships between European colonists and indigenous peoples) are not regarded as African. Thirdly, in his own subsequent articulations it was clear that Mbeki conceived of Africanness as distinct from other South African identities such as South African Indianness, Coloured identity and European identity. Thus talking about the stubbornness of the “National Question”, Mbeki argued that this stubbornness, “…points to the amount of work we [Africans] still have to do in organising among the white community. To a certain extent the same reality applies to the Indian and Coloured communities” (cited in More, 2002: 65).

It is thus clear that South Africa’s post-1994 constitution and belonging manifesto was not based on “originary syncretism.” Rather, it was motored by a hybridisation impulse. The difference between “originary syncretism” and “hybridity” is that with hybridisation the assumption is that originally bounded and separate identities are blended together. The Rainbow Nation metaphor and Mbeki’s conceptualisation aptly illustrate this point. Hybridity thus denies the historical fact of miscegenation and cultural intermingling from the time European and other settlers came to the territory that will later become South Africa (Martin, 2006: 173). More importantly, the hybridity agenda does not constitute a rebirth because it is not faithful to the fact, as Ramose noted in the previous section, that the essence of African cultures and identities is that of openness based on relations of complementarity with no beginning and not ending. It is in this regard that Martin, also relying on Amselle, proposes a new South African agenda of creolisation. The creolisation agenda is the opposite of Mbeki’s hybridisation agenda or even that of métissage because,

both [hybridity and métissage] originally imply that pure and homogenous elements entered into a combination. They cannot accommodate a history of mankind made of métissages of métissages, of hybridisation of hybridities, in which there was never a beginning, never any barrier to blending and mixing (Martin, 2006:169).

The main problem with the hybridisation agenda is that its locus of enunciation is the liminal world. Hybridisation is thus an agenda of and for transcultural person. These are people who exist in Du Bois’s ‘double environment’ and are thus homeless. As we saw above, such individuals tend to generalise their psychological and spiritual predicaments onto the entire group.
This point brings us an important limitation of Mudimbe and Appiah’s synthesis agenda. The “hybridisation solution” proposed by Appiah and Mudimbe does not address the fact that the colonial encounter bequeathed multiple heritages and also caused the forceful integration of Africa into the world system. It is this integration that is responsible for Africa’s current malaise and stagnation. Tsenay Serequeberhan (1993: 113) thus also argues that at the heart of the malaise gripping Africa is series of “non-traditional” pasticcio that were caused by the forceful insertion of Africa into the European world. Any post-colonial reconstitution agenda would have to deal with this pasticcio. Such an agenda would have to remember and re-member Africa and not simply dismiss the idea of an African identity as per post-modernist critiques. An agenda based on active synthesis as propagated by post-modernist theorists such as Mudimbe and Appiah could also defang struggles against de-worlding and for a pluriversal world. Additionally, the third path proposed by these transcultural elites only aims to hybridise the “reality” of the subjugated group while leaving the dominant pole intact. In contrast to this, the creolisation agenda seeks to change both poles and to affirm African-centered belonging to the world. Therefore, making a case for creolisation as opposed to hybridisation, Jane Gordon summarises the issue in this way:

Although the insights borne of this position [exemplified by Bhabha’s hybridity and Gloria Anzaldúa’s bordercrossing] were thought to extend more generally to illuminating the process of disavowing the constructed nature of membership and belonging and the disciplining and repressive capacities of both, hybridity often became more closely associated the angst of specific individuals whose mediating role ironically reasserted the logic of pure, distinct groups through which they moved as a go-between. While the existential insight produced by this homelessness or permanent in-betweenness made for rich literary and philosophical reflection, it often was pitched against the spirit and forms of anticolonial and progressive politics that required, however open-endingly, defined collectivities through which people could struggle for more democratic conditions (J. Gordon, 2014: 6).

To conclude, Martin’s proposal of creolisation, a process and not an identity, is a proposal that resonates with a proposal of remembering and re-membering Africa as Becoming. This vision is faithful to African humanness because it revalorises the principle of originary syncretism; the ‘hybridisation of hybridities’. More significantly, such a constitution and belonging vision answers to the African humanness’ prescription of always reaching out to attain be-ing-becoming and thus world-creation. Glissant would endorse such an understanding of syncretism based on what I have been calling African-centered belonging-in-the-world. In the “Introduction to a Poetics of the Diverse,” Glissant (1999: 120) argues that, “to live a world-totality from the place that is one’s own means to establish a relation, not consecrate exclusion”. Martin’s synopsis of Glissant’s world-creation vision shows that this African humanness-aligned vision rejects both Pan-Africanism in its nativist and integrationist guises. Rather, Glissant’s poetics of Relation share affinities with Ramose’s proposal of African humanness-mandated quest for pluriversality:
A poetics of Relation answers the obligation to think in terms of worldness (*mondialite*) and not of globalisation (*mondialisation*): a universe that for the first time in history can be envisioned as inextricably multiple and one. The multiplicity of the world thought as *mondialite* accommodates individuals and specificities; it eliminates all contradictions between multiplicity and singularity… (Martin, 2006: 171). 21

From the foregoing, we can understand why Mbeki’s Pan-Africanism and hybridity-based constitution-making project did not facilitate nation-becoming or a ceaseless process of national consciousness or reclamation of belonging-in-the-world.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter, I have been concerned with three main objectives: (i) to formulate the pillars of Du Bois’s very influential manifesto and its pitfalls, (ii) to set out the reasons for contemporary strivings for constitution and belonging in the ‘new South Africa,’ and (iii) to demonstrate that “post-Apartheid” leaders such as Mbeki continued to struggle with racial melancholia and ambivalence. I have argued that Mbeki’s Du Boisian-influenced (re)constitution agenda presaged national atrophy, a generalised state of unhomeliness, and dearth of national consciousness and nation-becoming.

Ultimately, Mbeki’s putatively radical agenda of African rebirth, de-racialisation of civil society and the economy as well as renewed integration of Africa into ‘the world’ betrayed his aggressive dependency on colonialist discourse. This is a symptom of racial melancholia. Mbeki’s agenda was a third path only because it combined, rather than superseded, the constitution and belonging visions of both Pan-Africanist integrationists and nativists. This combination enabled black transcultural elites, for the first time in the history of South Africa, to overcome ‘the segregation fallacy’. These elites were thus able to cash in the assimilation cheque that was made out to them just before the constitution of South Africa in 1910. These transcultural elites were, and still are, thus able to make demands for their integration into the extant world on basis that they are “black” or “native” and should thus benefit from black economic empowerment schemes. In the meantime, the majority of black people remain wedged on the underside of “the new South Africa”.

21 In *The Creation of the World or Globalisation*, Nancy (2007: 61. Original emphasis) similarly proposes that, “what is necessary is a world that would only be the world of singularities, without their plurality constructed as a unitality”. Of more relevance to my contention here is Nancy’s (2007: 109) further insistence that, “a world is a multiplicity of worlds, the world is a multiplicity of worlds”. This being the case it becomes necessary for Africans to assert the reality of an African world in the context where they are constantly being reminded that they ‘come from nowhere;’ or as Arendt puts it, that they exist in a ‘world of folly’.
I have argued that these neo-colonial outcomes should be located in the history of New African integrationist agenda. More specifically, these neo-Apartheid outcomes reflect the pitfalls of the Du Boisian manifesto of constitution and belonging; namely, an integrationist agenda that perpetuates a world of apartness; a top-down forging of collective identity and national consciousness that miscarries the project of forging post-colonial creolising national consciousness; and an attachment to colonialist discourse reflected in a reconfirmation of a ‘distinct but equal’ framework. The post-1994 re-manifestation of a world of apartness - a world in which the minority belong and the majority continues to experience ‘Native Life in South Africa’ - is an outcome of an emancipatory vision that failed to ‘resurrect the land’ on all three planes of African belonging-in-the-world. Part 2 of the dissertation puts forward counter-hegemonic constitution and belonging visions that, I argue, attempt to terminate the original sin in the constitution of South Africa and to elaborate post-Apartheid being-togetherness.
PART 2

CHAPTER 3: AFRIKAN HUMANNESS AND THE (RE)CONSTITUTION OF THE SPIRITUAL WORLD

Ambivalence, ambivalence. Always having to maintain equilibrium. You walk with this double personality as a colonised man… The pendulum swings between revulsion and attraction… Ambivalence [Es’kia Mphahlele, 1974]

I am looking forward to the day when our culture will so much unify us…[w]e shall have absolutely no distinction, and we will stand together [Es’kia Mphahlele, 1955]

Introduction

I begin this Part with Es’kia Mphahlele’s prefigurative constitution-making praxis. By prefigurative I mean that Mphahlele’s praxis, as is the case with those of Biko and Abahlali, sought to enact post-Apartheid forms of belonging and living even before the end of Apartheid. Mphahlele (1919-2008) was a writer of fiction, a journalist, a cultural activist and organiser, and above all, a teacher. Mphahlele’s vision of constitution and belonging was based on what he termed Afrikan humanness. The focus of his philo-praxis was predominantly on (re)constituting the spiritual world. The significance of the life and thoughts of Mphahlele is that they, in the first place, span colonial, Apartheid, and “post-Apartheid” eras.

The second significance of Mphahlele’s thought, as the epigraphs at the head of this chapter attest, and as I am going to demonstrate, is that Mphahlele is a premier theorist on the predicaments faced by people who find themselves interned in the liminal zone. As I have suggested in the preceding Part of this thesis, a fundamental question facing exilic elites is what route they ought to take to reckon productively with their condition of ‘inner melancholia’ and concomitant feelings of ambivalence. To borrow from Mphahlele’s second epigraph above, such a productive reckoning is essential if these elites are to contribute to the constitution (‘standing together’) of a polity with ‘no distinctions’. I will show that Mphahlele’s decolonising vision was made possible by the fact that he realised, firstly, that the problem of Apartheid was not simply a problem of racial subjugation and segregation. Rather, the problem of Apartheid was a problem of a world carved by numerous invisible lines resulting in a failure of constare, a ‘stand togetherness’. As can be seen in the second epigraph, Mphahlele proposed that a post-Apartheid constitution (‘foundational law’) should constitute an intercultural home for all. In this way, as I am going to argue in this chapter, Mphahlele brought together the two etymological origins.
of constare, namely, ‘to stand together’ and ‘to agree/fit together’. Furthermore, as the first epigraph shows, Mphahlele implied that ANC’s and other Pan-Africanist leaders’ failure to formulate genuine constitution-making policies was linked to these leaders’ state of spiritual and psychic fragmentation. Focusing specifically on transcultural elites, Mphahlele urged anti-colonial leaders to overcome their condition of ambivalence if they hoped to contribute to the Mayibuye imperative of re-membering of the world.

This is the reason why I have devoted an overwhelming portion of this dissertation to elites (Plaatje, Du Bois, Mbeki, Mphahlele, and Biko). This is because this stratum of colonised society is usually the one that takes up the cause of independence. As we saw in the previous chapter, these elites’ leadership of the anti-colonial struggle meant that their visions of constitution and belonging usually shaped “post-colonial” societies. In the preceding Part of this study, I focused on the dominant faction of this elite sector, the ones who were propelled to the forefront of constitution-making. In this chapter and the next one, I will explore the visions suggested by the non-dominant wing of the elite sector. Mphahlele and Biko were both influential individuals who, similar to Mbeki and other Pan-African leaders, received missionary education. They both battled with the problematic of liminality and concomitantly double consciousness. I will show that Mphahlele and Biko’s counter-hegemonic praxes were made possible by their ability to potentiate double consciousness and thus ‘return to the source’. In the final chapter, I will explore the convergences between the prefigurative, counter-hegemonic vision of Abahlali, a movement of mostly uneducated and impoverished people, and those of Mphahlele and Biko. Mphahlele’s own life story is a lesson on how elites could overcome what Mphahlele called ‘first exile’ (psychic and spiritual alienation), re-suture with home-culture and thus be in a position to contribute to collective processes of homemaking. Apart from the chronological reason (the fact that Mphahlele came before and influenced both Biko and Abahlali), this is the second reason why I have started this Part of the study with Mphahlele.

The third reason why Mphahlele is important to my main thesis is that his non-fiction, creative and literary critique work sought to formulate a counter-discourse that could resist the historical de-worlding of Africa and its people. By way of overview, Mphahlele’s lifetime mission can be illustrated with a passage from Mphahlele’s first non-fiction book, African Image (1962). Right in the middle of that book Mphahlele writes the following:

I do not know what Hannah Arendt means when she says ‘…they [Africans] had not created a human world, a human reality.’ What more human reality does one need than that people have socially and politically organised lives? Of course, our civilisations did not float on the back of advanced technology or on stocks and shares. Africans have always been more interested in human relations than in gadgets, even when they realise that they have to operate machines for a living… (Mphahlele, 1962: 91):
Mphahlele expressed puzzlement at Arendt’s attempt to ‘phantomise’ Africans and their world. Mphahlele seemed to wonder to himself: How could anybody lay a standard for what is human and what counts as ‘the world’ when the projects of being human and of creating the world are so diverse and never-ending? In actual fact, Mphahlele was aware that the basis upon which Arendt and other purveyors of colonialisit discourse assign the value of Absence (L. Gordon, 1999: 99) upon Africans is a commonplace Eurocentric gesture of relegating Africans to a non-world. Mphahlele’s response here was simply to avow African forms of creating and appearing in the world without totally rejecting Euro-American instruments and epistemologies. In this way, Mphahlele calmly asserts the Presence, worldliness, cultural openness, and world re-making capacity of Africans against the cavalier claims of one of the most influential Euro-American theorists on worldliness, appearance, and natality.

My aim in this chapter is to trace Mphahlele’s voyages of disalienation, homecomings, and homemaking. Tracking Mphahlele’s physical and spiritual odysseys will enable me to distill the main pillars of his decolonising praxis. In 1957, Mphahlele ‘choose’ to exile himself from South Africa. Twenty years later, although a tenured professor in the USA, Mphahlele decided to return to Apartheid South Africa. Why did Mphahlele leave? And, why did he return? The answers to these two questions are key to understanding Mphahlele’s strategy of constitution and belonging. The answers to these questions are also fundamental to understanding why Mphahlele proposed that the (re)constitution of the spiritual world is the primary constituent element of Mayibuye exigency.

I will discuss Mphahlele’s striving against what he called ‘first exile’ in section one. In section two, I will explore Mphahlele’s decision to physically exile himself and to seek belonging in “the Black World”. In the final section, I will analyse the main constitution, becoming, and belonging lessons to be derived from Mphahlele’s decision to take leave of his homeland. In this regard I will focus on Mphahlele’s decision to disavow “the Black World” and subsequently his deconstruction of Africanity (hence Afrikanness). I will show that Mphahlele’s deconstruction was based on the argument that Africanity as elaborated by Pan-Africanists and the early Négritude movement reprised colonialist discourse and thus perpetuated the worldlessness of Africans. Finally, I will show that Mphahlele’s return to Apartheid South Africa was impelled by a need to recover ‘first sight,’ and to re-suture with home-culture (‘the source’) in order to learn from it, to educate it and to engage in collective conscientisation processes aimed at molding ‘the source’ into a decolonising and creolising constituent power. Mphahlele predicted that unless ordinary people prefigure post-Apartheid becoming and belonging and forge themselves into a motive force that will de-constitute the South African world, the ‘new’ South Africa will be ushered in by alienated elites who will reiterate a world without ‘standing togetherness’.
3.1 Mphahlele’s Striving against ‘First Exile’

3.1.1 ‘Being born black in this country…is a political event’

Mphahlele has described his life as one of “exiles and homecomings” (cited in Manganyi, 1983: 11). Typical of the situation of many conquered people, Mphahlele’s exile began in his childhood. He was born in Marabastad, a “black-Indian ghetto” in the outskirts of Pretoria. Mphahlele’s parents sent him to live with his grandmother in a “black reserve” in the rural areas when he turned five-years-old. Ostensibly, he was being ‘returned’ to his ancestral location. However, the experience of living with a grandmother that Mphahlele perceived as uncaring made this an unhappy return. His parents sent him back to Marabastad after a few years. This childhood experience impressed in him a duality and an ambivalence that would constitute a “never-ending dialogue” between his rural/ancestral and urban streams of consciousness (Mphahlele 2002: 9). Back in Marabastad, young Mphahlele noticed “a certain ambivalence and disharmony” between his neighbours and their surroundings (Mphahlele, 2002: 189). The disharmony was caused by the fact that the ghetto was full of dirt and muck. At the same time, residents were in a constant state of hyper-vigilance against the hazards posed by both hoodlums and the government superintendent of the ‘black location’. The dis-ease of the inhabitants was ultimately caused by the fact that colonial spatial regulations made it impossible for “natives” to dwell where they desired. The colonial regime regularly evicted African communities from their ancestral homes and dumped them in Marabastad or other ghettos. Mphahlele recalled that this experience of violent de-homing and relocation engendered in new arrivals a feeling of melancholia because it was as if they were, “coming to a strange land, almost as if they were exiles” (Interview with Manganyi, 2010: 477). From a young age, Mphahlele, therefore, perceived a generalised state of unhomeliness.

The experience of being “caged” in a ghetto impressed on Mphahlele’s young mind both the reality of enforced racialisation and the fact that he was on the wrong side of the color line (1974: 26, 28; 1962: 68). From a young age he, therefore, developed a fluctuating mixture of envy and hatred vis-à-vis white people and the white world. These feelings of ambivalence were heightened on those days when he cycled to the white suburbs to deliver the laundry his mother had washed for white people. The ambivalence was aggravated by lack of human recognition from the other side. His early dealings with his mother’s white patrons left him with a feeling of being made invisible, as if, “I did not exist” (interview with Manganyi, 2010: 468). This very brief survey of Mphahlele’s early life demonstrates that, in colonial South Africa, the world between the ancestral world and the settler suburban world was a world of political oppression, rootlessness, unhomeliness, disharmony, impoverishment, enforced racialisation and depersonalisation. This was not a Third Space of ‘happy hyphenation’. Chabani

Manganyi, Mphahlele’s most important biographer, thus characterises life in the in-between world of Mphahlele’s upbringing as a life of “spiritual exile” (Manganyi, 1983: 29).

As we saw in Part 1 above, spiritually-exiled/‘liminalised’ persons often develop feelings of internal and external ambivalences. Internally, as Mphahlele points out, these persons’ consciousness vacillated between the sensibilities of the ancestral home and that of the alien/western modern setting. This psychic oscillation is made worse by the fact that colonial spatial regulations and precarious living made it impossible for conquered and displaced persons to experience feelings of habituation and sovereignty over their own life. It is in this context of being homeless and riddled with feelings of unhomeliness and worldlessness that most of the colonised begin to look towards western education for socio-economic mobility and spiritual succor. Mphahlele also looked towards education as, “the mountain path to Canaan” (Du Bois, 1986a: 367). He thus determined that the only way he could resolve his spiritual striving was to become an immigrant of the South African world (the first option in my typology of options available to exiled person). Mphahlele received a scholarship to study at a prestigious Christian mission school for black students.

The discussion in Part 1 above left us with a cautionary note regarding this route: the journey and process of receiving western education can lead to another form of homelessness and thus increased spiritual restlessness. Mphahlele (1984: 269) would thus later reflect that the process of being sent to school was akin to being sent into “the wilderness” with neither precedent nor guidance. Aligning himself with the theme of Ambiguous Adventure, Cheik Hamidou Kane’s acclaimed novel, he (Mphahlele, 1982: 42) wrote that journeying into this new world was similar to undertaking, “an adventure into the night”. This adventure is a nightmare that The Gambia’s Lenrie Peters dramatised as being characterised by a “bloodless war” for the spirit of a colonised person (cited in Mphahlele, 1982: 39). The war metaphor is apt. A character in Kane’s novel concludes that western education is a much more devastating weapon than the physical weapons of colonialism: “The cannon compels the body and the school bewitches the soul” (cited in Ngũgĩ, 2009:16). As we saw in the previous Part, the feeling of being bewitched comes from the fact that to journey into this space is to journey into an ambiguous spiritual space. The school-goer is eventually elevated above his or her “unuplifted” family and community. The ambiguity here is that the “wrench” from the community is cruel, “if at the same time exhilarating” (Mphahlele, 1984: 60). The adventure is exhilarating because western education, as Du Bois also realised, can also provide the colonised with tools to understand and manipulate western modernity. Ultimately, western education added another internal dialogue on top of the antagonistic dialogue going on between the ancestral consciousness and the urban-setting consciousness. It is this addition that launches the colonised person into a journey toward becoming transcultural. It is in this context of trying to understand himself and the psychic unhomeliness he was going through in this ‘ambiguous adventure’ that Mphahlele theorised and pioneered notions of “ambivalence” and hybridity.
In a paper published in 1967, and reproduced in 1973, Mphahlele (1973: 121) wrote that Africans have been enticed by the “neon lights” of western homes ever since they were forcibly incorporated into western modernity in the long sixteenth century. The enticement, and eventual sense of betrayal, is severe for those who are victims of this modernity’s teleological praxis. This is the “uplifted” stratum of the colonised group. Mphahlele’s main philosophical contribution was, firstly, to demonstrate that colonised transcultural persons are actually saddled with two layers of hybridity: the often-disagreeable negotiation between the ancestral spirit and the urban-setting sensibility as well as the tug-of-war between the indigenous consciousness and the western one. Secondly, in his philosophical and creative writings, Mphahlele demonstrated the ramifications of these dizzying forms of hybridity. Mphahlele revealed that double hybridity did not mean he became, “the oversimplified and sensationalised Hollywood version of a man of two worlds” (Mphahlele 1973: 121). Rather, he became a liminal-hybrid person. The subjectivity of a liminal-hybrid person is a subjectivity jammed in a limbo by, “a ‘civilisation’ that beckoned us from across the colour line but at the same time resisted us” (2013: 27). “And so here I am, an ambivalent character,” Mphahlele simply declared (1973: 121).

It should be clear by now that the concept of ambivalence (a key trait of racial melancholia) is one of the leitmotifs of this dissertation. I wish to explicate this concept further because it is also pivotal to understanding Mphahlele’s (and Biko and Abahlali’s) voyages of disalienation, homecomings, and homemaking. The concept of ambivalence conveys the sea-saw standpoint of individuals who find themselves interned between the ancestral home and the house of settler-invaders. Existence in this ‘double environment’ leads to divided loyalties and shifting stances towards the world of colonisers and its discourses. Thus, “rather than assuming that some colonised subjects are ‘complicit’ and some ‘resistant’, ambivalence suggests that complicity and resistance exist in fluctuating relation within the colonial subject” (Ashcroft et al., 2000: 12-13). This vacillation is the result of the fact that the process of creating ‘mimic men’ never results in completely complicit and domesticated persons. Rather, an excess or slippage always occurs in this process of producing the reformed Other (Bhabha (2005: 123). This excess creates figures that are neither altogether lost to the autochthonous home nor have full belonging in the coloniser’s house. This is because, as Mphahlele sought to demonstrate, western modernity and colonialist discourse both summon and reject colonised people. Liminal-hybrid individuals thus end up with a deep sense of inner conflict. For these almost mimetic figures, “the pendulum swings between revulsion and attraction… the two selves are apt by turns to fight, quarrel, despise each other, hug each other, concede each other’s roles…” (Mphahlele, 1974: 41, 281).

The crucial insight that Mphahlele, therefore, wished to convey was that feelings of ambivalence do not only relate to western modernity and its regimes of coloniality. More insidiously, feelings of revulsion and attraction are internal and internalised. For Mphahlele, then, to be a colonised transcultural person
was to be hybrid in the sense of embodying split selves. Spiritual unhomeliness is the result, therefore, of the fact that two warring streams of consciousness are coursing through the subjectivity of the liminal-hybrid: “that’s the anguish: not being two but the African having become both” (Mphahlele, 1974: 46-47). Mphahlele called attention to the idea that what we are dealing with here is not an edifying aggregation that results in one ‘being two’ and thus embodying syncretic or creolising sensibilities. Rather, we are here dealing with an internal dualism – an embodiment of internal multiculturalism as opposed to inter-culturality. Spiritual multiculturalism leads to a divided consciousness. This split renders a liminal-hybrid individual unhomely and homeless. Understood this way, conquest and colonisation do not only ‘kill’ the land; they also kill the spirit of colonised elites. We are now in a position to understand the reason why Mphahlele proposed that the task of (re)constituting the spirit world is a premier one.

Returning to my provisional typology, the first course that presents itself to the internally exiles person is a quest for further acculturation and thus assimilation. To adopt this deportment, as we have seen in Part I above, is to attempt a move from being an exile with ‘partial presence’ (Bhabha, 2005: 193), to being an immigrant with full Presence in western modernity and the house of the colonist. It is, in other words, an attempt gain admission to what Arendt (1998: 179) calls “the space of appearance”. Arendt (ibid.) submits that entry to this space can only be secured through action and speech. According to Arendt (1998: 178) speech-acts enable a person qua person to appear to one another. This is because words, in particular, enable disclosure and distinctiveness (Arendt, 2006: 152). Words, in other words, are key to overcoming anonymity, and thus depersonalisation and invisibility. More pertinently, Arendt (1998: 178) goes as far as to argue that without words, appearance is impossible because the newcomer would not be able to answer the question asked of every newcomer “who are you?” Following Arendt, Julia Kristeva (2001: 71) asserts that to respond to this question, the newcomer must first find a discourse, a lexis. Kristeva suggests such a discourse is the province of narrativisation. From an Arendtian, and Heideggerian, perspective narrative and story-telling are, therefore, ways of asserting belonging and worldliness.

These strategies are also important in African discourse and its modes of self-writing. However, as we shall shortly see, Mphahlele’s life and intellectual biography contradict Arendt’s proposals regarding appearance and worldliness. Briefly put, Arendt is blind to the fact that in settler colonial settings such as South Africa, or the USA where she was writing from, to appear in this way is to negate oneself and to suffer further unhomeliness and homelessness. This is because the settler world casts itself as the only human world. The historically ‘invisibilised’ person is thus put in a position of being a perpetual interloper. As Du Bois painfully learned, the feeling of being declared a ‘misbirth’ were exacerbated by the fact that, “I sort of had to justify myself” (cited in Lewis, 1993: 31). Nevertheless, this project of rehabilitating identity and manifesting worldly presence through the telling of stories and the offering
of autobiographies has appealed to successive generations of enslaved persons and other dehumanised and de-worlded peoples.

In 1946, Mphahlele published a collection of short stories. He was only the second black South African to do so. This collection contained vignettes of township life. Similar to Plaatje with Mhudi, Mphahlele sought to use his stories as a window into the ‘invisibilised’ lifeworld of “natives”. Anti-colonial intellectuals, mostly of a communist bent, met Mphahlele’s collection with derision. These reviewers dismissed this collection as a product of a person trying too hard to win the recognition of the white world. They assessed that Mphahlele was a cognitively and spiritually deracinated person who, “has had the gods of his fathers exorcised by the missionaries…” (cited in Mphahlele, 1959: 165). Mphahlele’s doomed attempt to reclaim worldliness recalls Frantz Fanon’s observations in “The Negro and Recognition”. Fanon (2008: 165. Original emphasis) chastised colonised elites for mistaking their mission in life as, “…to be, to emerge” in relation to the coloniser. It could thus be argued that in the middle of the century, Mphahlele belonged to that bloc of transcultural persons that H.I.E. Dhlomo, writing on the eve of Apartheid, derided as “Neither-Nor” persons bedeviled by double consciousness:

This type of African is not sure of himself, proud of his racial identities and affiliations and cultural heritage, as his tribal brother. He is neither wholly African nor fully Europeanised. He is in the desert between Egypt and Canaan, sometimes overwhelmed by the nostalgia to turn back, at other times by the urge to press forward…He uses European measuring-rods for success, culture, goodness, greatness…

(cited in Couzens, 1985: 33).

Mphahlele would later disavow this collection regarding it with a mixture of amused scorn and disdain (Obee, 1999: 25). Therefore, in 1946, Mphahlele had not yet realised the importance of the first pillar of the Du Boisian manifesto. This pillar suggests that the transcultural elite should first resolve his or her own condition of internalised alienation/exile if he or she is going to reclaim belongingness-in-the-world. In the case of Mphahlele (1973: 121), he recalled that it was only later in life that he came to the realisation that the first task facing him was to undergo “an agonising [internal] journey” which would culminate in him developing an “innate personality equipment” (Mphahlele, 1973: 121). This equipment would empower him to reconcile his many layers of enervating dualism (ibid.). As I discussed it in the previous chapter, Du Bois posited that the only route towards developing a self-conscious subjectivity was through a deeper descend deeper into western modernity’s rite of passage. This descent helps sharpen ‘second sight’. As I mentioned above with reference to Césaire’s Caliban, such a potentiation of double consciousness enables the transcultural person to begin to subject colonialist discourse to intense scrutiny; and in the process, to reevaluate himself or herself and the world. This was the case with Mphahlele who states that the further he progressed with western education the more he developed intellectual tools to question some of the myths of Christianity and
European civilisation (Mphahlele, 2007: 211-212). It thus happened that when he turned 21-years,
Mphahlele forsook Christianity and became a non-believer. His spiritual odyssey was gaining steam.

Mphahlele’s potentiated ‘second sight,’ and thus initial radicalism, is evident in the slant he adopted
when he co-founded an independent African-run newspaper in 1949. *The Voice of Africa (The Voice)*
was an explicitly African nationalist newspaper. Mphahlele and his co-editors announced the
motivation behind establishing this newspaper as follows:

> There is a general political inertness among us. Nothing . . . ever awakens our political consciousness...
> Self-pity never solved personal or national problems: it is a maladjustive reaction. . . (cited in Sandwith,
> 2006: 72).

From this first editorial, we can discern that the editors wished to address racial melancholia by
assaulting feelings of internalised inferiority, victimhood and political apathy. *The Voice* exposed the
hypocrisy of white liberals and upbraided the ANC for being elitist and assimilationist. More to the
point, the editors, “argued that in its insistence on following only constitutional methods of resistance -
at the same time adopting an extremely patronising attitude towards the ‘backward’ poor majority - the
‘lethargic and slow-moving ANC’…had become isolated from its people” (summarised by Sandwith,
2006: 75). Mphahlele and his co-editors were, therefore, offering a critique that applies to Du Boisian
praxes of constitution and belonging. The critique here is that integrationist politics, or politics of
evolutionary constitution-making, always go together with the denigration and marginalisation of the
lifeworlds of the majority of historically marginalised people. Thirty years later, Mphahlele reiterated
this same critique during the political debates leading to the transition to the “new” South Africa. For
purposes of this Part of the study, it is important to point out that Mphahlele and his co-editors
anticipated one of the central contentions of Black Consciousness philosophy. They did this by rejecting
a reformist vision in which, “both races can live in this country peacefully, not as masters and servants,
but as partners, the white race playing the role of senior partner” (cited in Sandwith, 2006: 76). At the
same time, Mphahlele and his co-editors rejected emergent politics of nativism encapsulated in the
slogan “Africa for Africans”. The editors, rather, advocated for cooperation and unity amongst all
oppressed peoples including Indians and Coloureds. Again, the editors were laying down a model for
Black Consciousness politics vis-à-vis the dominant Pan-Africanist politics of the time.

Not to be mistaken for assimilated intellectuals, Mphahlele and his co-editors combined this rejection
of politics of radical alterity with a disavowal of the myths of colonisation. Thus from 1951 Mphahlele
penned a five-part series entitled “What it means to be a Black Man”. In this series, Mphahlele
dismissed the moralising pretences of western civilisation by exposing the ways in which the South
Africa legal system subjugated black people (Sandwith, 2006: 83). Furthermore, Mphahlele and his co-
editors provided a model for resolving the problematics of double consciousness, ambivalence, and lack

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of constitution. The lack of constitution is what Mphahlele in 1955 (in the second epigraph above) referred to as the absence of ‘standing together’. Towards this end, in addition to calling for an expansive notion of Africanness, the editors chided black intellectuals and activists who called for the complete repudiation of western culture. Thus, when the ANC Youth League urged black people to, “resign from anything European,” an anonymous editor of The Voice (most probably Mphahlele) retorted that,

when nationalism takes this trend, the attitude is strikingly uncongenial to a progressive temperament: it is a poisonous and disastrous transition of thought that must narrow and stereotype men's outlook on things forcing them to see no glory in Debussy, Baudelaire, Maurois and others who are unAfrican (cited in Sandwith, 2006: 80).

Finally, and following this inter-cultural stance, the editors strenuously denounced the Apartheid regime’s efforts to impose “Bantu culture” on black people. Mphahlele and his co-editors responded by reproducing studies that showed that cultures are products of mutual borrowings (Sandwith, 2006: 82). The editors, therefore, valorised cultural syncretism and rejected the idea that cultures are bounded up and originary. The Voice (which was mostly funded by the three editors) ran until 1952. It ceased to circulate after Mphahlele was dismissed from his teaching job.

The Apartheid authorities dismissed Mphahlele from his teaching job when he mobilised against the Bantu Education Act. Hendrik Verwoerd, then Minister of Native Affairs, had rationalised the necessity of Bantu Education on the basis that missionary education had fostered in “the native” a feeling, “that that its spiritual, economic, and political home is among the civilised community in South Africa” (cited in Matthews, 1983: 198). The aims of Bantu Education were, therefore, to ‘re-tribalise’ and intensify the de-worlding of Africans by eradicating conditions that produced transcultural “natives” and a creolising national consciousness. The regime banned Mphahlele and other leading campaigners from the teaching profession. This attack prompted Mphahlele to undertake his first journey into physical exile. He took up a teaching post in Lesotho in 1954. Mphahlele’s first foray into bodily exile was, therefore, motivated by his refusal to contribute to more black subjugation and to a ‘re-tribalising’ ideology that would both fragment black people and inspire politics of nativism. With this act of refusal and physical exile, Mphahlele was completing his transition from aspiring to become an immigrant to being a fugitive.

3.1.2 On the quixotic and spiritually-enfeebling nature of disobedient fugitivity

Mphahlele returned to South Africa in 1955. He obtained an M.A. degree in English with distinction becoming the first black South African to be bestowed that honour. His dissertation was a critique of representations of black and white characters in South African literature. Mphahlele’s conclusion was
that these representations were products of colonised mindsets (Godzich, 1988: 29). This dissertation is significant because it shows the transformations that transcultural figures often go through – from trying to assimilate to being what Abdul JanMohamed (1992: 219-220) calls “specular border intellectuals”. Even though only a year separates Mphahlele’s honour’s dissertation (a study in English romantic poetry) and his master’s dissertation, a vast critical fissure separates the two. As Apartheid intensified and it became clear that assimilation was impossible, Mphahlele’s ambivalence tilted towards menace. Physical distance-taking, and the fact that he had begun an independent study of radical black American literature, contributed to his spiritual distance-taking. By the late 1950s Mphahlele had thus completed a journey he began when he co-founded The Voice in the late 1940s. He had advanced his ‘second sight’ to an extent of rejecting assimilationist promises.

Barred from practicing his “faith”, teaching (Thuynsma, 1989: 2), Mphahlele decided to join Drum magazine as a fiction editor, sub-editor and political reporter. Drum was a pivotal vehicle for the black urban cultural renaissance of the 1950s. Drum distinguished itself by its acerbic writings and its coterie of brash, extremely innovative, and hard-living black journalists. Taking their cue from the Harlem Renaissance of the 1920s, these writers charted a third path beyond their timid black literary predecessors and the literary tradition of white liberal writers (Brown, 2013: 46). True fugitives, these artists lived in the interstitial space that one Drum journalist, Nat Nakasa, baptised as the “Fringe City”.

Nakasa (2005: 9) explained that Fringe City was “between two worlds” and constituted, “life in a ‘No-man’s Land’ where anybody meets anybody”. In this zone, black artists and intellectuals came together with white intellectuals and students to kick it to jazz and consort with one another. Fringe Living, taking place mainly around the vibrant African-Indian-Coloured slum of Sophiatown, was an attempt to pre-figure post-apartheid living. This was because this way of living was not so much a matter of ‘crossing the line,’ it was, Nakasa insisted, “jumping the line or wiping it clean” (cited in Brown, 2013: 54).

Mphahlele never became part of ‘the Drum gang’. He quit the magazine after two years. Mphahlele regarded the bohemian multi-racial and inter-racial life on the border of the two worlds to be idealistic and meaningless. Liminal dwellers acted as if Apartheid did not exist, as if racial categorisation did not exist, and consequently often ridiculed overt political mobilisation.23 In the context of Apartheid and apartheid, this kind of interstitial living only got the colonised so far because it shied away from

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23 As Bloke Modisane, one of the most flamboyant Fringe dwellers, reflected in his much-acclaimed biography Blame me on History (1963), there was, however, no realistic way out of being involved in politics. This was because the black Fringe dweller was imbricated in the web of oppression and identity politics: “But I am black, because I am black I was a piece of the ugliness of Sophiatown and a victim of the violence of white South Africa; I became an unwilling agitator trapped in the blackness of my skin, and because I am black I was forced to become a piece of the decisions, a part of black resistance. I wanted to be both black and unconcerned with the games at politics, but a non-committed African is the same black as a committed Native” ([1963] 1986: 140. My emphasis).
confronting questions of identity, double consciousness, ambivalence and non-belonging. In a situation of forced tribalisation, political oppression, and apart-heid to eschew these questions was not to transcend spiritual unhomeliness and homelessness, it was actually to exacerbate them. Exiled Haitian writer Dany Laferrière’s reflections on the aporias of this kind of living are apposite here:

The dictator insists on being the center of your life
and what I did best in mine
was to banish him from my existence.
I admit, to do that sometimes I had to throw
the baby out with the bathwater (Laferrière, 2009: 109).

For Mphahlele, not only was liminal living escapist; it was also a sham. On the one hand, there was no real co-living because at the end of the night white Fringe sojourners retired back to their spirit-edifying suburbs while their black counterparts remained in their spirit-sapping slums. White Fringe dwellers visited the border city as respite from their humdrum, established existence. A white character in Mphahlele’s fictionalised autobiography put it as follows: “I can slum because I want real basic and expressive companionship which slums affords in plenty. Yet I couldn’t live in a slum; because it is a slum” (Mphahlele, 1984: 136. Original emphasis). On the other hand, such encounters only seemed to work because all liminal dwellers wore masks. The same white character imagines Mphahlele’s character thinking the following: “I have to keep accounting myself to the white man…never the other way round…So what do I do? I lie openfaced and laugh inside because you are not likely to know that I am lying, and if you know it, I know you can do fuckall about it” (Mphahlele, 1984: 137. Original emphasis).

For Mphahlele, then, fugitive living under apartheid, and under “post-Apartheid” as we shall see in the final chapter below, was at best ineffectual in bringing about the kind of internal and external transformations demanded by the situation. At worse, it acutely exacerbated them. For one whose consciousness had been raised, the only possibility that remained was to mobilise politically to try to bring about political change. However, as we saw above, Mphahlele’s involvement in the ANC’s politics of integration convinced him that such politics re-centered white people and were never going to result in meaningful change. Mphahlele was left with the two options: stay and pursue radical “unconstitutional” tactics or leave the country. Mphahlele decided to take up a teaching post in Nigeria.

To recap, Mphahlele was in the process of realising the first pillar of the Du Boisian manifesto by the time he decided to go into physical exile. He had overcome, or rather believed he had overcome, self-alienation and attained what Du Bois called ‘self-conscious manhood’. Mphahlele, now endowed with a sharpened ‘second sight,’ decided to seek belongingness inside the African Diaspora when he realised that the second option of my typology of dealing with the exilic condition (becoming a fugitive) was
quixotic. Leaving on the eve of the first wave of the decolonisation of African nations, Mphahlele might have believed that exile in Africa would put him in a position to contribute to Pan-Africanism and projects aimed at cultivating a proud African identity.

3.1.3 Black inter-nationalism: a home of the homeless?

Mphahlele’s route was not unique; he was following a route plotted by previous generations of black elites. These New African activists and intellectuals include the first president of the ANC, John Dube who left South Africa in 1887 to study in the USA; the man credited with coming up with the idea of forming the ANC, Pixley ka Seme who left South Africa at the begin of the twentieth century and returned with degrees from Colombia University and the University of Oxford; and as I discussed in the first chapter above, Solomon Plaatje who had several sojourns in England and North America. Although Mphahlele’s route was not unique, he has been described as, “the first Black South African to be truly international” (Thuynsma, 1989: 1), and a person in whom, “we have the most sustained record of the encounter between a black South African writer and the cultures of the diaspora” (Attwell, 2005: 111). A brief overview might be useful at this point. Mphahlele’s ‘spiritual striving’ impelled him to involve himself in pivotal moments of belonging and becoming of “the Black World”. Mphahlele’s involvements included his active, and often critical, participations in the 1950s Sophiatown Renaissance in Johannesburg when he worked for Drum magazine; the late 1950s West African Anglophone cultural renaissance when he was teaching and co-editing a literary magazine in Nigeria; the Négritude movement when he was a director of an international cultural center in Paris in the 1960s; and finally, the Black Art Movement and “Negro literature” when he was a professor of literature in the USA in the early 1970s.

Mphahlele exiled himself from South Africa with two main ambitions in mind: (i) to attain belonging within a proud global black identity and (ii) to achieve spiritual fortification. His hope was to then return to his homeland no longer intending to be a fugitive; rather an insurgent bent on de-constituting the house that had rendered him a pariah. A key question that arises is whether diasporic belonging or exile-living could ever prepare a transcultural elite to achieve the aforementioned goals; or whether such a detour is a route towards deepening ‘first exile’. This question is germane to my thesis because, as we have seen, transatlantic alliances, exiles, and foreign sojourns have always been pivotal to black people’s strivings for constitution and belonging. To answer this question, I will momentarily take leave of Mphahlele’s life and instead go on a theoretical detour to reflect on the question whether black internationalism could be a home of the homeless, and thus a space for personal and collective rebirths and world belonging.
I begin my reflections on exile and inter-national (un)homeliness with Edward Said - one of the most emblematic transcultural and exile figures of the twentieth century and a contentious critic of nationalism, hegemonic forms of belonging, and blind anti-imperialism. In “The mind of winter: Reflections on exile,” Said (1984: 49) starts off by chastising writers who romanticise the idea of exile. Such idealising can be seen in the western imagination where restlessness and boundary crossings have become leitmotifs. Said makes it clear that although an exiled person can enliven the new environment and might even rake in some personal achievements those accomplishments should not detract from the fact that exile, “is the unhealable rift forced between a human being and a native place, between the self and its true home; its essential sadness can never be surmounted” (ibid).

Let us go back to my provisional typology regarding the options opened to an internally-exiled person: to become an immigrant, a fugitive, or a mobilising diaspora-cum-insurgent. Said (2000: 50) writes that to be an exile is to be in a “perilous territory of not-belonging”. This is a third space between ‘the inside’ and ‘the outside’ that processes of nationalism draw in an effort to construe a sense of rootedness and belonging. A bold gesture by an exile would be to refuse to belong to the inside of the host nation. This refusal can take two extremes. On the one end of the spectrum: a person in exile could adopt a ‘fetish of exile’ refusing to commit to anything and refusing all connections and commitment. If the exile adopts this deportment, he or she falls prey to petulant cynicism, and perhaps melancholia because of a longing for home. On the other end of the spectrum: there could be pressure to join and develop new loyalties. The latter option brings with it a loss of, “critical perspective, of intellectual reserve, of moral courage” (Said, 1984: 54). Said suggests that an exiled person who goes beyond these two extremes can develop a scrupulous subjectivity that questions accepted notions and ways of belonging. Such subjectivity comes from the fact that having crossed borders and crushed barriers, the exile remains suspicious of habituations (Said, 1984: 54). This positionality lends to the exile an originality of vision and thus a way of being aware of a multiplicity of cultures and homes. Such a person, therefore, develops a contrapuntal awareness that refuses traditional and ultimately oppressive notions of settling and belonging (Said, 1984: 55).

Such an empowering sense of contrapuntal awareness is made possible by the fact that a transcultural person, even one saddled with a double consciousness is, in the words of Du Bois, gifted with a ‘second sight’. Salman Rushdie takes up this notion of an enabling doubleness in “Imaginary homelands” (1991). Rushdie argues that ‘second sight’, or what he calls a “double perspective,” (1991: 19, see also Said, 1994: 44) is borne out of the fact that an exiled or emigrant intellectual has an identity that is “at once plural and partial” (Rushdie, 1991: 15). Plural and partial because such person is no longer of the home-culture and is now “partially of the West” (Rushdie, 1991: 12). Although this positionality may lead to angst because, “sometimes we [feel] that we straddle two cultures; at other times, that we fall
between the two stools,” Rushdie (1991: 15) asserts that this habituation is on the whole a fertile territory for the writer or intellectual to occupy because it grants him or her a contrapuntal awareness.

If in that 1992 essay Rushdie exhibited some angst, writing in his memoir a decade later he would pose a more optimistic question: “[I]s it possible to be – to become good at being – not rootless, but multiply rooted? Not to suffer from the loss of roots but to benefit from an excess of them? (Rushdie, 2012: 53-54. Original emphasis). To be multiply rooted is, in my provisional typology, to be both an exile and immigrant. It is to be endowed with a dual ontology that comes not from feeling like a straddler but from looking back to historical cultural identity and forward towards the society of repositioning (Ashcroft et al, 2005: 425). This dual ontology is made possible by and leads to a constant movement between a multiplicity of homes. This continuous movement critiques and eschews essentialised and fixed notions of home, nation, belonging and identity in favour of syncretic understandings (Stock, 2010: 26).

However, is multiple rootedness a possibility for all exiles and migrants? Rushdie is quick to add that for multiple rootedness to be a possibility, “the different roots would have to be of equal or near-equal strength…” (2012: 53-54). Is this possibility open to all exiled persons? Leaving aside, for now, the question whether it is ever possible for anyone to be equally rooted in multiple homes (cultures), the reality is that ‘host’ societies often display prejudice against exiled persons. The ‘host’ society’s hostility often thwarts quests for additional rootedness. It is in this context that in Home and Exile then USA-based Chinua Achebe cautioned against the tendency to celebrate the notion of restlessness and of the writer-in-exile. Achebe (2003: 92) reminds us that when a writer from the west travels he carries, “the confidence of authority of his homeland with him”. A traveler from the Third World, however, finds that he can never appropriate multiple attachments; that in fact the imperial center holds nothing but misery and non-belonging for him or her (ibid). Kamau [nee Edward] Braithwaite (the Barbadian poet and historian who once accepted his status as a, “rootless man of the world” (2000: 45)) conveys in exact terms the seemingly endlessness exilic subjectivity of the racialised émigré. In, “Rights of Passage: Postlude-Home” Braithwaite seem to bemoan the fact that victims of imperial displacement/de-homing can never complete the rite of passage and attain rights of full belonging:

Where then is the nigger’s home?
In Paris Brixton Kingston Rome?
Here
Or in Heaven?
What crime
his dark
In a world of almost universal anti-blackness, it is almost impossible for black people and other cultural and racial minorities to resolve their psychic displacement and spiritual unhomeliness by being at home both in their left-behind home-culture and the culture of the host environment. That travelling black bodies often experience terror and that in white-dominated spaces and territories black people are expected to be invisible often impel black people to hide themselves and their cultures (hooks, 2009: 93). Indeed, to borrow a felicitous term from Frank Wilderson’s (2008: 59) harrowing memoir of exile and Apartheid, black people are often compelled to travel “incognegro”. To move about ‘incognegro’ is to never arrive because one’s identity is not being positively transformed. There is no transformation and aggregation because one is travelling with a false identity, with a mask: We wear the mask that grins and lies/It hides our cheeks and shades our eyes/This debt we pay to human guile/With torn and bleeding hearts we smile/And mouth with myriad subtleties (Paul Laurence Dunbar in Roberts, 2007: 128). When a transcultural person adopts an incognito (mis-) appearance he or she suffers more spiritual liminality because he or she is forced to subdue a part of himself or herself in order to assimilate - except that assimilation is impossible. The result is further self-renunciation, more invisibility.

Is invisibility, however, always a disability? Let us recall the opening testimony of the eponymous narrator of Invisible Man: “I am an invisible man…I am invisible simply because people refuse to see me. I’m not complaining; nor am I protesting. It’s sometimes an advantage to be unseen” (Ellison, 2001: 3). What possible advantages could there be to be unseen by “people;” to be seen as a nothing? The clue lies in the rest of Paul Laurence Dunbar’s nineteenth century poem: Why should the world be otherwise/In counting all our tears and sighs?/Nay, let them only see us, while!We wear the mask (cited in Roberts, 2007: 128). To put on a mask is, from this perspective, to engage in an act of refusal - a refusal to dwell in the world whose standard of humanity one does not seek to emulate, rather to

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24 Frank Wilderson also recalls a time when his then South African wife came to join him in the USA. His wife became depressed when her dreams of swapping racist South Africa for a land where one could pursue happiness without discrimination did not materialise. Wilderson (2008: 26) recalls a conversation in which he dashed his wife’s optimism: “You don’t need a law degree to know that African immigration is an oxymoron…. A land of opportunity. A step up in the world. You were so inebriated with your arrival that you thought you’d pass through customs and be changed forever…A vertical leap from kaffir to immigrant, when all you made was a lateral move from kaffir to nigger. That’s what’s eating you”. Wilderson (2008: 59), a leading theorist of Afropessimism, concludes that black people are “cosmic hobos” with no place and time in the universe.
disavow. An exiled person who wears a mask refuses to be seen. The mask allows an ‘invisibilised’ person to rebuff, or at least to distort (further) the white man’s gaze.

The performative act of refusing acceptance is an embrace of that Third Space that Said calls the ‘perilous territory of not-belonging’. ‘We wear mask’ is the opposite of being coaxed into wearing a ‘black skin, white mask’. It is in other words, a descend into fugitivity in the sense conceived by Fred Moten (2008: 179). Moten (ibid.) proposes that blackness is as a state of being that refuses to be captured by the logic of the dominant, of the settled, that is, of the hegemonic home. As Moten (2013: 756), following Fanon, puts it, blackness-as-fugitivity, “signifies a relationality that displaces the already displaced impossibility of home and the modes of relationality that home is supposed to afford”. More pertinently, such a fugitive relationality is a “sharing of life in homelessness” that comes about through refusing that which has been refused (ibid.). It is a refusal, therefore, of being human according to the prescription of colonial and “post-slavery” praxes; namely, dwelling in the nation-state and in western modernity or of being admitted into the Arendtian space of appearance.

In the remainder of this sub-section, I aim to delve deeper into the aforementioned notions of (i) ‘sharing life in homelessness’ as a release from, not intensification, of exile; and (ii) a critique of the nation-state and western modernity by black ‘fugitives,’ and, finally (iii) an exploration of the limitations of black internationalism’s disembodied universalism-as-home.

JanMohamed (1992: 218) terms being-togetherness in homelessness a condition of “homelessness-as-home”. This kind of homelessness is a habituation of those border-crossers JanMohamed names “specular border intellectuals.” Whereas ‘syncretic intellectuals’ are ‘at home’ in both the formative culture and the new culture; ‘specular intellectuals’ are unwilling or are unable to be “at home” in the two cultures (Jan-Mohamed, 1992: 219-220). The latter group of intellectuals thus approach the host culture coldly and analytical. Most importantly, JanMohamed (ibid.) shows that it is the latter set of intellectuals that, consciously or unconsciously, seek or reflect new ways of group formation. The pivotal question, as JanMohamed implies, is how, precisely, does a colonised/ oppressed person enter the third space; what their intentions with regards to the original home (culture) and the colonists/master’s home are; and what do they regard as the culmination of their spiritual striving.

To sum up the discussion so far: although black transcultural intellectuals are often unwilling or are prevented from achieving multiple rootedness; that they wear masks to disfigure the gaze of racialisation; and that they often, willingly and or unwillingly, occupy interstitial spaces in-between homes, nothing prevents them from having a contrapuntal awareness to deconstruct hegemonic spaces and belongings. What makes this deconstruction possible is the transformation of an exiled person’s positionality from that of unwanted liminal being to being a fugitive who is at home in not habituating
any home. I have suggested that black inter-nationalism (a response to the Du Boisian ‘spiritual strivings’) is a sharing of life in homelessness by fugitives-cum-diaspora. Complicating my main thesis is the fact that it is precisely for this latter reason that black internationalists, as we shall shortly see, do not only critique the idea of nation-states and other forms of belongings demanded by western modernity. They also reflect a tension between nationalism and the need to supplant it.

Black struggles are for the most part struggles against western modernity-as-coloniality. These struggles have thus been analogous, cross-cultural, and collaborative. This is one of the takeaway points in Cedric Robinson’s *Black Marxism: The Making of a Black Tradition* (1983). In this path-breaking study, Robinson makes the case for the existence of a historical or social tradition of black radicalism across the globe. Robinson (2000: 72) rejects the tendency to read instances of black revolts, or rebirth, as historically and geographically bounded acts that simply respond to exigencies of particular places. The fact is that black inter-nationalism, in all its varieties and conflicts, emerges from the sense that third space (dis)location conferred on black people a common desire to end their bane of unhomeliness (Robinson, 2000: 166). As Michael Hanchard (2005: 113) also observes, this common cause has resulted in strategic collaboration of black actors across the divide of colony, state, nation, and local cultures. Hence black *inter-*nationalism. What makes black inter-nationalism a discourse of resistance against de-worlding and what transforms it into “worldliness-without-world” (JanMohamed, 1992: 234) are the interlinked ideologies that perform, *in the world*, the humanity, the being-togetherness, and the belonging-in-the world of black peoples.

Understood in this way, black inter-nationalism is thus a constitution of a people and a world – the so-called Black World. This world is a creation of specular border intellectuals, such as Solomon Plaatje (see Boehmer, 2002: 141), who assemble on the margins of nation-states to forge and instantiate alternative forms of belongings and cultures (also see Gilroy, 1993: 16). In this regard, Gilroy (1993: 1-3), Hanchard (2003: 7-8) and others have observed that black diasporic movements and transnational black politics seek to problematise the homology between nations and states. There is thus a subtle paradox and indeed a tension that can be perceived in black internationalists’ stance regarding the nation-state: calling for territorial sovereignty and statehood and at the same time prefiguring an internationalism that would subvert the nation-state (Hanchard, 2005: 118). Black inter-nationalism is thus proposed as ‘homelessness-as-home’. Could this proposal help surmount homelessness, rootlessness, namelessness and unhomeliness? Or is this world another instance of de-worlding and rootlessness that in his 1956 letter of resignation from the French Communist Party Aimé Césaire ([1956]2010: 152) denounced as “emaciated [disembodied] universalism”?

In the final section below, I trace Mphahlele’s journey from seeking Pan-Africanist membership in “the Black World” to disavowing this world. Mphahlele’s odyssey demonstrate that if the Black World does
exist, it is often an unhomely and harrowing space particularly for exiled African intellectuals. This realisation led Mphahlele to conclude that the problematics of ‘first exile (spiritual and psychic alienation) and worldlessness could only be resolved ‘at home’. This realisation is the foundation of Mphahlele’s prefigurative praxis of constitution and belonging.

3.2. Mphahlele’s Constitution Vision: Seek Ye First the Spiritual Kingdom

3.2.1 Regaining Africa and deconstructing Africanity

Something inside Mphahlele thawed when he arrived in Nigeria. The asthma that he had been suffering from since he was twenty-years old immediately disappeared. Manganyi (1983: 14), a Black Consciousness psychologist, speculates that this psychosomatic relief points to the fact that Mphahlele was becoming spiritually rejuvenated. Mphahlele (2013a: 20) confirms that his first days in Nigeria felt like freedom and “daytime” after the “nightmare” in South Africa. He found that urban Nigerians still practiced their ‘traditional’ cultures. He could thus immerse himself in a society that was proudly African. Mphahlele (2013a: 25) will later confirm that West Africa, “gave Africa back to me”. One of the key insights from Part I of the dissertation is that a ‘liminalised’ person can attempt disalienation without returning to home-culture. This was indeed the case with Du Bois. Du Bois claimed to have attained ‘self-conscious manhood’ and Negro-becoming even though he never re-sutured himself with ordinary black folks. I have outlined the pitfalls of such being-becoming in chapter two above. In the previous section of this chapter, I showed that Mphahllele believed that further education had enabled him to achieve disalienation to such an extent that he could even be a ‘voice of Africa’. However, we now learn that it was only when Mphahlele immersed himself in an African atmosphere that Africa was finally returned to him. I will shortly return to the significance of this insight.

In “The pleasures of exile” George Lamming (2000: 40) explained that West Indian writers went to exile because they were faced with the choice of either taking the risk of dying with bitterness or leaving their homelands. Mphahlele (1962: 54) also writes that, “I had to get out or shrivel up with bitterness”. Writing for *Drum* Mphahlele’s writing had been choked with bitterness and protest. Exile emancipated Mphahlele from bitterness and he could thus write without a poisoned pen (ibid.). It was in this frame of mind that he finished his most acclaimed work, *Down Second Avenue* (1959). This autobiography exposed the harsh realities of growing up under colonialism and Apartheid. This autobiography is a demonstration of how much Mphahlele had matured spiritually. His first published work had revealed a writer striving after white recognition and assimilation, while his editorials and columns in *The Voice*

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25 I propose this shorthand to draw a contrast between Mphahlele’s vision of constitution and belonging and that of dominant forms of Pan-Africanism. This shorthand is my riff on Kwame Nkrumah’s very influential proclamation: ‘Seek ye first the political kingdom and all things will be added unto you’.
of Africa presented a man who was of necessity outwardly-focused and belligerent. In *Down Second Avenue*, we meet a man who is going down memory lane to re-member himself and begin anew his mission of attaining self-conscious personhood. This is to say that autobiographical writing in exile enabled this coming-to-self-consciousness writer to critically journey back into his or her ‘ambiguous adventure’. This was one of the ‘pleasure of exile’ for Mphahlele. More importantly, away from Apartheid, Mphahlele was now compelled to define his identity on other terms than those motivated by bitterness and the socio-historical fact of racial subjugation. Mphahlele (2013a: 20) thus recalled that landing in Nigeria took away the reactive and bitterness-inflected “crutch” that was central to his idea of himself. He was thus compelled to search for other grounds for his self-consciousness and self-definition than the ones imposed by his behind-the-veil existence. Therefore, as we shall see, his poetics diverged from those of Jean-Paul Sartre’s Black Orpheus poets (1964: 13-14). These poets’ négritudist poetics were impelled by aggressive dependency and thus a striving towards radical alterity.

Mphahlele landed in a Nigeria that was in the midst of a literary and cultural renaissance. Mphahlele threw himself into this renaissance. This renaissance was also his personal rebirth. In addition to teaching at a high school and later at a university, he co-established a club for writers and artists. He also contributed to and later co-edited the felicitously entitled *Black Orpheus* journal. In South Africa, Mphahlele used to write with “barbed wire between the mouth” (Mphahlele, 2002: 178). For as long as he sustained such an oppositional tension he was always distracted from journeying into his own soul. Physical exile enabled Mphahlele to begin the voyage towards resolving his spiritual unhomeliness. In this regard, Mphahlele explained the work he and his co-editors were doing at *Black Orpheus* in a manner that suggested that he was traversing liminality towards the frontier: “We are pioneers at the frontier, seeking a definition of ourselves and the past from which we have come” (Mphahlele cited in Benson, 1986: 17). If the colonists’ act of over-running the frontier leads to ‘death of the land’ and ‘the relocation of home and the world,’ Mphahlele and his co-editors and contributors were redefining the terms of engagement.

It was during this time of trying to take leave of a liminal consciousness that Mphahlele wrote *African Image* (1962). Support for my suggestion that exile enabled Mphahlele to rethink and re-fashion the first and second pillars of the Du Boisian manifesto (disalienation and valorisation of group consciousness) can be found in the preface of this book. Mphahlele (1962: 16) described this first non-fiction book of his as a work about, “the sense and nonsense that is often said and thought by whites and blacks…about each other and about themselves”. As we shall shortly see, Mphahlele’s intentions with this book were to engage in discursive self-determination in order to redefine the terms of engagement between himself and colonists. *African Image*, then, aimed to deconstruct the false image that colonialist discourse had imposed on Africa and Africans. To more specifically draw a link with my discussions in Part I above, Mphahlele wished to offer a demystified notion of Africanness.
We can illustrate Mphahlele’s deconstruction and construction impulses by going back to the section of *African Image* with which I began this chapter. Firstly, we would recall that in that section Mphahlele resisted what he regarded as Arendt’s attempts to relegate Africans to a non-world. Mphahlele opened that chapter by affirming Africa’s own civilisations and the reality of Africa’s history, a history that he (1962: 90) pointed out had been interrupted by missionaries, traders, and then by military conquests. However, his wish was not to recover pre-colonial African culture and identity. He instead celebrated what he referred to as his “detribalised,” hybrid, but still African identity. His creolising identity ensured both a trans-ethnic solidarity and allowed him to, “enjoy the best of both [African and European] worlds” (Mphahlele, 1962: 91). It was not that he belonged to both worlds. Rather, he was privy to both, and as such he was, “one up” against colonists (Mphahlele, 1962: 66).

Secondly, Mphahlele (1962: 92) warned white settlers that unless they adopt “certain” African ways of life they will continue to be materially prosperous but be bedeviled by a strong persisting sense of alienation from fellow humans and the surrounding environment. This alienation comes from the fact that even though white settlers are no longer European they are not yet African. Therefore, Mphahlele turned colonialist discourse on its head to make the charge that it was white settlers who occupied a barren liminal ghetto of “unreality”. In this sense, Mphahlele was intimating that European settlers suffered from white racial melancholia. I will return to this notion in the next chapter when I outline Steve Biko’s vision of (re)constituting the social world. According to Mphahlele, white people continued to be settlers because they continued to evade indigenous peoples and the surrounding landscape. Settlers masked their [Sartrean] inauthentic existence with a “civilised posture” (ibid.). To buttress the point that conquerors were the ones who suffered from spiritual unhomeliness, rootlessness, and worldless, Mphahlele mobilised the following passage from Octavio Mannoni’s *Prospero and Caliban*:

> What the colonial in common with Prospero lacks, is awareness of the world of others, a world in which others have to be respected. This is the world from which the colonial has fled because he cannot accept men as they are. Rejection of that world is combined with the urge to dominate... It is always a question of compromising with the desire for a world without men (cited in Mphahlele, 1962: 78-79).

Finally, Mphahlele announced that his mission was to ‘civilise’ white South Africans. Mphahlele’s civilising mission, or his burden, aimed to help descendants of colonists to regain worldliness through African-centered belonging-to-the-world. Although Mphahlele will later revise *African Image,* the rudiments of his vision of constitution and belonging are found in this 1962 edition. Two features of Mphahlele’s then nascent vision of stand out: (i) a desire for a creolising form of Africanness, and (ii) the idea that white settlers should be assisted to become and to belong. It is important to point out that this vision of constitution and belonging was incongruent with the then prevalent ideologies and praxes
of African otherness. As we saw in the previous chapter, 1960s Africa was the zenith of political and epistemological decolonisation and radical discourses of otherness. As I discussed in Part I, these ideologies promoted ideas of ‘Africa for Africans’ and of ‘African authenticity’. Mphahlele entitled this chapter “Going my way?”. This title suggests that Mphahlele was aware that his constitution and belonging vision was incongruent with dominant Pan-Africanist visions.

To be sure, Mphahlele opened *African Image* with a critique of the notion of “African Personality”. Mphahlele’s (1962: 19-20) main argument against this concept invented by Edward Blyden was that it does not have any ontological reality. Mphahlele (1962: 21) conceded that the evocation and invocation of the idea of African Personality might have some resonance in the field of politics. However, even on this plane, divergent understandings of what freedom ought to entail made an all-encompassing idea of African Personality “nonsense” (ibid.). According to Mphahlele (1962: 23), if necessary at all, the search for this identity should be confined to personal quests undertaken by physically and culturally exiled leaders. Morphed into a national quest, this personal quest became “re-colonisation” of people who were never wrenched from their ‘traditional’ communities and culture (ibid.)

Mphahlele carried the same critique against Négritude in chapter two of his deconstruction and reconstruction of the *African Image*. Mphahlele inquired, “What price ‘Négritude’?”. He answered that the price that came with Négritude were romanticism, exoticism, and the calcification of African cultures. Mphahlele specifically rejected the purity stance adopted by most négritudist artists and thinkers. He asserted that such a stance is an unnecessary deception. Again, Mphahlele empathised with the fact that Négritudism was being embraced by ‘liminalised’ Africans desperate for ways to deal with their psychic restlessness. He (1962: 27), however, warned that the Négritude movement was unfortunately, “too preoccupied with anthropological creepy-crawlies” to sufficiently deal with the dilemma of double consciousness. In this way, Mphahlele anticipated Mudimbe and Appiah’s post-structuralist critiques. Finally, in an earlier paper entitled “The cult of Négritude,” Mphahlele (1961: 50) went as far as to argue that the Négritude project was not a decolonising project because it was a project propagated by returning “middle class disciples” intent on “auto-colonising” the rest of the continent.

Mphahlele’s 1962 book is, therefore, an early exposé of the potential pitfalls of the Du Boisian manifesto of constitution and belonging. Mphahlele’s warning was that Pan-Africanism and Négritude leaders never actually exit the liminal world. Instead, these elites imposed their own image of African rebirth and Africanity based on their particular socio-cultural station and psychic predicaments. Their salvationist efforts amounted to “auto-colonisation”. Finally, Mphahlele observed that these leaders recolonise the non-transcultural majority by elaborating a static notion of “African culture”. Rather than learning from the unassimilated majority (‘the source’), these elites deployed an aggressive anti-western
discourse which was nevertheless a colonialist discourse because it was based on ‘anthropological creepy crawlies’.

3.2.2 Of prodigals and the (re)constitution of home

Mphahlele would later adjust his attitude towards Négritude and African Personality. He now granted that both of these ideologies could be useful launching pads to spark the “spiritual odyssey” of transcultural persons. Mphahlele now perceived that these movements of return aimed to convert spiritually and culturally exiled leaders into prodigals. Following the leitmotif of Leopold Senghor’s poetry, Mphahlele (1982: 38) understood that returning elites were prodigals not because they had squandered their heritage; rather they had tried to bury it. Thus deracinated individuals suffered from disinherited imaginations (Mphahlele, 1982: 36-37). They were personalities uprooted from their African beliefs and epistemologies. Mphahlele’s position was that he would support these ideologies of return if the impetus behind them was to facilitate the prodigal leader’s re-appropriation of their home-culture, and thus identity. Such a return would then be an endeavor to contribute to the reconstitution of self and home; rather than a ‘recolonisation’ endeavor.

To my mind, Mphahlele’s most insightful contribution to the debates around disalienation and post-colonial becoming was his warning that the return would always be a “qualified return” (Mphahlele, 1982: 38). The leader’s return is qualified between the transcultural leader can never, should never, completely purge his or her western stream of consciousness. Secondly, the return is constrained by the fact that to stage their return an alienated person naturally deploys equipment typically associated with western modernity such as novels, poetry, and history books. It is from this perspective that Gambia’s Lenrie Peter’s deployed the metaphor of “Parachute Men” to describe these prodigals. It is precisely because the exiled elite seeks to stage their return using western equipment, dramatised here by a parachute, that the return is awkward, and it is always a beginning:

*The violent arrival
Puts out of the joint
Earth has nowhere to go
You are at the starting point.
Jumping across worlds
In condensed time
After the awkward fall
We are always at the starting point* (cited in Mphahlele, 1982: 39).

Another factor that conditions ‘the return’ is the fact that home-culture is dynamic; it is not a “museum specimen” (Mphahlele, 2002: 96). The fact that ‘the source’ is inherently syncretic and that the encounter with western modernity has altered it means that the ancestral shrine is now painted with
paints obtained from the urban center, the ‘traditional’ dress is adorned with fabrics and beads obtained from Europeans, the ‘ancient’ music now issues from electric guitars, and the ‘original’ poetry now carries inflections from elsewhere. The ‘source’ is thus neither wholly traceable to an original Past nor is it hybrid in the sense I discussed in chapter 1 above as being ‘almost-European’. Rather, ‘the source’ is creolising in the sense used by Jane Gordon (2014: 167) to call attention to historically colonised cultural practices that have been altered by their encounter with western modernity while still remaining “authentically” African, for example. To borrow from Ashish Nandy’s idea of the spiritually and culturally ‘uncolonised’ Indian as the Other Orient (2011: 72), the source is the Other African. ‘Other African’ because in its dynamism “it assimilates – i.e. adopts – while it can also resist” harmful aspects of western modernity (Mphahlele, 2002: 96). Mphahlele’s proposal, then, was that to circumvent nativism, decolonising modes of redemptive returns/returning ought to aim (i) to remember, re-member, and recreate African myths and cultures, and then (ii) to continue assimilating and domesticating aspects of western modernity on African terms. In this way, the return is a return to the principle of originary syncretism. Furthermore, understood in this way, the return is always a starting point.

To sum up the journey so far: physical exile enabled Mphahlele to recreate the first and second pillars of the Du Boisian manifesto. This is because physical exile helped Mphahlele to both regain Africa and to deconstruct Africanness. Furthermore, exile enabled Mphahlele to begin to reclaim and redefine his African identity without the poetics of bitterness, pain and ‘pathology of alienation’. Finally, being an outsider endowed Mphahlele with a unique perspective to critically evaluate how in the course of putative homemaking transcultural leaders deepened homelessness and unhomeliness. As we will see later, Mphahlele will later deploy these exilic insights in his trenchant critique of South Africa’s post-1990 ‘nation-building’ processes.

3.2.3 Africa is not for Africans

My main aim in this sub-section is to bring Mphahlele’s experience to bear on proposals of homelessness-as-home. As we have seen, exile not only launched Mphahlele on a spiritual odyssey; it also endowed him with what Said calls a scrupulous subjectivity. Invoking Said is, however, also a reminder that the exilic condition should not be romanticised. Said (1994: 35) mourned that exile is “one of the saddest fates” that can befall a person. The condition is sad and fraught with danger because the exiled person could be thrown into another liminal world, “neither completely at one with the new setting nor fully disencumbered of the old, beset with half-involvements and half-attachments” (Said, 1994: 36). It is with this experience in mind that Mphahlele ([1974]1984: 6) aimed to demonstrate that exile-living is “fragmented” living. He conveyed this sentiment by way of a fictionalised autobiography he entitled The Wanderers (1974). In Mphahlele’s case, he had taken flight into other parts of Africa in search of the daytime of home after the uncanniness and nightmare of the occupied home. However, he
found himself caught between daytime and nightmare. Exile-living thus came with its own ambivalence: “from innocence to experience to the acceptance and resentment of placelessness…,” wrote Mphahlele (2013a: 126).

Mphahlele’s engagement with African ideologues of radical alterity had convinced him that an all-embracing African identity that all Africans belong to does not exist. At the same time, the more he lived in Nigeria the more he came to realise that the rhetoric of Pan-Africanism and African unity was simply rhetoric. Mphahlele and his family were never allowed to be part of the Nigerian society. They were embraced by a small group of professionals and artists composed mainly of inter-racial couples. Mphahlele was thus thrown into a form of ‘Fringe Living’ he had resisted in segregated South Africa. He could not assimilate into Nigerian society. He could only be an expat. Addressing The Wanderers, Mphahlele declaimed as follows:

You’re an expatriate. Take your chances, tread softly, human cultures have stone walls. Find the crevice and dig your way through and don’t try to go further than it allows you. Africa has several enclaves with walls and around them and several crevices in the walls (Mphahlele, 1984: 247-248).

To live as an expat, Mphahlele (2013a: 3) thus lamented, is to live in the bubble of the “international community”. Mphahlele advised African exiled intellectuals to give up the quest for ‘full belonging’. Rather, they must take their chances in interstitial spaces/crevices. However, “what are we seeking when we enter through the crevices?” asked Mphahlele (ibid.). Mphahlele partially answered this question in “Africa in Exile” (1982). Mphahlele (1982: 33) provisionally agreed with Paul Toberi’s suggestion that border-living in exile could be a positive endeavor because it enables the exiled person to keep his or her own national and spiritual identity. It is this retention that ensures a contrapuntal consciousness. There are, however, costs to the exile holding fervently to his or her own national and spiritual identity. Firstly, as Mphahlele inquires above, what then is the point of leaving home and seeking belonging elsewhere? Secondly, as Achebe reminds us in the previous chapter, the privilege of proudly carrying and affirming home-culture wherever one goes is a luxury often only available to western intellectuals. Thirdly, and even more pertinently, what is the African exile’s own spiritual identity when colonisation had degraded and suppressed the autochthonous spiritual world and produced spiritually colonised elites?

Indeed, as Mphahlele (1982: 33) noted, the majority of African artists and intellectuals cross borders not for professional reasons, but because they hanker after “spiritual self-fulfillment”. For these displaced people, Theodor Adorno’s writing-as-dwelling (Said, 1994: 43) would, therefore, not suffice. According to Mphahlele (1984: 234) the condition of a specular intellectual in crevices is essentially a “condition of anonymity”. Speaking of his fictionalised self, Mphahlele wrote that, “he wanted just as many people as could feel his presence and give him a sense of community” (ibid.). In contradistinction
to border-living and the bubble of the expat community, he preferred African humanness/\textit{ubuntu}-living amongst other people because the community, “gives me reason for being alive” (Mphahlele, 1984: 73). Too often, however, the exiled African finds that this kind of \textit{ubuntu}-living is out of reach. Rampant ‘tribalism,’ xenophobia and chauvinism denied Mphahlele embeddedness in the Nigerian society (Mphahlele, 1984: 286). In Kenya, the political elites boycotted the African cultural centre that Mphahlele had established. Instead, they choose to frequent the once ‘European-only’ establishment. Most of the Kenyans he was working with at the cultural centre eventually turned out to be xenophobes. They would later conspire against him and force him to abandon the centre.

Mphahlele had no choice but to take up PhD studies in the USA. After finishing his PhD studies (the manuscript of \textit{The Wanderer} constituted his PhD submission), Mphahlele’s wife insisted to the reluctant Mphahlele that they should return to Africa. Mphahlele applied for and received a lectureship position at the University of Zambia. When the Mphahleles arrived in Zambia, Zambia had recently signed a peace and co-operation pact with the Apartheid regime and sentiments against South African refugees were prevalent. Mphahlele’s experience in Zambia caused him to decide to abandon Africa. Mphahlele thus learned that the “Black World” could be as uncanny and unhomely as the left-behind ‘dead land’. Instead of helping him end his spiritual unhomeliness and homelessness exile became, “a ghetto of the soul” (Mphahlele, 1987: 57); “often a soul-mutilating process” (Mphahlele, 1984: 6).

3.2.4 ‘The tyranny of place’

Mphahlele returned to the USA in 1970 to take up a post of associate professor of literature at his alma mater, the University of Denver. By the time he left Africa his lived experience as an African exile/wanderer confirmed to him that the idea of African unity – if not ‘Africa’ itself - was just rhetoric. In Africa he had become just another “black alien” (Mphahlele, 1984: 6). Years living in the crevices of Nigerian, Kenyan, and Zambian societies taught him that there is, “no use in assuming an immediate common heritage among blacks everywhere. No use” (Mphahlele, 1984: 247). Having left South Africa to seek belonging in “the Black World”, Mphahlele’s distressing experience led him to question the existence of this world. “The ironies and paradoxes of the black world. Oh the games we play with one another…,” Mphahlele (2013a: 126) thus reflected.

To be sure, Mphahlele was uncomfortable with the idea of “the Black World”. In “Your History Demands Your Heartbeat: Historical Survey of the Encounter between Africans and African Americans,” Mphahlele traced the history of exchange of ideas, concepts, aesthetics and bodies between black South Africans and black Americans. In a largely autobiographical section, Mphahlele (2002: 159) recalled that black South Africans first took a flight into ‘the Black World’ to escape their conditions of conquest, subjugation, and the denial of the fruits of western modernity. New Africans
looked towards New Negroes as exemplars that a person could be black and still thrive in western modernity. This “lofty myth” was exploded for Mphahlele when he began reading black American radical literature and engaging in a sustained correspondence with Langston Hughes.

Secondly, not only did black South Africans have a false picture of their American counterparts, many USA black internationalists also had a false picture of Africa. In the process of seeking to rediscover Africa and fashion it as their spiritual anchorage they ‘primitivised’ and exoticised Africa. In his reflections, Mphahlele thus agreed with Alain Locke’s assessment that these Pan-Africanists adopted a “Caucasian strain” in their imagining of Africa (cited in Mphahlele, 2002: 168). Thirdly, Mphahlele’s skepticism of black internationalism focused on its ‘return to Africa’ ideology. He derided people of African descent who returned to ‘the motherland’ often, “prepared to eat the dust under our feet in self-abasement in an attempt to identify with Africa” (Mphahlele, 1963: 82). He (ibid.) thus expressed agreement with the once self-exiled James Baldwin’s contention that black Americans will have to fight their struggle, and resolve their spiritual striving, in the USA as “native sons” of the USA.

Finally, Mphahlele bemoaned the fact that black elites in the diaspora dominated the discourse about the spiritual strivings of people of African descent. Specifically, as Appiah would later contend, Mphahlele (1973: 174) worried that New World transcultural figures had introduced an unhelpful element of race consciousness to the discourse about the problems of African belonging and becoming. Mphahlele’s main concern was that the result of this was that too much focus was put on race and racism. This focus distracted Africans from fundamental tasks facing them. These tasks include resolving the ambivalences riddling transcultural Africans, reclaiming and redefining African identity, and achieving cultural and political self-responsibility.

Mphahlele’s main publication in the USA was a collection of essays that engaged critically with the dilemma that Du Bois first set out in his 1897 meditation on belonging, identity, and constitution. This dilemma is whether Americans of African descent should seek a cultural and symbolic return to Africa or assert their identity as black Americans. The crux of Mphahlele’s argument in Voices in the Whirlwind (1973) was that black Americans must seek their being-becoming in the USA (see in general, Mphahlele, 1973). Mphahlele feared that most black poetry was excessively bitter and too focused on protest to enable this project of being-becoming. Black American interlocutors were stunned by Mphahlele’s appraisal. They labeled him an “Afro-Saxon or Euro-African” who had lost touch with his African identity (Manganyi, 1983: 272-273). They suggested that Mphahlele was an interloper who had failed to penetrate and understand ‘African-American’ culture (ibid.).

Once again, the Mphahleles were thrown entirely upon themselves because they refused all manner of what Said calls egregious belongings. They had to negotiate the “dark alley” of exile alone (Mphahlele,
While the USA was professionally more fulfilling than Africa; spiritually the country did not ease Mphahlele’s spiritual restlessness. It was during this time that Mphahlele rediscovered ‘African humanism’. Having to negotiate the “dark alley” of exile by themselves, the Mphahleles took heart in the words uttered by Gita teacher Vinoba Bhave. Bhave had suggested that even when one is facing hardship (the ghetto of exile, or prison in the case of Bhave) “the heart can be tuned to produce unbroken music” (cited in Mphahlele, 1987: n.p.). Mphahlele’s inner meditation brought the realisation that Afrikan (sic) humanness is his unbroken music:

We carried the song across countries
over oceans
over snow-topped mountains
Afrika (sic) my music (ibid.).

Mphahlele’s rediscovery of and immersion in Afrikan humanness enabled him to finally and truly begin the process of exiting the liminal world he first entered when he was sent to school. The insight here is that during the transition from ‘second sight’ to recovery of ‘first sight the liminal person must remember and re-member the unceasing but muted song of Afrikan humanness. This continuous song is a tonic against ‘inner melancholia’ and will become a lodestar that guides the alienated person back home. Mphahlele’s voyage out of liminality is similar to the route Josiane Nespoulous-Neuville suggests Senghor took to re-suture himself with “the Kingdom of Childhood”:

First stage is the trial of separation... [neophytes] feel like outsiders in an alien and threatening world...
The second stage brings the first major trial, the anguish of a night of initiation...come to grips with the existential agony of darkness.
The third stage is that of the initiatory teaching itself. Presence and transcendence are experienced through the rituals of death and rebirth...This is an immersion in the invigorating wellspring of Négritude ...The last stage opens the way to a new fullness of being (Nespoulous-Neuville, 1999: xxiii-xxiv.)

Afrikan humanness had always accompanied Mphahlele during his wanderings through ‘the dark alley’ of exile. However, he could not connect to this philosophy of life because he sought spiritual edification elsewhere. In the USA, Mphahlele had flung himself into the ivory tower of the academia. He did not feel the weight of exile as long as he immersed himself in work and gloried in an intellectually-stimulating life (Mphahlele, 2013a: 113). However, unlike Adorno’s homeland-less exile figure that dwells in writing, such a stance is more suited to a person who is egocentric. As we have come to

26 Mphahlele’s decision in the early 1980s to evoke and invoke Afrika with a ‘k’ is a profoundly decolonial decision. Firstly, it is an understanding that “Africa” is an externally imposed appellation and identity. Secondly, following Mphahlele demystification of Africanness, this decision is an indication of his discomfort with prevailing essentialising discourses of Africanness. At the same time, having had Africa restored to him in West Africa, desiring to contribute to the de-Europeanisation of the continent, and now reclaiming the spirit of Afrikan Humanness, he needed to hold on to an African identity, “even if we have to create a myth” (Mphahlele, 2013a: 135).
understand, Mphahlele was not an individualist. He longed for *ubuntu*-living. The Sartrean existentialist direction was, therefore, not an option for Mphahlele (Godzich, 1988: 29).

*Afrikan* humanness demanded of Mphahlele to seek a ‘real’ place with people, “not place in the theatre of the mind. But a place that contains real life” (Mphahlele, 2013a: 126). At the same time, Mphahlele realised that he was still psychologically imprisoned to South Africa: he kept having nightmares in which he was hounded by those he left behind in South Africa (Mphahlele, 1984: 313). Additionally, he was, in spite of himself, still saddled with bitterness and was still burdened with racial reflexes learned in South Africa (Mphahlele, 1984: 312). He could not put South Africa behind him. He (1987: 49) characterised this tug of the occupied home as, “the tyranny of place”.

This tyranny imposed various ambivalent stances and Mphahlele found himself, “doing everything to court and diminish alternately the tyranny of place” (Mphahlele, 2013a: 125). Those exiles that attempted to escape this tyranny suffered severe depression and melancholia leading to early alcohol-induced deaths: “*My days have fallen into nightmarish despair,*” then USA-based poet Keorapetse Kgotsitsile lamented (cited in Mphahlele, 1982: 45).27 The despair is caused by the reality that the writer can only produce “imaginary homelands” (Rushdie, 1991: 10). This feeling is exacerbated by the frustration that comes from the fact that the exiled writer is producing art that cannot be enjoyed by those it is intended for (Mphahlele, 1982: 45). Feeling even more alienated, the exile writer turns to writing for, “that vaguely defined ‘world intelligence’” (ibid.) For Mphahlele this was not good enough (2013a: 169). The pursuit of world intelligence is ultimately a striving after ‘disembodied universalism’. A revolutionary writer abroad thus became an “disembodied voice” (Mphahlele, 2013a: 123). For the Mphahleles, ‘placelessness’ was aggravated by the fact that the work that Mphahlele and his wife were doing, teaching and social work respectively, demanded a community and a cultural milieu if it was going to be relevant to nation-building (Mphahlele, 2013a: 160). Mphahlele came to realise that a black foreign intellectual was ultimately irrelevant to the USA education system and its cultural goals (Mphahlele, 2013a: 159).

In 1975, a friend with whom Mphahlele had founded *The Voice of Africa* and a theatre group in Soweto in the 1950s came to visit the Mphahleles. This friend had never left South Africa but was spiritually and culturally fulfilled. He had set up theatre groups across South Africa. Later that year, Mphahlele

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27 Author Nortje, the black South African poet who killed himself in Oxford in 1970, conveyed this sense of despair and psychic dislocation in a poem entitled “Waiting”. From a distance, exile seemed full of pleasurable possibilities and endless vistas. In actual fact, exiling-living is one big pause that interrupted being-becoming: “The isolation of exile is a gutted/warehouse at the back of pleasure streets/the waterfront of limbo stretches paranomically....” (Nortje, 1992: 83). Nat Nakasa, who famously embraced Fringe Living, jumped to his death in New York City in 1965. Nakasa’s melancholia and depression were caused by the fact that he had become a, “native of nowhere...a stateless man [and] a wanderer” (Nakasa, 2005: 203).
wrote a letter to this friend in which he claimed that, “but for the academic and intellectual and literary growth I have experienced outside [South Africa] the whole exercise in exile can be written off as utter waste” (Mphahlele, 2010: 254-255). Mphahlele was being slightly hyperbolic here to convey feelings of deep frustration and despair. The ‘tyranny of place’ will not let him be. After twenty years in bodily exile, the Mphahleles returned to Apartheid South Africa.

3.3 Towards the Ending of ‘First Exile’: Reconstitution of Self and Nation

Mphahlele (2013a: 234) recalled that he left South Africa an agnostic but came back as a firm believer in Afrikan humanness. Therefore, bodily exile enabled Mphahlele to descend further into the night of the ambiguous adventure to accomplish his spiritual odyssey, and thus attain self-conscious personhood. Mphahlele was fifty-five years old when he returned to South Africa. The Mphahleles had not, however, come back to ease themselves into old age and retirement. Rather, the spirit of Afrikan Humanness impelled them to come back to establish their seriti, their ‘presence’ (Mphahlele, 2013a: 183). The Mphahleles felt deprived of seriti in exile because they could not embed themselves in any community. They were unable to contribute to the cultural and spiritual welfare of those around them. They thus continued to suffer spiritual restlessness and worldlessness. This is because seriti (lit. a shadow) is more than an individual’s existential quest for appearance. It is a, “life force by which a community of persons are connected to each other” (Cornell and Muvangua, 2012: 529). From an Afrikan humanness perspective, then, seriti cannot manifest through narrative self-disclosure as Arendt’s notions of appearance and worldliness would suggest.

The ethical prescriptions of Afrikan humanness charged Mphahlele with the responsibility of contributing to the cosmic harmony of his ancestral home. Cosmic harmony is realised when there is cultural, spiritual, and political justice. The more a person contributes to this task, the more that person’s own being-becoming and being-belonging are realised. A person’s striving against rootlessness and spiritual unhomeliness would not be effective without such a contribution. Since the exilic condition is both internal and external, Mphahlele (1984: 6) summed up the imperative of returning as follows: “there are no heroes, outside the possibility of return and the war to reclaim your country”. Can the exile truly return? Can home ever be truly reclaimed? What did Mphahlele mean when he said ‘the return ‘is always a qualified enterprise? This final section of this chapter is animated by these three questions.

Mphahlele interviewed for several university posts when he came back to South Africa. Inevitably, white interviewers were patronising and racist. Mphahlele’s biographer hears Mphahlele lamenting: “…on the verge of severing my links with life in exile I was again entering another version of spiritual exile” (Manganyi, 1983: 29). To deal decisively with the condition of exile that had gnawed since he
was a child Mphahlele had, therefore, to boomerang into a third exile. It is this third exile that would potentiate ‘second sight’ back into ‘first sight’. Let us get to the main point of this last section. Mphahlele’s homecoming and homemaking endeavors carry three important lessons for one part of my two-fold thesis. This is the part that relates to the exigency for the spiritually-alienated future constitution-maker to return from the liminal world and re-suture himself or herself with ‘the source’. I have argued that such a return and re-suturing are indispensable to overcoming racial melancholia. Mphahlele’s return to Apartheid South Africa offers three inter-related lessons. First, it is not a matter of simply re-suturing and re-membering oneself with ‘the source’. ‘The source’ might itself be in need of being re-membered and reconstituted. Second, exile(s) gifts the prodigal leader with a ‘double perspective’ that can empower the returnee to engage critically with ‘the source’ without needing to adopt a fugitive or liminal positionality in relation to own community. Third, such a prospective constitution-maker can then be in a position to elaborate terms of belonging and constitution that move constitution and belonging struggles beyond constitutionalism and towards constitutionness - never-ending processes of seeking ways ‘to stand together’ and ‘to fit together’.

Let us continue with Mphahlele’s third exile. Not only was Mphahlele entering another form of spiritual exile, he was also returning to a people very much in exile. The year before Mphahlele’s return (1976) the Apartheid regime had responded to the Youth Uprising against Bantu Education by killing and injuring hundreds of children and detaining thousands more. As the Mphahleles were making their way back to South Africa, hundreds of children were either in detention or preparing to go the other way into exile. Furthermore, a denuded survivalist culture had taken hold in the black ghettoes thus overshadowing the ‘traditional’ culture of Afrikan humanness. The Mphahleles were, thus, coming back to a spiritually, “colonised people…” (Mphahlele, 2013a: 237). It is for this reason that Mphahlele titled a post-return short stories collection of his Renewal Time (1988). Or as he put in the preface to another collection of short stories published shortly after his return, “by revolution I understand renewal” (1981: xii). Freedom time is renewal time because conquest led to ‘death of the land’. Mphahlele was coming to contribute to the renewal of his people and to prepare them for liberation.

As I suggested in the introductory chapter, spiritual rebirth and the (re)constitution of the spiritual world is a premier task because the enigma of homemaking or the primary constitutional paradox for a historically conquered people is that to ‘resurrect the land’ they ought themselves to become new at cultural and spiritual levels. Since colonial occupation first took place at spiritual and cultural planes, de-occupation must start there too. In this regard, in Devil on the Cross, a novel about neo-colonialism in Kenya, Ngũgĩ’ wa Thiong’o has one of the characters pose this constitutive question as follows:

This country, our country is pregnant. What it will give birth to, God only knows…Our country should have given birth to its offspring long ago…What it lacks is a midwife…The question is this: who is responsible for the pregnancy? (Ngũgĩ, 1987: 45-46).
In a situation of neither political nor cultural revolution, the pregnancy is not provoked by the majority non-elites; they are not the constituent power. The new nation is stillborn because its midwives are men and women who are themselves not yet home because they are not yet reborn. Therefore, contrary to Nkrumah’s renowned injunction that African revolutionaries must ‘seek first the political kingdom and all else will follow,’ but similar to the Indian nationalists discussed by Partha Chatterjee in The Nation and its Fragments (1993: 7), Mphahlele understood that the first stage towards homemaking must involve a reclaiming and rebuilding of spiritual and cultural liberation. Mphahlele’s experience in Kenya had taught him that political independence that is not preceded by cultural and spiritual independence often led to independence and mobility for the transcultural elite minority, and invisibility and stagnation for the non-modern majority. Furthermore, rampant corruption and the lack of humanness generally exhibited by state elites are the result of the fact that the historically de-worlded come to power/into office without intra-, inter-, and cosmic re-membering of the spiritual world.

Mphahlele had returned before any intimation of revolution and before the commencement of the process of negotiated settlement with the hope of contributing to the process of creating a renewed and thus decolonising constituent power. In this regard, Mphahlele (1974: 64), echoing Frantz Fanon, posited that the aim of becoming independent is to forge a national consciousness. Fanon makes a distinction between nationalism and national consciousness. Nationalism without national consciousness, Fanon observed, leads to neo-colonialism, chauvinism and xenophobia. This is what Mphahlele experienced in ‘independent Africa’. More importantly, Fanon demonstrated that the development of national consciousness is aimed at the rebirth of the nation. This rebirth is only possible when both the nation and nationalist elites are disalienated (Fanon, 1970: 114-115). In turn, national consciousness is a prerequisite of a truly national culture. Here we would recall Mphahlele’s 1955 speech at the historic gathering for the Freedom Charter (the second epigraph at the head of the chapter) that he looks forward to a day when interculturality will be the source of nation-becoming and ‘standing together[ness]’. The ultimate aim of Mphahlele’s renewal project was to contribute towards the forging of the second pillar of the Du Boisian manifesto. The aim here is to contribute to the fashioning of group consciousness in order to lay seeds for a future national consciousness. I will shortly outline how Mphahlele’s strategy avoids ‘the pitfalls of nationalism’.

In a mid-1980s essay that was very critical of Mphahlele’s decision to return to Apartheid, Ntongela Masilela (n.d: n.p), a South African USA-based scholar, granted that Mphahlele’s return had led to new politics of cultural intervention. Mphahlele threw his energy towards helping to refashion the education and literature of his people. This is because Mphahlele recognised that literature is an important tool in building national consciousness (see also Okolo, 2007: 22; Irele, 2001: 7; JanMohamed, 1983: 266). In the case of 1980s South Africa, the black cultural landscape was dominated by the protest literature
inspired by the praxis of Black Consciousness. Mphahlele immediately started holding writing workshops with the aim of shifting young black artists beyond protest culture. We will recall that almost immediately after leaving South Africa, Mphahlele was convinced that protest art might lead to an atrophy of imagination and thus waylay the artist from the urgent task of rediscovering the self and community. “Excessive protest poisons one’s system,” Mphahlele (1962: 54) had written. Taking stock of black South African literature in the 1980s, Mphahlele worried that the poetry and the fiction of the time was not moving beyond the anguish of the moment. Mphahlele (2002: 176) insisted that even under conditions of repression the artist’s job is to move the people beyond the social reality of ‘white savagery,’ for example.

One of Mphahlele’s (1974: 270) key insights is that a work of literature must contribute to the process of post-colonial becoming even before the end of formal colonialism by helping to determine, “what kind of society we want, how we are going to get there....” Protest literature was not fit for this purpose because it conscripted the colonised people to the moment. This is because such a literature lacked a myth; “the myth...that there is tomorrow” (Mphahlele interview with Manganyi, 2010: 485). Writing in 1982 (2002: 96) Mphahlele was clear that confronting the fact that there is tomorrow forces a colonised people to engage with that “other liberation” which has to do with, “the freedom of mind, of the spirit”. It is only when a shift is made from protest literature to a literature that aims to decolonise the mind and spirit, and that thus construct a national consciousness, that a move can be made from what David Scott (2004: 7) refers to as a move from “anti-colonial longing to post-colonial becoming” (see also, Motha, 2010: 287).

The crucial lesson we can draw from Mphahlele is that if a westernised intellectual wishes to contribute to collective processes of being-becoming, then such an intellectual must stage a return; a return in the first place from melancholia and aggressive dependency. Furthermore, even if the writer seeks to move beyond protest literature to a literature that contributes towards national consciousness, as long as the writer is still alienated from home-culture, he or she would only produce a literature that contributes to more confusion and dislocation. Therefore, although artists can help forge a national consciousness by resolving the Manichean ‘dialogue’ and merging the various streams of consciousness:

when the dialogue is simply a rhetorical projection of mind and feeling or self-indulgent nostalgia on the part of the poet who in reality stays aloof from village life just on the edge of town or from life as it is lived by his people at the basic level, the tone sounds phoney, at best a militant posture (Mphahlele, 1974: 288-289. My emphasis)

It is of major significance, therefore, that Mphahlele’s first substantial post-return research project involved travelling to the rural northern part of South Africa to collect and record live performances of oral poetry. This research project on orature should be seen as part of Mphahlele’s quest to reclaim and
re-center his ancestral heritage. As Mphahlele often averred, it is in poetry that the wisdom, values, and beliefs of the autochthonous home are kept (Mphahlele, 2002: 143). Mphahlele had started to reclaim the spirit of Afrikan humanness whilst he was a wandering ‘black alien’; and now on his return he was going back to “the source” to learn about contemporary Afrikan humanness. This process enabled him to avoid the pitfalls of négritudist ‘cultural revival’ and Pan-Africanist salvationist forging of group consciousness. From his voyages to the non-modern colonised, Mphahlele’s view that Afrikan culture is not static was confirmed. He learned that contemporary Afrikan culture is creolising. What enables this creolisation, as I discussed in Part 1 above, is the fact that at the base of this culture is a humanness that, “has never sought to shut out anybody. It has always been a humanism that could absorb many things, influences, members” (Mphahlele interview with Manganyi, 2010: 467). Mphahlele was learning that principles of originary syncretism and permeability of boundaries were being kept alive by ‘the source’.

Therefore, staging returns, re-asserting the lived philosophy of Afrikan humanness, and exalting a creolising Afrikan culture of the non-modern majority are at the heart of becoming post-colonial. Mphahlele (2002: 137) warned, however, that in this quest the imperative is not to fight a ‘rearguard action’ by trying to revive a supposedly pure traditional culture. He echoed Fanon by asserting that the mission of his generation was different from that of their grandparents: “different times make and demand different heroes” (Mphahlele, 1984: 345). The mission of his generation was to end traumatic ambivalences and the marginalisation of modern Afrikan culture. Their mission was to work towards an “African synthesis” (Mphahlele declared, 2002: 74). Under colonialism Africans had been forced to assimilate aspects of western modernity on the colonisers’ terms (Mphahlele, 2002: 242). The outcome of this was what Mphahlele (2002: 19) called a “confused hybridity”. This is what led to a disinheritance of African imagination (ibid.). The redemptive return will enable the reclamation of imagination. Africans would then be empowered to take charge of the process of synthesis (ibid). Afrikan humanness-driven synthesis is the sine qua non of post-colonial constitution and belonging: “This, after all, is how multiculturalism can rise to nonracialism, which goes concurrently with the intercultural enterprise, before the latter totally refines and supercedes it” (Mphahlele, 2002: 82. My emphasis). This creolisation proposal is another proof that Mphahlele’s constitution and belonging vision transcended those of Nègritudism and Pan-Africanism.

However, Mphahlele contended that the post-dialectic inter-cultural moment would only become possible if black people took steps to “strengthen” themselves first (Interview with Manganyi, 2010: 467).

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28 Orature, simply put, is literature transmitted by word of mouth (Ngūgī, 2007: 4). Pitika Ntuli, a South African polymath, extended this concept to emphasise that the fusion of all art forms is the basic characteristic of orature (ibid.). More importantly for our purposes, this fusion assist in re-memberance and spiritual wholeness because it expresses a more profound wholeness and totality of life (Ngūgī, 2007: 5).
Mphahlele’s Afrikan humanness strategy, therefore, carried elements of Black Consciousness philosophy. This is because Mphahlele understood that in a colonial situation before Afrikan humanness can reestablish itself as the lived philosophy of the nation-in-formation, the humanity of black people needed to be affirmed first (Rafapa, 2006: 11). If this is not done, we could find a situation where the discourse of African humanness/Ubuntu is ubiquitous but the majority of Bantu (black people) continue to experience dehumanisation. Relatedly, Mphahlele emphatically rejected the multi-party negotiations’s discourse of non-racialism: “I can’t see myself running around celebrating my non-something [being non-racial] instead of my somethingness: the fact of being African” (Mphahlele, 2002: 18). Therefore, in line with a revolutionary humanness that demands a renewal of and a reasserting of Afrikan identity Mphahlele warned that it was a mistake to put all efforts at becoming a “non-racial society”. Mphahlele advanced two reasons for this. Firstly, non-racialism does not resolve the fact that transcultural black people still suffer from spiritual exile. In the “post-Apartheid” era the transcultural ex-conquered would thus still be ‘Neither-Nor’ spiritually homeless characters. The immediate task, Mphahlele argued, “[i]s not to try and win over whites to the side of non-racialism but to strengthen our sense of an African identity. Our African consciousness at the deeper levels of culture where it is felt as a spiritual necessity…” (2013a: 240. Original emphasis). Secondly, Mphahlele worried that “non-racialism’ had marginalised the ideology of Black Consciousness. The result was that the transitional era was the, “era of institutional integration and assimilation” (Mphahlele, 2002: 176-177). Mphahlele observed that integration and assimilation processes aggravated spiritual exile: “we are exiles spiritually. We are even apologetic, if not ashamed of being African” (Mphahlele (2013: 148). This led Mphahlele to conclude that black leaders were still in exile. The implication of this was that because (re)Afrikanised people had not taken charge of the process of constitutional re-arrangement and thus no home-making will be achieved.

Conclusion

On the eve of South Africa’s transitional period we thus observe Mphahlele – in keynote addresses, speeches, book prefaces and introductions, a monthly magazine column – advancing the argument that the main aims of the political transition ought to be the forging of a conducive environment for the re-assertion of Afrikan humanness and Afrikan-becoming. He observed that the discourse of non-racialism and the hastiness surrounding “the reconciliation project” obfuscated these objectives. Exile had thus endowed Mphahlele with a scrupulous subjectivity as far as processes of constituting post-colonial nationhood are concerned. He was able to look at South Africa’s transitional processes through the lenses he had forged as a specular intellectual at the borders of recently independent Africa.

Mphahlele was very critical of the ‘new’ South Africa that was supposedly being build. He feared that South Africa’s supposed (re)constitution processes was being undertaken mainly by exiles: white
people (‘the no-longer European but not-yet African’ people) and black transcultural nationalists returning from prisons, banishment, physical exile and studies abroad. From an Mphahlelian perspective, these exiled leaders never returned; they were still spiritually homeless. These putative constitution-makers could thus never (re)constitute home. Mphahlele proposed that transitional processes and nation-building efforts should be imbued with Afrikan humanness if they were to end spiritual de-worlding and realise the aspiration of remembering and re-membering Africa. Alas, contrary to Mphahlele’s counsel, these elites forged a ‘new’ South Africa without the concomitant collective project of reclaiming Afrikanness (in spite of, or because of, Mbeki’s ‘African Renaissance’ project). Without spiritual re-homing, the intercultural home could not be ‘resurrected’. More pointedly, Mphahlele’s warning that constitutional negotiations will guarantee a transition from white domination to white hegemony (Mphahlele, 2013b: 213) shows that Mphahlele’s vision anticipated and embraced certain elements of Black Consciousness. In the next chapter, I will discuss Steve Biko’s Black Consciousness proposals for (re)constituting the social world.
CHAPTER 4: BLACK CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE (RE)CONSTITUTION OF THE SOCIAL WORLD

This country looks, My Lord, like a province of Europe…It has no relationship rootwise to the fact that it happens to exist in Africa…We want to be…complete Africans [Steve Biko, 1977]

Introduction

The aim of the previous chapter was to put forward Es’kia Mphahlele’s contribution to my exploration of a holistic agenda for post-Apartheid constitution and belonging. Mphahlele’s contribution is his proposal that personal and collective returns to Afrikan humanness are indispensable for non-elitist and unceasing projects of remembering and re-membering Africa. The proposal is that such projects will help usher in a post-segregationist and intercultural society. In this chapter, I will explore Steve Bantu Biko’s (1946–1977) philo-praxis for constitution and belonging. I aim to demonstrate that Biko’s vision aligns with that of Mphahlele. To be sure, Biko described a post-Apartheid society to be a society that is constituted on the basis of a “modern African culture” and that puts the quest for “true humanity” at its foundation (Biko, 2004: 45, 99). Biko’s main proposal was that the praxis of Black Consciousness is the only route towards such an anti-racist, united and humane society. This is Biko’s main contribution to my proposal of a holistic (re)constitution framework. As Biko argued before court in 1977 (reproduced in the epigraph at the head of this chapter), South Africa will continue to be an alien and alienating house and black people will continue to be non-Africans of Africa unless black people adopted and deployed Black Consciousness tactics. My main objective of this chapter is to demonstrate that Black Consciousness is a tactic while Afrikan humanness is the strategy.

The symbiotic relationship between these two philo-praxes will become clear at the end of the chapter. It suffices for this background section to remind the reader that Mphahlele returned to Apartheid South Africa with the mission of helping to foster a black constituent power for a post-Apartheid society. Mphahlele put his efforts into teaching, hosting writing workshops and other conscientisation processes. He thus co-founded black people-only programmes including the African Writers Association and the Council for Black Education and Research. These programmes were explicitly inspired by the Black Consciousness Movement. These programmes aimed to showcase and cultivate black self-reliance, self-pride, and self-determination, and thus to shift black people’s consciousness beyond poetics of bitterness and hatred of white people. Mphahlele was, therefore, aware that the full measure of and the blossoming of ‘spiritual decolonisation’ is to be found in the social realm.

Looking towards the future, Mphahlele (1987: 58) agonised that black leaders’ marginalisation of Black Consciousness will result in a “post-Apartheid” future characterised by a “fragmented black force” with
no sense of solidarity and intra-humanness. As we saw in the previous chapter, Mphahlele’s Black Consciousness leanings can also be discerned from the fact that he regularly warned that the 1990s mantra of non-racialism will result in white domination transmuting into white hegemony, while black people’s minds and souls continue to be colonised. Writing after the putative end of Apartheid, Mphahlele (2002: 81) thus observed that black people’s historical inferiority complex had transformed into a pervasive sense of post-colonial victimhood mentality - a symptom of racial melancholia in the terms of my thesis. Finally, writing in 1995, Mphahlele (2002: 82) predicted that black people will remember, remember and resurrect Biko and Black Consciousness if historical conditions remain the same. Therefore, Mphahlele’s Afrikan humanness-centered strategy of constitution and belonging embraced the tactic of Black Consciousness. At the same time, as Ruth Obee (1999: 113) has shown, Mphahlele’s project of encouraging black communities to reclaim black pride through African culture and traditions helped pave the way for Black Consciousness. I have already alluded to the fact that Biko echoed Mphahlele when he called for black people to forge and remember a modern Afrikan culture based on the principle of inter-culturality. More importantly, Biko (2004: 108) was at pains to impress that the ultimate quest of Black Consciousness is a quest for “true humanity,” that is, a striving for Afrikan humanness. Biko’s tactic of Black Consciousness was thus aimed at realising Mphahlele’s dream of a post-colonial national consciousness based on a creolising Afrikan humanness.

My main thesis is that main constitutional task facing historically settler societies is to re-member and (re)constitute the triadic world shattered by settler constitution-making. I argue that “post-colonial” leaders have failed in this task because their visions of constitution and belonging are shaped by their liminal status-induced conditions of double consciousness and racial melancholia. In the previous chapter I explored Mphahlele’s strategy for (re)making the spiritual world. In this chapter, I will focus on Steve Biko’s strategy for (re)making the social world. I will show that both Mphahlele’s Afrikan humanness and Biko’s Black Consciousness were concerned with the constitutive sin of “native” pariahdom and worldlessness. I have argued that the main source of black non-belongingness are colonialist/anti-black discourses and values that relegated black people to a non-world. We have already gained insight into Mphahlele’s counter-discourse and praxes in this regard. As far as Biko is concerned, the name Black Consciousness already gives us a hint of Biko and fellow Black Consciousness Movement adherents’ avowed mission to challenge anti-black discourses and values in order to stage self-constitution and belongingness. By way of overview, this Movement (under the aegis of the South African Students’ Organisation, ‘SASO’) elaborated this mission in its first “Policy Manifesto” as follows: “The basic tenet of black consciousness is that the black man must reject all value systems that seek to make him a foreigner in the country of his birth…. ” (SASO [1971] 1978c: 99-100). The themes of disalienation, redemptive returns, consciousness-building, and reclamation of belonging-in-the-world are, therefore, at the core of Mphahlele and Biko’s interrelated constitution visions.

My goal with these background and overview remarks was to make a case for the interrelatedness of
this tactic (Black Consciousness) and strategy (*Afrikan* humanness) in order to justify my reasons for putting them together in my framework for holistic (re)constitution. My aim is this chapter is to explore the tactic of Black Consciousness as it specifically relates to the (re)constitution of the social world. In the first section, I will trace Biko’s striving against what he termed the ‘totality’ of the white power structure. In section two, I will distinguish Black Consciousness from black constitution visions that are burdened by racial melancholia and thus perpetuate worldlessness. In the final section, I will demonstrate that the Black Consciousness Movement’s constitution vision of ‘One Azania, One Nation’ is a creolising striving towards pluralist co-existence. This section will explore Biko’s proposal on how to avoid ‘the pitfalls of nationalism’.

4.1 Biko’s Striving against the ‘Totality’ of the White Power Structure

The literal meaning of Bantu Steve Biko’s first name is ‘people’. Biko liked to joke that this meant that he was the ‘son of man’ (Wilson, 2011: 18). Biko’s friends understood him to mean that he believed that his life should enact the core ethical prescription of *Afrikan* humanness; namely, *umntu ngumntu ngabanye abantu* or a person is a person by means of other people (ibid.). *Afrikan* humanness and its emphasis on service to others as route towards being-becoming, therefore, framed the entirety of Biko’s life. This philosophy of life also motivated and underpinned his Black Consciousness praxis. Another phenomenon that framed Biko’s life and inspired his emancipatory philosophy was the reality of an institutionalised world of apartness. He explicated this reality in the following terms:

> I have lived all my conscious life in the framework of institutionalised separate development. My friendships, my love, my education, my thinking and every other facet of my life have been carved and shaped within the context of separate development (Biko, 2004: 29).

In chapter one above, we saw that settler-invaders constituted this Manichean social world during the hundred-year Wars of Dispossession and other wars inland. I also demonstrated that colonialist discourse supplied the rationale behind settler-invaders’ attempts to ‘kill the land’ and to localise the logic of the amity lines. Thus in *Race and the Construction of the Disposable Other*, Bernard Magubane (2007: 182) also shows that the epistemic arrogance of the first group of settler-invaders supplied rationale for their exploits of dispossession, massacre, and enslavement. Magubane (2007: 183) further demonstrates that the depiction of indigenous peoples as sub-human and barbaric was central to the European creation of otherness. Ultimately, Jan van Riebeck and his crew’s attitude to indigenous people led to white settler’s belief that there was are substrata of beings without ontology (Mostert, 1992: 106-107). The point that I am making here is that conquest, colonisation, and the conqueror’s imposition of Euro-modern rationality (instruments deployed to ‘kill the land’) had two main intertwined objectives: the shattering of the socio-cultural worlds of indigenous peoples and the installation of a social world based on the human/non-human dichotomy. Plaatje made this point
eloquently in chapter one above. Plaatje’s critique pertained to the high period of colonisation.

In 1948, the white minority-regime instituted the system of Apartheid (Afrikaans for “apart-hood” or separateness). The aim of Apartheid was to formalise, institutionalise, and systematise ‘separate development’. If colonisers’ acts of ‘killing the land’ were attempts to render the conquered people spiritually unhomely and to interrupt their being-becoming; the architects of Apartheid addressed themselves more to the realm of the social world with the view of consolidating black subjugation and invisibility. More pertinently, the aim of Apartheid was to entrench what can be regarded as the “social death” of black people. Social death is a state of existence that Plaatje described as a state of being, ‘deprived of the bare human rights of living…’. Black social death was necessary, so proponents of Apartheid argued, to prevent the social death of white people. D.F. Malan, the first Prime Minister of Apartheid, thus explained that Apartheid was necessary because, “a course of equality between white and black races must eventually mean national suicide for the white race…” (cited in Brown, 2013: 17. My emphasis). Following this logic, Apartheid ideologues determined that the only way to prevent the death of settler being-belonging was to entrench the constitutive racial contract and to continue to keep South Africa white.

Hendrik Verwoerd, the most influential ideologue of Apartheid, further explained that, “‘keeping [South Africa] White’ can only mean one thing, namely White domination, not ‘leadership,’ not ‘guidance’…” (cited in More, 2008: 51. Original emphasis). Apartheid was, therefore, a different mode of governmentality when compared to colonialism. We would recall that the English were of the view that ‘an ethic of differentiation’ was essential to ensuring the long-term survival of the social world of colonists. Under this scheme, colonialists cultivated “exceptional natives,” or ‘liminalised’ Africans, in order to create a buffer zone between the world of the white minority and the world of the hordes of “natives”. Apartheid ideologues, perhaps influenced by events in India and elsewhere, feared that colonial ‘leadership’ and ‘guidance’ risked creating transcultural persons who would turn out to be a menace to white society. Therefore, Apartheid was based on what we can regard as an ‘ethic of communalism’ with the aim of ensuring the social death of black people.

Born two years before the enactment of Apartheid, Biko’s childhood was thus lived under this system of brute domination and radical estrangement. Biko spent his early childhood years in Ginsberg Location, a black ghetto attached to a place called King William’s Town. Ginsberg Location is a product of ‘separate development’. Ginsberg, a local white industrialist, built this “black location” to relocate black people from the white part of the municipality (Mangcu, 2012: 82). By law, a strip of land had to be reserved between the ‘black location’ and the white suburbs. This strip of land sought to emphasise the sense of metaphysical otherness between the black location and the suburb. When Fanon (1963: 29) famously described the settler colonial world as a world “cut in two…,” he was, in the first place, describing the alterity between these two zones.
Therefore, under Apartheid political subjugation, social invisibility, and dehumanisation were meant to be the primary markers of black people belongingness-in-the-[white]world. In chapter two above, I discussed Du Bois’s analysis that behind-the-veil person regard western education as a route towards visibility, recognition, and thus bestowal of humanity. The Apartheid regime did not want to leave such possibilities to chance. In 1953, the regime promulgated the Bantu Education Act. As we saw in our discussion of Mphahlele’s mobilisation against this Act, the ultimate aim of Bantu Education was to consolidate both the dehumanisation and pariahdom of black people.

This was the context of Biko’s social upbringing. Biko was academically gifted, and when time came for him to attend high school the impoverished community of Ginsberg pooled together resources to grant him a bursary. The community wanted Biko to study at the legendary Lovedale College (‘the Eton of Africa’) - the same school where Thabo Mbeki received his education. It could be said that Biko’s community was keen for him to further his schooling at one of the few remaining missionary schools so that he will grow up without being poisoned with the chalice of black inferiority. The community hoped that Biko will further sharpen his ‘gift of second sight,’ and later return to ‘resurrect their land’. Missionary education, however, also meant that Biko imbibed ideals of Enlightenment as well as ideas about British sense of fairness and non-racialism.

Biko’s moment of political consciousness came after he was arrested with his brother on suspicion of being a member of the proscribed Pan-Africanist Congress of Azania (the PAC). He was released after a long interrogation (Mangcu, 2012: 109). His brother, who was indeed a member of the PAC, was detained for ten months (ibid.) Despite the fact that he was never charged, let alone convicted, Biko was summarily expelled from school. He felt betrayed by an institution that he considered a paragon and an oasis of equity and fairness. After this episode Biko declared that, “I hate authority like hell” (cited in Wilson, 2011: 23). Despite this declaration, Biko continued to be an avowed non-racialist who believed that racial prejudice and Apartheid could be defeated through mutual cooperation between black people and good white people.

Biko was later admitted to study medicine at the University of Natal (Non-European section). He was immediately attracted to the non-racial politics of the dominant National Union of South African Students (NUSAS). NUSAS was one of the few remaining multiracial organisations in South Africa (Woods, 1978: 48). In his second year of university, Biko went to Rhodes University to participate in a NUSAS congress. It was here that Biko came to realise that the tactic of non-racism is not only inefficacious, it is ultimately deceptive. At this congress, white delegates were booked accommodation in university residences whereas those classified as “Indian” and “Coloured” were meant to stay in town. African students were ordered to stay in black ghettos far from the congress venue. Biko was outraged and he proposed that the meeting should be moved to a ‘non-racial’ venue. To his shock, white students regarded this proposal as too radical. Biko came to realise that his cherished principle of non-
racism principle was trickery. This was the seed of his political and philosophical rupture:

I realised that for a long time I had been holding onto the whole dogma of non-racism almost like a religion, feeling that it was sacrilegious to question it… I began to feel there was lot lacking in the proponents of the non-racist idea… They had this problem, you know, of superiority, and they intended to take us for granted and wanted us to accept things that were second class (Biko cited in Wilson, 2011: 31).

Later that year Biko encountered the same duplicity of white liberals at another NUSAS congress. Biko put a specific challenge to his white ‘comrades’ at this congress. He asks white students to act in solidarity with black students by defying a law that stipulated that black students could only be in ‘white areas’ for less than seventy-two hours. Specifically, he requested white students to engage in direct action when police come to arrest black students. “We said all right, when the vans come to collect us, whites should all lie in front of the [police] vans so that they don’t move… They [whites students] could not accept this. They saw it as an extremely irresponsible, radical line…” (cited in Gerhart, 1978: 22). These two episodes taught Biko that in a deeply anti-black country a strategy of non-racism only benefitted white liberals; and more importantly, that white people could not be relied upon for the radical de-constitution of South Africa. Biko immediately convened a meeting of the black caucus to convince black students to form their own student body. Biko and his group formed the blacks-only South African Students’ Association (SASO) in July 1969.

SASO adopted a separatist tactic from its inception. SASO (1978: 99) was at pains to emphasise that this position should not be construed as “anti-whitism” or even a reactive posture. They explained that their decision to constitute an all-black organisation was, rather, a “positive way” to work towards de-constituting and eventually reconstituting “South Africa” to attain a “normal situation” (ibid.) Over and over again, SASO activists proclaimed that only “black people” could be the constituent power for Azania, a post-South Africa world. I will come back to the significance of this later on. Biko’s explanation for a separatist tactic was that this tactic is a lesser sin compared to what he described as the ‘farical non-racialism’ of multi-racial organisations (Biko, 2004: 13). White people were dominant in these organisations and they expected black people to simply assimilate into organisations that in essence were white organisations (ibid.). From Biko’s (2004: 163) perspective, this set up was a concrete manifestation of what he termed “the ‘totality’ of white power”. What did Biko mean by a ‘totality’ of white power? 29

Biko (2004: 66) argued that, firstly, Apartheid should be apprehended as a ‘totality’ of white power because it accorded all privileges of life to all white people. The ‘totality’ of this structure was such that

29 It is of utmost significance to emphasise that Biko articulated this “totality” in inverted commas to make the obvious point that totalisation is an aspiration never completely achieved in reality. See from example, Biko 2004: 163.
all white people were beneficiaries of Apartheid. The corollary to this was all white people were accomplices in the crime of black dehumanisation (SASO, 1978: 99). Secondly, the ‘totality’ of white power was such that white people believed that they could be both beneficiaries and opponents of Apartheid (Biko, 2004: 163). More than the egregious acts of racism, this manifestation of white power was what sustained the constitutive ‘racial contract’. Thirdly, white supremacy, white vanguardism, and white social life were made possible by a system that was, “blatantly exploitative in terms of the mind and body” of black people (ibid.). Finally, white power presented itself as a totality to black people because it sought to both oppress them and condition their response to their oppression (Biko, 2004: 55).

Manganyi (1973: 27) took this argument further by showing that the seeming totality of white power expresses itself radically different to white people and to black people. Manganyi argued that this differential application and condition led to a situation where two modes of being-in-the-world existed in South Africa; namely, a white-being-in-the-world and a black-being-in-the-world. Manganyi asserted that because of this reality it becomes necessary for black people to form a strong blacks-only organisation to resist this putatively totalitarian system. Manganyi submitted (ibid.) that this move was necessary because the main instrument that white power used to enforce these differential modes of being in the world was “psychic manipulation” (ibid.).

The thesis that the main problem in South Africa was the ‘totality’ of white power and concomitant ‘psychic manipulation’ of its victims was the first insight of the Black Consciousness philosophy. The second insight was that the South African social world is constituted by a White world and a Black World that were not totally separate. Rather, the former world relied for its sustenance on the cannibalisation of the latter world. These two insights together with BCM’s insistence that only “black people” could become the constituent power for a non-racist and anti-racist society make up what I see as the three pivots of Biko’s praxis of constitution and belonging.

Therefore, in his first Presidential Address, Biko emphasised that the formation of SASO was not a tactical move to pressurise NUSAS into being more accommodative of Black students and their concerns (see in general Biko, 2004: chapter 1). Biko (2004: 4) argued that SASO’s main aim was rather to build a “solid identity” among black students so that they could “do things for themselves”. More pertinently, Biko (2004: 5) explained that black students were not agitating for more visibility, rather they were working towards “real black participation”. Moving forward, black students were to assume the burden of their fate by eschewing the paternalism of white liberals, or what Manganyi (1973: 17) recognised as “white fathering”. Already at this early stage a central tenet of the Black Consciousness philosophy could be detected. This was that although Apartheid sought to marginalise Black people and produce them as Absent, black strivings for constitution and belonging should not aim for recognition. Rather, the black struggle for liberation should seek to dismantle the entire system
and (re)constitute it on the basis of principles of majoritarian democracy.

BCM adherents posited that the failure of the previous generation of anti-Apartheid and anti-colonial politicians was due to their failure to carry out a thorough analysis of the ‘totality’ of the white power structure and to elaborate a revolutionary theory in response to it. As per my analysis in chapter one above, BCM activists proposed that victims of this form of colonisation needed to launch a frontal attack on colonialist discourse if they hoped to supersede a system that sought to render them pariahs. Such an attack would mean engaging in an epistemic revolt to resist the discursive powers of colonisation. Towards this end, part of the preamble of SASO’s launching Manifesto proclaimed as follows: “We, the black students of South Africa, [belief] that the black man can no longer allow definitions that have been imposed upon him by an arrogant white world concerning his being and his destiny…” (SASO, [1969] 1978a: 97).

This preamble neatly summarises the enduring relevance of Black Consciousness philosophy. To repeat, the main theoretical contribution that Biko and his BCM comrades made was to show that the South African social world is framed by a ‘totality’ of white power that divides the world into the White world and the Black world. More importantly, the BCM argued that the white world attempted to colonise the being of the Black person through both institutional and psychological oppression. Biko thus referred to “two forces” that colonised the being of ‘the black man’:

He is first of all oppressed by an external world through institutionalised machinery, through laws that restrict him from doing certain things, through heavy work conditions, through poor pay, through very difficult conditions, through poor education, these are all external to him, and secondly, and this we regard as the most important, the black man in himself has developed a certain state of alienation, he rejects himself, precisely because he attaches the meaning white to all that is good, in other words he associates good and he equates good with white (Biko, 2004: 111).

We can hear echoes of Du Bois’s analysis that black people are saddled with double consciousness. Biko thus identified the ‘first truth’ of the South African situation to be the ‘spiritual poverty’ that black people have been made to suffer from. This spiritual impoverishment manifested itself in the fact that most black people had come to accept oppression as natural. Consequently, a preponderant attitude that black people exhibited was that of inauthenticity in the form of a “two-faced attitude” (Biko, 2004: 113). According to Biko, the existentialist philosopher, an inauthentic life is non-life because it is life devoid of responsibility and agency. At a more profound level, this is an attitude of self-deprivation of existence because, “bad faith is the effort to evade human reality through denial of agency” (Gordon, 2000: 377). The point I wish to emphasis here is that Biko’s Black Consciousness philosophy, as the name implies, was more than a reaction to white racism. The BCM’s foremost area of concern was black people’s complicity in their own oppression and thus self dehumanisation (Sanders, 2002: 174-179). For Biko, then, the decolonial project of remembering and re-membering Africa was a stillborn.
project until black people acknowledged their complicity in ‘the killing of land’. An attitude of Black Consciousness was, therefore, first and foremost a critical consciousness and awareness of the myriad ways in which a black person was imbricated in and was collusive in the entrenchment of the ‘totality’ of the white power structure.

According to Biko, black people’s bad faith lives were proof positive that black people were a defeated people, not simply in terms of being a politically conquered people. Rather, black people were humanoids with conquered souls: “all in all the black man has become shell, a shadow of man, completely defeated, drowning in his own misery, a slave, an ox bearing the yoke of oppression with sheepish timidity” (Biko, 2004: 31). Black depersonalisation was the result of the fact that the South African society was fundamentally an anti-black racist society. Flowing from the foregoing, it is clear that if for Mphahlele the first task in (re)constituting the spiritual world was to remember the ontotriadic community made up of the living, the living-dead, and the yet-to-be-born; the first task in (re)constituting the social world was to ensure that black people remembered the fact that they were not useless non-beings. Therefore, in addition to processes aimed at ensuring cosmic re-membering, “an inward-looking process” (Pityana cited in Woods, 1978: 34) was needed to address the psychic world of black people so that they could assert their Presence in the world. Without this painful psychic interrogation, black people will never be able to reclaim their agency and assume responsibility to (re)constitute the world. To sum up:

the first step therefore is to make the black man come to himself; to pump back life into his empty shell; to infuse him with pride and dignity, to remind him of his complicity in the crime of allowing himself to be misused and therefore letting evil reign supreme in the country of his birth (Biko, 2004: 31).

The BCM offered the Black Consciousness programme as such a first step. Black Consciousness was, therefore, a counter-hegemonic discourse and praxis to challenge the ‘totality’ of the white power structure and to effect reawakening and re-existence.

### 4.2 Black Consciousness versus Black Melancholic Visions of Constitution and Belonging

The rest of my investigation of Biko’s means of achieving post-Apartheid constitution and belonging will be motored by two central questions. The first question is the following: in what ways were Black Consciousness distinguishable from other black philo-praxes of constitution and belonging? Secondly, in what ways did BCM activist-philosophers interact with the Du Boisian manifesto and how did they avoid its pitfalls? In this section, I am concerned with addressing the first question. The Négritude movement will serve as my comparator. The aim of this section is, therefore, to clear the way for the final section in which I show that Biko’s tactic of constitution and belonging is a liberatory route towards (re)constituting the social world.
4.2.1 ‘Black man, you are on your own’: A disalienating cry towards authentic living

I have so far attempted to show that in the first half of the twentieth century dominant black politics of constitution and belonging were overridden with melancholia. This melancholia was revealed in New Africans’ striving against, and an obsession with, their status of social invisibility. These socio-legally ‘liminalised’ individuals confirmed Fanon’s psychosocial analysis that racialised individuals who suffer from a neurosis of abandonment are disinclined to ‘reconstruct the world’. Mphahlele focused our attention on the intra- and inter-spiritual worlds to demonstrate that on the cosmic plane, the only route towards overcoming melancholia is through remembering and reclaiming Afrikan humanness. Mphahlele’s odyssey showed that taking flight into a fictional Black World would not do. The disalienating work has to be realised at home.

Analysed from an Mphahleleian perspective, the BCM was a home-based movement that sought to address the psychosocial impacts of racial melancholia. The discussion in the previous section of this chapter showed that Biko and his BCM protagonists believed that racial melancholia is connected to an internalised sense of ontological and social inferiority. Bad faith-living in the inter-subjective realm of the social world was the main outcome of racial melancholia. Biko thus showed that a Black person lived an inauthentic existence because he or she had internalised what Derek Hook (2012: 105) calls, a ‘white mask psychology’. As a result of this, his or her consciousness was doubled and divided. The BCM proposed that racial melancholia could only be overcome through deliberate programmes that emphasised self-awareness and self-pride. Such programmes would, as Freud would have it, enable the melancholic to invest the libido in a new object – the object here being the self and own community that the melancholic elite had up to then shunned. The BCM’s challenge to black people was that black people needed to shun the white world and to disavow the white liberal scheme of upliftment, recognition, and integration of “natives”. It is in this context that Barney Pityana, a co-founder of SASO, came up with the following rallying cry of the BCM: “Black man, you are on your own” (cited in Gerhart, 1978: 294).

This statement should be understood as an existential declaration of personhood (being a ‘man’), of rootedness and identity (appropriating and embracing the idea of being black), and of responsibility, agency, and maturity. This performative utterance is an acceptance of pariahdom and a decision to delink from the white-dominated world. This cry was, therefore, of a different quality and had a different objective to that uttered by Du Bois’s pariah who constantly cries out, ‘why did God make an outcast and stranger in my own house?’ The latter bellowing is a cry against abandonment and a plea for recognition. Pityana’s cry and the BCM’s declaration had a radically different telos. The BCM’s declaration of intention to shun the world that had denied black people membership to the family of humans makes it a sibling of other black radical praxes of constitution and belonging. What all these
black praxes have in common is the expressed intention to delink from the white world. This intention serves as notice of intention to reconstitute the world in ways that would realise black belonging. Pityana proposed that such a realisation would only be possible when black people adopt, “a positive unilateral approach” (cited in Woods, 1978: 35). The idea here was that a separatist posture would enable black people to overcome racial melancholia and attendant double consciousness. The thinking here was that victory over racial melancholia will empower black people to work towards self-conscious personhood and eventually group consciousness. Pityana, citing Fanon, thus asserted that a black consciousness project would enable black people “TO BE” and to assert their “BEness” (cited in Woods, 1978: 34. Original emphasis). I have proposed that these ambitions constitute the first and second pillars of a Du Boisian manifesto.

4.2.2 Delinking for re-existence

My discussion of settler-invaders’ ‘construction of the Other’ and my explication of Biko’s analysis of the depersonalisation of Black people highlighted the fact that the second pillar of the Du Boisian manifesto plays a very critical role when it comes to the social world. The argument here is that racialised groups needed to cease aspiring for whiteness. Instead black people needed to accept their race if they wished to de-constitute the hegemonic world. Stated differently, it would seem that the quests for disalienation, self-pride, and re-existence begin when a black person does not ‘accidentalise’ their ‘race’ (Fanon, 2008: 32). Consequently, the first task facing a racialised subject who seeks to attain self-consciousness personhood is to recognise the fact that they have internalised black phobia and are involved in self-renunciation. This is what SASO wished to address. Point 1 of SASO’s first Policy Manifesto thus began with the following words: “SASO is a black student organisation working for the liberation of the black man first from psychological oppression by themselves through inferiority complex...” (SASO, 1978c: 99. My emphasis). As we can see, SASO wished to rehabilitate and embrace blackness. This aspiration flowed from Biko’s analysis that the “first truth” to be distilled from the fact that South Africa is an anti-black racist society is the truth that black people are spiritually impoverished and that they reject themselves.

Biko never offered a comprehensive definition of alienation. However, we can piece together what Biko had in mind from his testimony at the 1976 ‘subversion by intent’ trial of seven leading BCM members. According to Biko, a state of alienation is an internalised sense of inferiority that, firstly, stemmed from economic exploitation (Biko, 2004: 111). Secondly, precarious existence and political oppression buttressed this sense of Marxist alienation and intensified it into an existential form of alienation. Thirdly, Biko showed that self-renunciation resulted in feelings of being homeless, rootless, and nameless. The latter feelings came from the fact that colonialist discourse instilled in black people the idea that they had no past and no present because they had no culture, no civilisation, and no religion.
In the first half of *Black Skin, White Mask*, Fanon thus demonstrated the many tragic ways in which self-negation manifests in the social world. From mastering the white man’s language to marrying a white person to vigorously absorbing European education, the racialised person goes through all of these efforts hoping to achieve ‘lactification’ and thus ascent to the white world (see in general, Fanon, 2008: chapters one to three). As we saw with respect to New Africans, these actions only lead to a further destabilisation of subjectivity and self-alienation. Writing in the context of South Africa of the 1930s, Gilbert Coka thus lambasted New African elites as follows: “There is no progress in Africans aping Europeans and telling us that they represent the best in the race, for any ordinarily well trained monkey would do the same. The slave mentality still holds our people in chains…” (Coka, 1935: n.p.). Therefore, the black-skin-white-mask person only succeeded in becoming an imitation.

In Fanon’s case, it would take the white gaze of a child to strip him of his imitation. In “The Lived Experience of the Black Person”, Fanon told that story to illustrate the psychic impairment suffered by an alienated black person when his blackness is exposed. In Fanon’s case, the white gaze brought home the fact that white civilisation and colonialism had forced “existential deviation” on a black person (Fanon, 2008: 6). Experiencing existential deviation, the Black is forced to ask herself or himself, a painful question: “in reality, who am I?” (Fanon, 1963: 200). This question is a question of identity and belonging. An alienated black person thus found himself or herself in a no-man’s land between a supposedly zone of human beings (the white world) and a supposedly zone of non-beings (the ‘savage’ world) he had renounced. Unable to use that third zone to come up with alien and disruptive identities, the mimetic and melancholic person concludes that only two options are available: to be elevated into the zone of humans or throw himself back into the zone of the Blacks. Spurned by ‘the real world’ (the white world), the temptation is then to assert some form of black authenticity. In Fanon’s case, he took this option as a way of spitting at the white world. He dived into the absoluteness of his blackness, “to assert myself as a BLACK MAN. Since the other hesitated to recognise me, there remained only one solution: to make myself known” (2008, 87. Original emphasis). Thus began Fanon’s flirtation with Négritudism. As Fanon declares above, the rationale behind this course of action is to delink from the white world in order to assert re-existence.

4.2.3 Black Consciousness is not black authenticity

Léon-Gontran Damas, Léopold Senghor, and Aimé Césaire are the main ‘founding fathers’ of the Négritude movement. Senghor has explained that exiled black people founded this movement in order to rehabilitate their African origins. They hoped that this undertaking of revalorising Africanity would empower them to cultivate a proud group consciousness and identity in the face of white rejection and internalised feelings of inferiority and non-beingness:

> We lived in an atmosphere of rejection, and we developed an inferiority complex. I have always thought
Négritude was thus a search for this ‘first fact’ (the ‘fact of being black’) and to use that rediscovery to forge a sense of group pride and identity. More pertinent for purposes of this chapter, Senghor confirms that Négritude emerged in a context where black elites from the French colonies grappled with the following question: “Who am I?” (cited in Vaillant, 1990: 90). Négritude was, therefore, a vehicle that transcultural black people living in France and in French colonies created to forge historical and contemporary belongingness. The Négritude movement congregated around the journal Présence Africaine. As the title of this publication suggests, the objective here was to reclaim Africanism in order to assert Presence in a context where the French social world had produced Africans as Absent. Négritude and Présence Africaine, therefore, sought to bring forth, “the dignity of otherness” (Mudimbe, 1992: xvii). Négritudists sought to achieve this alterity through a double agenda of, “articulating theoretically the norms for a process of disalienation on the one hand, and of illustrating the values of cultural difference on the other” (Mudimbe, 1992: xxii). Similar to Pan-Africanism, an Anglophone sibling of Négritude, this movement was thus a movement of rebirth, redemptive returns, and belonging.

However, as Bernard Mouralis (1992: 6) has pointed out, négritudists incessantly recalled the conflictual context with the western world. The result was that their sense of African self-affirmation was based on constant criticism of the West (ibid.). This is in spite of the fact that Senghor often asserted that the creation of a “métissage civilisation” had to be based on, “memory without hatred…” (Vaillant, 1990: 264-265; Wilder, 2015: 62). Négritudists constant critique of the west thus exemplified a nativist mode of self-writing characterised by what Ali Mazrui in chapter two above referred to as “aggressive dependency,” or what Denis Ekpo (2005: 118) in another context called a condition of oedipal psycho-dependency. Similar to the dominant strand of Pan-Africanism, Négritudism was, in the first place, therefore, mainly a program of reaction. It could be argued that this reactive stance demonstrates that négritudists were still conscripted to the world of their oppressors. Secondly, Négritude writers’ attachment to colonialist discourse is seen in the fact that the condition of possibility of Présence Africaine was the Eurocentric movement of cultural relativism that emerged in the 1940s (Mudimbe, 1992: xix). As Mphahlele put it in his scathing criticisms of Négritude in the 1960s, this movement was thus reliant on anthropological concepts to articulate itself.

Thirdly, consequently, this movement essentialised “black culture”. In this regard, Senghor had described Négritude as the “…the sum of the cultural values of the black world…” (cited by Manganyi,
1973: 36). More explicitly: “Négritude is the whole of the values of civilisation – cultural, economic, social, political – which characterise the Black peoples, more exactly the Black-African world. It is essentially instinctive reason…the sense of communion, the gift of imagination, the gift of rhythm – these are the traits of négritude” (cited in Gibson, 2003: 68). Senghor wished to rediscover and valorise these values in order to assert Presence in the face of universal ‘invisibilisation’ of black people. My contention is that this move does not help black people to reclaim belongingness-in-the-world. I have in previous chapters showed that claims of a universal African culture or the existence of the values of the ‘Black World’ are fictional, deceptive, and unnecessary. At the spiritual level, attempts to assert bounded and originary African cultures or traditions freeze the spirit and perpetuates spiritual unhomeliness. In the social realm, these assertions perpetuate invisibility and de-worlding because they conjure up a black or African person that does not exist in reality. This is the case because in their attempt to rehabilitate blackness, Négritude artists produced, “fiction black, ideal black, black in the absolute, primitive black, the Negro,” as Fanon (1970: 34) charged. Fanon’s hostility towards Senghor’s project had to do with the fact that Senghor, ultimately, was not interested in displacing the colonialist discourse and its Manicheanism. What Senghor simply did was to reverse the terms of colonialism: to white supremacy’s inhumanity he opposed Black essential pride and supposed humanism. He, therefore, substituted one myth for another. In this way, Senghor fell into the trap set by colonialist discourse. Senghor reified the terms of this discourse because this discourse of apartness relies on alleged fixities of identities for its power and persistence (Bhabha, 2005: 94). Early Négritudists thus reinforced Manicheanism because its point of departure was Africa’s total difference (Vaillant, 1990: 252).

The fourth reason why the Négritudism could not be relied upon to serve as the basis for (re)constituting the social world is that it did not seek to fundamentally deconstruct and reconstruct the world. Rather, it demanded ‘African presence’ in the extant world. Ultimately, Senghor’s project was not aimed at dislodging alleged white cultural supremacy. The allegation here is that being an elite Francophone/French scholar, Senghor was more interested, consciously or unconsciously, in pleading for a seat at the European/uni-versal table. Indeed, Senghor managed to gain unprecedented recognition and achieve profound ‘presence’ in the universe of his former colonisers. Thus the more Senghor articulated Négritudism and principles of radical alterity, the more the French considered him the, “perfect black Frenchman” (Vaillant, 1990: 324).

The BCM sought to distinguish itself from the Négritude movement. It is important to start off by mentioning that proponents of South Africa’s Black Consciousness philosophy did borrow some elements of the Négritude movement. In particular, the imperative to take cognisance of the proud
history of Africa’s contribution to human civilisation and to use that as the basis for self-constitution and rebirth appealed to proponents of the BCM. However, Biko’s BCM did not share the Négritude movement’s *raison d’être*. As I have already discussed, Damas, Senghor, and Césaire’s initial motivation was to change the perception that the French public held about black people. The ultimate aim here being to secure black Presence and thus white recognition. As far as the BCM was concerned, recognition demands were anathema. This is because Black Consciousness activists did not recognise the legitimacy of the Apartheid regime. Therefore, the BCM did not raise any grievances against the white-minority regime (Motlhabi, 1986: 120). Likewise, white people, as a collective, did not exist as far as the BCM was concerned. Consequently, the BCM did not direct demands towards “the oppressors” (Khoapa, 1972: n.p.). As Biko made clear in his first SASO Presidential Address, the BCM did not want to assert black people’s presence (in the white world). Instead, SASO and the BCM sought to dismantle the ‘totality’ of the white power structure, supersede South Africa, and constitute Azania from a Black Consciousness perspective. Furthermore, SASO did not share Négritude’s obsession with a pan-black culture. In a June 1971 newsletter SASO, thus, explained that they understood Négritude (being Negroness) to mean black identity, but that “black identity… is an attitude towards life” (cited in Magaziner, 2009: 238, My emphasis). According to the BCM, then, there was nothing metaphysical or ontological about being black. Finally, as I have discussed in the preceding pages, the BCM was determined to delink from colonialist discourse.

The BCM can also be distinguished from Pan-Africanism. The crucial distinction here is that the BCM did not identify itself with an Africanist agenda. Some elements of Pan-Africanism were obviously attractive to the BCM. For example, Biko explained that BCM protagonists were encouraged by the self-confidence and self-assertiveness of African nationalist leaders of the 1960s and early 1970s, “guys who could speak for themselves” (Biko, 2004: 23). Biko was also attracted to the politics of the PAC over those of the ANC because of Africanists uncompromising attitude towards land restitution (Wilson, 2011: 23). However, Biko could not join the PAC because he believed that the PAC’s Africanist identity was too narrow. According to Biko, as Mphahlele and his *African Voice* co-editors first propagated, what was needed was, rather, a political programme that would unite all oppressed groups in South Africa. It was also for this reason that Biko persuaded his Black Consciousness comrades to embrace Black Theology over African Theology. Biko reasoned that African Theology would isolate people of Indian ancestry and “Coloured” South Africans (Mangcu, 173-174).

Finally, SASO was also dissimilar to the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) and other USA-based Black Power groups. Although SASO was influenced by the aesthetics and style of organising of these groups SASO, deviated substantially from the goals of SNCC and other Black Power movements. Firstly, BCM organisers constantly emphasised that theirs was not a Black Power agenda. Rather, it was a black *conscioussness* agenda—a qualitatively more radical project as I will shortly demonstrate. Furthermore, unlike the SNCC and the Black Panther, SASO admitted into its
ranks people who were not classified as Black. Lastly, it is incorrect to suggest that Black Consciousness was influenced by the philosophy of Marcus Garvey. As I will discuss in the next section, this is because the BCM fervently rejected the notion of ‘race,’ let alone that of racial purity.

To conclude this section, as I have already mentioned above, SASO was at pains to assert that its separatist posture should not be construed as a posture of “anti-whitism”. More to the point, SASO emphasised that hatred of white people is a manifestation of racial melancholia and aggressive dependency. In a paper circulated at its 1971 ‘Formation School’ SASO articulated this point as follows:

we must not be limited in our outlook. There is a mile of difference between preaching Black Consciousness and preaching hatred of white. Telling people to hate whites is an outward and reactionary type of preaching which, though understandable, is undesirable and self-destructive. It makes one think in negative terms and preoccupies one with peripheral issues. In a society like ours it is a ‘positive feed-forward’ approach that leads one into a vicious circle and ultimately to self-destruction through ill-advised and impetuous action. In fact it is usually an extreme form of inferiority complex where the sufferer has lost hope of ‘making it’ because of conditions imposed upon him. His actual aspirations are to be like the white man and the hatred arises out of frustration (SASO, [1971] 1978d: 103)

This directive is sufficient proof that the BCM was concerned to ensure that its members overcame racial melancholia and aggressive dependency. To sum up: in its quest to (re)make the social world the BCM rejected the liberalism of the USA Civil Rights movement; it took a distance from the Africanist exclusivism of Pan-Africanism; it spurned the racial and cultural essentialism of Négritude; and it eschewed the Black Nationalist agenda of Black Power and Garveyite movements. Rather, the BCM borrowed from these philosophies and transcended them to come up with a potent philosophy that addressed the unique situation of black people under Apartheid.31 Having distinguished Black Consciousness from dominant theories of re-birth and authenticity, a question that arises is the following: what did Black Consciousness stand for? More precisely, what was the Black Consciousness’s vision of constitution and belonging?

4.3 Biko’s Constitution Vision: ‘One Azania, One Nation’

4.3.1 ‘There is no Black problem’: Negating Apartheid’s negation of politics

SASO justified its propagation of Black Consciousness in its First Manifesto in the following terms:

31 Borrowing from these philosophies, and those of European existentialists, was Biko and the BCM’s strategy (similar to Plaatje’s) of refusing the Apartheid regime’s strategy of culturally ossifying black people and denying them national and inter-national mobility, global identification and thus world belongingness.
“SASO upholds the concept of black consciousness and the drive towards black awareness as the most logical and significant means of ridding ourselves of the shackles that bind us to perpetual servitude” (SASO, 1978c: 99). SASO thus made it clear that it sought to cultivate group consciousness in order to realise the liberation of black people in society. With this declaration, SASO sought to avoid one of the drawbacks I highlighted in chapter two above. I discussed this drawback in the context of discussing Du Bois’s failure to recover ‘first sight’. This pitfall arises when a racialised person deploys their gift of ‘second sight’ to achieve disalienation but does not go further and recover their “first sight”.

The tendentious point is that it is not enough for a racialised being to proclaim, like Césaire’s Caliban, that they have discovered the white lie and that they now know themselves and will proceed to remake the world. As I suggested in chapter two above, as important and indispensable such an individual disalienation process might be, it ends up being an interior process lacking any real structural impact. Furthermore, as Mphahlele discovered, it is not sufficient for the “non-being” to reclaim his or her sense of humanity and belonging-in-the-world on the spiritual plane. It is for this reason that upon his return to South Africa, Mphahlele borrowed the means of Black Consciousness to realise his Afrikan humanness ends. Mphahlele, therefore, understood that fundamental lesson of existential phenomenology: “…self consciousness without freedom leads to contradictions” (L. Gordon, 2011a: 21). In other words, even if a conquered person remembers and embraces Afrikan humanness and is thus able to proclaim that he or she now knows that he is an umuntu (a human being with cosmic belongingness), on the social plane the anti-black racist will still subjugate umuntu and treat him or her as a non-being. Recall thus Fanon’s opening lines in “The Lived Experience of the Black”: “‘Dirty nigger!’ Or simply, ‘Look, a Negro!’” (Fanon, 2008: 82).

The fact is that the ego of the Black collapses when it meets the gaze of the white man. Even if a black person undertakes an existentialist quest to transcend his or her situation of unfreedom, in the real world of inter-subjective relations such achievements of self-consciousness and spiritual assertion of freedom do not matter: “The black man has no ontological resistance in the eyes of the white man,” Fanon (ibid.) concludes after the above episode. The Black has no ontology in the (white) world. Proponents of Black Consciousness followed this logic. For example, in his ground-breaking phenomenological study entitled Being-Black-in-the-World (1973) Manganyi agreed broadly with the notion that Black Consciousness should inspire self-reclamation of consciousness. However, Manganyi (1973: 23-24) asserted that Black Consciousness must lead to action and efforts aimed realisation of freedom in the social world. Manganyi (1973: 22-23) critiqued the writings of existential phenomenologists and in particular those of Victor Frankl who argued that although freedom is finite, a person can always transcend their somatic and psychic determinants by adopting a free attitude towards these determinants. Manganyi implied that Frankl is engaged in too much abstraction. Manganyi’s rejoinder was that although it is true that a person can transcend somatic and psychic limitations by adopting certain attitudes towards them; sociological limitations will always be harder to transcend. Manganyi
(1973: 23) offered the example of a healthy enslaved person who is sold to a slaver. The stance that this enslaved person takes, Manganyi posited, must be evaluated by whether it results in the actual and real improvement of the lot of the slave. From this analysis, Manganyi (1973: 24. My emphasis) offered the following: “The first lesson appears to be that we have a duty to be conscious of our responsibility to deal with the limitations of our freedom. Black consciousness and solidarity must mean a posture which will express a movement away from indifference and despair to rational, organised activity”.

Soaring above ‘the veil’ was, therefore, out of question for Black Consciousness activists. For the BCM, the first pillar of achieving self-conscious personhood had to be followed by the cultivation and imposition of group consciousness in the political field. This is to say that the Black Consciousness Movement strove to play the political game in order realise that first prerequisite of re-existence; namely, to “achieve otherness” (L. Gordon, 2011b: 74).

In the “Introduction Into Politics,” Hannah Arendt (2005: 93. Original emphasis) writes that, “politics is based on the fact of human plurality…politics deals with the coexistence and association of different men”. From this perspective, black people could only engage in politics, and hope to (re)constitute the social world, if they elaborated tactics that would radically negate Apartheid’s negation of plurality and coexistence. It follows then that the BCM had to refuse the seductive missionary politics of creating mimetic persons. Biko and the BCM’s separatist tactic enabled them to engage in political acts that demonstrated black self-reliance, self-pride, and thus subjectivity-becoming. Biko and BCM protagonists would thus endorse Jacques Rancière (2004: 7) explication that, “all political action presupposes the refutation of a situation’s given assumptions, the introduction of previously uncounted objects and subjects…” In this regard, SASO explained ‘Black Consciousness’ in the following words:

‘Black Consciousness’ is essentially a slogan directing us away from traditional political big talk to a new approach. This inward-looking movement is calculated to make us look at ourselves and see ourselves, not in terms of what we have been taught through the absolute values of white society, but with new eyes (SASO, 1978d: 101).

The ‘traditional big talk’ that Black Consciousness disavowed was that of making recognition demands on the white man through liberalism and assimilationist discourses. The BCM understood, firstly, that it was impossible to introduce ‘uncounted objects and subjects’ (the idea of post-South Africa/Azania and black people who are beings-in-themselves) without developing new ways of seeing the world. This would involve the disavowal of colonialist discourses. Secondly, the BCM was aware that to develop ‘new eyes’ and to elaborate previously discounted ways of thinking and being-in-the-world they had to institute an epistemic and political break with the world that sought to relegate black people into a ‘zone of non-beings’. Flowing from this, two imperatives became necessary. First, black people had to delink from the clutches of the white world and render this world superfluous. Second, to render this world superfluous, to resist the subjugating powers of white consciousness, and to re-exist on own
terms, black people had to offer a strong counterpoint against whiteness. It is for this reason that Biko explained the tactic of Black Consciousness in the following Hegelian terms,

The thesis is in fact a strong white racism and therefore, the antithesis to this must, ipso facto, be a strong solidarity amongst the blacks on whom this white racism seeks to prey. Out of these two situations we therefore hope to reach some kind of balance – a true humanity where power politics will have no place (Biko, 2004: 99).

The BCM’s separatist tactic was thus a means toward a humane, united, and non-racial polity. In Part I of this dissertation I argued that one important aspect of the melancholic condition of New Africans was the fact that they were obsessed with the fact that they were invisible in the settler social order. Black Consciousness impelled black people to abandon this thinking. If black people were to (re)constitute the South African social world in such a way that black people will no longer be treated as invisible non-beings, then black people had to first re-exist for themselves – ‘to look at ourselves and see ourselves’ as SASO put it. This coming together of black people is self-valorisation, an instantiation of appearance on own stage, and thus a rejection of the colonialist idea that black people are invisible.

In line with BCM’s proposition that ‘second sight’ and attainment of self-consciousness must lead to action if they are not to be ultimately purposeless, Invisible Man also confirms that, “without the possibility of action, all knowledge comes to one labelled ‘file and forget’” (Ellison, 2001: 579). This insight induces Invisible Man to decide to end his hibernation and liminality. If promises of assimilation where a way for the white world to, “keep this Nigger-Boy running” (Ellison, 2001: 33) - running from the world, running from good faith living, running from other “Niggers,” indeed running from himself or herself – Invisible Man would need to stop running, “…since even an invisible man has a socially responsible role to play” (Ellison, 2001: 579). This role is that abandoning a ‘two-faced’ attitude and thus assuming the responsibility of co-creating and reconstituting the world.

Similarly, Biko (2004: 53, 25) also demanded of black people to, “stop running from themselves” and to realise that, “there is nothing the matter with them”. The Black Consciousness philosophy thus led to an awareness that black people are not what Du Bois referred to as a ‘problem people’. Biko urged black people to realise that there was no ‘black problem’ or a ‘problem with blacks’. Rather, black people encountered problems in their lived experiences: “problems of oppression, problems of poverty, problems of deprivation, and problems of self-alienation” (Biko, 2004: 138). Biko’s shifting of the discourse of problemacy allowed black people to stop running from themselves in a vain attempt to prove that they are not a problem.

At the aforementioned 1977 trial, having given an eloquent lecture on the causes of self-negation and self-hatred and having rejected the idea of “the black problem,” Biko went on to put the Apartheid system and white society on trial. He bust the myth that Apartheid is an instance of western modernity.
or a civilising force. He showed that the South African polity is sustained by violence and fear. He then proceeded to appropriate the Apartheid courtroom and turn it into a political rally by suggesting that the white world must be charged with terrorism:

…what we have to experience…certainly is much more definite, much more physically depressing than the charge you are placing against these men for the few things they have said… I think put together all this [anti-black violence] is much more terrorism than what these guys have been saying. Now they stand charged. White society is not charged (cited in Mangcu, 2012: 195).

Whereas the Apartheid regime sought to negate black politics; Biko suggested that Apartheid is what needed to be banned. Black Consciousness’s tactic of re-existence was ultimately based on this kind of discursive inversion; a tactic that Nahum Chandler (2008: 305) identifies as one of “overturn [renverser]”. I will shortly return to this idea. Biko’s testimony before court is also testimony of the kind of bravery and commitment to tell the (black) truth that the BCM demanded of black people. This display of maturity, freedom, and radical responsibility was an exercise in self-actualisation and proof by black people to themselves that they are not defective beings. The BCM thus spawned a whole generation of black people who no longer acted like a ‘problem people’.

Having shown what Black Consciousness is not and what it stood against, and before closing this chapter with an elaboration of the constitution and belonging tactic of the BCM, I will now recap what Black Consciousness is. For our purposes, Maboge More’s succinct summation will suffice:

From an identity point of view, Black Consciousness means (1) black people’s consciousness or realisation that the world is infested with an anti-black social reality and (2) black people’s recognition of themselves as black and proud of the fact. From a liberation perspective, Black Consciousness meant black people’s intense desire to annihilate this social reality as a condition for universal humanism (More, 2014: 180).

In the rest of the chapter, I seek to elaborate Black Consciousness’ prefigurative praxis of constitution and belonging. I contend that this praxis is a revolutionary praxis to (re)constitute the social world because it deliberately averted pitfalls of a Du Boisian manifesto of constitution and belonging. As can be expected, however, BCM activists were also influenced by Du Bois. More specifically, exponents of Black Consciousness often invoked Du Bois’s famous proposition that ‘the problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the colour line’ as well as Du Bois’s notion of “double consciousness” (More, 2014: 179). However, as I will shortly show, Black Consciousness’s praxis of constitution and belonging transcended the Du Boisian manifesto in fundamental ways. By way of reminder, I have suggested that the three pillars of the Du Boisian manifesto are (i) disalienation and attainment of self-conscious personhood; (ii) forging/rehabilitation of group consciousness and identity; and (iii) quests to (re)constitute the world. I have proposed that the three pitfalls of the Du Boisian manifesto are (i) an unwitting attachment to colonialist discourse as reflected in a reiteration of the notion of the existences
of “races” as natural and antithetical phenomena; (ii) a salvationist praxis of consciousness-raising and a top-down elaboration of constitution and belonging in ways that undermine the process of forging national consciousness and nation-becoming; and (iii) ultimately, a reformist and integrationist vision that does not fundamentally dismantle the world of apartness. I will first address the first pillar and the first pitfall. I will then read the BCM praxis in relation to the second pillar and second pitfall; and then finally, I will do the same with respect to the third pillar and the third pitfall.

4.3.2 Exposing white racial melancholia, deconstructing Blackness, ‘blackening’ the world

It should be clear that a premier task that the BCM set for itself was that of disalienation – ‘to make the black man come to himself,’ as Biko explained the agenda. This is first pillar of the Du Boisian manifesto of constitution and belonging. Towards this end, Biko and BCM activists appropriated and embraced blackness. In this regard, the BCM followed a route that had been chart by previous black movements of disalienation and rebirth. In the previous section, I argued that the BCM transcended these movements because it made a concerted effort to overcome racial melancholia and aggressive dependency. In this sub-section, I aim to show that Biko and the BCM, similar to Mphahlele’s deconstruction of Africanity, sought to refuse colonialist-Apartheid discourse by deconstructing Blackness and in that way avoid the first pitfall of the Du Boisian manifesto.

Biko understood that in the context of the ‘totality’ of the white power structure any move to deconstruct Blackness and reconstruct black personhood had to start with a refusal of whiteness and a confrontation with white consciousness. Biko’s brilliant two-fold proposition was that if black people were serious about overcoming racial melancholia and double consciousness they had to make sure that they do not spend too much time rehashing the evils of Apartheid and trying to shame overt racists. Rather, black people had to refuse the entirety of the white world. Such a total refusal included refusing the help of white liberals. Such a total refusal, as we shall shortly see, would ensure that black people gain self-empowerment and thus self-conscious personhood. Such total refusal would also plant the seeds of a black constituent power. Flowing from this, the second part of Biko’s proposition was that well-meaning white people could only become part of black constituent power if they confronted their own bad faith and racial melancholia and when they became traitors to whiteness and the white world.

Biko first elaborated the concept of the ‘totality’ of white power when he explained why black students had decided to break away from NUSAS and the United Christian Movement. Biko (2004: 11) explained that organisations dominated by white people would always be biased towards “white issues”. Biko explained that it was impossible for white liberals in those organisations to change and be pro-black because they belonged to the “oppressor camp” (Biko, 2004: 11). According to Biko (2004: 20),
ultimately, in an anti-black society white people are a homogenous community of people who enjoy unjustified privilege, were aware of this injustice, and were all the time trying to justify their position. From a Bikoian perspective, what marked out white people as a homogenous group was the fact that their white skin conferred on them privilege and power at the expense of black people. All white people were, therefore, accomplices and beneficiaries of the original sin in the constitution of South Africa. In this regard, explicating the “racial contract,” Charles Mills (1997:11. Original emphasis) also writes that, “all whites are beneficiaries of the Contract, though some whites are not signatories to it”. Biko (2004: 24) went further and posited that the fact of being an on-going beneficiary of the racial contract and the original sin is, “what demarcates the liberal from the black world”.

The brilliance of Biko is that he did not just bemoan ‘separate development’. More importantly, he turned Apartheid’s Manichaean against Apartheid. At one level, he did this in order to build a strong sense of black solidarity. Biko and Pityana’s message was that black people could only exercise self-responsibility and reclaim existential freedom if they understood that they existed in a different world to that of white people. Biko (for e.g., 2004: 82) constantly reiterated that the white-dominated world was the real evil in South Africa because it had claimed monopoly over comfort and security at the expense of black people. Biko’s objective was thus to conscientise black people to loathe the white world and not lust for it.

At another level, by emphasising the aloneness of black people in the South Africa polity, Biko and BCM philosophers were consciously isolating white liberals and exposing their Sartrean bad faith. He took up this theme in July 1970 in his first article for what was going to be a regular column in SASO’s newsletter writing under the telling nom de plume of “Frank Talk”. Biko’s “Black souls in White skins?” echoed Fanon’s Black Skin, White Mask. Whereas Fanon focused on the split personality of the Black person, Biko focused on the double consciousness of the good white person. He thus introduced three ‘previously unthinkable objects’: (i) the notion that the conquered are beings with a soul and, moreover, that the ‘black soul’ was a prerequisite for being a political subject and ultimately for being-becoming; (ii) the black gaze that racialises and discursively undresses white people; and (iii) the idea of white racial melancholia.

As a prefigurative constitutionalist, Biko was already laying the seeds of future nation-becoming and the role that all Azanians (white and black) were going to play in the post-South Africa polity. Since there was no ‘Black problem,’ Biko demanded that white liberals desist from wanting to help black people. He deployed Karl Jasper’s concept of “metaphysical guilt” to make the argument that all white people in South Africa were guilty of a crime against humanity against black people. Ultimately, white people must realise that, “there is nothing the matter with blacks. The problem is WHITE RACISM and it rests squarely on the laps of white society” (Biko, 2004: 25. Original emphasis). Thus if good white people were serious about playing a role in the reconstitution of society they had to do two concrete
things. First, Biko demanded that ‘the good white’ to repudiate white supremacy and boycott the benefits of white privilege. Second, he (2004: 27) demanded that white people fight white supremacy in the white world - the only problematic world. Biko’s argument was that if white liberals really wanted to change the status quo they had to engage in an internecine battle that would result in the death of whiteness and the killing of the white world. In this way, Biko impelled good white people to confront their bad faith. The following statement by Nadine Gordimer, an internationally-acclaimed white writer, captured the mode of critical self-reflexivity that Black Consciousness imposed on ‘good white people’. Commenting on the emergence of Black Consciousness Gordimer thus reflected as follows:

We shall need to see our efforts not so much as attempts to right wrongs on behalf of blacks as to set our society free from the lies upon which it is built. The role of protector, honourable though it may have seemed, and great courage though it undoubtedly showed in certain individuals at certain times, is one of those lies (cited in Khoapa, 1973: 48).

Biko was clear: White liberals ought to stop deceiving black people and themselves. They knew what the problem was. They knew that the problem was not individual acts of racism. The problem was not even segregation. The real problem was the ‘totality’ of the white power structure. More importantly, Biko forced a crisis on liberals. If white liberals wanted to help, they had to commit race suicide and become liminal creatures, fugitives, and insurgents of, in, and, against the white world. Similarly, Biko castigated white leftists for privileging a class analysis over a race one. Biko commented that a class analysis was a defensive mechanism adopted by white people who did not want to face up to the fact of the ‘totality’ of white power. These white radicals failed to face up to the truth that even if the economy were to be altered along socialist lines, the whole system of white values would remain (Interview with Gerhart, 2008: 34). In such a socialist society, white values and colonialist discourse would reconfigure but not eliminate the constitutive sin. Biko intuited that although some white radicals were prepared to commit class suicide, they could not be persuaded to commit race suicide. In this regard, referring to a debate that took place amongst white and black leftists during the transition to the “new” South Africa Frank Wilderson puts this matter succinctly:

even if these White radicals had been persuaded …that the essential nature of the antagonism was not capitalism but anti-Blackness (and no doubt some had been persuaded), they could not have been persuaded to organize in a politically masochistic manner, that is, against the concreteness of their communities, their own families, and themselves, rather than against the abstraction of ‘the system’ (Wilderson, 2008a: 102. Original emphasis).

Thus, if colonisation and ‘death of the land’ had forced an existential crisis on transcultural black people, Biko was now imposing a similar existential crisis on ‘good white people’. Biko was asking them to confront a very fundamental question: can you fight white supremacy and still be white? His answer was clear: only people with “black souls” could play a role in the (re)constitution of society. If
white rejection had triggered melancholia and attendant Sisyphus-like struggle for recognition in respect of transcultural black people; Black Consciousness’s rejection of good white people sought to do the same thing. In this regard, Gordimer (2010: 281) confesses that Black Consciousness’s separatist tactic and rejection of white people had a traumatic impact on the psyche of liberal and radical white people. This is because Biko and his BCM ideologues forced good white people to confront the fact that they were “Janus oppressors” (Gordimer, 2010: 282). Gordimer (2010: 277) explained that in her case this trauma together with the discovery of the lie at the heart of the South African polity impelled her to undergo a “rebirth” or “second consciousness” in order to become a political subject and to finally belong to South Africa. Flowing from my earlier arguments, we can understand Gordimer’s metamorphosis as follows: To truly become and to truly belong she had to potentiate her double consciousness. Similar to the voyage of self-discovery and attainment of self-conscious personhood that melancholic black people go through, such a potentiation assist white people who want to contribute to the (re)constitution of the South African social world to “change the concept of who and what they are….” (Gordimer, 2010: 281).

Biko and the BCM’s ingenuity lay not only in forcing an existential crisis on good white people and forcing them to confront their bad faith existence. Biko and the BCM’s ultimate aim was to destroy blackness and whiteness discourses. Their tactic was one of radical displacement, not reversal, of colonialist-Apartheid discourse. Biko and the BCM’s project brings to mind a word from a later era: deconstruction. This is how Robert Bernasconi’s surmises Jacques Derrida’s method of deconstruction: “to address a hierarchically determined oppositional system, it is not sufficient simply to reverse the priorities. The task is to neutralise or displace the opposition itself” (Bernasconi, 2003: 97. Also see in general, Chandler, 2008). Biko’s gesture was two-fold. Firstly, as we saw above, he deprived whiteness of all innocence and civilisational pretenses: Whiteness was evil. Whereas Apartheid discourse sought to marginalise black people and deny them a political life, Biko, secondly, argued that to do politics and to lead an ethical life, one needed to be black. That is, one had to have a “black soul”. Whereas Fanon thought that the “white man” could only be suppressed through violence; Biko thought that white people had to commit race suicide and seek being-becoming by, to borrow the felicitous title of Antjie Krog’s 2009 book, “begging to be black”. 32

32 Writing in the late 2000s Krog’s writes that her quest of “becoming black” (Krog, 2009: 92) was impelled by a feeling of non-belonging, psychic restlessness, and perhaps melancholia: “I want to be part of the country I was born in. I need to know whether it is possible for somebody like me to become like the majority; to become ‘blacker?’ and live as a full and at-ease component of the South African psyche”. ‘Becoming black’ would presumably also enable an at-ease sense of belongingness to South Africa and end the feeling of “fierce belonging” that Krog evinced a decade earlier (Krog, 1998: 277). Incidentally, Gordimer’s 1977 musings were contained in a lecture on white consciousness entitled “What being a South African Means to me”. On how this process of decolonial becoming is made possible by liminality, see Motha, (2010: 286). As stated earlier, from a Black Consciousness perceptive, the demand for liminality ought only be directed at white people because it is this group that has historically placed itself at the centre of the South African polity.
White people had to beg to become black because blackness was not a problem, whiteness was. SASO Policy Manifesto put it as follows: “the white man is either a part of the solution or part of the problem…” and, “in this context because of the privileges accorded to them by legislation and because of their continual maintenance of an oppressive regime whites have defined themselves as part of the problem” (cited in Khoapa, 1973: 40). At the 1976 treason trial these resolutions were put to Biko as examples of how SASO promoted ‘race prejudice’. Biko’s answer reveals this displacement tactic I have been discussing:

In a situation where you have a hiving of privileges within society for the sole enjoyment or for the major enjoyment by one section of society, you do get a certain form of alienation of members who are on opposites sides of the line, and that the white man’s specifically has got to decide whether he is part of the problem – in other words whether he is part of the total white power which we regard as the problem - or he accedes and becomes part of the black man…” (2004: 138. My emphasis).

The choice for white people was simple, Bantu Biko argued: either they remained in their inhumane world (the world of those who are not abantu/persons) or they try to cultivate ethical existence and thus pursue being-becoming by assimilating into blackness. Therefore, in terms of Black Consciousness the dissolution of whiteness through assimilation into blackness was a route towards ending what Biko called the mutual ‘alienation’ of people on opposite sides of the world. From this perspective, Black Consciousness was less a separatist strategy than as strategy to blacken the world. Addressing white students, Ben Khoapa explained this strategy in the following way:

Too many people think blackness means withdrawing and tightening the circle. On the contrary, blackness means expanding and widening the circle, absorbing and integrating instead of being absorbed and integrated and from that perspective, it is easy to see that a philosophy of liberation requires black people to cast their light not over one thing but over everything… (1972: n.p. My emphasis).

The BCM encapsulated the telos of this tactic in the slogan: “One Azania, One Nation”. As is clear, at the heart of the BCM’s vision of constitution and belonging was the intention to build one nation of Azanians. To recap the discussion so far: SASO adopted a separatist posture in order to engage in politics as per Arendt and Rancière’s definitions above. A separatist posture was a tactic to try to create a constituent power that will birth Azania for the benefit of everyone who lives in ‘South Africa’. In

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33 Why Azania? In The Rise of Azania and the Fall of South Africa (1983: 4-5) David Dube explains the significance of this appellation for black strivings for constitution and belonging in the following manner: “…‘South Africa’ was not only a creation of white settlers and their colonial backers, but ‘South Africa’ was never meant for the blackman. A ‘South African’ has always been and is a white person….Azania distinguishes the mentally liberated Blacks from the mentally colonised Blacks. The use of Azania when referring to ‘South Africa’ distinguishes those who know South Africa is colony from those who say South Africa is ‘an independent state’.”
the context where Apartheid refused politics, the BCM sought to blacken the polity and thus create a political environment for the radical de-constitution and (re)constitutions of the social world. The BCM declared that only those with ‘black souls’ could do politics. Refusing the ‘traditional big talk’ aimed at integrating into the extant world, the BCM showed that there was no world to integrate into. More fundamentally, the BCM declared that politics only exists and emerges on the underside of South Africa. The underside of South Africa was not a ‘zone of non-beings’, but a zone of political beings. Therefore, all those who wanted to reconstitute society had to embrace Black Consciousness and become ‘part of the black man’. Lewis Gordon (2008b: 89) summarises this gesture as follows: “Black Consciousness is thus identical with political life, and those who are willing to take the risk of politics in a context where the state has waged war on politics are, as their opposition mounts, blackened by such a process”.

From the perspective of Black Consciousness, then, white liberalism and white left radicalism were not political projects. Rather, they were projects aimed at bolstering whiteness and sustaining the world of apartness. In this world of apartness, politics is negated because plurality is negated. Similar to dominant black struggles, the latter projects did not seek to create a constituent power to fundamentally (re)constitute society. Black Consciousness forced ‘good white people’ to confront their own racial melancholia. Commenting on Invisible Man, Ann Cheng (2005: 124-125) explains that white racial melancholia is caused by the fact that white people depend on black people for their identity and self-consciousness and yet they constantly attempt to deny black people. White racial melancholia is, therefore, the result of the fact that white people have psychically incorporated that which they deny (ibid.). As is the case with alienated black people, white people had to overcome their racial melancholia if they wished to play a socially-responsible role. For Biko, it was only by embracing ‘black soul’ and becoming black that white people could become political actors.

Biko and BCM philosophers were able to make this demand and to ‘blacken’ politics because they adopted a broad definition of blackness. BCM activists proposed that blackness was a shorthand for ethical living. This was possible because Biko essentialised whiteness: all whites were the same because Apartheid accorded them privileges and they gladly embraced these ill-gotten privileges. On the other hand, blackness was neither an essentialist phenomenon nor a metaphysical one. Black Consciousness, as an existential phenomenological philosophy (see in general, More, 2008; L. Gordon, 2008b), laid down two elements of blackness. In the first place, ‘black’ referred to the lived experience of being oppressed. SASO (1978c: 99) declared that “black” includes all, “those who are by law or tradition politically, economically and socially discriminated against as a group in the South African society”. Secondly, and more fundamentally, ‘black’ referred to the, “willingness of the oppressed individual to identify with fellow oppressed people against the oppression” (Khoapa, 1973: 43). Biko (2004: 52) explained SASO’s resolution in the following succinct terms: “1. Being black is not a matter of pigmentation – being black is a reflection of a mental attitude. 2. Merely by describing yourself as black
you have started on a road to towards emancipation…”

At the same time, the BCM declared that not all people whom Apartheid racialised as Black were not black. Biko (2004: 52) explained that people who aspire to whiteness, those who collaborate with the system of Apartheid, and those who feel inferior to white people are not ‘real black’. In the vocabulary of SASO such beings are “non-whites” (see Khoapa, 1973: 43). In spite of their relentless aspiration, such persons were not part of the white world. Non-whites were, therefore, also not part of the ethical world of black people. As Biko (2004: 86) posited, such persons were liminal figures: “Any black man who props the system up actively has lost the right to being considered part of the black world… [such people] are colourless white lackeys who live in a marginal world of unhappiness”. Therefore, only those who had the consciousness that the main antagonism in South Africa was anti-black racism, cultivated and embraced blackness, and were willing to sacrifice their lives fighting against the ‘totality’ of white power could be considered black.

A fundamental pillar of Biko’s praxis of constitution and belonging was thus an attempt to ‘blacken politics’ by first deconstructing the colonialist discourse that characterised black people as defective-beingness. At the same time, he re-constructed blackness by broadening it to be open to all those who aspired to be ethical beings. The discussion in this sub-section and the previous section alerts us to the fact that Black Consciousness did not fall into the nativist pitfall of a ‘distinct but equal’ discourse. Unlike Du Bois, Biko did not wish to ‘conserve the race’. Biko, rather, wished to supersede the concept of race in order to achieve a post-South African society which he wished to be ‘colourless’. Another fundamental difference between the BCM and early Pan-Africanist and Négritudist approaches to the first and second pillars of the Du Boisian manifesto is that the BCM cared about what happens to white people. Biko’s tactic of radical displacement through ‘tactical re-signification’ (Lloyd, 2003: 26) aimed to ultimately destroy both racialised identities and their associated psychic complexes. To do this, Black Consciousness forced both white people and black people to confront their conditions of racial melancholia. With regards to black people, as SASO put it in the previous section, the aim was to conscientise black people into forming a strong block of solidarity, and thus lay seeds for a future constituent power. More importantly, SASO wished to pursue this objective without collapsing into white hatred and anti-colonial longing (two pitfalls of a nativist vision of constitution and belonging).

4.3.3 Forging a black constituent power through dialectical conscientisation

In its Policy Manifesto, having set its goal as that of creating a non-racial “open society,” SASO (1978c: 100) declared that it, “believes that a truly open society can only be achieved by blacks”. With this declaration, as I have already discussed in the previous section and as C.R.D. Halisi (1999: 130, 129) rightly notes, the BCM reformulated, “the legitimate standards of civic participation,” and thus, “challenged the white government’s power to decide the most basic question of citizenship, ‘who are
the people”. According to the BCM, people who were to play a role in the constitution of Azania were not White or Black, but rather black. The BCM, therefore, regarded group consciousness to be part of a transient phase towards ‘One Azania, One Nation’ based on an all-encompassing national consciousness. We can, therefore, understand that for Biko and his BCM existential-phenomenologist companions, the aim of forging group consciousness was to constitute a black constituent power that will birth a post-South African polity on the basis of, “a true humanity where power politics [identity/group politics] will have no place” (Biko, 2004: 99). This then was Black Consciousness’s unique contribution to the second pillar of the Du Boisian manifesto. Another way in which the BCM transcended related movements of rebirth and race consciousness was in the fact that this movement sought to avoid the Du Boisian pitfall of top-down cultivation of group consciousness. In this regard, the BCM employed Paulo Freire’s tactic of dialectical conscientisation and community development programmes to circumvent this pitfall. These are the same tactics that Mphahlele also resorted to.

The BCM’s quest of awakening black people and urging them towards being-becoming necessarily involved a lot of reading and other intellectual work. This is because Black Consciousness was first and foremost an epistemic and ideological struggle: “a continuous struggle for truth” leading to an examination and questioning of, “old concepts, values and systems” (Biko, 2004: 102). Therefore, between 1968 and 1972 (the period of the making of Black Consciousness thought) SASO engaged in an immense amount of intellectual production (Magaziner, 2009: 226-227) However, from its early beginnings proponents of Black Consciousness were anxious to ensure that a fissure did not develop between BCM students and the rest of the black community. We can detect this anxiety in SASO’s very first Manifesto:

A. We black students are:

1. an integral part of the black oppressed community before we are students...
2. committed to a more disciplined involvement in the intellectual and physical world…
3. committed to work towards the building of our people and to the winning of the struggle for liberation and guided by the central purpose of service to the black community on every technical and social level (SASO, 1978a: 97).

SASO was thus anxious not to be perceived as a disconnected band of ivory tower intellectuals who wished to forge group consciousness and to elaborate black visions of constitution and belonging from above. This anxiety went beyond matters of perception. SASO activists were also eager to build a popular-democratic movement. SASO leaders warned that “grassroots support” and the adoption of Black Consciousness by a critical mass of black people were indispensable if the philosophy of Black Consciousness was to be “effective” (SASO, 1978d: 102). Towards this end, SASO adopted Freire’s conscientisation methodology (Wilson, 2011: 59). Biko had read Freire’s Pedagogy of the Oppressed (1968) and had sought out Anne Hope who was offering workshops on Freire’s methodology (Ibid.).
Fifteen SASO members attended four months of these workshops with a monthly obligation to return to their communities for three weeks of intensive research and practice (Ibid.). Through such a dialectical conscientisation method, SASO could contribute towards the awakening of black communities while also learning from and being conscientised by ordinary black people. Freire’s conscientisation methodology was perfect in this regard because it demanded of Black Consciousness activists to constantly engage in critical self-reflexivity to ensure that they were, “marching to the same tune as the rest of the community” (SASO, 1978d: 105). Freire explains this anti-philosopher king pedagogy as follows:

Those who authentically commit themselves to the people must re-examine themselves constantly…To affirm this commitment but to consider oneself the proprietor of revolutionary wisdom – which must be given to (or imposed on) the people – is to retain the old ways (Freire, 1996: 42-43).

Lindy Wilson (2011: 60) reports that Freire’s methodology resonated with Biko because it accorded with his open and unimposing leadership style. Biko detested the cult of personality and preferred to stay in the background whilst others took charge (Woods, 1978: 36). Biko’s acquaintances, such as a Father Aelred Stubbs (cited in Wilson, 2011: 53), report that Biko “had a deep-seated institution of togetherness” and believed in collective leadership. This is the reason why the BCM was characterised by a large pool of talented leaders and spokespersons from its inception (Woods, 1978: 36).

It could thus be said that Freire’s dialectical methodology helped proponents of Black Consciousness to recover their ‘first sight’. From Cabral and Henry’s perspective, the recovery of ‘first sight’ is a prerequisite for a genuine attempt to fashion a constantly unfolding and creolising national consciousness. This is a genuine attempt because it encourages equal and democratic participation from all sectors of society. In this regard, Jane Gordon (2014: 131) has shown that popular-democratic participation was also Fanon’s indispensable ingredient for forging a national consciousness. Mass participation enables people who have been historically infantalised and muted to make themselves subjects of history and co-builders of a new society. In this way, the processes of dismantling ‘the racial contract’ and of (re)constitution would then be based on what Jean-Jacques Rousseau called the “general will;” and not on what Jane Gordon (ibid.) calls the “will of some”. Freire’s conscientisation methodology is indispensable to this project because it helps the oppressed people to perceive their situation clearly, recognise that they can change it, and become new by overcoming their divided, inauthentic selves (Freire, 1996: 30). In the context where Fanonian armed struggle was not an option, conscientisation was a way of creating new men and women who will prepare themselves to be part of the constituent power towards Azania.

This brings us to the BCM’s second tool of operationalising the second pillar of the Du Boisian
manifesto namely, the Black Community Programmes (BCP). Ben Khoapa, the first director of BCPs, explained the aims of BCP’s in words that demonstrated their indispensability for the shaping of consciousness through self-remaking, subjectivity-becoming and self-actualisation: “Black people want to know, and must know, more about who they were and who they are if they are seriously concerned about whom they intend to become (Khoapa, 1973: 1. Original emphasis). Khoapa further explained the rationale of these programmes in ways that demonstrated their indispensability to the bottom-up process that I discussed in the previous passages. Khoapa proclaimed that BCPs were aimed at, “issues of empowerment, the development of the ability to decide, the ability to be critical….“ (cited in Wilson, 2011: 57). The BCM praxis, therefore, held that conscientisation efforts were meaningless unless they helped black people to achieve liberation understood as the fulfillment of the human potential of historically-dehumanised people.

In the context where the BCM was urging black people to delink from the white world and to make no demands against the state the BCP programmes were central to sustaining black communities and to inculcating a spirit of self-reliance and self-determination. In this way, de-linked people could meet their own spiritual, psychic, social and material needs (Black Community Programmes, 1978a: 331). From a Bikoian praxis of constitution and belonging, therefore, community programmes together with dialectical conscientisation were indispensable tools for forging constituent power from below. Leslie Hadfield (2016: 19) thus concludes that, “facing an oppressive state, community action was a way to develop people in preparation for a future political liberation”.

4.3.4 Towards pluralist co-existence

I have in the preceding sub-sections attempted to outline Black Consciousness distinctive philo-praxis of constitution and belonging. The uniqueness of the BCM’s vision was its sincere attempt to avert the pitfall of inadvertent attachment to colonialist discourse as well as the pitfall of elitist nationalism. In this final section, I aim to show that the BCM elaborated an anti-assimilation praxis. Biko famously articulated his objection against “integration” as follows:

Does that mean that I am against integration? If by integration you understand a breakthrough into white society by blacks, an assimilation and acceptance of blacks into an already established set of norms and code of behavior set up and maintained by whites, then YES I am against it. I am against the superior-inferior white-black stratification that makes the white a perpetual teacher and the black a perpetual pupil (Biko: 2004: 26).

The outcome of integrationist politics, Biko argued, would be that black people simply continue to be “appendages” of white society (Biko, 2004: 55). Furthermore, according to Biko, integration into the
South African/white world would perpetuate both white racial melancholia and black racial melancholia because, “the people forming the integrated complex [would] have been extracted from various segregated societies with their inbuilt complexes of superiority and inferiority and these [would] continue to manifest themselves even in the ‘nonracial’ set up of the integrated complex” (Biko, 2004: 21). For Biko, then, integrated/ “new” South Africa would be a neo-Apartheid world in a sense that only a few “intelligent and articulate” [transcultural] black people would be extracted from the black world and assimilated into the white world (Biko, 204: 21).

Biko’s warning was that the failure to deal decisively with the ‘totality’ of the white power structure would leave the colonial-racist situation intact. In such a situation, the ‘post-Apartheid’ society would simply be a neo-Apartheid society. Biko predicted three main consequences of such a scenario. First, neo-Apartheid would lead to black-on-black exploitation; a situation where, “black will compete with black, using each other as rungs up a ladder leading them to white value” (Biko, 2004: 101). Secondly, under a “deracialised” neo-Apartheid political economy black people would continue to be the damned of the earth. He explained this in very prescient terms: “this is one country where it would be possible to create a capitalist black society. If whites were intelligent…and South Africa could succeed to put across to the world a pretty convincing picture, with still 70 percent of the population underdogs” (Interview with Gerhart, 2008: 42). Finally, the original sin of “native” pariahdom would continue because white values, European epistemologies and aesthetics would continue to frame South Africa ensuring that South Africa remains a “province of Europe” (Biko, 2004: 148). Biko (2005: 70) thus proposed that the decolonisation imperative was to, “overhaul the whole system”.

The BCM’s vision of de-constituting South Africa might not have the same rhetorical radicalism as Fanon and Algeria’s National Liberation Front ‘destruction of the colonial situation’ rallying cry. However, it substantially amounted to the same vision. This is clear from a debate that a group of SASO members had on the significance of the statement “before entering the open society, we must first close ranks” (Gerhart, 1978: 276). This was a standard line from the USA Black Power movements. SASO’s conclusion was that in the context of South Africa this statement should be changed to make it clear that only black people could create an open society. SASO proposed that the statement should be amended to read: “before creating an open society we must first close our ranks”. They explained the significance of this amendment as follows:

The difference of course is of paramount importance in that in the first one, the Afro-Americans accept that they will never be in a position to change the system in America, and adopt the approach that if you can’t beat them, join them – but join them from a position of strength; whereas implicit in the latter statement is a hope to establish a completely new system at some stage…Purely from a consideration of who we are, we realise that it is we who must be allowing others to participate in our system. We must not be the ones to be invited to participate in somebody else’s system in our own private yard (cited in Gerhart, 1978: 276. My emphasis).
Biko often declared that he was in favour of an open, common, and inclusive society, but that only the oppressed could articulate the method or approach to this kind of society (Wilson, 2011: 26). Although SASO was steadfast in its insistence that only black people could be constitution-makers, it was at pains to explain that it, “…believes that South Africa is a country in which both black and white live and shall continue to live together” (SASO, 1978: 99). At a 1976 trial Biko (2004: 136) explained that this statement meant that the BCM believes in “a plural society with contributions made to its development by all segments of the community… We intend to see [white people] staying here side by side with us, maintaining a society in which everybody shall contribute proportionally”. The BCM’s vision of constitution and belonging is one we could thus identify as a quest for pluralist co-existence.34

More specifically, this vision accorded with Mphahlele’s vision of re-membering and remembering Africa and a valorisation of creolising African culture. Biko argued that in an open society European culture could not be dominant. Rather cultures will rub and affect each other “like fashion” thus leading to a situation of inter-culturality (Biko, 2004: 147). Biko’s remarks in this courtroom exchange deserve to be quoted at length:

Counsel: the question I think which is of greater interest to us is on the first day of the open society, on the following day, is there going to be general destruction – any destruction or proscription of existing culture and cultural values?

Biko: I think a modification all round.

Counsel: Now what sorts of modifications are envisaged?

Biko: ….all that [SASO] insist on is primarily a culture that accepts the humanity of the black man. A culture that is sufficiently accommodative of African concepts, to pass as an African culture. What we are saying now is that at the present moment we have a culture here which is a European culture. This country looks, My Lord, like a province of Europe. You know, to anybody who perceives the behavior pattern it looks like a province of Europe. It has no relationships rootwise to the fact that it happens to exist in Africa…we behave like Europeans who are staying in Africa. So we don’t want to be just mere political Africans, we want to be people living in Africa. We want to be complete Africans, we – social Africans…must understand Africa and what Africa is about. And we don’t’ have to go far. We just have to live with the man here, the black man here, whose proportionate contribution in the joint culture is going to sufficiently change our joint culture to accommodate the African experience. Sure, it will have European experience, because we have whites here who are descended from Europe. We don’t dispute that. But for God’s sake it must have an African experience as well (Biko, 2004:148).

34 Neville Alexander (2002: 39) has shown that the BCM believed that there existed two nations which will be dissolved into one nation in Azania. The BCM’s vision of “One Azania, One Nation” might open it up to criticisms that such a vision of nation-state contradicts the movement’s goal of pluralist co-existence. The discussion of this justified critique is, however, outside the scope of this study.
As is clear, Biko did not wish to see the elimination of European culture. Rather European culture would have to make a proportional contribution in a future society. More importantly, he was calling for the elimination of white culture. The two must be distinguished. White culture does not accept the humanity of “the black man”, it is exploitative and does not lend itself to humane inter-subjectivity and mutual recognition. European culture need not be purged because, as I discussed in Part I above, it is part of the heritage of the historically conquered and is an integral component of a pluriversal world.

Finally, this brings us to Biko’s thoughts on the role of African culture in the constitution of the future open society. It has been suggested that at the core of Black Consciousness is a deep investment in ‘African humanism’. Cornel du Toit (2008: 32) thus writes that underlying Black Consciousness was not merely a resistance against colonialism and Apartheid; it was rather a, “spontaneous expression of African humanism”. Andries Oliphant (2008: 215) is even more explicit in asserting that Biko was an African humanist who considered that “the future humanisation of the world will take on an African quality”. Ruth Obee (1999: 5) puts forward the theory that Biko and his Black Consciousness companions must have read some of Mphahlele’s work on Afrikan humanness and used that as a “strategic launching pad” for their philosophy. More (2004b: 213) argues along the same line asserting that Biko’s ultimate mission was the restoration of African consciousness.

For his part, Biko recognised the fact that colonialism had interrupted the natural evolution of African culture and that there was, therefore, a need to recover and re-member African culture and civilisation. He (2004: 57, 53) wrote that one of the aims of Black Consciousness was to correct colonial-Apartheid distortions of African culture and to encourage black people proud of their culture and value systems. Biko’s views on culture are summarised in his 1971 speech entitled “Some African cultural concepts” (2004: 44-51). In that speech he started off by observing that if South Africa was a normal society acculturation and inter-culturality would naturally take place. However, in Apartheid South Africa cultural fusion has been one-sided because African culture has been destroyed and bastardised by the ‘colonialist’ and ‘exploitative’ “Anglo-Boer culture”. Biko did not believe in the recovery of some pre-colonial African culture. Rather, as the title of his speech hints, he advocated for the retrieval of some vital elements of African culture. He focused on three main elements of African culture that needed to be retrieved and actively promoted. He first focused on the humanness at the core of African culture. This humanness, Biko argued, also encouraged a spirit of communalism which inspires joint-community action. Second, he called for the valorisation of the culture of music and the use of music in joy, sadness or to ease the burden of work. Third, he posited that the Azanian society ought to abide by the African principle of communal ownership of property.

In conclusion, Biko’s third way (beyond Apartheid and integration) was an attempt to properly get over the conflict/structural antagonism and to open the possibility of a truly pluralist co-existence beyond the racist pluralism imposed by colonial-apartheid (Turner, 2008: 73). The third option ensures a move
towards a post-apartheid social world because it seeks to explode the myth of colonial ontological and epistemic difference. This move ensures a ceaseless motion towards pluralist co-existence based on mutual respect, self-determination and what can be called inter-culturality. Biko explained this vision in the following terms:

Each group must be able to attain its style of existence without encroaching on or being thwarted by another. Out of this mutual respect for each other and complete freedom of self-determination there will obviously arise a genuine fusion of the life-styles of the various groups. This is true integration (Biko, 2004: 22).

It is in this sense that More (2008: 59), following Lucius Outlaw, suggests that Biko’s liberatory synthesis is aimed at “pluralist integration”. I hope by now it is clear that by ‘pluralist co-existence’ I do not mean the type often evoked by liberal multiculturalists to, “enable assimilation and forgetfulness” (hooks, 2009: 105). In Biko’s praxis there is no forgetfulness of dispossession and damnation. Biko thus insisted that there would never be co-existence unless there is radical redistribution of the economy and an end to socio-economic subjugation (Interview with Gerhart, 2008: 34). Biko was also clear that pluralist co-existence could only take place after land re-conquest because land dispossession and displacement of African people, “is working against our existence” (Biko, 2004: 90). Landlessness makes it difficult to find spaces to perform rituals and rites that are geared towards the realisation of cosmic harmony between the living, the living-dead and the yet-to-be-born. Since African humanness is a pursuit for wholeness and cosmic belongingness anything that interferes with this pursuit is working against African existence. The ‘quest for true humanity’ as firstly, a deconstruction and dismantling of the ‘totality’ of the white power structure; and secondly, a ceaseless motion towards affirming one own humanity through recognising and respecting the humanity of others, therefore, enable pluralist coexistence when it is based on the pursuit of justice – including epistemic justice, aesthetic justice, land justice, economic justice and cultural justice. This is the justice of African humanness as Bantu Biko understood it. This is how African humanness, via Black Consciousness, could (re)constitute the social world.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have attempted to demonstrate the homology between Mphahlele’s constitution and belonging vision and that of Biko’s. I have argued that both Mphahlele and Biko believed that Afrikan Humanness and Black Consciousness are indispensable to the termination of the constitutive sin and for holistic (re)constitution of the historically conquered world. I have also showed that the Black Consciousness Movement of South Africa transcended previous movements of rebirth and self-discovery because it made serious attempts to assist black people to overcome racial melancholia and aggressive dependency. Biko, therefore, understood that the struggle to re-exist was not complete with the reclamation of blackness as a defiant and positive category. To end the struggle there would be to
remain fixated with ‘the white man’ and the dual world he has created. Biko went to the very beginning of the installation of the Manichean world and proposed that black people ought to recover African culture. Here Biko emphasised that the goal was not to seek to recover pre-colonial African traditions. Rather, the goal was to recover the spirit and culture of what Mphahlele referred to as Afrikan humanness. The point here is that Black Consciousness was not just a philosophy of alterity; it was, as Biko often proclaimed, a ‘quest for a true humanity’. Thus Black Consciousness was, ultimately, based on the philosophy of African humanness/Ubuntu.

Towards this end, Black Consciousness forced both black people and white people to work towards being-becoming and belonging – even before the end of Apartheid. Biko’s genius was that he rejected both Black Nationalist strategy of reversing racial hierarchies and the liberal strategy of countering white power with a non-racist discourse. Biko showed that both these strategies left white power and colonialist discourse intact. These two approaches were also driven by bad faith and self-deception. Operating in a non-revolutionary context, Biko’s solution was a radical strategy of ‘blackening’ politics and civil society, and thus deconstructing and displacing Apartheid discourse and disarming white supremacy. The BCM’s strong black solidarity combined with and enhanced with dialectical conscientisation and Black Community Programmes led to what we may call pre-figurative constitution-making.

In the late 1970s, the Apartheid regime finally came to the awareness to the fact that the BCM was a far more radical and dangerous proposition than Nelson Mandela’s ANC and its campaign of armed struggle. Biko was thirty years old when the Apartheid regime had him killed in custody. However, Biko’s ideas about the (re)constitution of the social world and the total liberation of black people continued to reverberate well after his death. In particular, his praxis of community action and self-pride inspired social movements that emerged in the 1980s. In the next chapter, we will see that contemporary social movements borrow from the action repertoires and discourses of the latter movements and those of anti-colonial thinkers including Biko and Fanon.
CHAPTER 5: ABAHLALISM AND THE (RE)CONSTITUTION OF THE MATERIAL WORLD

In South Africa everyone will say that life is not fair for the poor. Even the rich will say . . . this when they are just finding more and more excuses to give more of the country’s money to themselves to build all these very expensive things . . . They want to have those things here so that they can feel themselves to be “world class”. Meanwhile our children, who, like the children in Haiti and Kenya and Zimbabwe are . . . burning in shack fires and dying from diarrhea... The poor have to make their choices from no choice... [S’bu Zikode, 2007. My emphasis]

The Constitutional Court ruling in favour of Abahlali means that a people’s democracy will not be undermined at every turn…The Constitutional Court ruling also means that while party politics is trying to bring our democracy to the brink of catastrophe, the Court recognises our humanity and that the poor have the same right as everyone else to shape the future of the country [S’bu Zikode, 2009]

Introduction

I began this dissertation with an account of the 2009 ruling party-sponsored deadly attack on Abahlali baseMjondolo, its ejection from their headquarters in Kennedy Road Informal Settlement, and the Provincial Safety and Security Minister’s subsequent proclamations that this settlement has been “liberated”. The aim of that preface was to highlight the dearth of constitution and belonging in the ‘new’ South Africa, the notion of neo-Apartheid constitutionalism, and one movement’s striving to constitute a new polity. In this final chapter, I return to Abahlali baseMjondolo to elucidate this movement’s counter-hegemonic vision and praxis of constitution and belonging. I aim to demonstrate that this movement’s praxis prefigures post-Apartheid being-becoming, being-belonging, being-togetherness, and national consciousness from the syncretic and creolising locales that are shack-settlements. I will also investigate the extent to which this movement’s vision and praxis cohere with, transcend, and deepen those of Mphahlele and Biko.

The two epigraphs at the head of this chapter come from speeches given by S’bu Zikode, the president of Abahlali baseMjondolo. Read together, they point to the idea that this movement’s agenda begins with a focus on and a demand for the radical alteration of the material world, but of necessity reaches towards making prescriptions for the holistic de-constitution and (re)constitution of the “post-Apartheid” world. These epigraphs also hint at the reality that people who still exists behind ‘the veils’
of class and race are impelled to ‘make choices from no choice,’ including tactically resorting to institutions and discourses associated with neo-Apartheid constitutionalism.

If we recall the discussion in chapter one above, we would not be surprised that the vision of this shack-dwellers’ movement will also encompass demands for the (re)constitution of the social and spiritual worlds. In that chapter, I discussed Solomon Tsekisho Plaatje’s seminal critique of the manner in which the Natives Land Act of 1913 portended the shattering of the worlds of indigenous people on the material, social, and spiritual planes. Plaatje’s investigative journalism showed that the impacts of the Act went beyond land dispossession and pauperisation. More significantly, the Act contributed to the entrenchment of a social world of apartness and to a sense of intra- and inter-spiritual estrangement. As will become obvious later, members of Abahlali baseMjondolo are descendants of victims of land dispossession, dispersion and racial proletarianisation. This is first link between that first chapter and this last chapter. The connection between these two chapters hints at the longue durée of conquest and colonisation as well as the on-going imperative to remake the ‘South African’ world on all three realms of belonging-in-the-world. The second link between the chapters that bookended this dissertation is more direct and points to the way in which “post-Apartheid” rulers institute neo-colonialism through their reiteration of colonialist discourse. In this regard, I will focus on the most high-profile campaign that this movement has to date embarked upon. This was a campaign against the KwaZulu-Natal Elimination and Prevention of Re-Emergence of Slums Act of 2007. The aims and title of this legislation (with its reference to shack-dwellers’ homes as “slums” and its intention to “eliminate” these dwellings through mass evictions) invoked and evoked colonialist discourse. This Act could also be regarded as an index of the new ruling class’ subliminal intentions to reestablish a form of life that Plaatje referred to as ‘Native Life in South Africa’.

Abahlali and other social movements of the damned associate the re-manifestation of a material world of apartness with the ANC’s imposition of an overwhelmingly neoliberal macro-economic policy. More pertinently, as the following member of Abahlali explains, impoverished people experience this re-manifestation as a reiteration of colonialism and Apartheid:

…neoliberalism… is a very modern kind of new apartheid. In this new form of apartheid we are still divided into those that count and those that do not, those who can live in the cities and those that cannot, those that are allowed to speak and those that are not, those that must burn and those that are safe (Mdlalose, 2012: n.p.).

This assertion makes it clear that what is at stake is more than the problem of ‘class apartheid’ or the need to transform the material world of the ‘new’ South Africa. From the perspective of Abahlali, the business of decolonisation remains unfinished. Therefore, the imperative is still that of ‘totally overhauling’ South Africa as per Biko’s suggestion. The total overhaul/de-constitution of South Africa
would undo this country’s economic configurations as well as the social and spiritual worlds they constitute and are constituted by. I hope that the connection between Abahlali’s vision of constitution and belonging and that of Mphahlele and Biko will become clearer as we proceed along with the chapter.

The main aim of this final chapter is to analyse Abahlalism. Abahlalism is this movement’s philo-praxis of constitution and belonging. My main argument is that Abahlalism transcends the immediate demand to (re)constitute the material world. Rather, this movement’s praxis extends towards a striving for an inclusive society based on the living philosophy of Afrikan humanness. In section one, I discuss Abahlali’s striving against what it mourns as the era of “unFreedom”. In section two, I show that Abahlali eschew liminal politics of homelessness-as-home for politics of contentious mobilisation that Abahlali has named ‘home-based politics’. In the final section, I discuss Abahlalism as pre-figurative constitution-making aimed at a creolising national consciousness and reclamation of belonging-in-the-world. I will also discuss the way Abahlalism avoids the pitfalls of the Du Boisian manifesto of constitution and belonging.

5.1 Abahlali’s Striving against “UnFreedom”

5.1.2 The struggle against neo-colonialist time and evolutionary constitutionalism

The origins of Abahlali can be traced to an event that happened on 19 March 2005. On this day, approximately 750 people from the Kennedy Road Informal Settlement (Kennedy Road) in the KwaZulu-Natal blockaded a major road. The stand-off between these shack-dwellers and the police lasted for more than four hours. The protest erupted after shack-dwellers learned that the council had reneged on a promise to allocate land for formal housing. The council had instead awarded this piece of land to a businessman. Following this protest, the residents of Kennedy Road declared 2005 a ‘year of action’ (Zikode interviewed by Pithouse, 2009: 35). Subsequently, Kennedy Road residents came together with residents from other settlements to establish Abahlali baseMjondolo. The aim of this introductory section is to demonstrate that Abahlalism is impelled by shack-dwellers’ perception that post-1994 constitutional re-arrangements inaugurated a time of neo-Apartheid.

Abahlali began its commemoration of “UnFreedom Day” on 27 April 2006. On that day, Abahlali released a press statement entitled “UnFreedom Day! No Freedom for the Poor! Why we mourn on April 27th, 2006”. The movement put forward the following reasons:

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35 This mourning echoes Frederick Douglass’s 1852 mourning entitled “The Meaning of July Fourth for the Negro”. Douglass explained his mourning as follows: “The blessings in which you, this day, rejoice, are not
The first democratic elections were held in South Africa on 27 April 1994. The promise of that day was equality, a vision that all South Africans might be able to share the country's wealth, that all would be equal under the law, that all would have inalienable rights. That day is commemorated as “Freedom Day”, and its memory celebrated in a national holiday each April 27th. As years have gone by, the hope has turned to bitter irony. Twelve years after the first democratic elections, the gap has increased between the rich and the poor (Abahlali, 2006: n.p.).

Abahlali’s designation of this time as a time of ‘unFreedom’ is meant to convey the idea that this time is neither a time of Apartheid nor a time of freedom. Rather, bahlali (members of Abahlali) contend that the post-1990 period is an interregnum in which the majority of black people find themselves interned in a space that the former secretary-general of Abahlali designates as “the democratic prison” (B. Mdlalose, 2012: n.p.). If we substitute “democratic” with “civilisation” and we might realise that what we are dealing with here is the longue durée of settler colonialism: as in the seemingly benign prison of western modernity, the historically conquered are deemed not to be co-present with the rest of the modern/new society because they are still considered uncivilised beings with defective humanity. Impoverished black people thus feel that they have been imprisoned in a liminal zone that Santos (2014: 10), in a different context, designates as a zone, “between No Longer and the Not Yet” (Santos, 2014: 10).

Time and constructions of temporality emerged as important sub-themes in Part I of this dissertation. This was the case when I discussed settler-invaders’ attempt to “kill” the world of indigenous people and freeze the being-becoming of the conquered. To be more specific, colonisation of time emerged as a fundamental aspect of colonialist discourse. By way of reminder: in chapter one above, I demonstrated that in the beginning was not only the word (John 1:1, The Bible); it was (in the installation of the Line globally and in settler colonies) word about time and temporality with regards to who sets time (the [western] modern man); who is not on/in time (the pre-modern being, the primitive humanoid, ‘the savage’); who imposes time (the slave owner, the colonialist); who exists on borrowed time (the woman, the slave, the indentured labourer, the colonised); and who can be on/in time (the white woman, the assimilado, the notable evolue, the New African). Coloniality of time was, therefore, central, not exhaustive, of coloniality of power and coloniality of being. The imposers of time could on this basis, therefore, dispense with the humanity of those not yet converted to Christianity, not yet modern, and/or not yet civilised - in a phrase, not-yet beings could be wasted. Colonisers of time working together with Eurocentric cartographers established the (Euro-centered) world and relegated ‘the rest’ to a zone of non-beings.

enjoyed in common… The sunlight that brought light and healing to you, has brought stripes and death to me. This Fourth July is yours, not mine. You may rejoice, I must mourn” (Douglass, 2009: 8).
Coming to the territory that colonialists constituted as ‘South Africa,’ we have seen that colonialist time and its perpetuation were, and are, indispensable to the projects of white supremacy and anti-black racism because they license racial trusteeship, white privilege, and white hegemony. The hegemony of colonialist time seduces its victims, the not-yet-fully human, to aspire for teleological whiteness. Thus for New Africans, the struggle for emancipation revolved around proving that they are as mature, rational, and, thus, in the same history and temporality as the colonists. These transcultural elites, thus, campaigned for constitutional amendments or a new constitution that would recognise their humanity and enable their inclusion into the extant, but de-racialised, polity.

In 1994, a transformative constitutionalism paradigm triumphed over a paradigm of decolonisation. Put differently, an evolutionary contra revolutionary scheme of constitution-making and belonging triumphed: evolution from four rival settler colonies to a Union of South Africa (1910) to the Republic of South Africa (1961) to the 1983 constitution that made provision for “Indian” and “Coloured” representation to the integrationist 1993 Interim Constitution. It is from this perspective that we should understand Mogobe Ramose’s thesis that the current Constitution (“Final Constitution”) has resulted in ‘conquest by consent’ because it, de facto, transmuted stolen land into lawful property. Ramose’s (2002: 572) contention is that this Constitution shows a bias towards Eurocentric legal doctrine, and the putative right of conquest, because, among other things, it aligns itself with the doctrine of extinctive prescription in terms of which after a passage of sometime illegally obtained property becomes lawful. This principle conflicts with the fundamental legal doctrine of Ubuntu (Afrikan humanness) law which commands that molato ga o bole – meaning that an injustice remains an injustice until it is rectified (ibid.). From a decolonising perspective, an evolutionary scheme of constitution and belonging, therefore, accords with (neo)colonialist time. The current constitutional dispensation is congruent with neocolonialist time because it does not significantly rupture with, “the new time [that was] inaugurated by the conquest, which [was] a colonialist time because occupied by colonialist values,” to recast Fanon (1970: 168).

The aforementioned ‘right of conquest’ is an explicit application of colonialist discourse and the colonisation of reason in the terms I have been elucidating throughout this dissertation. This putative right originated in the long fifteenth century when Europe expanded and violently imposed Eurocentrism and western modernity on other parts of the world. Ramose explains that European expansion/colonisation was based on the lines westerners drew between reason and unreason. Colonisers relegated “non-western” people to the unreason side of the line. In chapter one above, I showed that colonisers drew amity lines that ran along the equator or the Tropic of Cancer in the South to buttress this philosophy of Enlightenment. European colonisers considered territories beyond the Line to be zones were unreason, barbarism, and lack of morality reigned (Ramose, 2002: 584). The application of this epistemological dichotomising scheme, therefore, proceeded as follows: “I think,
therefore, I conquer and enslave....” (Ramose, 2002: 544). Ramose asserts that conquest confirmed and established the idea that ‘right of conquest’ in a way that meant permanent and irreversible loss of titles to territories and sovereignties over them.

In the terms of this dissertation, therefore, this ‘right’ sanctioned the ‘killing of the land’ and the subsequent de-homing, unhoming, and cosmic dislocation of “natives”. The Natives Act of 1913 and the constitutional order that enabled its enactment were practical realisation of this right.36 The argument was that the ‘right of conquest’ acquired the status of juristic fact during post-1990 constitutional re-arrangements. This is because these re-arrangements led to a situation where, “…formal equal constitutional status to both successors in title to the ‘right of conquest’ and the conquered people was granted such that injustice came to be constitutionalised” (Ramose, 2002: 551). This assimilationist scheme dis-member the memory of offense relating to conquest and the imposition of colonialist time. It is Ramose’s contention that the ‘right of conquest’ and its ongoing consequences can only be dislodged by epistemological decolonisation because this ‘right’ is a product of colonialist discourse. In this chapter, I contend that Abahlali’s disobedient acts of “squatting” in cities, its demand for land redistribution, and most importantly, its valorisation of epistemologies borne in struggles against pariahdom are direct challenges to the ‘right of conquest,’ colonialist discourse, and colonialist time.

Any attempt to understand Abahlali’s counter-hegemonic praxis of constitution and belonging must begin with an understanding that Abahlalism is grounded on a radical refusal of colonialist time and the concomitant idea that this is the time of post-Apartheid. Indeed, it is from the above perspective that we can understand Abahlali’s (2011: n.p.) lamentation that those trapped in the liminal zone of the “democratic prison” are “the forgotten”. ‘The forgotten’ suffer from what we may call the enduring colonisation of time. This is because they suffer from historical omission because they feel excluded from the “miracle of the transition” and putative processes of nation-building; temporal ossification by deliberate processes that re-enact colonial and Apartheid processes of primitive accumulation, impoverishment, “retribalisation”, enforced racialisation and social invisibility; and an imposed conceptualisation of time and temporality via a cluster of post-1994 keywords (transitional justice, final constitution, a new united nation) that perpetuates the monoculture of western modernity in terms of which time unfolds in a linear, evolutionary, and homogenous manner. This conception ‘invisibilises’

36 The ‘right of conquest’ forms the basis for settler colonisation and calibrates future constitutional re-arrangements in a way that ensures that settler hegemony and permanent “native” loss of land and sovereignties are guaranteed. Thus, Harry Smith, a lieutenant-general of the British Army and later governor of the Cape Colony, invoked this ‘right’ in 1836 to justify the permanent expulsion of Xhosa groups from their ancient lands and the establishment of a settler colony in present day Eastern Cape, South Africa. Smith (ibid.) charged that the right of conquest is a right, “…by which the British dominions have been extended to their present magnitude, by which they are extending at this moment in Australia, that right which has ejected the Aborigines form the vast territory of America, the West Indies, the ancient Oriental World... Are the Kafirs...not to be ejected by the same right?” (cited in Mostert, 1992: 784).
groups of people that exist according to the temporalities of “non-western” cosmologies, epistemologies and legalities.

What does time and temporality have to do with contestations around constitution and belonging? Firstly, from the perspective of constitutionalism (constitutionalism understood both as a legal concept dealing with allocation of rights and responsibilities and a politico-ethical theory prescribing how to (re)constitute the polity) to be ‘forgotten’ is to be as if one is outside the walls constituting the new political society. To be interpellated as outside the wall of the new polity, is to be cast as the Other and to be produced as, “invisible, unintelligible, or irreversibly discardable” (Santos, 2006: 165). To be ‘forgotten’, Abahlali implies then, is to still suffer from pariahdom and worldlessness. Secondly, if we bear in mind Santos’s (2004: 158) reminder that, “the understanding of the world and the way it creates and legitimates social power has a lot to do with the conceptions of time and temporality”, colonisation of time in the terms I have sketched above and the hegemonic signifier of post-Apartheid serve to mask disguise on-going damnation and “native” pariahdom.

The discourse of post-Apartheid permit beneficiaries of South Africa’s “elite transition” (see generally, Bond, 2005) to manufacture the consent that 1994 presaged both emancipation and liberation. From a Foucauldian perspective, this hegemonic discourse is meant to mould the political subjectivities of contemporary pariahs in a way that induces them to internalise the idea that they are not casualties of historical structural problems; but rather, because “the past is in the past” ‘the forgotten’ are themselves the problem. I have, in previous chapters, argued that the discourse of assigning the status of problemacy to certain sectors of society is a condition of possibility for producing those sectors as pariahs. As we shall see, the premise of the contemporary South African discourse of “poverty management” is that “the poor” are problematic people.

To recap: from the perspectives of victims of systemic social exclusion and racial subjugation, post-1994 constitutional re-arrangements were decidedly not constituent moments of decolonisation and liberation. I have proposed that neo-Apartheid time and its invisibilising world could only be terminated when time itself is decolonised and its conception radically altered from the standpoint of ‘the forgotten’. At the most fundamental level, then, from the standpoint of those ensnared in “a zone of stasis” (Fanon, 1963: 51, 122), quests for constitution and belonging begin when this present time is accurately named as a time of ‘UnFreedom,’ is dislodged, and the never-ending time of decolonisation is inaugurated. A decolonised time substitutes the monoculture of western temporality for an ecology of temporalities to enable Freedom-Time understood as a ceaseless pursuit of pluralist co-existence.\(^{37}\)

\(^{37}\) Following my discussion of Biko’s constitution vision above, by pluralist co-existence I mean a co-presence and an end to a world where some people exist and Others are produced as anachronistic, as non-existing.
Herein lies a crucial insight. Abahlali’s insistence that this is a time of ‘unFreedom’ is meant to achieve precisely the aforementioned de-constitution and (re)constitution objectives. This invocation is meant to convey the notion that ‘the forgotten’ are victims of what Santos (2007: 60) defines as “pre-contractualism” in the sense that they are excluded from the social contract of the “new nation”. In the case of post-1994 South Africa, pre-contractualism is an outcome of the fact that in 1996, the state substituted a social democratic programme (the Reconstruction and Development Programme) with a neoliberal macro-economic programme known as the Growth, Employment, and Redistribution Programme (“GEAR”). The enduring consequences of this austerity programme (a ‘reverse Gear’ as leftist activists called it) is that the majority of black people continue to suffer from social dislocation, ‘invisibilisation,’ and racialised oppression due to high rates of racialised impoverishment, structural unemployment, miseducation, ill-health, and precarious existence in “squatter camps” and other “black locations”. Post-1994 pre-contractualism has thus banished victims of the constitutive racial contract further into the ‘other side’ of a reconfigured Line. The result of this is a pervasive sense of on-going social and spiritual death. Abahlali confirm this generalised state of unhomeliness and pariahdom in the following words: “to be poor means to live with death as a constant presence” (Abahlali, 2016: n.p.).

To put matters squarely: Looked at from the lived experiences of ‘the forgotten,’ there is a need to posit a concept of time of “a present which is not a transition, but in which time stands still and has come to a stop” (Benjamin cited in Agamben, 1993: 102). Therefore, although the time of the postcolony is a ‘time of entanglement’ in which the past, the present, and the future intermingle (Mbembe, 2001: 17), the struggle against the racialised present-past predominate for bahlali and Others. The existence of the racialised present-past indicates that the ‘Final Constitution’ did not vanquish the ‘totality’ of the white power structure. Similarly, post-1994 elites’ violent interpellation of impoverished black people as out-of-sync beings implies that spiritual dislocation and cosmic exile are on-going tribulations. The link between this chapter and the other chapters in this Part of this dissertation should now be clear.

It is this perpetuation of social and spiritual deaths that impel Abahlali to mourn UnFreedom. On 27 April of every year, Abahlali and its allies stage a “mourn UnFreedom Day” rally. This mourning is for those Others who continue to exist in what Abahlali (2016: n.p.) explain as an existence, “in the shadow of death”. Abahlali’s mourning calls attention to the fact that the failure to (re)constitute the material world has buttressed a state of pariahdom for majority of black ‘South Aficans’. Abahlali explains:

In our movement we have often said that we are not free because we are forced to live without toilets, electricity, lighting, refuse removal, enough water or proper policing and, therefore, with fires, sickness, violence and rape. We have often said that we are not free because our children are chased out of good schools and because we are being chased out of good areas and therefore away from education, work, clinics, sports fields and libraries. We have often said that we are not free because the politics of the poor
is treated like a criminal offence by the Municipalities while real criminals are treated like business partners (Abahlali, 2008a: n.p.).

The persistence of racialised impoverishment reconfirm Mbeki’s 1999 thesis (in chapter two above) that South Africa continues to be a country comprised of ‘two nations’. Abahlali and other movements of ‘the forgotten’ struggle against this dearth of constitution and belonging. ‘UnFreedom’ time is thus a time of systemic inequality, structural invisibility, homelessness, and unhomeliness in the terms I sketched out in chapter one above.

To sum up: drawing on insights from Part 1 of this dissertation, I have suggested that black elites have elaborated a vision of constitution and belonging that was not incongruent with colonialist time and evolutionary constitutionalism. Agreeing with Ramose, I showed that post-1990 constitutional re-arrangements did not dislodge the ‘right of conquest’ and its logic of everlasting land deprivation and black subjugation. On the other hand, side, Abahlali’s counter-hegemonic discourse of ‘UnFreedom’ seeks to highlight the fact that the de-worlding consequences of the Native Land Act of 1913 linger on and are actually being buttressed by the present constitutional dispensation. Accordingly, Abahlali’s strategies of disregarding property rights seek to challenge the consequences that flow from the ‘right of conquest’. Indeed, Abahlali’s grammatically disobedient discourse of ‘unFreedom’ is not only a disavowal of the discourse of post-Apartheid. This counter-hegemonic discourse is also a call for the de-constitution of South Africa and the constitution of a new humane polity. Social movements of impoverished people have been making similar calls since the late 1990s. In this sense, Abahlali is not unique. In the next sub-section, I will discuss the post-1994 reemergence of social movements of the damned. My aim here is to distinguish Abahlali from these movements in order to justify my selection of Abahlalism for inclusion into my holistic framework of decolonising constitutionness.

5.1.2 The “post-Apartheid” (re)emergence of the damned of the earth

Two main aspects of the post-1994 political context have stimulated the (re)emergence of counter-hegemonic social movements: (i) material privations entrenched by austere macroeconomic policies, and (iii) the truncated nature of local democracy. The state’s 1996 implementation of a largely neoliberal macroeconomic policy resulted in steady cutbacks in central government’s allocations to local authorities. Municipalities were thus left with little choice but to introduce cost-recovery and cost-cutting measures. These measures resulted in water and electricity cut-offs, evictions from council houses, and retrenchments from privatised providers of social services. The second aspect of the political context that triggered contemporary social movement activism is the lack of democracy at the local government level. The constitution mandates the restructuring of the sphere of local government to reflect this sphere’s new role as the engine of redistribution and development, and the main locus of participatory democracy. However, local governments are not meaningfully engaging local
communities when drafting development plans, annual budgets, and other priorities of municipalities. The most influential stakeholders in local government affairs are politically-connected business people, business organisations, and ANC local branch leaders. Faced with homelessness and lack of basic necessities and having exhausted all avenues for dialogue, township residents began employing collective action repertoire from the anti-Apartheid struggle. Various communities eventually started organising regular meetings and forming ‘concerned citizens’ forums,’ ‘anti-evictions committees,’ and ‘crisis committees’. These forums and committees marked the beginnings of many post-1994 social movements.

State and non-state elites have responded to the struggles of these movements through a mixture of vilification, counter-movements, co-optation, and criminalisation. It is important to emphasise that state officials and non-state elites employ legal tactics as their principal response to social movement struggles. These tactics include court interdicts against protest marches and others forms of direct action, the imposition of onerous bail conditions against activists charged with ‘public violence,’ infiltration of movements by intelligence agents, and court-issued orders for evictions and termination of services. The result of this is that activists exhibit a negative attitude towards the post-1994 legal order. The legal consciousness of counter-hegemonic activists is also shaped by the fact that state officials often ignore or intentionally violate constitutional provisions in their encounters with impoverished people’s movements. The following account by a shack-dweller from a settlement affiliated with Abahlali succinctly captures the challenges that impoverished township groups face when confronted by agents of state intent on acting illegally:

> When the evictions happened…the South African law and the constitution didn’t work for us. They were pointing guns at us, threatening us, meantime we were fighting for our rights [as enshrined in the constitution]. One comrade came asking them ‘What about section 26?’ but they didn’t say anything…When our chairperson came to ask. ‘By what right and by what law can you do this?’ Teargas just got thrown in his face (cited in Pithouse and Butler, 2006: 1).

Many impoverished black people thus regard the post-1994 legal order as ‘the law of the ruling class’ (Madlingozi, 2014: 113). More importantly, impoverished people often perceive the law to be a central apparatus in the perpetuation of “native” pariahdom. It is from this perspective that the president of Abahlali asserts that the state treats impoverished black people as if they are, “beneath the law – as if you don’t count to the law” (Zikode, 2011a: n.p). It is of no small significance that the quote above comes from a 2006 study sub-titled “Pariahs Hold their Ground against a State that is both Criminal and Democratic”. The clearest indication that impoverished people do not have faith in institutions of liberal democracy is the fact that groupings of impoverished black people incessantly embark on what mainstream media and commentators misrecognise as “service delivery” protests. For purposes of this
dissertation, these perennial protests should be understood as pariahs’ rejection of the historicism aspect of colonialisist time which holds as follows: “first in Europe ['first world’/‘world-class’ part of South Africa], and then elsewhere ['third world’ part of South Africa]” (Chakrabarty, 2000: 22). The post-1994 (re)emergence of these groups of impoverished people, therefore, signifies an unwillingness by ‘the forgotten’ to continue to be trapped on the underside of the ‘new South Africa’.

Let us now finally turn our attention to Abahlali baseMjondolo. However, before we do so I first need to outline my reasons for selecting Abahlalism for inclusion into my proposed framework for ‘resurrecting the land’ and the holistic (re)constitution of a new polity. Abahlali is unique from the aforementioned movements and groups of impoverished people in four ways. Firstly, formed in 2005, Abahlali is a comparatively newcomer to the scene. Secondly, whereas state repression and strategic mistakes have resulted in the death of most, if not all, of these movements, Abahlali continues to not only exist but to expand to other provinces. Thirdly, the groupings that are currently staging the perennial “service delivery” protests I mentioned earlier are ‘spontaneous’ groupings and not social movements as defined in traditional social movement scholarship (see for e.g. Tarrow, 1998: 2). This is because these groupings do not develop a collective identity, do not put forward change-oriented goals, do not possess a degree of organisation and embark on sustained collective action. Their vision and praxis of constitution and belonging are, therefore, vaguely articulated, if at all. Fourthly, Abahlali is distinguishable from most of these movements and groupings in that the latter movements and groupings seem to demand an end to their marginalisation and for their integration into hegemonic society. Arguably, a form of subaltern melancholia can, therefore, be discerned in the visions of these movements. The mission that Abahlali has set for itself, as I will show below, differs from the missions of these groupings because it is a mission aimed at totally overhauling the whole edifice of South Africa.

5.2 From fugitivity to ‘home-based politics’

Where so many homes have been demolished, people moved to strange new places, home temporarily becomes the shared experience of homelessness... [Njabulo Ndebele, 1996]

As I have previously mentioned, the headquarters of Abahlali are situated in Kennedy Road Informal Settlement (Kennedy Road). This shack settlement can be found in Clare Estate in the city of Durban. Under Apartheid, Clare Estate was reserved for people of Indian ancestry. This Estate is located on the margins of the city – a buffer zone between the historically white suburb and historically, and presently,

Dipesh Chakrabarty (2000: 2) might as well be referring to post-1999 South African popular movements when he wrote that, “historicism has not disappeared from the world, but its ‘not yet’ exists today in tension with this global insistence on the “now” that marks all popular movements toward democracy”. Indeed, writing in 2006, one leader of Abahlali indicated a refusal of historicism via this rhetorical question: “Why are we expected to have unlimited patience while we are being attacked because ‘service delivery is coming’?” (Zungu, 2006: n.p.).
blacks-only townships. A fifth aspect that, therefore, distinguishes *Abahlali* from most “post-Apartheid” movements and groupings is that its origins and location are not in a historically black township. In other words, *Abahlali* refuses the “black location” (as black ghettoes were officially called during Apartheid). In this sense, *Abahlali*’s situatedness is similar to Ellison’s *Invisible Man* who lives in a manhole near the white part of New York City. *Invisible Man*’s location enables him to live rent-free and to access electricity and other amenities without any payment. As I have discussed in chapter two above, this is one advantage of ‘not being seen’ that the eponymous narrator embraces. In the South African literary context, one ancestor of *Abahlali* is the main protagonist in Sylvester Stein’s *Second-class Taxi* (1958). This is how the narrator describes this protagonist’s disobedient location:

> Staffnurse Phofolo was a vagrant...In terms of the law he was Idle and Undesirable, liable to instant arrest for having no Pass. If the law had known about his dug-out it would have become quite choleric, on the turn. For the rubble dump was situated within what was known as a European Area (though this was Africa). *His very presence there was threat to the delicate plant of European civilisation*... ([1958]1983: 11. My emphasis).

It will soon become obvious why I have highlighted sentence above. My discussion of *Abahlali*’s rebellious location brings us back to the argument that has been running throughout this dissertation. I introduced this theme in Part I above. This leitmotif has to do with the possibilities available to a person or group of people that hegemonic society has exiled or that society treats as if they are outside the walls of the polity. I have suggested that there are three main routes available for such pariahs. The first option is to accept the reality of subjugation and seek to be an immigrant of the world that the oppressor claims to have created. The second option is to refuse subordination and engage in tactics of appearances and disappearances aimed at appropriating the fruits of this world. I have suggested that this is a stance of a fugitive. The third option is that of the pariah physically exiling him or herself from the occupied homeland. In this case, the pariah leaves the unhomely world to formulate an insurrectionary vision in a place of exile, and later stages a return intent on de-constituting and (re)constituting the world.

The location and the mission of the social movement that I am currently discussing suggest that there is at least one other option. This option combines the second and third options of my typology. Kennedy Road’s location tells us that it is an interstitial place of fugitives who, similar to Staffnurse Phofolo and *Invisible Man*, live on the borders and in the shadows of the dominant world to be able to appropriate socio-economic resources historically and currently out of reach of the majority of black people. At the same time, *bahlali’s* and other city-based “squatters”’ exploits of taking leave of “Native Reserves” or former Bantustans as well as ancestral villages are acts of exile. Both these acts of internal exile and border-living, therefore, combine exilic and fugitive subjectivities. To refuse the spaces that may be figured as places of historical belongingness is to opt for ‘homelessness-as-home’ as JanMohamed
frames it in chapter two above.

This kind of ‘voluntary exile’ is a process and not an event. In the urban spaces of the settler-dominated polity the exile-fugitive comes into contact with exile-fugitives of other ethnicities. Their common situation of enforced racialisation, homelessness, lives of precarity, and a shared vision to escape oppression impel them to band together and form a multi-ethnic political community. We may call this imagined community a community of the internal diaspora. The main objective of these exiles-fugitives-cum-internal diaspora is, therefore, neither to retreat to “tribal” enclaves nor to recreate their pre-colonial homes. For these exile-fugitives, as Ndebele in the epigraph to this section might put it, homelessness is embraced as temporary home. However, if we recall that JanMohamed elaborated the concept of ‘homelessness-as-home’ to affirm the existential location of certain black American intellectuals; and furthermore, if we also recall my argument that these ‘specular intellectuals’ were ultimately assailed by racial melancholia, the following question arises: could Abahlali’s shunning of ‘black locations’ be an indication that exile-fugitivity is a transitory positionality whose telos is not the ending of the bifurcated world but assimilation into historically hegemonic spaces?

My answer is that Abahlali’s own vision of ‘the right to the city’ is one where both the black township and the white suburb cease to exist. In this vision of post-colonial constitution and belonging, black townships are not regarded as places of conviviality based on a vibrant trans-ethnic and creolising culture that could provide a blueprint for a non-(Euro-American) modern and humane post-colonial city. This non-nostalgic view of the black township is compatible with the two decolonising visions I have discussed in this Part of the dissertation. We will recall that Mphahlele described the relationship between township residents and their surrounding environment as one of uncanniness, marked as it was by ‘ambivalence and disharmony’. Upon his return from physical exile, Mphahlele noticed that although ‘township culture’ was comprised of an admixture of western culture and sediments of indigenous culture, it was, however, not a hybrid culture that edifies the spirit. Mphahlele further observed that although there were positive elements to the ‘survivalist culture’ that had emerged in these spaces, this culture was, ultimately, a culture very much shaped by the struggles for survival and thus denuded of Afrikan humanness. For Mphahlele, township residents were still unhomed people ‘caged’ in spaces to which they had been forced into. Biko’s lamentation about having lived his whole life in the context of “separate development” is proof that he shared Mphahlele’s argument that township dwellers were, ultimately, interned people deprived of freedom of movement and the right to control their destiny. Indeed, Biko listed township-living as one of the factors that contributed to self-alienation and bad faith existence. Biko posited that high levels of crime, pervasive violence, and general disregard for human life found in townships were caused by the fact that there was an, “absence of abundant life for the people who live there” (Biko, 2004: 122). This common experience of living in
the shadow of death instilled, “the sense of insecurity which is part of a feeling of incompleteness; you are not a complete human being” (Biko, 2004: 124).

My point here is that any vision of constitution and belonging that seeks to spiritually, socially, and materially (re)constitute the South African world ought to disavow the black township. It is this vision that motivates Pastor Xola Skosana’s “Welcome to Hell” annual campaign. On every Easter Weekend, Skosana and his fellow Black Theology supporters embark on a pilgrimage through Cape Town to highlight their crusade against the continuing existence of black townships. This is Skosana’s rationale:

Townships are nothing but glorified refugee camps, rat infested hellholes that must be exposed for what they really are. In many parts of South Africa, townships exist as readily available hubs of cheap labour to keep labour intensive industries going for the benefit of the few. Let it be known across the breath and length of this country that the continuation of separate development and integration, based on affordability, is the perpetuation of the notorious Group Areas Act of yesteryear” (Skosana, 2012: n.p.).

My first submission in this section is that Abahlali’s location and politics are motivated by a similar long-term vision against ghettoes. My second suggestion is that Abahlali’s decision to set up their shacks in this interstitial space and to reject the government’s offer of formal housing in black townships and peri-rural areas is a resolve to challenge colonialist discourse. Fanon reminded us in chapter four above that the colonised world is a compartmentalised world. The Manichean nature of the colonial city is, therefore, a manifestation of this world and a physical realisation of colonialist discourse. In the terms of this discourse, conquered people must be ‘caged’ and physically delimited in over-crowded, dirty, and politically and spiritually oppressive zones because they are “non-beings”. That is, “the native” must know his or her place. Under colonialism and Apartheid, the place of “the native” was the “black location”. Fanon suggests that a vision motivated by a disavowal of colonialist discourse is one in which the bifurcated city has been destroyed and both zones are superseded: “To break up the colonial world does not mean that after frontiers have been abolished lines of communication will be set up between the two zones. The destruction of the colonial world is no more and no less than the abolition of one zone, its burial in the depths of the earth or its expulsion from the country” (Fanon, 1963: 31).

An indispensable historical point I wish to make is that victims of the original sin in the constitution of South Africa have always adopted this Fanonian approach. It is from this perspective that we can apprehend the decision of the “squatters” who first occupied a portion of Clare Estate in the late 1970s as a decision to refuse the place assigned to them by colonialist discourse. Abahlali’s ‘homelessness-as-home’ can thus be seen as a continuation of this particular struggle against colonialist discourse and its tendency to expel the colonised to the ‘other side’ of the ‘abyssal line’. This embodied resistance against colonialist discourse is present in the history of city-based “squatter” movements throughout the history of South Africa. It is to this that I will now turn to.
Dislocated members of the Zulu Kingdom established the first shack settlements in Durban in the early 1880s (COHRE, 2008: 1-2). This followed the defeat that the Zulu nation had suffered at the hands of the British military. Consequent land loss and the system of hut tax forced many conquered people to pour into Durban City in search of wage labour. The regime did not manage to stem the flow of these economic migrants. In 1913, as I discussed earlier, the colonial state promulgated the Natives Land Act to prohibit Africans from owning land or renting outside of ‘scheduled areas’. The regime’s ensuing expropriation of the land still held by “natives” pushed Africans into further poverty and thus increased migration into the main cities. The state then introduced the Native Urban Areas Act of 1923 with a requirement that Africans males should carry “passes” showing that they had permission to be present in urban areas. This Act also declared cities to be white areas and made provision for the establishment of “black locations”. Local state authorities tightly regulated these locations and implemented influx control measures to control the inflow of Africans. However, the economic boom of the 1930s led to massive immigration of Africans into the urban areas. Most immigrants lived on the margins of cities.

This period marked the beginnings of organised “squatter movements”. These movements mobilised scattered people to invade land owned by municipalities (Bonner, 1990: 92-93). The “invaders” were usually people who had little experience of black urban culture. They thus introduced a new political and cultural dynamic. Focusing on the dynamic introduced by newcomers to the Rand, Peter Bonner (1990: 93) reports that for the first time since the establishment of the Rand; “people characterised by a very transitional migrant culture were concentrated together and not immediately assimilable to the urban culture which older townships had helped form”. Inevitably, the “squatters” way of life clashed with that of missionary-trained ANC elites. These “invaders” destabilised the ANC’s discourse and narrative of civilisation and social norms of respectability. As we saw in the first chapter above, this discourse and narrative were aimed at proving to colonists that urban-based and western-educated Africans were as civilised and respectable as white people, and that they thus deserved to be integrated into the polity. As I will show below, bahlahli’s political and social culture also challenges and destabilises the ruling elites’ neo-colonialist culture and associated “world-class” discourse.

In 1934, and in response to widespread white anxiety about the presence of Africans in the city, the colonial state passed the Slums Clearance Act with the view of making, ‘comprehensive provision for the elimination of slums’. “Squatters” responded to this threat by establishing even more powerful movements. The most well-known of these movements of “squatters” is James Mpanza’s Sofazonke which was set up in 1944. “Squatters” regarded Mpanza as a “Moses” coming to deliver them to the “Promised Land” (Bonner, 1990: 102). Similar to early twentieth century “wanderers,” “exiles,” and “pariahs” that Plaatje described in chapter one above, these “squatters,” had spent years searching for home and a sense of belongingness. Mpanza, a larger-than-life Garvey-like figure, duly presented himself as a prophet-in-wilderness coming to heal the social, material, psychological, and spiritual
ailments of these pariahs and fugitives (ibid.). An important point to highlight for purposes of my main thesis is that rather than embarking on a quest to reconquer and “resurrect” ancestral lands, Sofazonke (“we shall all die”) promised to take these multi-ethnic communities to a Promised Land in a sense of an entity that never existed before. The Promised Land in this instance were urban spaces that these exiles could constitute and home themselves in. Most significant for my later discussion of Abahlali’s tactical engagement with neo-Apartheid constitutionalism is the fact that Sofazonke successfully mobilised colonial laws to defend illegal occupations and unauthorised settlements (Bonner, 1990: 100-101).

In 1950 and 1951 respectively, the Apartheid government promulgated the Group Areas Act and the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act in an effort to appease unceasing white anger at the presence of unemployed Africans and economic competition posed by Indian traders in Durban. The Group Areas Act made provision for the segregation of residential areas into four race groups. This Act mandated local authorities to remove “black spots” (black and multi-racial residential areas adjacent to or in between ‘white residential areas’). This led to unprecedented mass removals of Africans to newly established townships on the periphery of cities. For its part, the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act placed an obligation on land owners to evict ‘illegal squatters’ and to build ‘transit camps’ to which evictees could be relocated. However, by the late 1970s, the rigid control over the movement and settlement of Africans in the city weakened and shack settlements mushroomed again. This process gathered pace after the 1976 Soweto Uprising and the political upheavals generated by the ‘ungovernable’ strategies of ‘people’s power’ uprisings of the 1980s (COHRE 2008: 37).

Today, the Apartheid laws that sanctioned segregation and the mass removal of “surplus people” are no longer on the statute books. Historically white suburbs are now also officially de-racialised. However, as Abahlali point out above, the “post-Apartheid” state has replaced these laws with neo-Apartheid laws that are propelled by a discourse that is recognisable for being neo-colonialist. This discourse finds expression in laws and policies that obey the dictates of neoliberal globalisation. This is what informs state officials’ preoccupation with creating “world-class” cities. This obsession is a reiteration of the European city ideal that Apartheid planners tried to simulate. Under the rule of neoliberal/neocolonial globalisation, cities are expected to compete with each other to attract foreign investment. City officials respond to this drive by ‘sanitisising’ urban spaces in the form of eradicating the presence of street traders, homeless people, shack-dwellers, and other unassimilable persons who, like Staffnurse Phofolo, authorities consider ‘Idle’ and ‘Undesirable’. Furthermore, processes of gentrification remove working-class people from central business districts to make room for a rapidly mobile black and white middle class. Finally, historical dwellers of “this side” of the Line and arrivedestes to “this side” of the Line (the black middle and upper classes) have built gated estates to migrate to. The intention here is to reconfigure the Line and to avoid social, economic, and cultural mixture with historical dwellers of the
“other side” of the Line. These gated communities thus reproduce the vision and culture of the colonial city in their drive towards supposed homogeneity and security in uncanny Africa. In this regard, Lindsay Bremmer makes the following observation:

the walled enclosure became an effective means of restoring a sense of order and control, keeping the stranger out and preventing the overlapping of identities and the clashing of cultures...[This walled enclaves] hollow out parts of the city and, on the basis of idealised images, construct urban places appealing to the desire, nostalgia, or paranoia of people who can pay to be there (Bremmer, 2002: 159-160).

However, the above attempts (‘sanitation’ of cities, gentrification processes, and the establishment of gated communities) have not stopped, or rather have actually stimulated, the emergence of “other-city” in-between sanitised cities and gated communes (Bremmer, 2002: 166). The ‘other-city’ is a place of unemployed, unemployable, precariously employed, “informal” traders, and undocumented non-nationals. These unassimilables have appropriated these interstitial spaces to carve out livelihoods and to constitute alternatives spaces of belonging. These spaces are characterised by a creolising culture and an alternative political economy that pose a challenge to the aforementioned neo-colonialist culture. The ‘other-city’ is a harbinger of a postcolonial urban imagination in that it, …wittingly or unwittingly...overwrite the hard-edged colonial formalist distinctions that established an epistemological division between urban and rural, tradition and modernity, formal and informal, village and city, authentic and inauthentic, chaotic and disorderly…. (Enwezor et al. 2002: 13).

My earlier historical discussion of the movements and cultures of urban-based “squatters” and “invaders” makes it clear that the ‘other city’ is not new phenomenon. Achille Mbembe and Sarah Nuttall’s work on Johannesburg as an “elusive metropolis” also confirms that the “other-city” has always been a feature of the colonial city. Mbembe and Nuttall (2008: 21-22) observe that African metropolises were and are constituted both by what lies on their surface and in ‘the underground’. In ‘the underground,’ one finds people who are alienated from and sometimes prohibited from the city. ‘The underground,’ or the ‘other city’, is a space of great suffering but also a space of possibilities, hope, and invention (ibid.). This description of ‘the underground’ immediately takes us back to Invisible Man and his embracing of his invisibility. In this regard, AbdouMaliq Simone (2002: 27-31) has shown that ‘other-city’ people embrace and invest in “politics of invisibility”. Ghostly and spectral appearances enable underground people to eke out a life of survival in these anti-poor “world-class” cities (Simone, 2002: 28).

I have discussed the history of city-based “squatters” and the presence of ‘other cities’ to make two points that are germane to a contextual understanding of Abahlalism. Firstly, the location of Kennedy Road Informal Settlement - in the liminal zone between the city and black townships – qualifies it as
an ‘other-city’. Mbembe and Nuttall’s description of ‘the underground’ supports my assertion that, slightly stretched, the definition of ‘other-city’ could apply to this settlement of these ‘invisibilised’ wretched of the earth: “the world below (the underworld) is…made up lower classes, the trash heap of the world above, and subterranean utopias” (Mbembe and Nuttall, 2008: 21-22). My second point is that ‘other-city’ people, similar to Nakasa’s fellow “Fringe World” dwellers (chapter three), are exile-fugitives in my typology.

Seen against this background, it would seem that Abahlali embrace the idea of ‘homelessness-as-home’. As I mentioned earlier, the concept of ‘homelessness-as-home’ is JanMohamed’s concept to describe exiled people who live on the boundary of the nation-state. These self-conscious pariahs (Arendt’s term) do not hanker after recognition, acceptance, and integration. In chapter two above, I drew a homology between JanMohamed’s concept of ‘homelessness-as-home’ and that of ‘fugitivity’ as framed by Moten. Moten deploys this concept to refer to blackness’s refusal of hegemonic belonging and homing. Rather, ‘blackness’ is, Moten argues (2008: 756) a, “sharing of life in homelessness” because it refuses that which has been refused. Similarly, city-based shack-dwellers and other ‘underground’ people appear to refuse that which has been refused; namely, assimilation into hegemonic society. Although not to the same extent as dwellers of the inner-city ‘underground world,’ it would seem that city-based shack settlements evince a similar sense of ephemeral and spectral presence. This is how Ross (2010: 54) describes one such settlement: “Although perfectly visible from the road, the settlement had a curious air of seeming somehow slightly secretive and impermeable to non-residents. To those driving past, the settlement whipped by in a blur of zinc, plastic and cardboard, an occasional glimpse of a person, an impression of dirt and squalor”.

Following Moten’s description of blackness, I would like to suggest that city-based ‘shackness,’ is also a fugitivity that cannot be captured by the frame of (neo)colonialist discourse: “What’s at stake is fugitive movement in and out of the frame, bar, or whatever externally imposed social logic,” writes Moten (2008: 179), “this fugitive movement is stolen life…”. In this understanding, city-based shack-dwellers are similar to marooned slaves who dis-locate themselves to be more at home with each other as part of constitution and belonging processes of “becoming otherwise” (Motha, 2010: 287). The ensuing “social life otherwise” (da Silva, 2013: n.p.) forged by shack-dwellers ensures that these fugitives escape relegation into colonialist discourse-prescribed “zone of non-beings”. Rather, they transcend the Manichean neo-colonial world to locate themselves in a transversal “zone of unattainability” (Moten, 2008: 179); a “zone of indistinction” (Farred, 2004: 604). In this zone, we find what Richard Pithouse (2006: 45), in reference to Abahlali’s settlement, calls “the home of exile”. It is in this sense that I refer to bahlali as fugitive-exiles.

The mere mention of exile, however, recalls Mphahlele and Said’s insistence that exile-living is not to
be romantised. Such a romanticism can be found in Pithouse’s narrative of *Abahlalism*. Similar to Said, JanMohamed and Rushdie’s reflections in chapter two above, Pithouse (2006: 24) invokes Alain Badiou’s assertion that political courage, and thus counter-hegemonic discourse, arise from “exile without return”. Pithouse invokes this idea to propose that *Abahlali*’s disruptive politics is potentiated by the movement’s decision to embrace exile. On the other hand, Said, Achebe, Mphahlele together with several exiled poets highlighted the fact that the romantic idea of the exile figure leading an independent life free of any moorings and exploitation does not apply to an overwhelming majority of physically exiled people. The reality is that an overwhelming majority of exiles and displaced people from the Global South as well as internally-displaced people within the South find themselves disjunctively included in and exploited by host societies. In this regard, Ross’s reference to Janice Perlman’s *The Myth of Marginality* is a very important intervention. Following Perlman, Ross shows that shack-dwellers are not marginal, let alone autonomous, of the dominant society and political economy. Rather, “…residents of shanty settlements enabled those economies, providing a source of cheap, surplus, endlessly exploitable and renewable labour” (Ross, 2010: 207-208). Peri-urban “squatter-life” and/as ‘other-city’ life is thus a precarious form of life imbricated in circuits of exploitation and discardability. It is, therefore, unequivocally not the ideal of “otherwise living” typified by the Brazilian *quilombos* of yesteryears (da Silva, 2013: n.p.). Rather, as Mike Davis puts it in *Planet of Slums* (2006: 184), shack-dwellers are “radically homeless” vis-à-vis the mainstream society and economy in relation to which they exist in a “semi-feudal” manner. At the same time, increased competition for low-skill labour diminishes bonds of togetherness and social capital and many shack dwellers are pushed into a situation of “marginality within marginality” (Davis, 2006: 201).

The first reason I am putting forward for my contention that *Abahlali* does not, and indeed cannot, embrace the idea of liminality inherent in ‘homelessness-as-home’ is that *bahlali* are not marginal and outside of society. Instead, *bahlali* find themselves on the exploited underside of the hegemonic house. “The underworld” can never be home; it is never homely. This is to say that underside habituation could never constitute a reclamation of belongingness-in-the-world. Zikode explains the reasons for this:

Most of us are not working and have to spend all day struggling for small money. AIDS is worse in the shack settlements than anywhere else. Without proper houses, water, electricity, refuse removal and toilets all kinds of diseases breed. The causes are clearly visible and every Dick, Tom and Harry can understand. Our bodies itch every day because of the insects. If it is raining everything is wet – blankets and floors. If it is hot the mosquitoes and flies are always there. There is no holiday in the shacks. When the evening comes – it is always a challenge. The night is supposed to be for relaxing and getting rest. But it doesn’t happen like that in the *jondolos* [shack settlements]. People stay awake worrying about their lives. You must see how big the rats are that will run across the small babies in the night…But poverty is not just suffering. It threatens us with death every day (Zikode, 2006: 186).
The second reason why a valorisation of shackness-as-liminal living is unsustainable is that fugitive-exile positionality and subjectivity are made possible by tactics of stealth and circumvention - “little tactics of survival” (Bremmer, 2002: 170). In the long run, however, these tactics become unsustainable, exhausting, bewildering, and thus re-enforcing of a sense of being worldless. In her ethnographic study of a city-based shack settlement situated in the city of Cape Town, Ross (2010: 124) found that residents experience a deep and pervasive sense of being cut adrift from the world. This is because continuous tactical living thwarts shack-dwellers ability to create or to adhere to “strategic action in the world” (ibid.). Additionally, crime and squalor, grinding poverty, and the ever-present fear of eviction result in a condition of “existential insecurity” (Manganyi, 1973: 13). All these factors make it difficult for shack-dwellers to live strategically even if they wished to (Ross, 2010: 124).

I am, therefore, suggesting, that fugitive-exile living can only be transitory if it is lead to an elaboration of a praxis that leads to the abolishment of the Manichean city and its worlds of apartness. Simone articulates this view in the following manner:

The investment in a politics of invisibility – i.e.; of trying to navigate a difficult and often oppressive urban world with stealth, inversion and guile – may enable daily survival, but it does not get around the need to create new cities even if the old ones are being dismantled. And so the visibility of collective action remains critical (Simone, 2002: 31).

It is for these two reasons (the myth of ‘homelessness-as-home’ and the fact that spectral and tactical existence is unsustainable) that I contend that politics of invisibility and liminality must eventually be replaced by politics of visibility and homemaking. This is because rather than avowing ‘homelessness-as-home,’ and the existential insecurity that comes with it, disjunctively included people long for heimlich (the homely), for a home, and to be part of a humane city and society. The post-abyssal line challenge then is not to isolate oneself in the ‘community’ one has been forced into nor to seek acceptance and integration into mainstream society. The long-term challenge is to de-constitute the polity and constitute a humane city and world. Humanity’s ability to rise up to this challenge depends on whether the visions, epistemologies, and praxes of those who suffer from structural invisibility and systemic exploitation become universalised. It is on this note that Davis (2006: 202) concludes his important book: “the future of the world and human solidarity depends on the urban poor resisting terminal marginality”. Similarly, Fanon, and later Lefebvre, believed that spatial justice and new urban humanism could only emerge out of the praxes of victims of spatial injustice and denial of belongingness (Gibson, 2011: 24). In the case of neo-Apartheid South Africa, for purposes of the thesis I defend here, I am proposing that Abahlalism is a vision of constitution and belonging that could contribute to the remaking of the city and eventually to Mayibuye iAfrica (the re-membering and (re)constitution of Africa).
5.3 Abahlali’s Constitution Vision: ‘A Fair World where Everyone Matters’

In the rest of the chapter, I aim to show that Abahlali’s self-described “home-made politics” (Abahlalism) is a revolutionary politics that seek to remake the world on the material, social, and spiritual levels. As I did with Biko’s and Mphahlele’s philo-praxes of constitution and belonging, I will investigate the manner in which Abahlali engage with and transcend the Du Boisian manifesto. To recap, this manifesto is comprised of three pillars: (i) potentiation of double consciousness to attain self-conscious personhood, (ii) forging of group consciousness and eventually national consciousness, and (iii) organised activity to remake the world and end ‘global apartheid’. Before I apply each of these pillars in turn, I will first show that Abahlali refuses nativist politics of irredentism in favour of humane and creolising politics of ‘resurrecting the land’.

5.3.1 Non-nativist ‘resurrection’ of the land

I have thus far shown that Abahlali’s archival memory is comprised of the ‘otherwise-living’ history of city-based “squatters”. This explains why Abahlali’s vision of constitution and belonging is predicated on a refusal of permanent exile and ‘homelessness-as-home’. Furthermore, Abahlali’s politics of mourning contra politics impelled by melancholia also refuses assimilationist visions of constitution and belonging. Abahlali has set itself the mission of engaging in visible and robust collective action processes to end ‘UnFreedom’. This is because, for this social movement, “freedom means that South Africa belongs to all who live in” (Abahlali, 2014: n.p.). The fact that bahlali are engaged in sustained collective action is further proof that this movement is not interested in spectral or ephemeral appearances. This is to say that bahlali want to assert themselves as political actors. They would like to engage in political action in the sense that Arendt described political action as action which takes place in the intersubjective public world when free persons in their plurality, through word and deed, create a ‘space of appearance’ (Arendt, 1998, 198-199; Arendt, 1973: 110). In contrast to dwellers of ‘the underground,’ bahlali wish to co-create the ‘space of appearance’.

More specifically, Abahlali’s self-identity, philosophy, action repertoire, self-narrative, and identity are indexical of the fact that this movement of historically “mummified” persons (Fanon, 1970: 93-94) sees its mission as that of refuting what I have referred to as the on-going process of de-worlding of black impoverished people. In Part I, I outlined four main consequences of colonialist attempts to expel colonised groups from the world of humans; namely, namelessness, unhomeliness, rootlessness, and homelessness. Abahlali’s dedicated attention to these consequences is seen, respectively, in the fact that:

- this movement of historically anonymous and discardable people have attached a name to themselves and that this name is based on appropriating an identity (being shack-dwellers) that
is historically associated with shame, illegality, and pariahdom;
• it has set up a day-care centre, food gardens, community safety forum, a choir, religious groups, and football teams;
• it has forged loyal and durable trans-local and transnational alliances; and
• it vigorously resists threats of evictions and displacements and it mobilises for land and housing.

Following from the above outline, we can deduce that Abahlali is engaged in a struggle to reclaim belongingness-in-the-world on all three realms that I have been concerned with. Therefore, even though this movement’s constituency is made up mostly of shack-dwellers and thus of necessity most of the movement’s demands are focused on claims related to landlessness, homelessness, and deprivation of basic services this movement’s striving for freedom and co-existence transcends material claims. The movement made this clear in 2006 on the occasion of its first commemoration of UnFreedom Day:

Freedom is a way of living not a list of demands to be met. Delivering houses will do away with the lack of houses but it won’t make us free on its own. Freedom is a way of living where everyone is important and where everyone’s experience and intelligence counts...We have often said that we are not free because even many of the people who say they are for the struggles of the poor refuse to accept that we can think for ourselves (Abahlali, 2006: n.p.).

In Part I of this dissertation I have shown that the colonialist act of denying the colonised the power of rationality was one of the conditions of possibility for depriving them of humanity and denying them worldly belonging. In this chapter, I have shown how this neo-colonialist discourse continues in the era of “post-Apartheid”. The above extract makes it clear that this movement seeks to challenge neo-colonialist discourse’s claim that impoverished black people are not endowed with the capacity to think and, in Arendtian terms, that they are not co-makers of the post-1994 world. By connecting systemic denial of material goods to a philosophy and a discourse that de-humanises and de-worlds, bahlali are suggesting that they experience the post-1994 dispensation as another form of ‘death of land’.

Therefore, the first key to understanding Abahlali’s vision of constitution and belonging is to understand that this movement regards its struggle as a continuation of the struggle against ‘right of conquest’ and the ‘death of the land’. I would like to advance two reasons as proof that the themes of ‘resurrection’ and redemptive returns are also present in Abahlali’s discourse and narrative. Firstly, leaders of Abahlali often speak of bahlali and other impoverished people as their Moses - in popular South African lexicon, as ‘their Mandela’. One member of Abahlali conveyed the idea as follows: “The first Nelson Mandela was Jesus Christ. The second was Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela. The third Nelson Mandela are the poor people of the world” (cited in Byrant, n.d.:n.p.). Secondly, Abahlali is one of a handful, if not the only active, urban-based movement that has made the demand for land an explicit demand. For
Abahlali, this demand is not simply economic. This demand is linked to a memory of offence relating to historical land dispossession. This is to say that the movement draws a connection between the current impoverished state of its members and the on-going consequences of the so-called ‘right of conquest’. M’du Hlongwa, a member of Abahlali, expressed this connection in an article he titled “I am the Professor of My Suffering”:

The land of our ancestors was taken for the farms and the forests. Our grandparents and parents worked on those farms and in the mines and factories and houses. Now we are either trying to make a living selling to other poor people or we are the servants who come quietly into the nice places with our heads always down to keep them nice and to keep them working for the rich (Hlongwa, 2007: n.p.).

Zikode expresses the same idea as follows:

But we are not poor because we are less than the rich. **We are poor because we were made poor**...If your ancestors had the land you will go to university and get a nice job and look after your family well. If your ancestors lost the land you will be lucky to find a dangerous job that you hate so that your family can just survive…. The system we suffer under now keeps the land in the hands of the descendants of those who had stolen it through the barrel of colonial guns (Zikode, 2008: n.p. Original emphasis)

I am, therefore, making the argument that this movement’s strategy of occupying land in urban areas is a strategy that is aimed at defying ‘the right of conquest,’ the Natives Land Act of 1913 and other laws and policies that deprived Africans of their land. However, and this is an important distinction, unlike the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania and anti-colonial movements of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, in Abahlali’s version of Mayibuye iAfrika land redistribution is not confined to the land bahlali’s direct ancestors have lost. Rather, the movement demands land in the cities and all over South Africa. Abahlali’s land politics are, therefore, similar to that of Sofazonke and other movements of “squatters” that imagined the Promised Land to be in urban areas. The point that I am making is that Abahlali’s politics of constitution and belonging eschew the politics of autochthony. This eschewal is motivated by the understanding that politics of autochthony fly too closely to the colonial constitution-making scheme. Under the latter scheme, the territory that became South Africa was violently balkanised and specified “native” “tribes” where assigned specific areas. Therefore, a land redistribution scheme based on ancestral claims could lead to a new form of balkanisation and apartness.

Abahlali’s eschew this scheme with this humanist proclamation: “land, cities, wealth and power are [to be] shared fairly” (Abahlali, 2014: n.p.). In other words, Abahlali’s does not base its notion of land and economic redistribution on autochthony and nativism. Instead, this movement’s vision of (re)constituting the material world is based on a strong rejection of ‘tribalism’ and racialism. To be sure, people who originate from the rural parts of KwaZulu-Natal (mostly AmaZulu), those coming from the former Transkei (mostly Xhosa people) and those who ascribe other ethnic identities to themselves co-exist and co-constitute the leadership of Abahlali. The membership and leadership of
this movement also include people of Indian ancestry. Lastly, *Abahlali*’s vision includes a Pan-African element in that *Abahlali* has made it clear that undocumented non-nationals ought to be regularised and afforded the right to a home. Thus in response to the 2008 Afrophobic pogroms, *Abahlali* defended non-nationals from attacks and issued a widely disseminated anti-xenophobia statement. In part, the statement read: “An action can be illegal. A person cannot be illegal. A person is a person where ever they may find themselves. *If you live in a settlement you are from that settlement* and you are a neighbour and a comrade in that settlement” (2008: n.p. My emphasis).

*Abahlali*’s vision of a ‘resurrected Africa’ is, therefore, based on a vision of cities as multi-class, multi-racial, multi-cultural, inter-cultural and perhaps plurinational spaces where multiple forms of belonging and ways of living are embraced and celebrated.\(^{39}\) I now finally turn to an exploration of the *Abahlalism* in relation to the Du Boisian manifesto of constitution and belonging.

5.3.2 ‘Our struggle is our school’: *Abahlalism* as potentiated double consciousness

I have suggested that the first pillar of the Du Boisian manifesto is that of disalienation. The imperative here is for an oppressed person to cease seeing himself or herself through the lens of the oppressor. This transformation enables the oppressed person to overcome double consciousness and work towards deconstructing the world. Attainment of further western education emerged as a key factor in the spiritual striving and psychic reconstruction of Du Bois and New Africans. According to Du Bois, this attainment enables the oppressed person to potentiate the gifts of ‘second sight’. Such a potentiation enables the behind-the-veil person to realise that he or she is not ontologically a problematic being.

I have sought to highlight two pitfalls with regard to this first pillar. The first pitfall is that an individualised psychic reconstruction and spiritual odyssey *might* end up being an internal process with no material and structural consequences. I demonstrated this pitfall with an account of Du Bois and his fellow Talented Tenth’s empyrean and elitist approach to civil rights. Relatedly, these well-educated elites exhibited a distrust of already-existing black civic organisations and churches. Furthermore, we saw that the route of further education might actually deepen spiritual unhomeliness and psychic dismemberment. Fanon and Cabral thus urged the coming-into-self-consciousness transcultural elite to engage in acts of critical returns to and dialectical conscientisation with the damned people.

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\(^{39}\) It is important to note that *Abahlali*’s anti-nativist politics of constitution and belonging is a direct confrontation with colonialist and Apartheid discourse. A resident of Kennedy Road explained this confrontation in the following terms: “Apartheid told us we are Zulus or Xhosas...I grew up in the Eastern Cape, I speak isiZulu; my wife grew up in KwaZulu-Natal, she speaks isiXhosa...our children and us, we are South African, we are Black people, we are all living in this ghetto” (cited in Chance, 2010: 5).
Abahlali’s point of departure is that black political leaders are “black boers”[black colonialists] in the sense that they have internalised their historical oppressors’ mode of thinking and governance (B. Mdlatlo, 2012: n.p.). Bahlali, therefore, regard most ‘uplifted’ people as alienated and alienating. Consequently, the process of disalienation and self-conscious personhood begins, for Abahlali, when impoverished people realise that the solution to their problems will not come from these ‘Talented Tenths’. Rather, impoverished people have to become ‘professors of their own suffering’ and, “build a spirit of political and economical consciousness through constant discussion and reflection on our situation...” (Zikode, 2011a: n.p.). Abahlali’s hope is that such collective and bottom-up learning and consciousness-raising processes will enable impoverished persons to overcome double consciousness and forge both a cognitive awareness and, “a spirit that recognises that we are poor because we were made poor and that we must work hard to unite the poor in order to resist this poverty imposed on us” (ibid.). “Abahlalism” (ibid.) is the name bahlali have given to this process, spirit, and way of life.

Abahlalism is, therefore, a consciousness and philo-praxis and consciousness that bahlali employ in order to cease apprehending themselves through the imposed lenses of racism and classism. A mindset based on Abahlalism enables bahlali and other damned people of the earth to reject the neo-Apartheid discourse that “the poor” are an “undifferentiated, unwilling carries of social diseases,” as Franco Barchiesi summarises the neo-Apartheid discourse on poverty (cited in Gibson, 2011: 150). Seen through the lens of Abahlalism, the post-1994 political and social dispensation is the problem that needs radical reconstruction. Abahlalism enables impoverished black people to resist neo-colonialist discourse, and to rather, “recognise our own humanity” (Zikode, 2010: n.p.). In this way, bahlali can begin deconstructing the myth of “post-Apartheid” and put this dispensation of UnFreedom on trial.

By launching a frontal attack on neo-Apartheid discourse, Abahlalism also enters into confrontation with neo-Apartheid constitutionalism and the laws it sanctions. An example of this confrontation can be seen in the following extract from Abahlali’s opposition to the KwaZulu Natal Elimination and Prevention of Re-Emergence of Slums Bill of 2006. This Bill reiterated the underlying motivation of the Slums Clearance Act of 1934 which suggested that black people and their dwellings are an unhygienic nuisance that must be cleared away. Abahlali’s response to the 2006 reincarnation of this colonialist legislation was as follows:

The Bill uses the word 'slum' in a way that makes it sound like the places where poor people live are a problem that must be cleared away because there is something wrong with poor people. But it does not admit that the poor have been made poor by the same history of theft and exploitation that made the rich to be rich and it does not admit that places where poor people live often lack infrastructure and toilets because of the failure of landlords or the government to provide these things. The solution to the fact that we often don’t have toilets in our communities is to provide toilets where we live and not to destroy our
communities and move us out of the city. In this Bill the word ‘slum’ is used to make it sound like the poor and the places where they live are the problem rather than the rich and the way in which they have made the poor to be poor and to be kept poor by a lack of development (Abahlali, 2007a: n.p.).

Abahlali’s campaign to resist this Bill (2006-2010) is the movement’s most-prominent campaign to date. This campaign is a good example of Abahlalism in action. In this campaign, we come across a group of people who have overcome double consciousness in that they refuse to see their situation from the perspective of state and non-state elites. Rather, the movement considered this Bill as an attempt to, “mount a legal attack on the poor” and drive impoverished people, “out of our cities as if we were rubbish” (ibid.). As soon as the movement become aware of this Bill, it took part in every forum available to voice their opposition against the Bill and to demonstrate that bahlali are “…not passive recipients of government services or promises but active critics of non participatory models of governance” (Abahlali, 2007b: n.p.). The movement launched a constitutional challenge at the Durban High Court when this Bill became law. In 2010, the Constitutional Court agreed with Abahlali’s submission that the Act is unconstitutional. This campaign is also an example of how this movement of marginalised people resisted city officials’ “world-class city” objectives.

Critics charge, however, that Abahlali’s decision to rely on legal tactics and discourse has resulted in the lowering of the movement’s goals, its deradicalisation, and a displacement of the movement’s counter-hegemonic/socialist vision. One critic writes that,

from around 2007 there was a definite turn to law, which seemed to juridify Abahlali’s public pronouncements. Their branding was reformulated to emphasise their being law-abiding, long-suffering protectors of the constitution. Their mission to achieve “dignity” and “voice” came to be calibrated in terms of due process rights the state owed them. The content of their demands and their methods of achieving them were cast within the boundaries of the law. Becoming primarily a national, rights-bearing subject also affected their organisational form. In Durban, it hardened, narrowed and professionalised (Böhmke, 2010: 19 ft.17).

This critique echoes the following critique made by another “radical” activist in 2006: “Initially involved in militant, direct action, Abahlali has now become bureaucratised, lacks a clear programme and is chiefly pursuing legal remedies for municipal delivery” (Setshedi, 2006: n.p.). These criticisms repeat well-known leftist arguments against social movement’s mobilisation of legal tactics and strategies. The critique here is that the law is ideologically biased towards the preservation of the status quo; that the law’s constitutive power can function to reify on-going domination, transmute radical desires, lower expectations, and induce passivity; that legal tactics are detrimental to movement-building because they deflect resources and attention from protest action and other forms of collective grassroots organising; and that, in any case courts are institutionally incapable of ushering in fundamental transformation (see Madlingozi, 2014: 93-95). To put this critique in the terms of this
dissertation, we can understand Heinrich Böhmke and Virginia Setshedi to be alleging that bahlali’s recourse to neo-Apartheid laws has enveloped them in a state of false consciousness and has thus deepened bahlali’s self-deception and self-alienation.

However, this critique ignores the fact that Abahlali’s resort to legal tactics took place after extra-institutional ‘radical’ collective tactics proved ineffective, arduous, and life threatening. In this context, the movement explained that, “we are going to court because we know that in court we will not be beaten, arrested, denied the right to speak or ignored” (Abahlali, 2008: n.p.). Furthermore, Abahlali continuously stresses that it engages in courtroom battles as a last resort because it is careful not to get demobilised and disempowered. Thus in “Poor People’s Movement and the Law,” (2011a: n.p.) Zikode emphasised that Abahlalism provides a lens through which to ‘make a choice out of no choice’ and engage in a cost-benefit analysis about using the law tactically - never as a strategy. To be sure, Abahlali is aware of the risk of being co-opted into hegemonic ideology via legal strategies. Abahlali has thus clarified that, “we are not a human rights organisation” (Zikode interviewed by Kate Tissington and Jackie Dugard, Durban, 25 April 2012). Rather, the movement has used the lens of Abahlalism to summon legal procedures and discourses tactically. The movement has thus won each and every single unlawful eviction lawsuit against the state. The movement is able to build on these defensive, and often temporary, victories to bolster their counter-hegemonic praxis of constitution and belonging. Anna Salmeczi (2011: 60) thus assesses that Abahlali’s tactical deployment of law is an instance of, “litigious disruption of the governing of global cities”.

To recap, the movement deploys Abahlalism to enable bahlali to know “who” and “what” they are. This living philosophy also empowers bahlali to let it be known that bahlali are not problematic beings that need to be solved. Seen from the perspective of the first pillar of the Du Boisian manifesto, we can understand Abahlalism as a potentiated ‘second sight.’ Abahlalism facilitates an overcoming of double consciousness while sidestepping the pitfall that come with an individualistic disalienation exercise. This is because this potentiated double consciousness emerges out of the struggles of the most marginalised of actors. Hence, rather than the route of formal education, “our struggle is our school,” asserts Mzwakhe Mdlalose (2012: n.p.).

40 The following remarks by Bandile Mdlalose (2012: n.p.), Abahlali’s former general secretary, indicates that bahlali have not being duped by neo-Apartheid constitutionalism: “South Africa has the most beautiful Constitution amongst all countries. Its beauty is well documented and respected. But we are living in a Democratic Prison…It is clear that we do not have the rights and freedoms that are written in the Constitution in reality. Let’s not fool ourselves and say we are in a Democratic Country while we are in a Democratic Prison”.

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5.3.3 Towards a creolising national consciousness

*Abahlali* thus ground its inclusive and humane constitution vision in collective action/struggle and in collective processes of disalienation. This is the main lesson that the movement has learnt from the ‘school of struggle’: “The main teaching that we have developed amongst our struggles by and for the poor is that we all count the same in our society” (Zokode, 2011a: n.p.). Following from this, Zikode (2011: viii) asserts that *Abahlali*’s ‘daily political practice’ seeks to continue the struggles of Biko and Fanon because both these activist-philosophers believed, “in individual freedom and collective liberation”. Such a view of total liberation is only possible in a situation where every member of society is treated as a thinking human being – where ‘everyone’s experience and intelligence counts’ as *Abahlali* put it above. From the foregoing, we can deduce that *Abahlali*’s idea of a national consciousness is based on what Jane Gordon, in the previous chapter, referred to as Rousseau’s’ notion of ‘general will’ as opposed to the ‘will of some’.

The danger with such a majoritarian understanding of ‘general will’ is, however, that the post-colonial nation-becoming would base its national consciousness on the populist, and perhaps sometimes demagogic, sentiments of the majority. The pitfall here is that ‘general will’ could mean a desire that, “the last shall be the first and the first last,” as Fanon (1963: 37) suggested in his most apocalyptic moment. The paradox here is that colonialist discourse would then still structure the nation’s putatively post-colonial national consciousness. Such a national consciousness does not instantiate the posterity of the colonialist world because the epistemological–ontological praxis of apartness would still condition it. The problem here is two–fold. First, the anti–humanness economy of racial classification and hierarchical existences is seemingly inverted but remains current. It is in other words a nativist vision. Second, instead of being bifocal in the sense of being both backward–looking and forward–looking such a national consciousness is entombed in an attitude that David Scott, in chapter three above, decries as an attitude of “anti–colonial longing”. Such emancipation then does not become a resumption of the self–determining history of the historically conquered and an enactment of liberation as a forward march. Fortunately, as Ato Sekyi–Otu brilliantly demonstrates in *Fanon’s Dialectic of Experience* (1996: 103-104), Fanon himself counseled against this kind of emancipation. Writing of “The Pitfalls of National Consciousness” Fanon (1963: 119-164) showed that the ‘last shall be the first’ is the reaction that immediately presents itself in reaction to settler colonialism’s Manichaeism. Fanon then goes on to show that this reaction is the nationalist bourgeoisie’s reaction which will simply leads to disaster moving from racialism, to xenophobia, to ethnic chauvinism, social injustice, and ultimately to full-blown neo-colonialism. In the closing passages of *The Wretched of the Earth*, Fanon (1963: 255) thus pleaded with the wretched of the earth to elaborate ‘a new humanism’.
Although Fanon directed his rebuke at neo-colonial elites’ constitution-making vision, we can formulate the same critique against majoritarian ‘general will’. I am, therefore, suggesting that it is not enough for the ‘general will’ to emerge from the visions and praxis of the damned. The ‘general will’ must also have humanistic content. I have already shown that Mphahlele’s and Biko’s visions also encompass Afrikan humanness as their means and ends. In this sub-section I aim to show that Abahlalism is also motored by a humanist vision. Firstly, in previous sections we discovered that this movement believes that the “new South Africa” is an anti-humanness polity because it is a polity based on political and social unfreedom; on the notion that the citizen is a homo economicus; on nativism; xenophobia; and the idea that the lives of impoverished black people are un grievable. Following from this analysis, secondly, Abahlali (2008: n.p.) explains that, “our struggle and every real struggle is to put the human being at the centre of society, starting with the worst off”. It is on this basis that Abahlali basis its struggle on the living philosophy of Afrikan humanness. Zikode (2011: vii-viii) explains that this philosophy is based on an acceptance that, “a person can only be a complete person in relation to others and that all others are human and must therefore count...”. Therefore, Abahlali’s proposal is that Afrikan humanness ought to suffuse the second pillar of the Du Boisian manifesto (forging group consciousness as a precursor to crafting a creolising national consciousness).

Yet, our discussion of Biko’s and Mphahlele’s homecoming and homemaking voyages taught us that before the oppressed group can articulate the ethical-ontological philosophy of humanness for the nation-becoming, it must first reclaim and recognise its humanity for itself first. This means that the oppressed must delink from the hegemonic world and its epistemological and normative assumptions, define itself, set humanness as the basis of its values and normative claims, and then struggle to impose its humanity on the rest of society. Speaking in the midst of the Total Strategy against ‘people’s power’ activists, Mphahlele expressed this route as follows: “I must reserve my humanism for my own kind and conserve the energy and strengthen my own first and see if we can stand on our own dignity and pride” (Interview with Manganyi, 2010: 483). Similarly, Biko and BCM philosophers understood that the route towards ‘bestowing the gift of true humanism’ to the future nation was via the steps I have articulated above. More specifically, Black Consciousness teaches that the oppressed must first come to a consciousness that they are ‘on their own;’ and from that place of metaphysical aloneness articulate a transitory identity of otherness. Such a positionality and subjectivity of alterity is a condition of possibility for hitherto non-existing inter-subjective relations.

Similarly, Zikode explains that the shack-dwellers of Kennedy Road did not know that they were building a movement when they decided to block the road in that 2005 constitutive protest: “all we knew was that we had decided to make the break. To accept that we were on our own...that the new politics had to be led by poor people and to be for poor people (Interview with Pithouse, 2009: 35-36. My emphasis). Shack-dwellers followed this realisation (of being on their own) with a ritual in which
they symbolically buried the local councilor. This burial was a declaration of autonomy vis-à-vis the local government and a declaration of intent to delink from hegemonic political discourse and values. After several meetings and rallies various shack-settlements came together and decided to form a social movement. The name they choose was as self-explanatory as it was defiant: ‘those who resides in shack settlements’. As I mentioned in the first section above, this name selection (together with self-identification as “the poor”) was an appropriation of a name and identity that was and is still associated with shame and pariahdom. This was the beginnings of a group consciousness known as Abahlalism.

In this regard, Nigel Gibson (2011: 14-15) asserts that an analogy can be drawn between “shackness” and Black Consciousness ‘blackness’. In both cases, an oppressed group decides to engage in an epistemological and political break and from that position of self-estrangement engage in politics of radical alterity (ibid.). Understood in this way, ‘shackness’ is an “epistemology of exile” (Pithouse, 2006: 46). Similar to Mphahlele’s spiritual odyssey and subsequent deconstruction of Africanity and the BCM’s rupture with liberalism and ensuing deconstruction of Black identity, it was in this place of exile that Abahlali was able to begin the process of potentiating their condition of double consciousness. One of the leaders of Abahlali explains thus: “the first thing the movement did after it was formed was to define itself before someone else could define us” (M. Mdlalose, 2012: n.p.). In this way, the first and second pillars of the Du Boisian manifesto came together.

How does Abahlali escape the pitfall associated with processes of forging of group consciousness? I have shown that the pitfall of Pan-Africanist and négritudist elaboration of this pillar is a salvationist, elite-driven fashioning of group consciousness and identity. I have argued that a critical return to ‘the source’ could help prevent this pitfall. Mphahlele sought to stage such a return by first immersing himself in the orature of non-modern people and by contributing to the collective fashioning of future national consciousness through literature and education programs. The BCM adopted two strategies to stage a ‘return’ and avoid this pitfall; namely, Freire’s dialectical conscientisation methodology and Black Community Programmes. I intend to demonstrate that Abahlali grounds its cultivation of group consciousness on similar initiatives.

The first thing to mention is that Abahlali has attempted to come up with an extensive practice of internal democracy to avoid salvationism. According to Abahlali, settlements affiliated with the organisation hold weekly meetings and leaders of the various settlements (branches) meet at least once a week. At meetings, the chair is rotated and open robust discussions take place. Although Zikode holds the title of president he does not regard his role as that of educating bahlali. In fact, he explicitly refuses this role. “I want to make it clear that we have built a democratic politics and that our settlements are far too well organised to be controlled or thought by one man like Zikode,” asserts Zikode (2008: n.p.),
“Zikode does not educate the people who elected him to speak with them and then for them”. Zikode clarifies that Abahlalism, or more accurately Abahlaliness, is instead based on popular education to ensure, “a continual discussion of Abahlalism” (Zikode, 2011a: n.p.; 2011b: vii). This is what the movement means when it asserts that the ‘struggle is school’. This is also the reason why at the first authorised protest march of 2005 shack-dwellers from various settlements painted banners declaring that the settlements are universities. From these spontaneous and defiant articulations, the movement subsequently created the University of Abahlali. Together with the other activities of the organisation, this University ensures further collective potentiation of double consciousness, participatory democracy, and prevents a top-down elaboration of group consciousness. Mdlalose explains this bottom-up process of forging Abahlalism as follows:

We believe that our struggle is our school. This is why we have created the University of Abahlali baseMjondolo. This is our own political school where we learn from one another. We learn from our meetings, at our all night camps that we hold on every quarter year. We learn from the streets during protests and we learn from the court rooms. But most importantly we have learnt from the old and young women and men. Our meetings are the center of our movement. This is where we discuss and think together (Madlalose, 2012: n.p.).

Abahlali have called this democratic and anti-elitist process of forging group consciousness a process of “living learning” (see generally, Figlan et al. 2009). Abahlali explains that ‘living learning’ draws on Freire’s ‘pedagogy of the oppressed’ (Figlan et al. 2009: 34, 62). For Abahlali, ‘living learning’ serves both internal and external functions. Internally, ‘living learning’ means that the idea of leaders as philosopher-kings who come up with pre-packaged analyses and theories is rejected. Externally, the movement deploys Freire’s ideas to reject hegemonic society’s interpellation of impoverished black people as people who cannot think and to whom education should be delivered. Hence speaking about the tendency of academics and NGO officials to descend on settlements to ‘workshop’ and ‘capacitate’ shack-dwellers, a member of Abablali expressed the following Freireian thought:

They assume we are empty enough and stupid enough for others to learn what they decide, and that they will come and think for those of us who are poor and cannot think. But now we are having our own living learning – and so there is a confrontation brewing about who’s teaching who (Figlan et al., 2009: 19. Original emphasis).

We can, therefore, see that this university contributes to both the first and second pillars by ensuring that shack-settlements are homely spaces of thought, mutual learning, political subjectivisation, belonging and constitution-making/homemaking. It is in this sense that we can understand Zikode’s (2010: n.p.) assertion that this university is a “home-based” university. Applying this to my two-fold thesis we can argue that ‘living learning’ ensures that ‘the source’ is always dynamic, critical, and ready to challenge neo-colonialist discourse and other hegemonic reasoning that seek to reinstall a world of
apartness. Furthermore, ‘living learning’ seeks to overcome pariahdom and worldlessness because it is, of necessity, based on multiple pedagogies, epistemologies, and cultures. This is because ‘living learning’ does not reject the ‘traditional’ university and knowledge systems associated with hegemonic actors. Rather, the point of ‘living learning’ is to try and achieve a truly universal world. ‘Living learning’ seeks to do this by working towards the unification of various sites of knowledge production and theory-making. A member of Abahlali puts this point as follows: “People compare the two universities – the university of emijondolo [shack dwellings] and eplasini [villages] & the academic University of KwaZulu-Natal…Perhaps we can talk of achieving ‘the Universal University’” (Figlan et al. 2009: 8-9). A ‘Universal University’ can only lead to a creolising national consciousness.

We thus arrive at an understanding that the aim of ‘living learning’ is to contribute to national consciousness because it takes seriously the epistemologies, knowledges, values, and norms emerging out of locale hegemonic reasoning usually cast as non-existing and thus having nothing to contribute to national consciousness. It is for this reason that Abahlali’s ‘living learning’ constitute and is constituted by what the movement refer to as ‘living politics’. ‘Living politics’ is both a tool for disalienation and a home for exiles and pariahs. Thus the movement explains that another name for Abahlalism’s ‘living politics’ is ‘home-made’ politics. Zikode explains the movement’s homemaking and homely politics as follows:

Our politics is also not a politics of a few people who have learnt some fancy words and who expect everyone to follow them because they know these words. Our politics is a traditional home politics which is understood very well by all the old mamas and gogos [grandmothers] because it affects their lives and gives them a home. In this home everybody is important, everybody can speak and we look after each other and think about our situation and plan our fight together …(Zikode, 2008: 115. My emphasis).

The above statement of ‘home-made’ politics is a comprehensive statement of Abahlali’s proposal as far as processes of forging national consciousness are concerned. The hope here is such processes would ensure that the nation-becoming would be inclusive and its consciousness humanist because all members of society will contribute to forging a ‘new humanism’. ‘Living politics’ is a living politics and life-affirming politics because it is dynamic and is not based on what Ramose calls ‘bounded reasoning’. This means that the image and form of the future nation is not predetermined. Rather, as Jean-Luc Nancy might propose, it is an inoperative community. This is because such politics and its telos arise from struggle, contestations, and being-togetherness.41 The only non-negotiable norm is that

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41 To be sure, shack-dwellers of Kennedy Road did not have a vision of what a future movement will look like or what a state of Freedom will look like on that day when they decided to no longer accept the post-1994 state of ‘unFreedom’ and to engage in protest action. Zikode explains: “The road blockade was the start. We didn’t know what would come next. After the blockade we discussed things and then we decided on a second step. That’s how
there must an agreement and a commitment to end conditions and power relations that have created a bifurcated society; and that everyone must be allowed to contribute to processes of nation-building.

5.3.4 Towards cosmopolitan (re)constitution of home and world(s)

The third and final pillar of the Du Boisian manifesto is the endeavor to de-constitute the current world and constitute a ‘world where everyone matters’ (Zikode, 2010: n.p.). The Du Boisian manifesto suggests that this unending striving becomes possible after pariahs of the world have, firstly, overcome double consciousness and reclaimed self-conscious personhood, and, secondly, when they have forged a group consciousness based on politics of alterity. In the case of Abahlali, we have seen that bahlali staged ‘a break’ with a discourse that insists that the problem of impoverishment is “the poor’s” fault and problem. Therefore, for Abahlali, the imperative to (re)constitute the world begins internally and in between bahlali. From this space, the movement has forged Abahlalism as a ‘collective action frame’ that provides tools for sense-making and construction of meanings in order to overcome self-alienation and self-deception and to activate and justify organised resistance.

Therefore, and as I have argued above, Abahlalism jettisons politics of ‘homelessness-as-home’ and ‘worldliness-without-world’. Rather, these historically homeless and unhomed people engage in sustained collective action to demand a home and a world. The movement has thus set itself the mission of contributing to the (re)constituting of the world into a space where everyone counts, where no one is produced as a pariah, and where diverse forms of being-togetherness are crafted. Zikode articulates this vision of constitution and belonging as follows:

We need to think about how we can create a new kind of communism, a new kind of togetherness. A living communism that recognises the equal humanity of every person wherever they were born, wherever their ancestors came from, whether they are poor or rich, women or men. This new togetherness must also understand that the world, what God has given to us all, must be shared by us all (Zikode, 2008a: n.p.).

As we can see, Abahlali’s vision of constitution and belonging aims to overcome domestic and global apartheid. Additionally, this vision is a vision that desires a world animated by a new spirit of togetherness (‘communism’/communalism). The struggles of the de-worlded to reclaim world belonging together with a new spirit of togetherness and thus Afrikan humanness will lead toward what I have called pluralistic co-existence. Against the colonialist discourse of de-worlding, this vision puts it went, that’s how it grew. We learnt as we went. It is still like that now. We discuss things until we have decided on the next step and then we take it. Personally I have learnt a lot” (Zikode interview with Pithouse, 2009: 36).
forward the ideal that every group of persons can take part in the creation of the world. This vision accords with Nancy’s (2007: 54-55, 112) insistence that, “to create the world means: immediately, without delay, reopening each possible struggle for a world…[I]t is the movement, the agitation of the general diversity of the worlds which make the world”. In other words, as Biko and Fanon also insisted, an alternative to the current framework of centres and peripheries, of surfaces and underworlds, cities and ‘other-cities’, and of zones of beings versus zones of non-beings would only emerge out of the struggles of those who are disjunctively included in the current world order. Thus, “poor people themselves can and must come up with a new living, an autonomous life, a completely independent stance where a new order would be about alternative ways of living…,” is how Zikode (interviewed by Pithouse, 2009: 42) articulates this vision. It follows that alternative forms of being-becoming and being-belonging are made possible when pariahs of the world unite in translocal and transnational struggles that embody alternative organisational forms, values and discourses, and legalities to those that underline neocolonial/neoliberal globalisation. Such struggles may lead to world (re)constitution in a way that ensures that no group of persons is de-worlded. Such an “insurgent cosmopolitanism” (Santos, 2008: 9) or “decolonial cosmopolitanism” (Mignolo, 2011: 270) depends on the damned of the earth making their humanist standpoint universal.

As far as the South African world is concerned, similar to the manner in which the BCM sought to ‘blacken’ the world as a precursor to world humanisation and creolisation, shack-dwellers must struggle to make Abahlalism hegemonic before they link up with others. At the heart of Abahlali’s approach to the second pillar (national consciousness) and the third pillar (the (re)making the world) is, therefore, the idea that everybody can think, and more specifically, that the national consciousness of the new society and world ought to be based on ‘shackness’. The univeralisation of this experience and consciousness is possible because, like blackness, ‘shackness’ is, firstly, a transitory anti-thesis; and secondly, it has no inherent class or racial content to it.

First, ‘shackness’ is transitory because as I have argued bahlali do not regard their condition of exile-living to be permanent. Rather, bahlali embrace the zone of exile of other-city (city-based shack-settlements) as a zone to potentiate double consciousness and from there to elaborate ‘shackness’. The positionality of being a self-conscious shack-dweller (Arendt’s ‘self-conscious pariah’) enables an elaboration of a vision of constitution and belonging from the perspective of those who are ‘worse off’. However, the central demand of the movement is, “Land, Housing and Dignity;” and thus an end to shack-living. Understood in this way, the central task of shack-dwellers and other damned people is one and one alone: to liquidate themselves. In Miguel Mellino’s (2011: 69) succinct formulation: “les damnés have no identity to claim, they struggle under no flag, they are moved only by a desire to abolish themselves (their own colonial subjectivity) and to do so they must suppress the society that has created them”. In the meant time, shack-dwellers demand that society see and understand post-1994 Unfree
South Africa from the standpoint of shack-dwellers. Secondly, therefore, similar to Black Consciousness, anyone, including people who do not stay in shacks, can adopt a consciousness of Abahlalism. It is possible for anyone to adopt a consciousness of shackness because, similar to Biko’s blackness, being umhlali (a shack dweller) is not a matter of class. Rather, it is matter of taking a decision to recognise the situation of UnFreedom and damnation and engaging in organised activity to end it. We would recall in this regard that in the previous chapter, Biko presented an ultimatum to white people and non-white people. He asked them to choose to remain in and perpetuate an inhumane world (white world) or to ‘accede and become part of the black man’ thereby creating a new humane world. Similarly, Mzwakhe Mdlalose (2012: n.p. My emphasis) explains that, bahlali “draw a clear line between those who are willing to struggle with the poor, to become part of us, to think with us” and those who choose to oppress and ‘invisibilise’ impoverished people.

The penultimate point I wish to discuss is Abahlali’s desire to contribute to the (re)making of the world in creolising way. This manner of (re)making the world avoids the pitfall I have associated with this last pillar of the Du Boisian manifesto. This is the pitfall of an integrationist vision under the guise of a ‘distinct but equal’ discourse. Four interrelated points are important here. First, my discussion of Abahlali’s approach to the first and second pillars is confirmation that bahlali do not support the ‘distinct but equal’ discourse. This is because bahlali consider themselves to be of equal worth to the rest of society and thus reject any suggestion that there is something ontologically distinct about impoverished people. Second, therefore, bahlali believe that impoverished people can think and can contribute to the (re)making of the world. Third, bahlali value principles of syncretism and interculturality. We can discern this from the fact that shack-settlements affiliated with Abahlali actively embrace people who self-identify with various ethnicities, ‘races’, nationalities, and even political parties. Fourth, we have also discovered that this movement deploys a wide variety of tactics, symbols and ideas in pursuance of their struggle. ‘Living learning’ and ‘living politics’ are, therefore, constituted by and constitute a creolising sensibility. Movement leaders often insist on this creolising outlook. In a speech before the Diakonia Council of Churches, Zikode expressed this view as follows:

what I am going to suggest right now is that, since we are coming from different backgrounds, from different spectra of life and we have grown up in different environments, and from different walks of life, we should put all of those experiences and skills together (Zikode, 2008a: n.p.).

Such a coming together (‘constitution’) enables the creolisation of national consciousness and the world. I am using creolising in the sense used by Jane Gordon. To repeat, Gordon explains that, “…in political terms, we could understand creolisation as the generalising of a shared, public will forged by individuals as they articulate what they seek in an through collectives that comprise a polity…” (J. Gordon, 2014: 4). By appropriating and defending space, democratising settlements, articulating a humane vision of being-belonging, and seeking to engage in translocal alliances with like-minded
organisations Abahlali is seeking to contribute to the building of a constituent power that will (re)make the city and the world. Such constituent power would only be creolising if, on the one hand, multiple collectives and communities build it; and if on the other hand, such communities are themselves comprised in such a way that they make multiple ways of being-in-the-world possible. Such a constituent power is, therefore, not an abstraction but it emerges from and is made possible by what Zikode calls “complete communities” (interviewed by Pithouse, 2009: 40). Complete because they are ‘living communities’ in the sense that they are able to sustain themselves, fashion edifying affective relations, and are based on inter-culturality and principles of syncretism. Zikode (ibid) describes “complete communities” as follows: “It does not mean a community is complete because everyone in it thinks the same or because one kind of division has been overcome. It means a complete community that is complete because no one is excluded – a community that is open to all. It means a very active and proactive community – a community that thinks and debates and demands”.

My final point relates to Mphahlele’s unavoidable ‘tyranny of place’. Creolising processes of reclaiming belongingness-in-the-world and of (re)constituting the world will only emerge from a particular space and place. In otherwise, Abahlali counsel that ‘disembodied universalism’ ought to be avoided. Zikode elaborates:

It is interesting that we send comrades to this WSF [World Social Forum] with a clear message that another world is necessary, necessary as a matter of urgency. We hear that everyone agrees that another world is possible. This is good but no one has ever asked when this will happen, when will we all take a collective step towards this change…we must start from where we are, with what we have, from our families, by teaching our children, and then to our schools, to our little neighbourhoods and communities before we say anything at the world level like the WSF. We must not fool ourselves and produce ideas that are not grounded in any soil (Zikode, interviewed by Pithouse, 2009: 41-42).

Conclusion

My main objective in with this closing chapter was to turn the spotlight onto the contemporary period and to decenter the perspectives of both sets of transcultural elites (ANC elites and counter-hegemonic elites). My analysis of the history of “squatter” movements shows that non-elite and autonomous movements have a long and consistent history of counter-hegemonic visions of constitution and belonging. I have shown that this vision starts from demands to de-constitute and (re)constitute the material world before elaborating theories and practices that touch on all three realms of belonging-in-the-world. Secondly, it became clear that these autonomous movements of historically ‘invisibilised’ people prefigure praxes of constitution and belonging that radically pose a challenge to the ‘right of conquest’ and, concomitantly, to the original sin in the constitution of South Africa. Finally, by building
a movement made up of people from various ethnic groups and claiming land in urban areas, these movements bequeathed to Abahlali the idea that the imperative of ‘resurrecting’ of the land ought to avoid nativist politics and ‘re-tribalisation’.

Turning to Abahlali, I showed this movement’s insurgent politics of mourning disavow the ANC’s melancholic politics of integration. The main impulse behind Abahlalism is the refusal of the current dispensation of ‘unFreedom’. The counter-discourse of ‘unFreedom’ seeks to challenge the hegemonic signifier that this is the time of ‘post-Apartheid’. By demanding the immediate redistribution of land, of the economy and of power relations in society, Abahlali evince a refusal of historicism and evolutionary constitutionalism. Rejecting disjunctive inclusion, this movement embraced exile. From that space of self-estrangement, these pariahs were able to overcome double consciousness and forge a unique group consciousness in the form of Abahlalism. I have also argued that Abahlali’s ‘shackness’ is a route towards a creolising national consciousness. I showed that Abahlali’s vision of the consciousness of the post-Apartheid nation is that such a consciousness ought to:

- emerge from struggles, be based on contestations, and thus a rejection of bounded reasoning;
- be vigilant of reiterating colonialist discourse;
- be geared towards individual freedom and collective liberation;
- inspire collective processes of non-nativist ‘resurrection’ of land; and
- sanction transnational decolonising struggles for the creation of the world, a world where everyone counts.
CONCLUSION

We do have to start.
Start what?
The only thing in the world worth starting:
The End of the world, for Heaven's sake
[Aimé Césaire, (1947)1995]

This dissertation moved from the premise that black people’s strivings for constitution and belonging continue in the ‘new’ South Africa. I advanced the thesis that these strivings are impelled by the fact that post-1994 constitutional re-arrangements did not meet the decolonisation exigency of remembering the world and (re)constituting a post-segregationist polity. In chapter 1, I defended this decolonisation exigency by showing that settler-constitution making ‘killed the land’. By this I meant that colonists endeavored to shatter the socio-cultural worlds of indigenous peoples and in their wake, impose their own world. The outcomes of this were being-belonging and being-becoming for colonists and pariahdom and worldlessness for the “natives”. Flowing from this I demonstrated that South Africa’s constitutive sin full belongingness for minority citizens and liminal inclusions of the majority of the population. A slippage in this scheme is the creation of transcultural “natives” who end up mobilising against their status of social invisibility and legal liminality. The first key insight of this dissertation was that the constitution and belonging visions of these transcultural elites were conditioned by frustrated promises of assimilation. Their emancipatory visions were thus shaped by condition of racial melancholia and thus an attitude of ambivalence towards the extant world. Following from Freud and Fanon I argued that these melancholic leaders were thus disinclined to de-constitute the white-dominated world and re-constitute a post-segregationist world in which everyone has a full sense of affective and material belonging.

This discussion took us to an exploration of dominant black traditions of emancipation and vision for re-making the world. Here I focused on the Pan-Africanist legacy of constitution and belonging as exemplified in the towering work and life of W.E.B. Du Bois. I distilled three pillars of the Du Boisian legacy; namely, the imperative to overcome double consciousness and achieve self-conscious personhood; the need to forge self-defined group consciousness as route towards national consciousness; and lastly, organised activity aimed achieving political emancipation and (re)constituting the world spiritually, socially and materially. In the process of unpacking the Du Boisian manifesto I showed that this manifesto has three main pitfalls: (i) a top-down salvationist praxis of constitution and belonging that therefore miscarries the continuous project of forging a national
consciousness; (ii) an essentialist apprehension of the culture(s) and identity of the subjugated that thus denies the lived reality of creolisation amongst the subjugated; and (iii) an unconscious perpetuation of the world of apartness. Ultimately, then, I argued that hegemonic black quests for constitution and belonging evinced ‘aggressive dependency’ upon colonialist discourse. This discourse emerged as a pivotal instrument for the de-worlding of “non-western” peoples. The pitfalls of the Du Boisian manifesto are caused by a failure to delink from this discourse. I thus concluded that this very influential manifesto led to elite nationalism, dearth of national consciousness and ultimately it perpetuated worldliness.

Turning to South Africa, it was my contention that the Du Boisian manifesto cast a long shadow over post-1994 constitutional re-arrangements. I showed a homology between Thabo Mbeki’s rebirth agenda and the three pillars of the Du Boisian manifesto. Mbeki proposed that the ‘final constitution’ of South Africa had to be undergirded by a Pan-Africanist agenda if it was to terminate the non-belongingness of historically colonised people. I also showed that Mbeki twin projects of constitution-making and African Renaissance were attempts to reimagine the Pan-Africanist ideology by moving it away from some of its fundamental assumptions. To be more specific, Mbeki sought to respond to the third criticisms I advanced against the Du Boisian manifesto by reconfiguring Africanness as capacious, hybrid and all-inclusive. Mbeki believed that in this way the more than three hundred years of black strivings South Africa could be brought to an exultant end. Mbeki did not succeed in this endeavour. This failure was mainly due to the fact that Mbeki was a ‘philosopher-king’ in the Du Boisian mould and his quest to deconstruct Africanity was based on an agenda of hybridisation as opposed to that of creolisation. Ultimately, Mbeki’s constitution praxis led to a re-manifestation of the world of apartness with the majority of black people still disjunctively included in the new constitutional polity. This is what impels perennial “social protests” currently bedevil South Africa.

I devoted Part II of the dissertation to excavating counter-hegemonic visions of constitution and belonging. I began with E’skia Mphahlele’s odyssey of exile, disalienation, homecoming and thus homemaking. Mphahlele provided three insights for my main thesis. First, that transcultural elites must first overcome ‘first exile’ (spiritual alienation and cosmic disharmony) by re-suturing with the non-modern majority if they wished to contribute to collective liberation and processes of world-(re)creation. Second, that the collective process of (re)constituting the spiritual world is a precondition for the thoroughgoing reconstruction of social and material worlds. Finally, that constitutionalists ought to place Afrikan humanness at the heart their post-colonial reconstruction agendas if wish to avoid neo-colonial outcomes.

Turning to the social realm I focused on Steve Biko and the Black Consciousness Movements praxis for (re)making the social world. Biko posited that the South African social world is framed by a ‘totality’
of white power structure that oppresses physically, psychically, politically, and culturally; that conditions and constrains black people’s responses to it; and, crucially, that divided the world into the dominant white world and the dominated black world. Biko and his Black Consciousness comrades rejected the oppressor’s world and conceived of a different world. This was a world where black people did not have to move around feeling that they have a defective humanity. According to Biko, good faith living (a life of responsibility and freedom) and radical displacement of colonialist discourse would enable post-apartheid subjectivisation even under conditions of Apartheid and vicious subjugation. If Apartheid and white people sought to push black people into a ‘zone of non-beings;’ the BCM urged black people to realise that there was no common political community between the two worlds. Biko urged black people to forge a black constituent power that would de-constitute South Africa and constitute Azania. In this regard, the BCM proposed Freireian dialectical conscientisation and Black Community Programmes to counter political apathy, an internalised sense of inferiority and to avoid the pitfalls of the Du Boisian manifesto.

Finally, I turned to the contemporary period and focused on the constitution vision and praxis of *Abahlali base Mjondolo*. This shack-dwellers movement begins with a focus on the material world but of necessity make prescriptions for the fundamental (re)construction of the South African polity and for reclamation of world belongingness. *Abahlalism* is thus a vision to (re)constitute the triadic world. The connection between this focus on the material world and Biko’s and Mphahlele’s constitution visions is as follows: From a Bikoen perspective, unless the ‘totality’ of the white power structure is dismantled, emancipation would be calibrated to democratisation and integration while the majority of black people remain impoverished “underdogs”. Biko predicted that white domination will transmute into white hegemony under the guise of “a capitalist black society”. From a Mphahlelian perspective, economic exploitation and material subjugation are symptoms of a society that has not remembered *Afrikan* humanness. Landlessness, homelessness, lack of gainful employment and precarious existence are, therefore, indexes of on-going ‘death of the land’ and spiritual dislocation. Indeed, Mphahlele’s and Biko’s perspectives find resonance in *Abahlali*’s organising campaign: “Land, Housing and Dignity”. Finally, *Abahlali*’s insistence that its members are philosophers of their struggle, its establishment of the University of *Abahlali* and the movement’s oft-repeated intention to assert “our place in the world as people that think…” (see for e.g., M. Mdlalose, 2012: n.p.) are indicative of this movement’s direct intention to confront and challenge (neo)colonialist discourse and praxis.

I used the chapter on *Abahlali* to apply the main themes of this dissertation; namely, ongoing black people’s strivings for constitution and belonging; my typology of options available to people produced as pariahs and non-elite application of the Du Boisian manifesto. I showed that *Abahlali*’s striving is against what they refer as “UnFreedom” – a constitution dispensation that freezes the black majority in an interregnum. *Abahlali* dealt with this reality by exiling themselves in order to potentiate double
consciousness and to forge Abahlalism. Ultimately, the case study of Abahlali demonstrates that the struggle against pariahdom and worldlessness can only be won by collective struggles waged by people who are still banished to the underside of the South African world.
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