The institutional design of monetary policy

Salsano, Francesco (2018) The institutional design of monetary policy. Doctoral thesis, Birkbeck, University of London.

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Abstract

The aim of this thesis is to provide a general framework for the analysis and interpretation of the determinants that help to define monetary stability goals. The main issue is that money supply, and therefore inflation are not exogenous; rather, they depend on interactions between monetary institutions and other economic agents (including governments, commercial banks, trade unions, etc.), as determined by the institutional rules and by the socioeconomic structure. This approach requires identifying factors that help to define the greater (or lesser) desirability of long‐term inflation control goals. In this regard, certain fundamental determinants characterizing the political, social, and economic context of decisions on monetary policy should be further analysed. Factors such as social sensitivity to the costs and benefits of inflation, the degree of political instability, the existence of asymmetrical information between the policymaker and the public influence the ability to be constrained by a rule or an institution. This work is therefore an attempt to carry out a theoretical and empirical analysis of the implications of these determinants for both the institutional design and the inflation rate. This is a very important issue, certain countries have often borrowed their institutional designs from others, but without achieving the same results in terms of control over inflation. More specifically, this thesis consists of four parts: 1. Monetary Policy in the presence of Imperfect Observability of the Objectives of Central Bankers. 2. On the Determinants of Central Bank Independence in open economies. 3. Political institutions and Central Bank Independence revisited. 4. Political Stabilization by an independent Central Bank.

Item Type: Thesis (Doctoral)
Copyright Holders: The copyright of this thesis rests with the author, who asserts his/her right to be known as such according to the Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988. No dealing with the thesis contrary to the copyright or moral rights of the author is permitted.
School/Department: School of Business, Economics & Informatics > Economics, Mathematics & Statistics
Depositing User: ORBIT Editor
Date Deposited: 03 Aug 2018 15:26
Last Modified: 03 Aug 2018 15:26
URI: http://bbktheses.da.ulcc.ac.uk/id/eprint/352

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