Becoming Oneself:
A Heideggerean Analysis of Complicity

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I hereby declare that the work contained in this thesis is entirely my own.

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Abstract

This work seeks to illuminate the issue of an agent’s complicity in their own unfreedom via appeal to the work of Martin Heidegger. A secondary aim is to demonstrate what use Heidegger’s philosophy can be put to for theorising matters, such as complicity, that resonate specifically with feminist concerns. Chapter One begins with a brief historical account of the concept of complicity as it is appealed to in a gendered context. It then moves on to examine the issue of complicity as it is implicitly articulated in contemporary literature on adaptive preferences, autonomy and self-deception, identifying what insights into the phenomenon can be drawn from such approaches. Chapter Two offers an overview of the way in which complicity manifests itself in a Heideggerean context in the phenomena of falling and fleeing. This chapter also acts as an introduction to the way in which Heidegger’s ontology incorporates the insights into complicity drawn from the contemporary literature. Chapters Three, Four and Five take a more detailed look at complicity in a Heideggerean context via appeal to the notion of disclosedness. Breaking disclosedness down into its constituent elements, Chapter Three examines the way mood accounts for the insight of the self-deception theorist that complicity involves a form of concealment. Chapter Four turns to Heidegger’s conception of understanding and the insight from autonomy that complicity must be analysed as a way of Being. Chapter Five examines discourse and the insight from adaptive preference that any analysis of an agent’s complicity in their own unfreedom must take into account the agent’s social setting. Chapter Six explores the way in which the three insights already considered can be unified in Heidegger’s understanding of authenticity qua coming to understand oneself as Dasein. Here some of the broader implications for analysing complicity via a Heideggerean ontology are also examined.
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Texts in Translation

Throughout I have referred to the following English translations of Heidegger’s work. At times I refer to the original German texts, but I do not give systematic references to them. The in-text references to *Being and Time* are to the 1962 Macquarrie and Robinson translation unless otherwise stated. For the most part I have endeavoured to stay close to this translation, as it is the standard and most well-known translation of *Sein und Zeit*. Where I have deviated from it, most notably in Chapter Three in my translation of ‘*Befindlichkeit*’ as ‘attunement’, this has been signalled in a footnote.


Introduction

The introduction to a recent volume of essays, *Feminist Interpretations of Martin Heidegger*, opens with the lines: ‘[o]ne might wonder how Heidegger could be useful to feminist theory, given that he was not primarily a political thinker. Nor was he explicitly concerned with social ontology, contemporary issues of sexual identity, moral epistemology, or social ethics.’¹ Similarly, complicity – the way in which agents and, in particular women, perpetuate or contribute to their own unfree way of Being² – is an uncomfortable notion, one we may be reticent to attribute to other agents, let alone ourselves.³ In order undertake an analysis of the phenomenon of complicity, in a gendered context and from a Heideggerean perspective – as this thesis aims to do – one must begin by confronting these obstacles. Even amongst his more sympathetic commentators one still has to go to great lengths to explain why a feminist appropriation of Heidegger is not only useful but also feasible. Likewise, any such discussion of complicity must explain not only why this concept has been historically relevant for women,⁴ but more importantly why it continues to be relevant today.⁵ This task is made harder by the fact that an explicit, unified and systematic account of complicity is currently lacking in the philosophical literature.

The aim of this thesis is to go some way towards rectifying this omission by establishing that we can read Heidegger’s *magnum opus, Being and Time*, as dealing with the question of an agent’s complicity in their own unfreedom, and, in so doing, be furnished with a novel approach that has consequences both for how we conceive of complicity and how we analyse it. A secondary aim is to show how reading Heidegger in this way demonstrates the usefulness of his philosophy to feminist theory. My purpose is not to insist that Heidegger presents complicity in one’s own unfreedom as a particular problem for women and thus that one can identify some specifically feminist strand in his work. Rather, my aim is to establish that Heidegger presents complicity in one’s own unfreedom as a universal human problem, so that, when his account is viewed through a gendered lens, it

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¹ Hunnting 2001: 1.
² In capitalising ‘Being’ I am following Macquarrie and Robinson’s convention in their 1962 translation of *Being and Time*. The capitalisation of Being signifies that it is used in Heidegger’s ontological sense of the term, rather than leaving it uncapitalised (‘being’) which signals the ontical sense. For the distinction between the ontic and the ontological sense of being see section one of Chapter Two.
³ To call women complicit in their unfreedom or oppression may appear to imply that it is somehow *their fault* that they are unfree, rather than the result of structural factors or other agents with more power or a higher status. This is a reason why people might be uncomfortable employing this notion.
⁴ It is appealed to in two of the most important works in the history of feminist philosophy: Mary Wollstonecraft’s *A Vindication of the Rights of Woman* and Simone de Beauvoir’s *The Second Sex*.
⁵ We shall attend to this briefly in the following section and in more detail in Chapter One.
can usefully contribute to feminist discussions on this topic, and thus lay the groundwork for rethinking Heidegger in a more positive light as a potential resource for feminist scholars.

1. Preliminary Remarks on Complicity and Unfreedom

Although complicity is a complex and often elusive notion, one can find it implicitly articulated in contemporary feminist literature under the headings of adaptive preference, deformed desires and internalized oppression, as well as in the philosophical literature more generally in discussions of self-deception and voluntary servitude. Two of the most substantial recent works of feminist philosophy related to the topic of complicity come from Clare Chambers and Serene Khader. In her 2008 book *Sex, Culture, Justice: The Limits of Choice*, Chambers utilises insights from so called ‘continental theorists’, such as Foucault, in order to critique the liberal focus on choice. She argues that some of the choices women make – even if they appear to be free in a liberal sense – are still problematic and thus should not be embraced or accepted unquestioningly. Similarly, in her 2011 book *Adaptive Preferences and Women’s Empowerment*, Khader develops a theory of adaptive preference to examine the delicate balance between respecting cultural diversity and maintaining a commitment to women’s rights in the context of global justice. Both thinkers are concerned with women’s adherence to harmful cultural practices and attempt to offer an account of how this phenomenon can be explained and how it can be combatted. Both writers thus implicitly articulate the problem of complicity in their analyses and, along with thinkers such as Mary Wollstonecraft and Simone de Beauvoir, imply that complicity is a particular problem for women.

Turning to the philosophical literature more generally, we can identify a concern with the question of complicity in analyses of adaptive preference, as well as in accounts of autonomy and self-deception. The infamous case of the voluntary slave, so often appealed to by autonomy theorists, describes a paradigm case of complicity, examining the way in which an individual may isolate themselves from their own agency. The subservient housewife, diagnosed as self-deceived about her subordinate way of life and her contentment with it, can also be understood to be complicit in her own unfreedom, and as an example of a

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6 This feminist aim is articulated primarily through the use of gendered examples as well as through a closer analysis of complicity as a particular problem for women in Chapter Six.
7 Khader 2011.
8 Superson 2005.
9 Charles 2010.
10 See for example Rosen 1996.
11 Chambers focuses specifically on breast enhancements, drawing a parallel between this and female genital mutilation, both of which she argues should be banned on the grounds that they harm women, regardless of whether women choose to undergo such procedures. Chambers 2008: 159 -203.
12 Khader 2011.
15 We shall see this in more detail in the following chapter.
voluntary slave. Accordingly, whilst at first blush complicity may appear to be a problematic, rare and perhaps even insidious notion, it can also be seen to inform much contemporary philosophical and feminist thought.

The concept of ‘unfreedom’, as opposed to oppression, may appear similarly unfamiliar. Although a more well-known phrase than ‘complicity in one’s own unfreedom’ is ‘complicity in one’s own oppression’, the latter puts the emphasis in the wrong place and obscures much of what an analysis of complicity in one’s own unfreedom seeks to explore. The notion of oppression implies some kind of (external) interference, a wrong or unjust relation between two parties, the oppressor and the oppressed. For example, Sally Halanger argues that ‘the most familiar notion of oppression is one that implies an agent or agents misusing their power to harm another.’ Complicity in one’s own oppression, then, covers cases where the oppressed agent in some way helps to uphold this unjust relation and thus perpetuates their own oppressive situation or state of affairs. Complicity in one’s own unfreedom, however, suggests a broader phenomenon; one that can be explored in and through an agent’s way of Being as a whole, rather than simply in terms of specific relationships between agents.

Although the phenomenon of complicity in one’s own oppression may capture some of what is meant by complicity in one’s own unfreedom – for example the kind of ‘active complicity’ described by Simone de Beauvoir and further analysed by Sonia Kruks17 – there are also cases of complicity in one’s own unfreedom that do not conform to this structure. Cases where no external oppressor is evident, or at least where ‘external interference’ does not seem to capture the phenomenon in full. In cases of voluntary servitude, where an agent surrenders their own freedom, the unfreedom does not appear to be rooted in the coercive force of another, but in the agent’s own choice to subordinate themselves. This is not to say that the phenomenon of complicity in one’s own unfreedom cannot include cases where there is an external oppressor. Nor does it mean that in analysing a person’s complicity in their own unfreedom we shall not attend to the external relations in which the unfree agents find themselves. Indeed, an analysis of the relational aspects of an agent – how they interact with and understand their world and others – will be key to understanding how an agent can be complicit in their own unfreedom. Rather, the use of ‘unfreedom’ as opposed to ‘oppression’ signals that our discussion will not be limited to, nor primarily focus on these cases, and that the unfree agent themselves will largely be the focus of the investigation.

16 Hasslanger 2004: 98.
2. Why (not) Heidegger: Heidegger and Feminist Philosophy

Having now laid out the parameters of my project in a preliminary way, the next question which presents itself is ‘why Heidegger?’ This question has a dual aspect. Firstly, why appropriate Heidegger for what is ostensibly a feminist project? Secondly, why choose Heidegger as a means by which to analyse complicity? Let us treat each of these questions in turn.

Unlike many other canonical philosophers, Heidegger’s work has been largely passed over by feminist scholars. Whereas there are many articles, books and papers dedicated to critiques of Hegel’s views on women, or to discussions of the implications of Kant’s ideas for feminism, comparable feminist literature on Heidegger is much harder to find. One might argue that this is because, in one way or another, philosophers such as Hegel and Kant actually address questions of gender and sexuality. However, as Jacques Derrida observes in his essay *Geschlect*, which philosopher doesn’t?\(^\text{18}\) It is therefore remarkable, as Derrida argues, that a philosopher such as Heidegger – writing when he did and having the concerns he had\(^\text{19}\) – apparently *did not* address these questions. This silence, Derrida concludes, is itself worthy of investigation.\(^\text{20}\) Equally worthy of note is the relative silence of feminist scholars on Heidegger’s work. It does not seem that one can straightforwardly argue that his concerns are irrelevant to feminist philosophy, since Heidegger’s work touches on freedom, the complexity of the social world, technology, nature, and art, all themes on which much feminist ink has been spilt. Why, then, have feminists been so reluctant to approach a figure who is arguably one of the most important philosophers of the twentieth century?

One answer can be found in Sandra Lee Bartky’s 1970 paper ‘Originative Thinking’, in which she asserts that Heidegger’s thought is ‘far too vacuous and abstract to serve the needs of any radical world-renewing project.’\(^\text{21}\) As Patricia Huntington notes, this proclamation ‘seemed to hammer the final nail in the coffin of any potential consideration of Heidegger as a resource for the newly emerging body of feminist theory’.\(^\text{22}\) The *final* nail because the mere authority of Bartky’s voice within the feminist community cannot adequately explain the lack of attention it has paid to Heidegger. A more significant factor here are his texts themselves. Dense, complex and employing a distinctive vocabulary, these works can, at first blush, appear impenetrable and even incomprehensible to the untrained or unwilling reader.\(^\text{23}\)


\(^{19}\) Most notably the character of the human being as *Dasein*.


\(^{21}\) Bartky 1970: 369.

\(^{22}\) Huntington 2001: 4.

\(^{23}\) A fact which has often seen his work excluded not only from feminist circles, but from the philosophical domain more generally. Here I have in mind Rudolph Carnap’s infamous dismissal of Heidegger’s work. Carnap 1932.
Taken together, Heidegger’s lack of attention to issues of gender and sexuality, his initially obscure and ambiguous writing style, the regular denouncements of his work from within and outside of feminist philosophy, and his much discussed affiliation with the Nazi party, have until recently rendered him and his work largely a ‘no go’ area for feminist scholars. Nevertheless, despite this general state of affairs, there does exist a small body of feminist scholarship about him. As noted above, Heidegger addresses many issues that resonate with feminist theory. He influenced many of the philosophers whom feminists seem far more willing to embrace, and was a direct point of reference for some of the feminist philosophers and political theorists of his time. However, much of the feminist literature on Heidegger is concerned with his later philosophy, particularly with the themes of language, nature and art. By contrast, the explorations of his early work usually take the form of articles, short chapters in collected volumes, or sections of comparative projects, rather than more sustained investigations. Perhaps predictably, given Heidegger’s lack of attention to the body, gender and sexual difference, much of the feminist engagement with his philosophy critiques his work. However, there is another strand of Heideggerian scholarship that looks not to condemn Heidegger from some contemporary feminist viewpoint, but to explore what a Heideggerian perspective can contribute to feminist theory. Within this domain, one finds works which analyse Heidegger’s influence on key feminist scholars, most notably Simone de Beauvoir and Hannah Arendt; but also works that present Heidegger’s philosophy as a resource for feminists. Within this last category, one finds defences of the feminist potential of concepts such as Dasein, das Man, authenticity and Being-with, and it is in this more constructive Heideggerian context that I situate my own project. Although I shall not explicitly return to the question of Heidegger and feminist scholarship until the final chapter of this work, and then only briefly, one of the motivations

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24 As Mahon O’Brien has convincingly argued, Heidegger’s involvement with the Nazi party and its relation to his own philosophy is complex and multi stranded issue. Accordingly, it cannot be dealt with quickly or easily. So whilst I am mindful of the issue when exploring the feminist possibilities of Heidegger’s thought, because of the modest aims of my project and the limited space available to me, Heidegger’s own politics is not something I will explicitly address. For more on the complex relation of Nazism to Heidegger’s philosophy see O’Brien 2010.

25 I have in mind particularly Derrida and the theory of deconstruction, which is utilised so enthusiastically in feminist theory.

26 Most notably Simone de Beauvoir and Hannah Arendt.

27 For example, Jean Graybeal in her Language and “the Feminine” in Nietzsche and Heidegger (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990) and Carol Bigwood’s Earth Muse: Feminism, Nature and Art (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1993) both offer extended discussions of these topics.

28 See, for example, the first four chapters of Feminist Interpretations of Martin Heidegger, 2001, Gothlin 2003, Bauer 2006, Guenther 2008 and Freeman 2011. Of this list, Freeman’s is perhaps the best example of a work which tries to appropriate Heidegger’s philosophy for feminist ends.

29 Derrida 1983.

30 For example, Freeman 2011 and Holland 2001.

31 For example, Leland 2001.

32 For example, Lisa Guenther 2008 and Bauer 2006.
for my project is to demonstrate in what way Heidegger’s philosophy can be useful to feminist theory, and thus to further the emerging body of work in this field.

2.1 Why Heidegger on Complicity

Assuming that Heidegger can, and has been, productively approached from a feminist angle, one might still ask why Heidegger is useful for dealing with the issue of complicity. One might think, for example, that Foucault would be a more obvious choice, as his work offers a detailed account of how our sense of ourselves is constructed by social practices and how such construction can be disciplining. Although Foucault could certainly be useful for developing an account of complicity, he does not offer the breadth of resources for theorising and overcoming it that we find in Heidegger’s early work. Unlike Foucault, Heidegger offers us an account, not only of how agents can be understood to be complicit in their own unfreedom, but how they can find the resources within themselves to overcome the inhibiting social structures which both create and limit their subjecthood. Moreover, Heidegger not only offers an analysis of phenomena pertaining to complicity – such as the social construction of identity – but also provides us with an almost explicit account of complicity itself in the notions of falling and fleeing.

Taking another tack, one might think that it would be better to analyse complicity through the lens of autonomy, since cases such as the voluntary slave capture our intuitions about what it is for an agent to be complicit in their own unfreedom. However, approaching complicity in this way defines the concept before it has been analysed, and in so doing limits the scope of the analysis. Approached through the lens of autonomy, complicity is understood as a form of non-autonomy. On the assumption that autonomy is the default state for most agents most of the time, this implies that complicity is only an occasional condition. However, a Heideggerean analysis of complicity allows us to put this assumption into question. Complicity, as it is manifested in the phenomena of falling and fleeing, is understood as a key element of Dasein’s existence, so much so that Heidegger claims falling ‘constitutes all Dasein’s days in their everydayness’. Accordingly, whereas an approach via autonomy only enables us to conceive complicity as a temporary lapse, a Heideggerean lens enables us to theorise complicity more widely as a way of Being. Furthermore, the autonomy theorist implies that something has gone wrong when we have fallen away from our natural autonomous state, thus painting sustained periods of complicity qua non-autonomy as a

33 We shall see the way in which a Heideggerean analysis of complicity accounts for this in Chapter Six.
34 This will be analysed in Chapter Two.
35 In the following chapter it will be argued that an approach via autonomy does highlight an important aspect of the way in which we should undertake our analysis of complicity, despite the problems discussed with such an approach here.
kind of pathology. A Heideggerean analysis, however, suggests that complicity qua falling and fleeing is neither an occasional nor a pathological condition, but rather is a far more widespread, everyday phenomenon, a state in which many of us exist most of the time.

To take a Heideggerean approach is not to suggest that complicity is an unproblematic phenomenon, or one that we should not endeavour to combat. But the less hostile approach to complicity that we find in Heidegger allows us to theorise complicity in a more exploratory and measured way, rather than assuming it is something totally alien to most of us. Moreover, Heidegger’s ontology offers us a way to theorise the ‘pathological take on complicity’ as itself a form of complicity, a method of distancing ourselves from this phenomenon and, in so doing, concealing the way in which we ourselves may be complicit. The virtues of a Heideggerean approach to complicity are that it offers us a way to theorise complicity, not just in terms of specific acts or an occasional way of Being, but instead furnishes us with the resources to develop an account of a complicit life. In so doing, we are able to articulate a richer account of what it is to be complicit and what it is to overcome complicity. A richer account than can be advanced by utilising approaches already on offer or by turning to theorists who do not deal with the phenomenon so directly.

Nevertheless, in order to fully appreciate Heidegger’s usefulness for theorising complicity, we shall have to get a firmer grasp on the way in which this concept has been rendered and how it is currently approached in the literature. This is the task of Chapter One where, after briefly tracing the notion of complicity in a feminist context, we shall attend to the way in which it is implicitly dealt with in contemporary literature on adaptive preferences, autonomy and self-deception. We shall examine how each of these theories highlights a key aspect of how to conceive of or approach complicity, whilst obscuring or ignoring others. From this analysis, three key insights into theorising complicity will be identified; insights that will then be utilised as ‘guiding principles’ in our Heideggerean account. Having gained a clearer grasp of what complicity might be and in what ways it can manifest itself, Chapter Two offers an overview of Heidegger’s analysis, examining how he can be understood to deal with the question of complicity in the concepts of falling and fleeing in *Being and Time*. Here we shall also see more clearly what we mean by ‘unfreedom’ and how Heidegger accounts for it. We shall examine how inauthenticity can be understood as an unfree mode of Being and in what ways it relates to the distinctive account of freedom that Heidegger develops in texts surrounding *Being and Time*. Chapters Three, Four and Five take up the Heideggerean analysis of complicity in more detail, exploring Dasein’s complicity as a distinctive way of Being via appeal to the tripartite notion of disclosedness. Disclosedness describes Dasein’s way of Being-in-the-world and is constituted by mood, understanding and discourse. Chapters Three through Five treat each of these elements in

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turn, examining how they can be seen to reflect key insights offered by the contemporary approaches to complicity considered in Chapter One. Chapter Three attends to mood and the way in which it mirrors the insight of the self-deception theorist that complicity involves a kind of concealment in our self-understanding. Chapter Four examines understanding in light of the insight drawn from the autonomy theorist that complicity must be analysed, not just in terms of particular acts, but as a way of Being. Chapter Five turns to discourse as an aspect of disclosedness, examining complicity via the adaptive preference theorist’s suggestion that in order to understand complicity we must attend to the social setting of the complicit agent. Having examined what it is for an agent to be complicit in their own inauthenticity and unfreedom with regard to the discrete insights drawn from the contemporary literature and the way in which these are rendered by Heidegger, Chapter Six examines how these insights can be unified. Developing a Heideggerean account of overcoming complicity with regard to the notion of becoming authentic and understanding oneself as Dasein, this final chapter examines how the insights from self-deception, autonomy and adaptive preference can be integrated into a wider whole. It concludes by addressing some of the broader implications for approaching complicity via a Heideggerean ontology.
Approaches to Complicity

It is in the work of Mary Wollstonecraft that one perhaps finds the first appeal to the notion of complicity in one’s own unfreedom in a gendered context. In *A Vindication of the Rights of Woman* Wollstonecraft argues that women are unfree because they are dependent on, and subject to arbitrary interference from, men. Here one can clearly identify an imbalance of power between two agents and thus a case of oppression. However, Wollstonecraft goes on to argue that this unequal relationship distorts women’s way of Being, meaning they ‘lose the rank which reason would assign them, and they become either abject slaves or capricious tyrants.’

Wollstonecraft’s position invokes a republican conception of freedom. This is significant for our analysis because the central question for republican theorists is not what it is to perform a free action or to live a free life, but rather what it takes to count as a free person. In this regard, to analyse an agent’s complicity in their own unfreedom will mean to theorise it in terms of a distinctive way of Being, something which Wollstonecraft gestures towards in the notion of women as ‘either abject slaves or capricious tyrants’.

Wollstonecraft makes it clear that women’s unfreedom is not something they simply have imposed upon them, but is instead something they embrace. Rather than resisting their subordinate position, women come to ‘despise the freedom which they have not sufficient virtue to struggle to attain.’ Women are therefore considered complicit in their own unfreedom insofar as it is the women themselves who ultimately come to resist and despise a freer way of life, rather than simply being kept in this subordinate position by men.

More than a hundred and fifty years later one finds a similar line of argument in the work of Simone de Beauvoir. In *The Second Sex* Beauvoir argues that a woman ‘chooses to desire her enslavement [son esclavage] so ardently that it will seem to her the expression of her liberty [liberté].’ Later Beauvoir goes on to claim that: ‘[i]t must be admitted that the males find in woman more complicity than the oppressor [l’opresseur] usually finds in the oppressed [l’opprimé].’ Taken together, these statements articulate what we shall come to see are some of the key themes of complicity—choice, freedom, our relations to others and our understanding of ourselves – whilst at the same time conveying the difficulties associated with developing an account of this phenomenon.

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39 Ibid: 121.
40 Both Bauer 2006 and Gothlin 2003 have recently commented on the Heideggerean aspects of Beauvoir’s work and drawn parallels between these two thinkers.
42 Ibid: 730.
In Beauvoir's first statement complicity is presented as a choice, albeit a choice that one makes in some state of either ignorance or self-deception. The choice only 'seems' to us to be an expression of our liberty. Here Beauvoir implicitly articulates the problem of the voluntary slave: how are we to understand a choice that ultimately deprives us of our freedom and our ability to choose? As in Wollstonecraft’s text, we see the contrast presented as one between liberty and slavery, rather than liberty and oppression. However, in her second statement Beauvoir shifts the discussion from complicity as an aspect of a lack of liberty, to complicity as an aspect of oppression, leaving open the relation she perceives to exist between these two phenomena. Rather than taking this to mean that women’s unfreedom is somehow reducible to a case of oppression, this claim is better understood in the context of the relational dimension of complicity. By introducing the notion of an oppressor, Beauvoir intimates that when exploring the phenomenon of complicity we will have to attend not only to the unfree agent’s own self-understanding, but also to how others view and interact with them. The main point in her analysis, therefore, remains the insight shared with Wollstonecraft, that female ‘enslavement’ is something women desire and, at least to an extent, help to bring about themselves.

1. Explanations of Complicity in Contemporary Philosophical Literature
Both Wollstonecraft and Beauvoir identify complicity in one’s own unfreedom as a distinctive phenomenon and one that is a particular problem for women, though neither thinker offers a fully systematic analysis of what complicity consists in and how and why it comes about. In more recent philosophical writing, however, one can begin to discern an answer to these questions. In contemporary literature one finds not so much a direct explanatory appeal to the notion of complicity, as an attention to some of the mechanisms by which it functions. Contemporary debates do not attempt to show that the phenomenon of complicity exists, as do Wollstonecraft and Beauvoir. Rather, they concentrate – if only implicitly – on suggesting different ways in which we can approach the problem. Such explanations of complicity can be found in discussions of adaptive preferences, autonomy and self-deception. We shall take each of these in turn and examine the extent to which they illuminate what complicity consists in and how it comes about, whilst also flagging up some potential problems with the projects of viewing complicity in each of these three lights.

43 Again reflecting a republican conception of freedom.
44 Rather, they seek to establish that it is the case that women are complicit in their own unfreedom and offer specific examples to support this analysis. For a detailed discussion of some particularly complicit female roles see Beauvoir [1949] 1953: part six.
45 Not all of these theorise complicity in a specifically gendered context, although analyses of adaptive preference tend to.
1.1 Adaptive Preferences

One mechanism which seeks to explain an agent’s complicity in their own unfreedom is adaptive preference, a phenomenon which Deepa Narayan characterises thus:

In cases of adaptive preference, individuals in deprived circumstances are forced to develop preferences that reflect their restricted options. A woman’s perception of herself and her world may be so skewed by her circumstances and cultural upbringing that she may say and believe that she genuinely prefers certain things that she would not prefer if she were aware of other possibilities.46

In the notion of adaptive preference we see concerns reflected from both Wollstonecraft and Beauvoir. Like Wollstonecraft, adaptive preference theorists draw attention to the fact that women develop desires that reflect their subordinate position. Wollstonecraft argues that women may come to despise the freedom they do not have the power to attain. Similarly, adaptive preference theorists look at the particular problematic preferences expressed by women in disadvantaged positions. In this way adaptive preference theorists also reflect some of Beauvoir’s concerns, drawing attention to the question of choice and the perplexing issue of people who choose things that seem to inhibit rather than enhance their freedom.

Adaptive preference theorists also explicitly highlight the social situation in which an agent finds themselves, analysing in what ways this might act as an enabling condition for the agent’s unfreedom.

At first blush, adaptive preferences appear to offer an attractive explanation of what complicity in one’s own unfreedom consists in and how it comes about. The approach suggests that the agent who is complicit in their own unfreedom has developed preferences that render them unfree because of the disadvantageous social setting in which they have found themselves. However, when one probes a little deeper, explanations that rely on theories of adaptive preference raise a number of questions. Firstly, how exactly should we characterise adaptive preferences? As Ann Levey notes, if by adaptive preferences we simply mean ‘any preference formed in response to past choices and available options’, then all of our preferences can be classed as adaptive.47 Not only does this mean that adaptive preferences may not always be problematic, but also that some may even be beneficial. For example, if I develop a preference for the only brand of bread stocked by my local corner shop, this is an adaptive preference because it is formed in response to the limited options available to me. But it is a preference that seems to bring with it certain benefits: namely that I do not have to go to the more widely stocked, but out-of-town supermarket in order to get bread that I like.

We have been generous above in characterising adaptive preferences as those preferences formed in response to the disadvantageous social setting of an agent. But adding this clarification means that we now have to define what exactly it would mean for a

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46 Narayan 2005: 34.
47 Levey 2005: 133.
social setting to be ‘disadvantageous’. In turn we must clarify who exactly it is disadvantageous for, and in what way. Whilst this is arguably a productive task in which to engage, it does not really seem to shed light on what it means for an agent to be complicit in their own unfreedom. It tells us more about the social setting than what is distinctive about the complicit agent themselves.

Theories of adaptive preference might not tell us much about what it is to be a complicit agent, but they do nevertheless offer an explanation of how and why agents may become complicit in their own unfreedom. Adaptive preference theorists point to an explanation from social construction in order to explain why an agent becomes complicit in their own unfreedom. They appeal to the social setting of the agent to explain why they are the way they are. This certainly seems to tap into some aspects of the notion of complicity in one’s own unfreedom as described by Wollstonecraft. For example, Wollstonecraft dismisses the claim that girls ‘naturally, that is from their birth, independent of education, [develop preferences] for dolls, dressing, and talking’, suggesting instead that these preferences are due to girls/women’s limited situations. Here Wollstonecraft articulates the familiar thought that the image of girls as weak, interested only in pretty things and idle conversation, are themselves social constructs. That is, they are preferences developed because of the disadvantaged situation and limited options with which girls and women find themselves presented. Accordingly, if the social situation were different, and women were not limited to the domestic sphere, they would develop preferences for more robust and mentally taxing activities that would open up more possibilities for them in life and afford them greater freedom.

If we base our analysis of complicity in one’s own unfreedom primarily on an argument from social construction, this implies that if the social setting was modified and the disadvantageous aspects removed, then the disadvantageous adaptive preferences would disappear and thus the agent would cease to be complicit in her own unfreedom. However, as Ann Levey notes this is not always the case. Levey argues that adaptive preferences have often come to form such a central part of a person’s identity – they are, for example, rooted in their conception of the good, or their most strongly held values – that even if the negative external conditions were removed these people might still continue to make the choices and express the preferences that have been diagnosed as adaptive. Moreover, if the cause of adaptive preferences is understood to be rooted solely in the social setting, it does not explain why, for example, some women in patriarchal societies develop preferences for subservient or traditionally feminine ways of life, and others do not. Thus whilst the adaptive

48 See for example, Barnes 2009 for an excellent discussion of how to diagnose adaptive preferences in relation to the social setting of the agent.
preference theorist usefully highlights the fact that we must attend to the social setting of the agent in order to understand their complicity, in addition to this we will also need to attend to the agent themselves in order to explain how and why some agents become complicit in their own unfreedom.

1.2 Autonomy
A greater focus on the agent can be found in approaches to complicity drawn from analyses of autonomy. Cases such as the voluntary slave, so often discussed by autonomy theorists, capture our intuitions about what it is for an agent to be complicit in their own unfreedom. In examples such as these, agents render themselves unfree. An agent’s unfreedom is therefore not explained in terms of external interference or rooted in the coercive force of another, but rather is explained in terms of the agent’s own choice to subordinate themselves. Proceeding via an analysis of autonomy will thus involve explaining why an agent comes to make such choices and thus why they become complicit in their own unfreedom.

Broadly speaking, autonomy theorists can be divided into two camps: those who endorse a substantive account of autonomy and those who offer a procedural analysis. Procedural accounts of autonomy are content neutral. That is, they do not discount certain ways of life from being able to be considered autonomous. Procedural autonomy theorists concentrate on how decisions are made rather than what decisions are made. Accordingly, procedural accounts determine the autonomy of an agent with regard to whether their choices and preferences exhibit the right level and appropriate form of critical reflection. By contrast, substantive accounts of autonomy suggest that certain choices, values or preferences are fundamentally incompatible with autonomy, and thus that not all ways of life can count as autonomous.

At first blush, the procedural approach seems to offer a useful explanation of how an agent becomes complicit in their own unfreedom: they have become complicit because they have failed to reflect fully on the choices they have made. However, returning to Beauvoir and Wollstonecraft, at least some of the women they describe do seem to have critically reflected on their situation and their choices and, as a result of this critical reflection, have decided that complicity is the best option for them.

In some cases of complicity we confront agents who appear to know they are unfree, but perceive some benefit in remaining so. This is the kind of complicity analysed by Beauvoir, and is what Sonia Kruks has termed ‘active complicity’. She offers a list, drawn

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51 There are of course lots of ways of being non-autonomous that will not count as instances of complicity. For example, we might argue that someone who does not have the use of their legs lacks autonomy, but we would not say that they are complicit in their own unfreedom.

52 We might also interpret lack of critical reflection in terms of the idea that the agent does not fully understand the choice she is making. We shall return to this idea in the next section.
from volume two of *The Second Sex*, of different ways in which women adopt such 'strategies of complicity':

From the woman who plays dumb and passive (who “makes herself prey”) to get a man; to the housewife who automatically adopts her husband’s political views or relies on him to navigate technology for her; to the narcissist who is in love with her own self-objectified image; to the mystic who tries to lose herself in mythical union with a great spiritual Other ... They try both to resolve the painful paradox of being a subject whom men posit as a thing and, simultaneously, to evade the ontological ambiguity of embodied subjectivity by positively identifying themselves with their objectification.\(^{53}\)

As Kruks presents it here, women who perceive some socioeconomic or metaphysical advantage in their subordinate position may embrace it, thus becoming complicit in their own unfreedom.

In addition to seeing some advantage, some people who appear to recognise they are unfree but do not resist this unfreedom, may also be motivated by a desire to hold on to the limited power they currently wield. This suggestion is defended by Wollstonecraft. She argues that in women who are ‘[t]aught from their infancy that beauty is a woman’s sceptre, the mind shapes itself to the body, and, roaming round its gilt cage, only seeks to adorn its prison.’\(^{54}\) Whereas men are valued and have power in a number of different spheres, women are valued only for their beauty or, as Wollstonecraft argues elsewhere, their caring abilities and domestic competencies. It is in these ‘feminine spheres’, then, that women can come to wield power. To transcend their subordinate position and become the equals of men would involve surrendering the power they currently hold. Therefore although they may be aware of their relative unfreedom, attempting to transcend it would be an unsettling, and in one sense, disempowering task.

Both perceived advantage and an appeal to feminine power thus provide reasons why women who are aware of their own unfree position may not seek to transcend it, and as a result can be considered complicit in their own unfreedom. These women have critically reflected and yet they remain complicit. This suggests that the complicit agent is not simply the agent who has failed to reflect critically on her choices, preferences and values. In these cases, then, it does not seem that procedural autonomy and lack of critical reflection really offer a way of characterising the agent who is complicit in their own unfreedom.\(^{55}\)

What of substantive accounts of autonomy? The formulation offered above suggests that an agent is complicit if they make choices incompatible with being autonomous. This does not shed much light on how best to understand the complicit agent. Indeed, we already know that the complicit agent expresses preferences, makes choices or holds values that are in some way inimical to their freedom. However, weaker forms of substantive autonomy do

\(^{53}\) Kruks 2012: 72


\(^{55}\) We might also worry that analysing complicity as a lack of critical reflection puts too much emphasis on being rational, failing to consider explanations for complicity outside of irrationality.
seem to offer more specific ways of conceiving of the agent who is complicit in their own unfreedom. For example, some weaker substantive accounts suggest that the non-autonomous agent does not just make choices incompatible with autonomy. Rather, they suggest that the non-autonomous agent is lacking in certain features.

Approaching the problem in this way shifts the focus of the discussion from what the complicit agent does and how they do it, to who the complicit agent is and what is distinctive about their way of Being. In other words, whilst it might be tempting to focus on the act of selling oneself into slavery, for example, it may be more productive to focus on the agent’s way of life more generally. This is the contention of the global autonomy theorist. Theories of global autonomy understand the autonomy or non-autonomy of an agent, not just in terms of the specific acts they perform, but instead argue that autonomy can only be understood with regard to an agent’s existence as a whole. For example, Marina Oshana suggests that autonomy should be understood ‘as a global condition of persons rather than a transient characteristic.’

Analysing non-autonomy, and thus complicity, in this way turns our attention away from whether the agent has performed or not performed a certain act, e.g. critical reflection, and gestures instead towards theorising complicity in terms of the make-up of the agent and what distinctive features they do or do not possess. Moreover, this approach reflects Wollstonecraft’s contention that we must theorise freedom and unfreedom in relation to the person as a whole, and not just in terms of their choices or their actions.

A feature commonly appealed to in analyses of non-autonomy that take this global approach, is a lack of ‘sufficient self-respect or self-worth’. For example, an abused spouse who stays with her partner because she believes she does not deserve any better, or blames herself for her partner’s violent behaviour, is explained, in Anita Superson’s words, by the fact that she does not ‘have[e] appropriate regard for herself as an intrinsically valuable human being.’ This is certainly a plausible analysis, but does an appeal to lack of self-regard offer a broad enough account of what it takes for an agent to be complicit in their own unfreedom? For example, we might think of a Western subservient housewife who understands herself to be a liberated woman. When she looks at women in Third World countries who occupy a role similar to hers, she identifies them as unfree. However, she does not make the connection between their situation and her own. The Western housewife, we

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56 These can be contrasted with local autonomy theorists who argue that autonomy should be attributed to certain acts, rather than to the person as a whole. My statements regarding the insights into complicity that can be drawn from autonomy, invoke theories of global autonomy, i.e. autonomy as it applies to the whole person, rather than just to the particular acts they perform.
58 Of course analysing complicity in terms of a way of Being does not preclude its analysis in terms of certain acts or choices. Rather, it stresses that we must cast our net wider than this and understand how these acts and choices fit with, and form a part, of an agent’s way of Being as a whole.
60 Superson 2005: 111.
could say, engages in a process of ‘othering’. As Chandra Talpade Mohanty argues, the Western woman produces the image of the Third World woman ‘as ‘ignorant, poor, uneducated, tradition-bound...etc’, in order to codify herself ‘as educated, as modern, as having control over [her] own bod[y] and sexuality[y] and the freedom to make [her] own decisions.’ In so doing the Western housewife not only fails to see the similarities between her situation and that of the Third World woman, but also prevents herself from seeing such similarities. The Western housewife can be considered complicit in her own unfreedom because she prevents herself from seeing her subservience for what it is. But her complicity does not seem to be rooted in a lack of self-worth. Rather, we might say that the Western housewife values herself too highly. She thinks her Western status raises her above Third World women and thus is blind to any parallels that might exist between them. In addition to possessing or lacking a certain feature – whether this be a lack of self-worth or an excess of pride – there appear to be other mechanisms in play that explain the subservient housewife’s complicity in her own unfreedom.

Nevertheless, the limitation of any particular substantivist account need not put into question the more general insight for theorising complicity that can be drawn from analyses of autonomy. Although we might worry that approaching complicity via autonomy does not shed much light on the mechanisms by which agents become complicit, instead presenting a normative description of the agents in question; or be concerned that in identifying the complicit agent with the non-autonomous agent we are in danger of painting the complicit agent as too passive in their complicity, thus jeopardising the responsibility – emphasised in the analyses of both Wollstonecraft and Beauvoir – that we want to attribute to agents for their complicity, this need not undermine the main point highlighted by the autonomy theorist that complicity is best approached as a way of Being. Thus, whilst we shall need to examine the specific social setting of the agent in order to understand their complicity (as the adaptive preference theorist suggests), as well as identifying certain mechanism by which complicity functions, the autonomy theorist still helps to illuminate the point that the best way to approach complicity is to cast our net wider than a focus on certain acts or isolated incidents will allow, instead incorporating this analysis into a theory of complicity as a way of Being.

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63 For example, many approaches outline conditions or criteria an agent must meet in order to be considered autonomous. Meyers 1987 and Christman 2004 both suggest that to be autonomous means to be ruled by one’s true or authentic inner self. In concentrating on the criteria for autonomy, such approaches often fail to explain why an agent becomes non-autonomous.
64 The analysis undertaken in the Introduction gives us further reason to suppose why an approach solely undertaken via autonomy will not be enough to fully analyse complicity, as it assumes complicity qua non-autonomy is a ‘temporary lapse’.
1.3 Self-Deception

To examine a mechanism by which complicity can be understood to function, we can turn to the self-deception theorist. An appeal to self-deception allows us to conceive of complicity as something we do to ourselves (intention condition), whilst also explaining how it is possible that agents maintain themselves in an unfree state (dual belief condition). The former preserves the self-responsibility for complicity emphasised by Wollstonecraft and Beauvoir, whilst the latter appeals to a notion of concealment in order to explain why agents do not seek to overturn their unfreedom or break out of their oppressive situation.

Proceeding via an analysis from self-deception will thus help to illuminate some of the more formal elements of complicity and the mechanisms by which this phenomenon can be thought to function. Taking the two conditions in reverse order, we shall see how complicity can be explained in terms of a notion of concealment or dual belief, before examining in what way it can be understood as an intentional phenomenon.

We began our discussion of complicity in one’s own unfreedom by noting that it differed from complicity in oppression because in cases of unfreedom it often seemed that only one agent appeared to be involved (i.e. there was not always an obvious oppressing agent to be identified). When analysing cases of complicity in one’s own unfreedom, one therefore has to focus on the unfree agent, whereas in cases of oppression, the focus seems to take in the oppressor. This difference can also be explained by the fact that, both in cases of structural and agent oppression, the oppressed agent can, and usually is, aware they are being oppressed. For example, the very idea of someone who identifies as a rape victim (agent oppression), or the slave who revolts (structural oppression), shows that the oppressed agent realises they have been wronged. However, in cases of complicity, this is not necessarily the case. Knowledge or, as the case may be, lack of knowledge that one is unfree, therefore has a key role to play in explaining what it is for an agent to be complicit in their own unfreedom.

This phenomenon is captured in the dual belief condition of self-deception. With regard to complicity, this condition explains how an agent maintains themselves in an unfree state. The dual belief condition, as the phrase suggests, does not mean that a self-deceived or complicit agent is simply ignorant of their situation. Rather, it suggests that the agent is in some way both aware and unaware of their situation, or, as we might say in the case of the

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67 For example, in Haslanger’s distinction between agent and structural oppression. Haslanger, 2004.
68 This is not to say that there cannot be instances of either structural or agent oppression that also count as cases of complicity in oppression, or complicity in one’s own unfreedom. Rather, I seek to show that complicity in one’s own unfreedom is a distinct case from that of oppression or unfreedom more generally, because in cases of complicity the oppressed or unfree agent is more often than not not aware of their oppressed or unfree state.
complicit agent, they both know and do not know that they are unfree. What is distinctive about the dual belief condition of self-deception is the interplay between these two beliefs. As Sebastian Gardner puts it, ‘a subject is self-deceived when he believes one thing in order not to believe another.’ In the case of the Western housewife considered in the previous section, we can say that she believes the Third World housewife is unfree in order to believe that she, herself, is free. Gardner further clarifies this point by adding that the dual beliefs of the self-deceived agent can be characterised as ‘the promoted and buried beliefs respectively.’ The relation between the two beliefs is thus one of concealment: one belief serves to conceal the other. In our example, the Western housewife buries the belief about her own unfreedom and the parallels between herself and the Third World woman, and promotes her belief about their difference and the unfreedom of the Third World woman. In so doing the Western housewife is able to conceal her own unfreedom from herself and understand herself as free.

However, the dual belief condition alone is not enough to define self-deception and hence complicity. What makes such cases of knowing and not-knowing one is unfree cases of self-deception, and thus cases of complicity, is not simply the dual belief that one both knows and does not know that one is unfree. We also need the intention to deceive. In our case we can say that the Western housewife resists recognising or acknowledging that she is unfree. The unfreedom of the Western housewife would not be straightforwardly overcome by someone just telling her that her situation was one of unfreedom. Even met with this challenge to her own position, she might still resist this knowledge, thus manifesting her complicity in her own unfreedom.

However, we might worry that this characterisation of self-deception is too narrow to fully account for what is going on in cases of complicity. As was argued in the previous section, complicity is best approached in terms of an agent’s way of Being as a whole, and not just in terms of the specific acts they perform or the particular choices they make. Extending this analysis, we might therefore say that rendering our examination of complicity qua self-deception primarily in terms of the beliefs an agent holds is also too narrow, as it focuses on a specific aspect of the agent without taking into account their way of Being as a whole. A writer who appears to charge theories of self-deception with a similar narrowness is Richard Holton. Holton seeks to broaden the scope of self-deception by arguing that self-deception

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69 Gardner 1993: 19.
71 This raises the complex matter of who should diagnose the unfreedom if the agent themselves is unwilling to recognise it. I will address this issue in the main body of the thesis. In brief, my answer will be that for Heidegger a person must diagnose their own complicity, rather than being told by someone else they are complicit in their own unfreedom, but in order to do this certain conditions must be in place. For example, certain moods, social set ups, relations with others, etc.
‘concerns a subject matter, and not a single belief.’ Holton argues that self-deception concerns is the self. On Holton’s account, the self-deceived agent is not deceived by itself, but rather should be understood to be deceived about itself. Holton argues that a necessary condition of self-deception is that the self-deceived agent can be said to be mistaken about itself. This mistake, he suggests, ‘is a mistake in the kind of belief that, were one to get it right in the right sort of way, would count as self-knowledge.’ By examining the self-understanding of the agent, Holton’s revised account shifts the focus of the debate and gives us a way to analyse self-deception, not just in terms of specific beliefs, but to consider it in the wider context of an agent’s way of Being qua self-understanding.

Although Holton revises the dual belief condition, he preserves the intention condition of self-deception in order to differentiate self-deception from mere cases of error. Being mistaken about oneself on Holton’s account is therefore a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for self-deception. Accordingly, the idea of a self as deceiver of itself does have a role to play in Holton’s account. He writes:

My thesis is this: given certain views about the self, the very idea of making a mistake about oneself will be problematic. It will be something that will demand an explanation. And the only explanation that is available is that the mistake must be the result of some intentional or at least culpable fault on the part of the subject: the self deceives itself.

As Holton presents it here, the reason that the self-deceived agent is mistaken about herself is because she has intentionally misunderstood herself. We now have a picture of self-deception where an agent motivates herself to misunderstand herself. The implication here is that an agent comes to be mistaken about herself because she wants to hide something from herself, thus reiterating the phenomenon of concealment present in Gardner’s characterisation of the dual belief condition. Following Holton, we can say that the self-deceived agent conceals their understanding of themselves from themselves. As Holton goes on to add, the ‘mistake about the self must result from something over which we have control... “Know thyself” is an injunction which we wilfully disobey’, again emphasising that the act of misunderstanding is one which the agent in some way intentionally brings about.

Returning to the Western housewife, we can say that she believes that she is free (when she is in fact unfree) because she has made a mistake about herself. That is, she has misunderstood herself by believing that she is free. Moreover, she has done this intentionally in order to conceal her unfreedom from herself. This formulation of self-deception fits well

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72 Holton 2001: 56.
73 Ibid: 63.
74 However, as we shall see, although this goes some way to improving self-deception as a mode via which to approach to complicity, it still fails to account for all the factors that we will need to take into account in our analysis.
75 Ibid: 57.
76 Ibid: 66.
77 Ibid: 67.
with Beauvoir’s characterisation of complicity. Beauvoir suggests that women’s situation can be understood as one of immanence, rather than transcendence. This means that women come to occupy the object position in contrast to men who are identified as subjects. Although all human beings are characterised by both immanence and transcendence – that is, they are always both subject and object – men attempt to identify themselves with pure transcendence and, in so doing, reify women as purely immanent. For Beauvoir, men both project this immanence onto women, but women also embrace this characterisation of themselves. They can thus be understood as attempting to intentionally mislead themselves by misunderstanding what they fundamentally are. They are therefore complicit in their own unfreedom by being self-deceived: they attempt to hide a truth about themselves from themselves by wilfully misunderstanding their own Being.

Self-deception, as it has been understood here, as rooted in a motivated self-misunderstanding, offers a good starting point for analysing what it is to be an agent who is complicit in their own unfreedom. It says that the complicit agent intentionally misunderstands themselves, a characterisation which sheds light on the phenomenon of complicity as developed by Wollstonecraft and Beauvoir. It also introduces the notion of concealment and allows us to understand how complicity can be maintained. However, it fails to explain why agents become complicit. More specifically, an account of why an agent would be motivated to intentionally misunderstand themselves is lacking. Proceeding via an analysis of self-deception also fails to explain why some agents may be more prone to complicity qua self-deception than others. Such an approach does not seem to explore the extent to which an agent’s social setting contributes to their becoming self-deceived, nor examine an agent’s ability to overcome their self-deception, and hence their complicity. Thus whilst theories of self-deception usefully highlight the way in which complicity can be understood as a kind of misunderstanding of the self, they also highlight the fact that in order to analyse the phenomenon of complicity in full, we shall need to appeal to the insights of the adaptive preference theorist and the autonomy theorist and examine the way in which the social setting of the agent impacts their complicity and how we must understand the agent’s way of Being as a whole, and not just their self-understanding, in order to fully grasp the complicity of the agent in question.

In this chapter I have argued that although analyses of adaptive preference, theories of autonomy and accounts of self-deception all contribute to our understanding of what complicity in one’s own unfreedom is, none of them by themselves offer a complete account of the phenomenon. However, I have suggested that each of these approaches presents us

\[78\] Bauer 2006: 84.
\[79\] This again can be understood as a strategy of ‘othering’, similar to the strategy which we have attributed to the Western housewife in the previous section.
\[80\] Bauer 2006: 85.
with a key insight into how to approach complicity as well as directing us towards factors that will need to be considered and accounted for in our analysis of an agent’s complicity in their own unfreedom. My examination of complicity, as it is presented in the texts of Beauvoir and Wollstonecraft and examined in contemporary philosophical literature, has shown that our analysis must take a three pronged approach. We must attend to the way of Being of the agent (as is signalled by the autonomy theorist), we must examine the agent’s social setting (as is indicated by the adaptive preference theorist), and we must analyse the way in which the agent’s self-understanding is characterised by a certain intentional self-concealment (as is suggested by the self-deception theorist). My analysis will take heed of these insights by exploring the phenomenon of complicity in one’s own unfreedom via Heidegger’s notion of disclosedness. Disclosedness reflects this multi-pronged approach to complicity in its tripartite structure of mood, understanding, and discourse. While mood accounts for the concealment in the agent’s self-understanding, understanding directs us not just towards the specific acts an agent performs, but directs us to their way of Being as a whole, and discourse elaborates the social and linguistic setting of the agent. The three insights will thus be taken up in the context of the three aspects of disclosedness: mood and self-deception in Chapter Three, understanding and autonomy in Chapter Four, discourse and adaptive preference in Chapter Five. However, before turning to disclosedness and embarking on this detailed Heideggerean analysis of complicity, I shall first show how the question of complicity in one’s own unfreedom arises in Being and Time by examining the notions of falling and fleeing.
Falling and Fleeing: A Heideggerean Analysis of Complicity

In his analysis of falling, Heidegger elaborates a phenomenon very similar to the notion of complicity as it is manifested in the work of Wollstonecraft and Beauvoir, and with elements comparable to those highlighted in the analyses drawn from adaptive preference, autonomy and self-deception. Falling describes a structural element of an agent’s existence, one that is intimately bound up with the situation in which the agent finds themselves, and – at least in its modification as fleeing – one that generates an unfree way of Being, namely that of inauthenticity. Moreover, falling involves a kind of concealment, both a knowing and a not-knowing associated with a particular way of understanding oneself, as well as being something for which Dasein can be held responsible. Accordingly, falling presents itself as a phenomenon through which we can develop a clearer and more systematic account of an agent’s complicity in their own unfreedom. Establishing this – by dealing first with complicity and then with unfreedom – is the aim of this chapter.

1. Falling and the Project of Being and Time
Heidegger’s aim in Being and Time is to investigate ‘the question of the meaning of Being’, (BT, 19) and he goes about this by means of an analytic of Dasein. ‘Dasein’ literally translates as ‘there-being’ (da-sein) and is Heidegger’s term for the human being and the human way of Being. Heidegger argues that ‘entities with the character of Dasein are related to the question of Being’, (BT, 28) a relation which manifests itself in Dasein’s understanding, as Dasein is said to possess ‘an understanding of the Being of all entities of a character other than its own.’ (BT, 34) Accordingly, in order to analyse the question of the meaning of Being, Heidegger undertakes an analysis of the entity who understands Being, namely us, human beings, Dasein. To say that Dasein is distinctive in being able to understand entities in terms of their Being, means that Dasein not only encounters entities in terms of their concrete manifestations, but that Dasein also relates to and understands entities at a more fundamental level. These different levels of understanding are brought out in Heidegger’s distinction between ontic and ontological levels of analysis.

In Being and Time, Heidegger understands himself to be undertaking an ontological analysis of Dasein, or, as he also terms it, an ‘existential analytic of Dasein’, (BT, 34)81 ‘existential’ being the term for an ontological analysis when it pertains to Dasein’s existence.

81 One cannot fail to ignore the echo of Kant in Heidegger’s appeal to the ontological analysis of Dasein’s existence as an ‘analytic’. Much like the transcendental analytic in The Critique of Pure Reason, Heidegger also understands himself as carrying out an analysis of what is necessary for humans to understand and experience – or rather Be-in – the world.
The existential analysis of Dasein seeks to get clear about the deep, universal structures of Dasein’s existence. These are features that are common to all Dasein as a way of Being, regardless of the specific ontical or ‘existentiell’ content of the existence of any particular Dasein.\textsuperscript{82} Ontical facts may affect the particular way Dasein encounters the world, but they nevertheless rely upon and reflect the fundamental ontological structures of Dasein’s existence, which make these ways of Being-in, and encountering the world, possible. One of the ontological constituents that make us, as Dasein, distinct from other entities is falling.

Heidegger argues that ‘Dasein is inclined to fall [verfallen] back upon its world (the world in which it is) and to interpret itself in terms of that world by its reflected light, but also... Dasein simultaneously falls [verfällt] prey to the tradition of which it has more or less explicitly taken hold.’ (BT, 42) In Chapter Four of Being and Time these observations take on a universal character in Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein’s relation to das Man (the social world), and in Chapter Five find expression in falling as a structural element of Dasein’s Being. From this preliminary analysis we can clearly see the two main features of falling. Falling is characterised by (1) being absorbed in the world (falling back upon its world) and (2) accepting the interpretations that are given to you (falling prey to tradition).\textsuperscript{83}

These two aspects of falling, give rise to two characteristics of Being-in-the-world. (1*) Although falling involves being absorbed in the world, this absorption functions to cover up the phenomena, concealing a genuine understanding of them and of Dasein’s Being. This is because, in falling, Dasein is fascinated by beings rather than Being. Dasein is concerned with entities or ontic levels of analysis, rather than the Being of those entities and hence ‘ontological’ investigations. Meanwhile, falling as accepting the interpretations you are given, engenders (2*) a certain kind of passivity where Dasein is kept ‘from providing its own guidance, whether in inquiring or in choosing.’ (BT, 42-43) As we shall see, the two aspects of falling and their associated ways of Being – covering up the phenomena and the way in which this is bound up with unquestioningly accepting the interpretations one is given – engender an inauthentic and ultimately unfree way of Being-in-the-world; a way of Being-in-the-world in which Dasein is alienated from its own agency and the possibility of taking responsibility for itself and its existence. As I shall aim to establish, Dasein can be held responsible for the way in which it is in the world and thus, in Being-in-the-world in an inauthentic and unfree way, Dasein can be understood to be complicit in its own unfreedom.

\textsuperscript{82} ‘Existentiell’ being the term for an ontic analysis of Dasein’s existence.

\textsuperscript{83} As we shall see in the next section this second aspect of falling comes to have a broader significance, manifesting itself as accepting the interpretations that are given to you by das Man.
2. The Insight from Adaptive Preference: Falling and das Man, the Unfreedom of Falling and the Situation of the Agent

In Chapter Five of *Being and Time* Heidegger offers a full account of the notion of falling as an essential element of Dasein’s Being. He begins by arguing that the term falling ‘does not express any negative evaluation’. However, this assertion is almost immediately undercut when he adds that the term ‘is used to signify that Dasein is proximally and for the most part alongside the ‘world’ of its concern. This “absorption in…” [Aufgehen bei...] has mostly the character of Being-lost in the publicness of das Man.’ (BT, 220) Das Man is Heidegger’s term for the social world with its constitutive norms, practices and ways of Being. The most common translations of ‘das Man’ are ‘the “they”’ and ‘the one’. However, as many commentators have noted, neither is truly satisfactory, and I shall therefore leave this term untranslated. Das Man promotes an anonymous form of everyday life, where Dasein follows the crowd and is guided by the average and ordinary ways of doing things. Dasein does what one (Man) does, thinks what one thinks, holds the beliefs and attitudes that one holds and, in so doing, Dasein is understood to be a they-self (a Manselbst), rather than its own self.

The relation between falling and das Man introduces the notion of the agent’s social setting into our Heideggerean analysis of complicity. This mirrors the insight drawn from the adaptive preference theorist who argued that attention needed to be paid to the social setting of the agent in order to understand their unfreedom and their complicity. In Division I of *Being and Time* Heidegger characterises the social world of das Man as a ‘dictatorship’, (BT, 164) which engenders a way of Being in which Dasein ‘stands in subjection to Others’ (BT, 164) and lacks agency. I argue that this suggests the ‘unfreedom’ involved in falling as a case of an agent’s complicity in their own unfreedom, is rooted in das Man, i.e. in the social setting of the agent. Indeed, the phenomenon of falling is so tightly bound up with the social world of das Man that we might even flesh out our initial gloss of falling to say that falling is being absorbed in the world of das Man and accepting the interpretations we are given by das Man. Put simply, then, one might say that falling is falling into das Man, thus highlighting that when we analyse complicity through the medium of falling we will necessarily have to attend to the social setting of the agent.

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84 For an explicit discussion of the inadequacy of the “they” as a translation of das Man see Dreyfus 1991. The English translations do not really capture the phenomenon Heidegger is trying to describe. ‘The “they”’ suggests it is someone/something other than me, something of which I am not a part, and ‘the one’, although it captures the anonymous nature of everydayness seems too unified, failing to capture the dispersion that is characteristic of Dasein’s everyday existence in das Man.

85 We shall analyse this lack of agency in section six.

86 Moreover, if das Man is – at least in the first instance – associated with an unfree way of Being, then we can say that in falling, Dasein falls into unfreedom.

87 This point is reinforced by the claims that Being-in-the-world and das Man are both existentiales of Dasein’s Being, i.e. essential aspects of what it is to be Dasein. Accordingly, one cannot analyse Dasein without taking into consideration Dasein’s Being-in-the-world and its existence in das Man.
Characterised in this way, one might think that falling is simply the restatement of the idea that we live in a public world of shared meaning, and that to be Dasein is to participate in this world. However, although this certainly captures one aspect of falling, it does not give us the full picture. Whilst the relation between Dasein and das Man is elaborated in the phenomenon of falling, falling articulates something beyond the inevitability of living in the social world and being subject to the ‘dictatorship’ of das Man. (BT, 164) Falling explains why Dasein becomes immured in das Man and its misleading interpretations, and why Dasein finds it so hard to extricate itself from these and come to encounter the world in its own way. Accordingly, I argue that falling provides the metaphysical framework for understanding Dasein’s ability to be complicit.

Highlighting the social dimension of complicity via an appeal to das Man and stressing the way in which, in falling, Dasein becomes ‘lost’ in das Man, intimates that it is difficult for Dasein to escape from falling and extricate itself from the misleading, public interpretations of the social world. This analysis highlights the pervasiveness and enduring nature of complicity and sits well with the accounts of complicity we find in Beauvoir and Wollstonecraft, who also imply that overcoming complicity will be a difficult task. However, on Heidegger’s account it is not only difficult for Dasein to escape from or transcend falling, it is impossible. Just as das Man is said to be an ‘existentiale’, (BT, 167) that is a fundamental element of Dasein’s Being, indicating that Dasein can never escape from the social world, falling is similarly understood to be ‘a definite existential characteristic of Dasein itself.’ (BT, 220)

This, therefore, raises a potential problem for our account. If falling is an essential element of Dasein’s Being, an inevitable aspect of Dasein’s existence that it can neither transcend nor escape, as Heidegger claims, how can Dasein be complicit in falling? Complicity involves the notion that things could be different. We cannot be complicit in something that we cannot avoid doing. I cannot, for example, be complicit in breathing, because simply by virtue of existing I must breathe. Similarly, as falling is an ontological constituent of Dasein’s Being, this would seem to suggest that Dasein is condemned to fall. How, then, can we reconcile Heidegger’s claim that falling is inevitable with the idea that falling can be understood as a case of complicity?

3. The insight from Autonomy: Complicity as a way of Being
In order to address this worry I shall appeal to the insight of the global autonomy theorist and examine the way in which complicity should not be understood as rooted in particular

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88 Heidegger argues that the social world of das Man is an ‘existentiale’, a fundamental aspect of Dasein’s Being. (BT, 167)
89 Heidegger argues that ‘[w]e would also misunderstand the ontologico-existential structure of falling if we were to ascribe to it the sense of a bad and deplorable ontical property of which, perhaps, more advanced stages of human culture might be able to rid themselves.’ (BT, 220)
acts, but rather should be analysed in terms of the agent’s existence as a whole and what we might term their ‘way of Being’.

Dasein can relate to the world in two ways, it can do so either authentically or inauthentically, and it can relate to the world in these ways because Dasein’s ‘[mode] of Being’ can be said to be either authentic or inauthentic. (BT, 68) As Stephen Mulhall argues, Dasein always starts from a position of inauthenticity, and thus authenticity should always be understood as an achievement. Inauthentic modes of Being are those that have been introduced above, i.e. modes of Being in which Dasein follows the crowd, accepts the interpretations it is given and is fascinated by beings, rather than Being. When Dasein exists in this mode, it is said to be a ‘they-self’ (Man-selbst). By contrast, authentic modes of Being are those in which Dasein is not in thrall to the public interpretations of das Man and instead is able to overcome the misunderstandings of publicness by ‘discover[ing] the world in its own way’, (BT, 167) thus existing not as a they-self, but as its own self.

Falling, as an essential aspect of Dasein’s existence, can manifest itself in both an authentic and an inauthentic mode of Being. Grasping this point and clarifying in what way Dasein’s existence can be said to be comprised of two seemingly opposing modes of Being, provides the basis for establishing that although falling may be an essential constituent of Dasein’s Being, falling can still be understood as a case of complicity.

3.1 Authenticity and Inauthenticity as Modes of Being

We can begin to understand the relation between authenticity and inauthenticity as modes of Dasein’s Being by returning to Heidegger’s discussion of falling. Towards the end of Chapter Five of Being and Time Heidegger argues that: ‘Dasein constantly surrenders itself to the ‘world’ and lets the ‘world’ “matter” to it in such a way that somehow Dasein evades its very self. The existential constitution of such evasion will become clear in the phenomenon of falling.’ (BT, 178) This ‘self-evasion’ is fleshed out in more detail later in the chapter when Heidegger describes the ‘movement’ of falling thus: ‘Dasein plunges out of itself into itself, into the groundlessness and nullity of inauthentic everydayness.’ (BT, 223) As Heidegger presents it here, Dasein is not a static entity. It does not have a fixed essence. Indeed, Heidegger argues that ‘[t]he essence of Dasein lies in its existence.’ (BT, 67) Although there are some structural elements or ontological constituents that are common to the Being of all Dasein, exactly what Dasein will be or do is yet to be decided. Accordingly, Dasein is best understood as a way of Being – or perhaps a ‘movement’ of Being – caught between the poles of authenticity and inauthenticity.

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90 Mulhall 2005: 73. As we shall see, my interpretation suggests that Dasein is always both authentic and inauthentic. To overcome inauthenticity and become authentic, on my interpretation, thus means to become more authentic and thus cease to exist in a predominantly inauthentic mode of Being.

91 This is implied by Heidegger’s claim that ‘as long as any Dasein is, it too is already its “not-yet”’. (BT, 288) Dasein’s Being is never settled, it is always still ‘up for grabs’ until the moment of death. We shall return to this idea in Chapter Four.
of authenticity and inauthenticity. Falling describes the pull towards the latter and, as such, we can say that when Dasein falls, it falls into inauthentic modes of Being.

Heidegger argues early on in *Being and Time* that ‘the inauthenticity of Dasein does not signify any ‘less’ Being or any ‘lower’ degree of Being. Rather, it is the case that even in its fullest concretion Dasein can be characterised by inauthenticity’. (BT, 68) This reiterates the idea that there are two possible ways of Being a self for Dasein – an inauthentic they-self or an authentic own-self – both of which reveal something essential about what it is to be Dasein.92 However, as Michael Lewis understands it, to be Dasein is not to be either authentic or inauthentic. Authenticity and inauthenticity are not mutually exclusive opposing possibilities. Rather, they are points on a continuum or spectrum, with Dasein existing as the entity ‘stretch[ed] between’ them.93 For Lewis, an entity that was wholly authentic (or indeed wholly inauthentic) would no longer be Dasein.94 Indeed, Heidegger himself argues that ‘authenticity is only a modification, but not a total obliteration of inauthenticity.’95

Following Lewis, we can say that authenticity and inauthenticity as modes of Being are not ‘either/or’ but rather ‘more or less’. When Dasein exists as an inauthentic they-self it is no less Dasein. However it is less of its authentic own self. This is an elaboration of the claim that in inauthenticity Dasein participates in self-evasion. In the everyday world of *das Man*, Dasein exists proximally and for the most part not as its (own) self, but as a they-self (*Man-selbst*) and in so doing Dasein is said to have ‘lost itself, and, in falling, ‘lives’ away from itself’. (BT, 223) However, we can now begin to see that it is only when Dasein exists primarily as a they-self (obscuring its ability to exist as its own self),96 that it is considered complicit in its own inauthenticity and unfreedom.97 That is to say, even though falling is an essential constituent of Dasein’s Being, this does not mean that Dasein is condemned to inauthenticity, even if it is always the ‘starting point’ from which Dasein must break away.98

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92 Mulhall 2001: 216.
93 Lewis 2005: 15.
96 We will touch on the way authentic modes of Being are obscured by inauthentic modes of Being in section five.
97 Depending on Dasein’s particular concrete social situation the opportunity to become authentic may be greater or more limited. We shall explore this briefly in section 8.1. The claims I make above are meant to apply only to those Dasein in ‘normal’ social settings who have the capacity for authenticity but yet turn away from this and flee into inauthenticity and a tranquilized and ‘tranquilizing’ way of Being. (BT, 222)
98 Falling can also manifest itself in authentic modes of Being. The idea that falling means being absorbed in beings rather than Being is not totally inimical to authentic modes of existence. Dasein needs to be concerned with things in order to live. Thus authenticity cannot involve the drive to totally overcome our fascination with entities in the world. Similarly, accepting the interpretations we are given by *das Man* is also compatible with authentic modes of Being. *Das Man* is that which furnishes Dasein with the common and accepted understandings of the phenomena. *Das Man* is Heidegger’s explanation for how Dasein comes to know that chairs are for sitting on, or that knives and forks are
The problematic nature of falling is not so much related to the fact that Dasein falls and is thus always to an extent inauthentic. Rather, the problem with falling (and the sense in which an agent may be said to be complicit in this phenomenon) is related to what extent Dasein becomes, or rather, remains inauthentic.

4. Two Responses to Falling: Fleeing as Complicity in Falling

Falling, as being absorbed in the world and accepting the interpretations we are given, is in many ways a prerequisite of Being-in-the-world in the meaningful way that Dasein is. The problem occurs and complicity enters the picture, however, when Dasein simply ‘gives in’ to falling, when Dasein’s Being becomes too dominated by inauthenticity, without this being tempered by more authentic modes of Being. Although falling is an essential element of Dasein’s Being, I argue that Dasein can still be said to be complicit in falling because Dasein can respond to falling in more than one way.

Taylor Carman makes this point when he argues that the authenticity or inauthenticity of Dasein’s Being is not simply a matter of whether Dasein falls, but in what way Dasein responds to falling. Carman argues that a response to falling that is compatible with more authentic modes of Being is one in which Dasein struggles against falling back on to and into the interpretations of das Man, instead attempting to ‘discover the world in its own way’. (BT, 167) While giving in to falling, Carman suggests, is constitutive of inauthenticity: Dasein gives in to the temptation of falling and becomes lost ‘in the inauthentic Being of das Man… which constantly tears the understanding away from the projecting of authentic possibilities, and into the tranquilized supposition that it possesses everything, or that everything is within reach.’ (BT, 223)

We find textual evidence for Carman’s analysis in Heidegger’s discussion of understanding, where he implies that it is Dasein’s duty to resist the temptation of falling and instead struggle for a more authentic understanding of the world. (BT, 195) If Dasein can resist falling, I argue that this suggests that falling – or rather the lack of resistance to falling – can count as an instance of complicity, at least in the minimal sense that it is something Dasein could resist, but instead embraces. This does not mean that Dasein will be able to stop itself from falling altogether. Rather, it means that Dasein can fall to a greater or lesser degree and thus although Dasein may always be characterised by falling, it can still be understood as complicit in this process if it gives in to, rather than struggles against, this phenomenon.

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for eating with. In addition to being a problematic aspect of our existence, das Man is also an enabling feature.

99 That is, modes of Being in which Dasein is transparent to itself as Dasein and tries to discover the world in its own way.

100 Carman 2000.
To further our Heideggerean analysis of complicity it is essential to distinguish between falling as a structural element of Dasein’s Being – i.e. something which all Dasein necessarily ‘do’ – and falling as something that Dasein can do to a greater or lesser extent. The former is properly called falling, while the latter should be understood as determinative of the phenomenon of ‘fleeing’. Heidegger argues that ‘Dasein’s absorption in das Man and its absorption in the ‘world’ of its concern, make manifest something like a fleeing of Dasein in the face of itself – of itself as an authentic potentiality-for-Being-its-Self.’ (BT, 229)

Fleeing is a complimentary phenomenon to falling. We might say that fleeing is a way of falling or, to use Carman’s terminology, a response to falling. Whereas falling implied a sense of passivity, something that simply happened to Dasein in virtue of Being Dasein, ‘fleeing in the face of [one]self and in the face of [one’s] authenticity’ (BT, 229) implies a more active process: something Dasein does to itself. This characterisation of falling as fleeing therefore reiterates one of the key aspects of complicity: the sense in which an agent can be held responsible for upholding and perpetuating their own unfree way of Being.

Even more significantly, I argue that interpreting falling qua fleeing as a mode of complicity gives us a new way of conceiving of this phenomenon. Rather than complicity being an isolated incident, a rare occurrence, or as Heidegger puts it ‘giv[ing] us something like a ‘night view’ of Dasein, a property which occurs ontically and may serve to round out the innocuous aspects of this entity.’ (BT, 224) On a Heideggerean account, complicity qua falling into inauthentic modes of Being, ‘[f]ar from determining its nocturnal side... constitutes all Dasein’s days in their everydayness.’ (BT, 224) This offers us a way to theorise a complicit life – complicity as a mode of existence – rather than just a fleeting occurrence or a momentary lapse. Falling is the draw towards das Man and inauthentic modes of Being.

Dasein can respond to this in one of two ways: it can resist or it can give in. Accordingly, whenever we are analysing Dasein’s Being in a predominantly inauthentic mode, this means that Dasein is fleeing from its authenticity: it has given into falling. Therefore, all other things being equal, I argue that when we are analysing inauthentic modes of Dasein’s Being, we are analysing modes of Being in which Dasein is complicit in its own inauthenticity and unfreedom.

We now have good reason to suppose that we can understand falling in its modification as fleeing as a case of complicity. I have argued that falling qua fleeing involves

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101 By this I mean we are considering ‘normal’ agents in ‘normal’ circumstances. As will be argued in section 8.1, the purpose of our current investigation is not to demonise those who fail to become authentic because of their material circumstances, but rather to explore why those who do appear to have the resources to become free and authentic fail to do so.

102 For the sake of brevity, when I refer to inauthentic modes of Being this should be read as ‘predominantly inauthentic’, because as we saw in section 3.1, Dasein is always both authentic and inauthentic.

103 The relation between unfreedom and inauthenticity will be developed in sections six and eight.
embracing inauthenticity, which, as we shall see in the final three sections of this chapter, is an unfree way of Being. Moreover, I have suggested that fleeing is something for which Dasein can be held responsible. However, at this juncture, we are faced with the same problem that faced analyses of complicity drawn from theories of self-deception: why and how does this flight into unfreedom come about. The self-deception theorist implied that the explanation involved the agent both knowing and not-knowing they were unfree. Accordingly, I shall now examine the way in which this knowing and not-knowing can be understood to manifest itself in a Heideggerean analysis.

5. The Insight from Self-Deception: The Knowing and not-Knowing of Complicity
The kinds of complicity I am attempting to elucidate in my analysis are not those where the agent actively embraces their unfree way of Being in full awareness of what they are doing. Rather, the cases of complicity that are the most puzzling and the most interesting, and upon which I shall try to shed light, are those cases in which the agent seems to be both aware and unaware that they are perpetuating their own unfree way of Being. With regard to Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein, we can say that Dasein is in some way always both aware and unaware that another, more authentic mode of Being is possible. Therefore I argue that a Heideggerean analysis of complicity, like an analysis of complicity drawn from theories of self-deception, highlights that complicit agents are distinctive in both knowing and not-knowing that they are unfree and that this mode of concealment manifests itself in a kind of self-misunderstanding.104 Although on one level Dasein always understands itself, on another level it attempts to hide this understanding from itself.

The idea that Dasein never fails to understand itself and thus somehow always knows more authentic modes of Being are possible, is brought out in Heidegger’s discussion of understanding. Here he claims that Dasein always understands what it is capable of. That is to say, Dasein always understands its capacity for authenticity and its ownmost potentiality-for-Being itself. (BT, 184)105 A key aspect of inauthenticity is the covering over of this genuine understanding of one’s own Being and of an understanding of the possibility of existing in more authentic modes. This is made explicit when Heidegger elucidates what it would be for Dasein to overcome the inauthenticity of everydayness and participate in a more authentic mode of Being. He states that: ‘this discovery of the ‘world’ and this disclosure of Dasein are

104 On this basis we can distinguish the complicit agents in which we are interested from brain washed agents, who are presumably unaware of their unfreedom. We can also distinguish the kind of complicit agents in which we are interested from agents who might also be considered complicit, but in a much more active way. For example members of a slave society who are themselves slaves, but help to uphold slavery because they see some advantage in so doing.
105 ‘Dasein is such that in every case it has understood (or alternatively, not understood) that it is to be thus or thus. As such understanding it ‘knows’ what it is capable of – that is, what its potentiality-for-Being is capable of. This knowing does not first arise from an immanent self-perception, but belongs to the Being of the “there”, which is essentially understanding. And only because Dasein, in understanding, is its “there”, can it go astray and fail to recognize itself.’ (BT, 184, emphasis added)
always accomplished as a clearing-away of concealments and obscurities, as a breaking up of the disguises with which Dasein bars its own way.’ (BT, 167 emphasis added) Here, I argue, we can clearly see that it is Dasein itself who prevents itself from existing in more authentic modes of Being, an analysis which is reiterated in Heidegger’s claims regarding the ‘temptation’ of falling and the idea that ‘Dasein itself... presents to itself the possibility of losing itself in das Man and falling into groundlessness’. (BT, 221) Dasein tempts itself with the prospect of covering over more authentic modes of Being and falling back upon the world of das Man so that it does not have to face up to the self-responsibility involved in existing in a freer and more authentic way. Instead Dasein chooses to hand itself over to das Man and ‘disburden’ itself of this responsibility (BT, 165) by fleeing into inauthenticity.

Nevertheless, authenticity is not presented as something Dasein simply pretends not to be aware of. There also seems to be a strong sense in which Dasein really does not-know that it is inauthentic and that more authentic modes of Being are possible. As we have seen, in Chapter Five of Being and Time Heidegger argues that, in falling, ‘Dasein plunges out of itself into itself, into the groundlessness and nullity of inauthentic everydayness.’ The passage continues: ‘But this plunge remains hidden from Dasein by the way things have been publicly interpreted, so much so, indeed, that it gets interpreted as a way of ‘ascending’ and ‘living concretely’. (BT, 223 emphasis added) The idea that an alternative way of Being ‘remains hidden’ from Dasein suggests that in addition to (in some way) knowing that authenticity is an option, Dasein also seems to not-know that this is the case. How, then, can this be possible?

The particular way in which Dasein knows, but also does not-know that it could be authentic, is clarified in Heidegger’s discussion of fleeing at the end of Division I.106 Here Heidegger implies that in order to flee from something Dasein must have some awareness that there is something to flee from; even if it does not fully grasp that from which it flees. The claim here, as I understand it, is not simply that Dasein always understands itself and its potentiality-for-Being its own self rather than merely a they-self, but also that it is only because Dasein always understands itself that it can go astray and fail to understand itself. This form of analysis is a common trope of Being and Time. The claim is that inauthentic Dasein – the Dasein who fails to understand itself, the Dasein who is alone (BT, 157), the Dasein who thinks it is free of moods (BT, 173) – is only able to exist in this way because,

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106 ‘Only to the extent that Dasein has been brought before itself in an ontologically essential manner through whatever disclosedness belongs to it, can it flee in the face of that in the face of which it flees. To be sure, that in the face of which it flees is not grasped in thus turning away [Abkehr] in falling; nor is it experienced even in turning thither [Hinkehr]. Rather, in turning away from it, it is disclosed ‘there’. This existentiell-ontical turning-away, by reason of its character as a disclosure, makes it phenomenally possible to grasp existential-ontologically that in the face of which Dasein flees, and to grasp it as such. Within the ontical ‘away from’ which such turning-away implies, that in the face of which Dasein flees can be understood and conceptualized by ‘turning thither’ in a way which is phenomenologically interpretive.’ (BT, 229)
ontologically – that is at a more fundamental level – it does understand, it is never alone and it is never free of moods.\textsuperscript{107} The positive conception therefore grounds the possibility of the privation. It is only because at some fundamental level Dasein knows freer and more authentic modes of Being are possible that it is able to flee from this knowledge and exist in a state where it appears to be unaware of this possibility. This analysis reinforces the idea that inauthenticity is not a lack – somehow not yet Dasein. Rather, inauthenticity is a deficient way of manifesting the essential structures of Dasein’s Being, a way of manifesting the structures and possibilities of Dasein’s existence in such a way that they are concealed and covered over.

To fully understand the knowing and not-knowing characteristic of complicity, we must therefore separate the ontic and the ontological levels on which Dasein ‘knows’. Whereas ontically Dasein does not grasp that from which it flees (i.e. an understanding of itself in its own Being and the possibility of existing in more authentic modes), ontologically Dasein always has an understanding of itself in its Being because, as Heidegger argues, ‘Being can be something unconceptualized, but it never completely fails to be understood.’ (BT, 228) Therefore, I argued that in fleeing, and thus as complicit, Dasein can be said to ontologically know, but at the same time ontically not-know that a more authentic mode of Being is possible.

6. Falling and Alienation\textsuperscript{108}

Having now offered an overview of the way in which a Heideggerean approach to complicity incorporates the insights drawn from the adaptive preference theorist, the autonomy theorist and the self-deception theorist in the notion of falling, I shall now turn to the way in which Dasein’s complicity qua falling manifests itself in Dasein’s everyday ways of Being as a kind of unfreedom.

At the end of Chapter Five of \textit{Being and Time}, Heidegger offers a brief explication of ‘the specific kind of Being which belongs to falling.’ (BT, 223) He describes falling as constituted by idle talk, curiosity and ambiguity – phenomena I shall examine in detail in Chapter Five – and then elaborates the ‘movement’ of falling (i.e. the pull towards inauthenticity) in terms of ‘temptation, tranquillization, alienation [\textit{Entfremdung}], and entanglement’. (BT, 224) These phenomena explain why Dasein remains inauthentic and tends to fall back into inauthenticity, even once it has managed to wrench itself away.

\textsuperscript{107} As we shall see in section eight, Heidegger employs a similar strategy for analysing Dasein’s freedom, claiming that only a free being could be unfree.

\textsuperscript{108} Although in section four it has been argued that it is fleeing as a particular response to falling that manifests Dasein’s complicity in inauthentic modes of Being, I shall continue to use the term ‘falling’ to signal Heidegger’s take on complicity. This is because falling elaborates the features of Dasein’s complicity, fleeing (as a response to falling) just signals that Dasein has embraced or become dominated by these features in its way of Being-in-the-world.
Alienation immures Dasein in inauthenticity because ‘alienation closes off from Dasein its authenticity and possibility’. (BT, 222) Alienation is a further clarification of the way in which Dasein engages in self-evasion. It does so not by ignoring itself, but by becoming ‘entangled [verfängt] in itself.’ (BT, 223) As Heidegger argues, the alienation characteristic of falling ‘borders on the most exaggerated “self-dissection”’, (BT, 222) indicating that alienation reflects the kind of absorption that, as I have argued in section one, is characteristic of falling more generally. The specific way this absorption manifests itself in terms of alienation is as a kind of self-misunderstanding, concentrating not on what is essential to me, but getting caught up in that which is inessential. The self-dissection that alienates Dasein from authenticity and its own most potentiality for Being is characterised by Heidegger as a way of Dasein ‘tempting itself with all possibilities of explanation, so that the very ‘characterologies’ and ‘typologies’ which it has brought about are themselves already becoming something that cannot be surveyed at a glance.’ (BT, 222)

One of the most crucial claims Heidegger makes about Dasein is that ‘the essence of Dasein lies in its existence’. (BT, 67) There is no pre-ordained way Dasein should be, no specific possibility upon which Dasein should embark simply in virtue of Being Dasein. Rather, Dasein is essentially a ‘not-yet’, it is characterised by possibility and could always be other than it currently is. (BT, 185-6) However, in the entanglement of falling, this is something Dasein fails to grasp. Rather than understanding the ‘truth’ about ourselves, i.e. that we have no essence other than the fact we exist, Dasein alienates itself from this fact. Again the distinction between our ontic and our ontological understanding of ourselves becomes key. Instead of becoming transparent to itself in its Being, Dasein gets caught up in the ontical facts of its life and its Being remains opaque. One of the main ways in which Dasein alienates itself from its Being via a kind of entanglement and self-dissection, I argue, is by becoming absorbed in the social roles it plays and believing that these roles in some way define it. The explanation for why such absorption alienates Dasein from its authenticity and an understanding of itself as Dasein can be found in the first aspect of falling that I identified in section one: Dasein becomes absorbed in ontic levels of analysis and in so doing conceals its ontological understanding of itself. In this absorption and entanglement in social roles, Dasein fails to realise that understanding oneself in terms of roles is, in the words of Hans Bernhard Schmid, ‘a fundamental tragedy of misapprehension’, as ‘there is a fundamental tension between being oneself [i.e. Being authentic] and playing a social role.’

We can begin to see the way in which playing a social role and understanding oneself in terms of these roles sits in tension with authentic modes of Being and understanding oneself as Dasein if we consider an example. Dasein might come to strongly identify as a

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109 Again reflecting this insight of the self-deception theorist.
110 Schmid 2014. This ‘fundamental tension’ will be explored in more detail in the following chapters.
housewife so much so that in making decisions Dasein will ask not ‘what should I do in this situation?’ but ‘what should a housewife do in this situation?’111 Coming to believe that you act simply according to the conventions, rules and norms of the roles you occupy, in a sense, I argue, deprives you of your responsibility for the actions you perform, because it conceals the fact that you — as Dasein — not as a housewife or as a mother, or any other social role, but you as yourself, are the one making the decision.

6.1 The Unfreedom of Falling
Through this analysis of absorption, entanglement and alienation as aspects of falling, I argue that we can begin to see why falling can be understood as Dasein being complicit in its own unfreedom. Although it is true that in falling Dasein can become alienated from its authenticity and an understanding of itself as Dasein, my interpretation suggests that the reason why Dasein becomes alienated from these aspects of itself is because in falling into inauthentic modes of Being Dasein becomes alienated from its own agency. Heidegger argues that in inauthentic modes of Being:

*Das Man* presents every judgment and decision as its own, it deprives the particular Dasein of its answerability. *Das Man* can, as it were, manage to have ‘them’ constantly invoking it. It can be answerable for everything most easily, because it is not someone who needs to vouch for anything. It ‘was’ always *das Man* who did it, and yet it can be said that it has been ‘no one’. In Dasein’s everydayness the agency through which most things come about is one of which we must say that “it was no one”. (BT, 165)

As I interpret this passage, when Dasein falls back upon the social world of *das Man*, Dasein in some way lacks agency. This can be explained by the second aspect of falling that I identified in section one: in falling Dasein accepts the interpretations it is given by *das Man* and this engenders a certain kind of passivity where Dasein is kept ‘from providing its own guidance, whether in inquiring or in choosing.’ (BT, 42-43) *Das Man* prevents Dasein from discovering things for itself and seizing hold of its unique possibilities, *das Man* deprives Dasein of its ‘answerability’. (BT, 165) The deferral of responsibility Heidegger describes in this passage is a very common phenomenon. When people appeal to rules to justify their actions, or invoke a norm to explain their behaviour, this is what is occurring. *Das Man* is easily invoked, but difficult to pin down. As Heidegger presents it, if one keeps pressing a norm or a rule to try to discover the ‘agent’ behind it that lends it its force or justification, we discover no one.112

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111 Dasein does not have to explicitly phrase the question to itself in this way, rather this is a crude way of highlighting the difference in the pre-reflective understanding one has of oneself when one is inauthentic as opposed to the pre-reflective understanding one has of oneself when one is authentic. A distinction which will be elaborated in section 8.1.

112 Beatrice Han-Pile also suggests a picture where Dasein is alienated from its own agency in inauthentic modes of Being, arguing that Dasein fails to take responsibility for itself by understanding itself as causally determined by its idiosyncrasies and a situation it cannot change. Han-Pile 2013: 296-7.
However, my interpretation does not suggest that Dasein simply lacks agency when it exists inauthentically as a They-self. Instead, it is more accurate to say that when Dasein exists in this way it conceals its own agency. Behaving not as myself, but as, for example, a housewife, offers me a way of avoiding questioning the choices I make, the things I do and the way I live my life. A housewife bakes cakes, I am a housewife, so I bake cakes. This picture paints Dasein as complicit in its own unfreedom by suggesting a way in which Dasein may deprive itself of its own agency. When Dasein asks ‘what should a housewife do?’ and then acts on the basis of the answer to this question, Dasein defers its own agency by filtering it through das Man. This phenomenon is elaborated in Heidegger’s claim that, ‘[i]n terms of das Man and, and as das Man, I am ‘given’ proximally to ‘myself’. Proximally Dasein is das Man, and for the most part it remains so.’ (BT, 167) Therefore I argue that in absorbing itself in the roles it plays Dasein is able to conceal its ontological understanding of itself from itself and cover up the fact that another freer and more authentic mode of Being is possible. In such self-concealment and the alienation it engenders, Dasein can be considered complicit in its own unfreedom.113

7. The Temptation of Falling: Why Dasein Becomes Complicit
The acceptance rather than interrogation of the interpretations we are given is perhaps the most perplexing element of falling, given Heidegger’s claim that Dasein is the entity ‘that, in its very Being, that Being is an issue for it.’ (BT, 32) Dasein, as a (self) interpreting entity is concerned with Being and with the meaning of Being. Indeed, it is this claim that drives the whole project of Being and Time. It therefore seems odd that an entity who is distinctive in being able to understand Being (BT, 32) would, for the most part, seek to cover up this understanding and lose itself in the way that things have been publicly interpreted. We must ask, then, why Dasein does not question the interpretations it is offered by das Man and, even when Dasein may eventually pull away from das Man, why it is drawn back in. Understanding this will help to explain the motivation of falling, why Dasein flees and thus why it is complicit.

It is true that the interpretations disseminated by das Man are, at least in one sense, unavoidable. They are even, in many circumstances, useful. Dasein cannot discover the whole world for itself; it needs to be given some interpretations and some understandings of the phenomena if it is to Be-in the world in the way Heidegger suggests. For example, Heidegger argues that ‘Dasein has grown up both into and in a traditional way of interpreting itself: in terms of this it understands itself proximally and, within a certain range, constantly.’ (BT, 41) Here Heidegger seems to suggest that to be Dasein, one must already have been socialised and this is precisely what Hubert Dreyfus understands him to

113 We shall analyse the relation between unfreedom and inauthenticity in more detail in section eight.
be saying. Moreover, it is *das Man* that explains how this socialisation takes place. Heidegger argues that ‘publicness proximally controls every way in which the world and Dasein get interpreted’. (BT, 165) Publicness is the public or average understanding of the phenomena that are disseminated in and through *das Man*. Via publicness *das Man* tells Dasein that chairs are for sitting on and knives and forks are for eating with. Simply picking up and running with these accepted norms may be, for the most part, harmless. They allow us to ‘rub along’ together and enable the social world to function smoothly. However, there are some interpretations, in particular the ways of understanding oneself offered to Dasein by *das Man*, that are problematic. As I have argued in relation to social roles, these common ways of Being do not so much reveal something about Dasein’s own Being, so much as cover up what Dasein essentially is. Why, then, does Dasein become so absorbed in the roles it plays and the average and levelled down understandings of itself prescribed by *das Man*?

One might think that Dasein is drawn into *das Man* because the interpretations it offers seem so convincing. However, on closer inspection, this cannot be the case. Although the interpretations disseminated by *das Man* do offer an approximation of the phenomena, Heidegger argues that publicness offers only average, generic and levelled down interpretations, (BT, 165) intimating that if Dasein probed them in any depth it would discover their inadequacy. Heidegger argues that publicness is constituted by ‘distantiality, averageness and levelling down’ (BT, 165) each of these phenomena suggest a minimisation of difference and a marginalisation of uniqueness. Indeed, Heidegger argues that *das Man* ensures ‘[e]very kind of priority gets noiselessly suppressed... everything that is primordial gets glossed over as something that has long been well known.’ (BT, 165) As a result, ‘Dasein’s understanding in *das Man* is constantly going wrong’, (BT, 218) Dasein thinks that it understands everything, but in fact never really understands anything. As Heidegger glosses it, this is because *das Man* ‘is insensitive to every difference of level and of genuineness and thus never gets to the ‘heart of the matter’. By publicness everything gets obscured’. (BT, 165)

Thus although the interpretations disseminated by *das Man* may be satisfactory in some sense, as they give us a general understanding of the world that enables us to operate within it, this does not seem to be the reason why Dasein remains ensnared by them. An alternative reason Dasein may fail to resist the interpretations offered by *das Man* is that they are dominant and shared. To resist them would be to go against the grain. This is certainly more promising than the first suggestion, and is an idea we shall return to in Chapter Five. However, it still does not offer the full picture. In order to understand why, for the most part, Dasein gives in to falling, I argue that we must return to Dasein’s ontological grasp of itself and the way that Dasein’s Being becomes an ‘issue for it.’ (BT, 32)

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114 ‘[H]uman beings do not have Dasein in them until they are socialized’. Dreyfus 1991: 95.
Heidegger argues that for Dasein ‘Being has become manifest as a burden [Last].’ (BT, 173) This is fleshed out in the idea that Dasein ‘has been delivered over in its Being; and in this way it has been delivered over to the Being which, in existing, it has to be.’ (BT, 173) Heidegger argues that why Being manifests in this way, i.e. as a burden, ‘one does not know’ (BT, 173) and yet nevertheless this is how Being is experienced by Dasein. Dasein cannot escape from the fact that it exists, from the fact “that it is and has to be”. (BT, 173) Nor can it escape from the fact that it has no essence other than its existence, and thus is ultimately responsible for itself.

However, even though Dasein can never fully escape from the reality of its Being, giving in to falling and fleeing into das Man, as we have seen, does allow Dasein to at least conceal its ontological understanding of its own Being from itself. Heidegger argues that ‘das Man constantly accommodates the particular Dasein by disburdening it of its Being.’ (BT, 165) Das Man accommodates and disburdens Dasein by ‘present[ing] every judgement and decision as its own,’ thereby ‘depriv[ing] the particular Dasein of its answerability [Verantwortlichkeit].’ (BT, 165) One way in which das Man does this, I have argued, is by filtering Dasein’s agency through social roles. The result is that, ‘[i]n Dasein’s everydayness the agency through which most things come about is one of which we must say that “it was no one”.’ (BT, 165) This deferral of responsibility, agency and accountability in Dasein’s inauthentic existence in das Man means that Dasein is able to flee from taking responsibility for its way of understanding the world, others, and, most importantly, itself. Das Man enables Dasein to flee from the question of its own Being, the question that is always an issue for Dasein, and which has become manifest as a burden.

The accommodating nature of das Man explains why Heidegger claims that ‘temptation [and] tranquilization... are distinguishing marks of the kind of Being called “falling”.’ (BT, 298) Although falling and becoming absorbed in das Man may often lead Dasein to misunderstand the phenomena, falling into das Man – or rather fleeing into das Man by failing to resist falling – disburdens Dasein of the responsibility it has for its own Being. Fleeing allows Dasein to conceal from itself the issue of understanding – and living in accordance with this understanding – of itself as Dasein, i.e. an understanding of itself as responsible for its existence. Falling in itself, then, is tempting. It is the easy option, a soothing, comforting and reassuring way of Being. Although giving into it may not be inevitable, it is very likely.

8. Falling as Engendering an Unfree way of Being

So far, I have suggested that inauthenticity as a mode of Being reflects some of our intuitions about what it means to be unfree. For example, das Man is described as a ‘dictatorship’, (BT,

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115 We shall return to this idea more fully in our discussion of mood in the next chapter.
Dasein is said to ‘stand in subjection to Others’ (BT, 164) and in fleeing into inauthentic modes of Being Dasein is cut off from ‘an authentic potentiality-for-Being-its-Self’ (BT, 229) and alienated from its own agency. All of these, I argue, imply that when Dasein flees and exists as an inauthentic they-self, Dasein is in some way unfree. However, relating this analysis to Heidegger’s explicit understanding of freedom is a more complex task than it may first appear.

For Heidegger, freedom is neither positive nor negative, since both of these ways of conceptualising freedom, he suggests, miss something about the essence of freedom. Heidegger does not develop a liberal conception of freedom as freedom from interference, nor does he accept the idea of freedom as some form of autonomy. His concern is not with what constitutes a free act, and although he does offer an account of freedom that takes into consideration the person as a whole, as does the Republican theorist, Heidegger does not primarily seek to theorise freedom as a property of human beings, a property that one can gain or lose.

In *Being and Time* Heidegger’s distinctive account of freedom is developed with regard to the notion of letting be. Letting be is understood as a phenomenon whereby Dasein lets an entity be involved in meaningful relations with other entities. This phenomenon is related to the question of freedom because Heidegger argues that Dasein ‘frees’ entities for a totality of meaningful involvements. (BT, 118) John Haugeland argues that *sein lassen* ‘to let be’, should primarily be understood as a kind of ‘enabling’ or ‘making possible’; although ‘acquiescing’ (leaving alone), ‘allowing’ (not preventing), and ‘effecting’ (bringing something about), are other possible meanings he identifies. Letting be thus describes a kind of freeing relation between Dasein and entities, Dasein enables entities to be what they are i.e. meaningful entities that can be used, and it is in this context that Heidegger’s primary conception of freedom must be understood.

Letting be is a further development of Heidegger’s claim that Dasein is distinctive in understanding entities in terms of their Being, as he argues that ‘if we say that entities ‘have meaning’, this signifies that they have become accessible *in their Being*. (BT, 371) Dasein is distinctive in its ability to let entities be meaningful because Dasein is distinctive in understanding entities in terms of their Being, which in turn means that Dasein is distinctive in being characterised by freedom *qua* Dasein’s ability to free entities for a totality of meaningful relations. This conception of freedom is further developed in *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, where Heidegger argues that:

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117 Haugeland 2007: 103.
118 Ibid: 94.
119 The point here is not that entities would not exist without Dasein. Rather, Heidegger suggests that, without Dasein, entities would not ‘show up’ in the way they do. As he puts it: ‘Being… is dependent on the understanding of Being’ (BT, 255).
Now in so far as transcendence, being-in-the-world, constitutes the basic structure of Dasein, being-in-the-world must also be primordially bound up with or derived from the basic feature of Dasein’s existence, namely, freedom. To put it briefly, Dasein’s transcendence and freedom are identical! Freedom provides itself with intrinsic possibility; a being is, as free, necessarily in itself transcending. Heidegger’s notion of transcendence means something quite specific. Transcendence is Dasein’s particular way of Being-in-the-world and indicates Dasein’s ability to go beyond beings and relate to entities in terms of their Being. As Michael Inwood puts it, transcendence signals that Dasein “always already stands in the open of beings”, Dasein’s transcendence involves understanding of being. Dasein’s transcendence is thus similar to the notion of letting be. However, it has a broader significance in that it characterises the way in which Dasein ‘goes beyond’ beings to Being in all aspects of its existence. As Beatrice Han-Pile notes, to say that ‘transcendence and freedom are identical’ means not only that as Being-in-the-world Dasein is free, but that ‘anything that has the structure of being in the world must be free: freedom is co-extensive with Dasein.’ This idea is expressed explicitly in Heidegger’s 1930 lecture course On the Essence of Human Freedom, where he argues that ‘Human freedom now no longer means freedom as a property of man, but man as a possibility of freedom.’

This conception of freedom as co-extensive with Dasein’s existence is Heidegger’s primary understanding of freedom. In this primary sense, all Dasein are free in virtue of Being Dasein and Being-in-the-world in the distinctive way that Dasein is. Sacha Golob glosses Heidegger’s primary account of freedom as ‘the capacity to recognise and commit oneself to norms, and to act on the basis of them’. For Golob, this means that freedom should be understood in terms of Dasein’s ability to, for example, interact with a pen as a pen: to recognise what it can be used for and to use it accordingly. Normativity thus brings us back to the notion of letting be and the idea that Dasein is distinctive in encountering entities as meaningful qua useful. For our purposes we need not pursue Heidegger’s primary sense of freedom any further, apart from to note its conclusion that this means all Dasein are necessarily free. As Golob puts it, ‘all Dasein, inauthentic and authentic, operate to at least some degree within a normative context and thus possess freedom in Heidegger’s

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123 For example, understanding as the projecting of possibilities relies on the notion of transcendence, as in projecting possibilities Dasein goes beyond entities as mere beings, and relates to them in terms of possibilities – the way they could be used – that is, in terms of their Being. We shall examine projection in more detail in Chapter Four. Similarly, Dasein is said to be not just what it currently is, but rather is defined by a ‘not-yet’, again reflecting the transcendence of Dasein in terms of a going beyond.
124 Han-Pile 2013: 291.
127 Ibid: 196.
primary sense of that term.' This is a conclusion which, at first blush, may appear highly problematic with regard to our project of developing a Heideggerean account of an agent’s complicity in their own unfreedom.

If all Dasein are free simply in virtue of Being Dasein, how can Dasein be unfree? Although this might initially appear to be a problem for our analysis, examining Heidegger’s account of inauthenticity in relation to his understanding of freedom will enable us to show how, in inauthentic modes of Being, Dasein can be understood to be unfree, without contradicting Heidegger’s claim that Dasein’s transcendence and freedom are identical. In order to understand this we can again turn to the common analytical trope of Being and Time that Dasein can manifest the ontological structures or fundamental features of its existence in both genuine (authentic) and deficient (inauthentic) ways. As Heidegger puts it with regard to freedom, ‘only a free being can be unfree’. Golob illuminates this point by arguing that, for Heidegger, in addition to identifying a primary sense of freedom – in Golob’s words, freedom to act in the light of norms – or what he terms freedom¹, we can also identify a second sense of freedom, freedom². Whereas all Dasein are free in the sense of freedom¹, only authentic Dasein are free in the sense of freedom². Heidegger’s account of unfreedom as articulated via inauthentic modes of Being in Being and Time can thus be thought to elaborate the way in which Dasein can fail to be free.

Golob argues that this second sense of freedom – the kind of freedom, or rather lack of it, that will concern us in our analysis of complicity – is embodied by agents who ‘are in the state of genuinely realising both their freedom¹ and their own nature by an intense engagement with the space of reasons, an engagement which recognises the limitations inherent on that space.’ What Golob means by this is that agents who are free in the sense of freedom² not only recognise and act in light of norms, they also have a genuine understanding of this normativity and the way in which it is binding on them. We shall see this articulated in more detail in subsequent chapters in the idea that in authentic modes of Being Dasein takes up a questioning relation to the norms of everydayness and the prescriptive ways of Being disseminated by das Man. In short, however, it can be summed up in the idea that:

Authentic Dasein is not characterised by knowledge of, or access to, any non-historical or non-social source of norms. Instead, it is defined precisely by the recognition that there is no such source: for Heidegger the one norm binding on Dasein qua Dasein is to recognise that there are no norms binding on Dasein qua Dasein.

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¹ Golob 2014: 208.
³ Golob also makes this point: ‘inauthentic agency constitutes Heidegger’s attempt to understand one of the central and distinctive ways in which Dasein may fail to be free.’ Golob 2014: 245.
⁴ Ibid: 250.
⁵ Ibid: 239.
By contrast, inauthentic Dasein fails to recognise that there are no norms binding on it qua Dasein. Inauthentic Dasein is thus considered unfree in the sense that it believes itself to be strictly bound by norms and thus sticks to them too rigidly. Whereas authentic Dasein realise that they are not ontologically bound by any particular norm and thus can choose what they want to be and how they want to live their lives, inauthentic Dasein relate to norms as binding on and determinative of their way of Being.

Although inauthentic agents ‘still act for the sake of norms’ and thus are free qua freedom, ‘they operate in a superficial and almost mechanistic way within the normative sphere.’\(^{133}\) The kind of unfreedom attributed to inauthentic agents, I argue, is thus explained as a kind of complicity in their own unfreedom, it is explained in terms of ‘a story about the way in which the first-person perspective can become reduced to a default series of prescribed inputs and outputs.’\(^{134}\) As I interpret it, the inauthentic agent fails to recognise – or rather conceals from themselves – the fact that no norms can be binding on them qua Dasein. In so doing they take up an unquestioning adherence to norms and thus fail to realise their freedom\(^2\) and their ability to choose freely among norms, possibilities and ways of life.\(^{135}\) This is precisely the kind of unfreedom I have argued characterises the way in which Dasein is alienated from its own agency in inauthentic modes of Being. As I argued in section six, inauthentic Dasein is rendered unfree ‘not via any third person causal story’,\(^{136}\) but by the way it relates to itself and its roles. For example, I suggested that when the subservient housewife asked ‘what should a housewife do?’ and then acted on the basis of the answer to this question, she deferred her own agency by filtering it through das Man. In light of Golob’s analysis we can now say that when the housewife acts in accordance with the norms of her social role in this unquestioning way, she takes the norm of being a housewife to be binding on her qua Dasein. She takes such norms to be determinative of her existence and feels that she must act in accordance with them, rather than recognising that she chooses to act in light of the norms of being a housewife, and thus could always choose to act in light of different norms than those to which she currently binds herself. Because of the way in which the housewife relates to these norms in an unquestioning way as binding on her qua Dasein, she can be considered complicit in her own unfreedom.

This of course does not mean that for an agent to become free in the sense of freedom\(^2\) one will have to rid oneself of all norms. In Han-Pile’s words, freedom does not

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\(^{133}\) Golob 2014: 250.
\(^{134}\) Ibid: 250–251.
\(^{135}\) As we shall see in a moment, and in more detail in the next chapter in our discussion of thrownness, this does not mean that in becoming authentic Dasein becomes radically free, in the sense of having no limitations on its existence. Golob also signals this when he argues that the freedom that is actualised in authentic modes of Being is one in which Dasein ‘recognises the limitations’ on its ability to choose. Golob 2014: 250
\(^{136}\) Ibid: 250.
mean that an agent becomes free ‘from the normative pressure of its environment... it does not enable Dasein to give itself its own laws nor to have full control over itself and its life – it does not make it autonomous.’ To be free in the sense of freedom\(^2\) is not to abandon all social roles, rather it is to develop a new way of occupying your roles, a way of occupying your roles that is rooted in a transformed self-relation and self-understanding.

8.1 Freedom and Dasein’s Authentic Self-Understanding\(^{38}\)

Although it is not the case that inauthentic Dasein is somehow not yet Dasein,\(^{39}\) or that one only becomes Dasein when one is authentic, it is the case that authentic Dasein somehow manifests its Being as Dasein in a more explicit way than inauthentic Dasein. This is because authentic Dasein grasps itself more explicitly as Dasein.\(^{40}\) This does not mean that authenticity is simply a matter of ‘knowing’ my Being has a certain structure. Rather, it is a matter of manifesting an understanding of my Being in my way of Being.\(^{41}\) Authenticity is the extent to which I have become ‘transparent’ to myself. ‘Transparency’, Heidegger argues, is ‘the sight which is related primarily and on the whole to existence’. (BT, 186) That is, it is a way of understanding ourselves that gets to the heart of what we fundamentally are. Or, in the words of Beatrice Han-Pile, ‘transparency is Dasein’s pre-reflective grasp of its own ontological make-up.’\(^{42}\) In authentic modes of Being Dasein is more transparent to itself and manifests this in its way of Being, whereas in inauthentic modes of Being Dasein’s understanding of itself is opaque, (BT, 187) and thus Dasein’s understanding of itself as Dasein cannot be seen so clearly in its everyday modes of comportment.

The idea that authenticity involves grasping ourselves more explicitly as Dasein is implied by Golob in his analysis of freedom\(^2\) when he argues that ‘authentic agents... “liberate” their own being and are liberated or “free” in choosing phronetically among the possibilities before them.’\(^{43}\) Golob goes on to suggest that we can further analyse freedom\(^2\) by distinguishing between freedom\(^{2a}\) and freedom\(^{2b}\). The former, it seems, involves understanding yourself as Dasein (liberating your Being), whereas the latter involves choosing possibilities in line with an understanding of yourself as Dasein (freely choosing among possibilities and thus Being-in-the-world in a freer way). Freedom\(^2\), then, I argue, is not simply transforming our relation to norms, it also consists in transforming our relation

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\(^{38}\) Han-Pile 2013: 312. Han-Pile deploys the term ‘autonomy’ in a very strong sense here.

\(^{39}\) From now on, and for the rest of the thesis, when I use the terms ‘freedom’ or ‘unfreedom’ I will be using them in the sense of freedom\(^2\) outlined in the previous section, unless otherwise specified. However, at points I will refer to ‘freedom\(^2\) for clarificatory purposes, e.g. when identifying the two aspects of freedom\(^2\).

\(^{40}\) As we saw in section five.


\(^{42}\) The distinction between knowing and understanding will be developed in Chapter Four.

\(^{43}\) Han-Pile 2013: 303.

\(^{44}\) Golob 2014: 250.
to ourselves, which in turn allows us to relate to norms in a new way and thus Be-in the world in a new way.  

Although Golob separates the aspects of freedom\(^2\) into freedom\(^{2a}\) and freedom\(^{2b}\), it is not clear that Heidegger really sees these aspects as separable. Instead implying, as Golob notes, that agents who are free\(^{2a}\) will also be free\(^{2b}\).\(^{145}\) For example, freedom\(^{2a}\) and freedom\(^{2b}\) are both expressed in statements describing authenticity as Dasein’s ‘Being-free for the freedom of choosing itself and taking hold of itself’. (BT, 232)\(^{146}\) As I interpret it, the idea that in authentic modes of Being Dasein ‘takes hold of itself’ implies that Dasein’s transformed self-relation and its transformed relation to norms, engenders a way of Being-in-the-world in which Dasein takes responsibility for itself. This follows from Heidegger’s characterisation of authenticity because to recognise that the only norm binding on Dasein qua Dasein is that there are no norms binding on Dasein qua Dasein – as Dasein does in authentic modes of Being – means to realise that there is nothing qua Dasein that we should or must do. There is no predetermined way we should be. As we shall see in the next chapter, at the basis of Dasein’s Being there is a nullity, there is only the ontological fact that the essence of Dasein lies in its existence. Accordingly, there is no essence on to which Dasein can defer responsibility for its existence, there is nothing that will act as an ultimate justification for the way Dasein is. To Be-in the world in a freer and more authentic way thus means to take responsibility for oneself and one’s way of Being.\(^{147}\)

The way in which this existential responsibility is bound up with authenticity and freedom furthers our analysis of an agent’s complicity in their own unfreedom. Overcoming complicity qua Being-in-the-world in a freer and more authentic way, I argue, will mean taking responsibility for oneself, as well as recognising that one has attempted to defer responsibility for oneself by ‘disburdening’ this on to das Man (BT, 165) and taking the norms of everydayness as something prescriptive and determinative of our everyday way of Being-in-the-world. As I shall argue in more detail in the next chapter, taking responsibility for oneself does not mean embarking on a new way of Being in terms of the existentiell content of one’s life. Rather, it is about taking responsibility for oneself as one exists now.\(^{148}\)

What it means to be free and authentic appears to be content neutral. Indeed, in Being and

\(^{144}\) Golob notes that it is just assumed by Heidegger that there is a correlation between freedom\(^{2a}\) and freedom\(^{2b}\). As I have understood it, that there is a correlation between agents who grasp themselves as Dasein and agents who are less constrained by norms and freely choose among them. We shall see a similar correlation expressed in Chapter Four in the claim that the way Dasein understands itself affects the way it exists. Although Heidegger does not offer an explicit argument for this claim, it seems plausible both within the context of his ontology and more generally. Arguably a person’s self-understanding does affect the choices they make and how they conduct themselves.

\(^{145}\) Golob 2014: 250.

\(^{146}\) Ibid: 250.

\(^{147}\) We shall analyse the responsibility Dasein must take for itself in authentic modes of Being in more detail in the following chapter.

\(^{148}\) Han-Pile 2013: 306.
Heidegger argues that we ‘let Dasein itself project itself upon this possibility [the possibility of living authentically], without holding up to Dasein an ideal of existence with any special ‘content’, or forcing any such ideal upon it ‘from outside’. (BT, 311) This implies that it is not the case that Dasein will have to occupy some particular role (or not occupy some particular role) in order to count as authentic and free. Rather, as I interpret it, what will decide Dasein’s freedom and authenticity will be the way it relates to the roles it inhabits and to itself. My analysis of the housewife as complicit in her own unfreedom, then, pertains not to the fact that she is a housewife, but to the way she understands herself and relates to herself as a housewife.

The fact that authenticity appears not to be prescriptive may seem problematic from a feminist perspective. It may seem to clash with our intuitions by allowing us to say that, for example, a subservient housewife is free, as long as she has the right self-relation to that role. Or, to take a more extreme example, it may seem that a slave could be considered free as long as he or she had the right self-relation. But this need not follow. My suggestion that our freedom consists in having the right kind of self-relation does not mean that for Heidegger freedom is simply something ‘in the head’. As Han-Pile notes, freedom is not simply a state of mind or a self-understanding, but the way in which that self-understanding manifests itself in our actions. As she argues, citing Charles Taylor, our actions are ‘the expression of our self-understanding rather than the result of our executive powers’. On this account, then, we can say, for example, that the slave is unfree, since she is unable to express her self-responsibility in her actions. Similarly, the idea that our freedom is in some way visible in what we do allows us to critique some of the roles that may intuitively seem incompatible with a notion of freedom. Accordingly, although it may be the case that the content of the choices one makes about one’s way of Being will not bar Dasein from authenticity and freedom completely, some roles may make attaining the right kind of self-relation required for freedom and authenticity more difficult than others.

Even though freedom and authenticity may be more difficult to achieve for some people, this does not mean that these people are complicit in their unfreedom and inauthenticity in the same way that, for example, the relatively privileged yet subservient housewife considered in Chapter One was. There is an important distinction to be made between your material circumstances preventing you from achieving freedom and

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149 As it is manifested in the possibility of Being-towards-death. We shall analyse Being-towards-death in Chapter Six.
150 Although as we shall see in Chapter Six, some roles may be more compatible with authenticity than others.
151 This does not mean that to be free I will have to perform some particular action or role. Rather, my freedom will be reflected in the way in which I perform my roles.
152 Han-Pile also makes this point. Han-Pile 2013: 310.
153 We shall examine this in Chapter Six.
authenticity and something about yourself stopping you.\textsuperscript{154} The purpose of our current investigation is not to demonise those who fail to become authentic because of their material circumstances, but rather to explore why those who do appear to have the resources to become free and authentic fail to do so. However, a by-product of this analysis may be a critique of the social roles and societal structures that are less compatible with freedom and authenticity and thus keep us immured in inauthenticity and unfreedom. One of the outcomes we might hope to further as a result of an analysis of Dasein’s everyday unfreedom and inauthenticity, then, is the ability to identify problematic social roles and structures that hinder the development and realisation of freedom and authenticity. That is to say, we should aim for a society where everyone has the same opportunity to become free and authentic, because despite what Heidegger may say to the contrary, authenticity is presented as a good to be striven for.\textsuperscript{155}

In this chapter I have offered a preliminary analysis of the way in which the insights into complicity drawn from theories of adaptive preference, autonomy and self-deception can be accounted for in a Heideggerean context. In so doing I have developed an account of the Heideggerean notions of falling and fleeing as concepts which present Dasein as complicit in its own inauthenticity. I have offered an interpretation of inauthenticity as an unfree mode of Being by examining the way in which Dasein can become alienated from its own agency by unquestioningly understanding itself in terms of social roles. I then went on to examine how this interpretation of inauthenticity \textit{qua} unfreedom is supported by Heidegger’s distinctive understanding of freedom.\textsuperscript{156} Via my analysis of falling, I have suggested that we should not conceive of complicity as a temporary lapse, but as an enduring and pervasive way of Being. I have also gestured towards the way in which complicity in one’s own inauthenticity and unfreedom can be overcome. I have suggested that overcoming complicity will involve coming to have a new self-relation and unconcealing an authentic understanding of oneself as Dasein. In the following chapters I shall develop this analysis, examining in what way Dasein’s complicity in its own inauthenticity and unfreedom manifests itself in Dasein’s Being-in-the-world, by turning to the phenomenon of disclosedness and its constituent aspects of mood, understanding and discourse.

\textsuperscript{154} As Holland 2001 notes, authenticity may be more easily achieved for some than others because of the material circumstances in which they find themselves.

\textsuperscript{155} Both Han-Pile 2013: 295 and Carman 2003 make the point that inauthenticity and authenticity are not evaluatively neutral. Authenticity does seem to be something we should strive to achieve.

\textsuperscript{156} Despite the fact I have offered an interpretation of inauthenticity as an unfree mode of Being, I shall not substitute one term for the other. Although inauthenticity can be understood as an unfree mode of Being, inauthenticity is not reducible to unfreedom.
Mood and Concealment: The Insight from Self-Deception

Having now seen how the phenomenon of an agent’s complicity in their own unfreedom arises in a Heideggerean context, we can turn to our Heideggerean analysis of complicity proper. In Chapter One it was argued that in order to analyse complicity we must take into account the agent – their way of Being, their self-understanding and their preferences; as well as attending to their social setting – their understanding of entities and the possibilities open to them, their relations with others and their orientation to the social world. The Heideggerean phenomenon that allows us to analyse all of these elements in conjunction with one another is disclosedness. Disclosedness is ‘a technical term… signify[ing] ‘to lay open’ and ‘the character of having been laid open’’. (BT, 105) It elaborates the fundamental relation between Dasein and world, and the way in which Dasein is always said to ‘Be-in’ the world. Heidegger suggests both that there would be no world without Dasein (BT, 445) and that there would be no Dasein without world. This means that Dasein is always Being-in-the-world and that Dasein and world can be understood to co-determine one another. With regard to the question of complicity, this offers a productive starting point for our analysis. Because of the fundamental unity of Dasein and world, a Heideggerean analysis will not be able to exclude the world from its discussions of the agent, nor focus too heavily on the agent and exclude considerations of the world.

Disclosedness, as the relation between Dasein and world, is constituted by three elements: attunement (Befindlichkeit) – or mood (Stimmung), as the way in which Dasein is attuned to the world, an analysis of which we shall undertake in this chapter; understanding (Verstehen), which we shall explore in the following chapter; and discourse (Rede), which will be our concern in Chapter Five. Disclosedness plays an essential role in Heidegger’s ontology because it determines the way in which Dasein encounters the world, others and itself. It also shows how Dasein can be led astray, misunderstanding its world, others and its way of Being. Deepening our Heideggerean analysis of complicity by focussing on disclosedness will therefore help to elaborate the particular way in which Dasein can be

\[\text{\textsuperscript{157} i.e. the way Dasein understands itself and its relation to the phenomena and comports itself within the world.}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{158} Heidegger [1925] 1985: 202.}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{159} Attunement is the ontological counterpart of the ontic fact Dasein is always in a mood. (BT, 172) Mood elaborates the concrete way in which Dasein is attuned to the world. With the other aspects of disclosedness, discourse and understanding, however, Heidegger does make a terminological distinction, using the same terms (discourse and understanding) for both the ontic and the ontological phenomena. For linguistic ease and to keep in mind that disclosedness always pertains to a concrete way of Being-in-the-world, when discussing the three elements of disclosedness I shall use the term ‘mood’ rather than attunement.}\]
said to be complicit in its own unfreedom with regard to the key aspects of complicity identified in Chapter One. Each of the aspects of disclosedness – mood, understanding and discourse – picks out a key insight into complicity, drawn from the self-deception theorist, the autonomy theorist and the adaptive preference theorist respectively. Disclosedness will thus enable us to offer a systematic and unified analysis of complicity. Beginning with mood, before turning to understanding and finally discourse, we shall examine both the deficient and the genuine mode of Dasein’s disclosedness as it manifests itself in each of these three lights. As a result, we will be able to examine not only the way in which complicity can manifest itself in different aspects of Dasein’s Being, but also the way in which certain moods, discourses and ways of understanding can help Dasein overcome its complicity in its own unfreedom.

1. Mood’s Disclosures
In our discussion of self-deception in Chapter One it was suggested that concealment was a key aspect of this phenomenon because the deception of the agent was explained in terms of them directing themselves towards some belief or way of understanding themselves in order to avoid another.\(^{160}\) What was implicit in this analysis of self-deception was a notion of orientation, attention or direction: by focussing on one thing we may fail to notice another. Moreover, by deliberately orientating ourselves towards one way of grasping something we are able to conceal another.\(^{161}\) In this chapter we shall concentrate on the notion of concealment as it pertains to complicity, and examine in what way it is accounted for in Heidegger’s analysis in terms of the phenomenon of mood. We shall explore how mood determines Dasein’s attunement to the world and thus enables certain forms of concealment, as well as exploring how a readiness for other moods can unconceal the world and Dasein’s understanding of itself as Dasein, enabling Dasein to overcome its complicity and Be-in the world in a freer and more authentic way.

Mood, as a constitutive aspect of disclosedness, clarifies the way in which Dasein first has a relation with the world, Heidegger writes: ‘Dasein’s openness to the world is constituted existentially by the moodedness \([Gestimmtheit]\) of attunement \([Befindlichkeit]\)’ (BT,176). \(Befindlichkeit\) is translated by Macquarrie and Robinson as ‘State-of-Mind’, by Joan Stambaugh as ‘attunement’, and rendered by others as ‘disposition’ (Theodore Kisiel), ‘affectivity’ (Hubert Dreyfus and William Blattner), ‘situatedness’ (Charles Guignon), and ‘so-foundness’ (John Haugeland’s literal translation).\(^{162}\) \(Befindlichkeit\) signals the idea that Dasein always finds itself situated in a certain way with regard to the world. The term also has connotations of feeling, as in ‘wie befinden Sie sich heute?’ ‘how are you feeling today?’

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\(^{160}\) This is implicit in Gardner 1993: 19 and Holton 2001: 66.

\(^{161}\) This analysis of self-deception is explicit in Alfred Mele’s rendering of the phenomenon. Mele 1997.

\(^{162}\) This list is given by Haugeland 1992: n. 37, 43.
This connotation of feeling is reflected in the manifestation of Befindlichkeit at the concrete level in terms of always finding oneself in a mood (Stimmung).\textsuperscript{163} Heidegger writes: ‘what we indicate ontologically by the term “attunement” [Befindlichkeit] is ontically the most familiar and everyday sort of thing; our mood, our Being in a mood [Gestimmthein]’. (BT, 172)\textsuperscript{164} Dasein’s mooded attunement to the world does not merely answer an epistemological question of how Dasein comes to know the world; rather mood is what grounds every way in which Dasein can have access to, or come to interact with, the world, whether this is, for example, a relation of knowing, practical comportment or scientific enquiry.\textsuperscript{165}

2. Mood: Dasein’s Openness to the World as a Meaningful Context

Heidegger argues that ‘mood has already disclosed, in every case, Being-in-the-world as a whole, and makes it possible first of all to direct oneself towards something’. (BT, 176) This is the claim that mood opens up the world as a realm of intelligibility, a context which Dasein can understand and thus within which it can comport itself. We see this more clearly in Heidegger’s 1929/1930 lecture course, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, where he writes:

Attunements are the ‘how’ according to which one is in such and such a way. Certainly we often take this ‘one is in such and such a way’ – for reasons we shall not go into now – as something indifferent, in contrast to what we intend to do, what we are occupied with, or what will happen to us. And yet this ‘one is in such and such a way’ is not – is never – simply a consequence or side-effect of our thinking, doing, and acting. It is – to put it crudely – the presupposition for such things, the ‘medium’ within which they first happen.\textsuperscript{166}

Heidegger wants to differentiate his conception of moods from that of emotions or feelings, which he argues are traditionally conceived as ‘the third class of lived experience’, subordinate to both thinking and willing.\textsuperscript{167} As we see in the quotation above, Heidegger does not understand moods as mere ‘adornments’, something that ‘obfuscates and inhibits’ thinking and willing.\textsuperscript{168} Rather, he suggests that moods are what make these activities possible. The way mood makes thinking and willing possible is by opening Dasein onto a realm of intelligibility and meaning, i.e. the world, in which Dasein can think and will.\textsuperscript{169}

\textsuperscript{163} I follow Stambaugh in translating ‘Befindlichkeit’ as ‘attunement’ to preserve the connection with mood, whilst at the same time conveying the idea of finding oneself already situated in a certain way in being attuned to the world. Translations have been modified accordingly.

\textsuperscript{164} ‘…die Stimmung, das Gestimmthein’. Heidegger 1927: 134.

\textsuperscript{165} Heidegger resists the idea that knowledge constitutes the primary relation between the self and the world, although this is the dominant way in which the relation gets conceptualised. (BT, 87)

\textsuperscript{166} Heidegger [1929] 1995: 67-68.

\textsuperscript{167} Ibid: 64.

\textsuperscript{168} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{169} This does not mean that meaning is simply something in the world that Dasein latches onto. Meaning is generated in the relation between Dasein and world: ‘When entities within-the-world are discovered along with the Being of Dasein – that is, when they have come to be understood – we say that they have meaning [Sinn].’ (BT, 192)
To open up Being-in-the-world as a whole clearly does not mean that Dasein somehow understands every entity in the world. Rather, as Sharin Elkholy argues ‘by simultaneously opening up the being of Da-sein to its world and the world to Da-sein, mood conditions the mode of access to possibilities’.\(^{170}\) This suggests that mood is that which holds together Dasein and world. It is mood that allows Dasein to latch on to different ways of understanding and interacting with entities. This is because moods are always ‘about’ something; (BT, 180) they always have objects\(^ {171}\) and thus moods tether Dasein to entities and to the world. We see this idea of moods as a connecting force between Dasein and world in Heidegger’s claim that moods are not mere psychological states inside me, as a mood: ‘comes neither from ‘outside’ nor ‘inside’, but arises out of Being-in-the-world, as a way of such Being’. (BT, 176)

Heidegger develops this notion in *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics* where he writes:

> Attunement is in each case already there, so to speak, like an atmosphere in which we first immerse ourselves in each case and which then attunes us through and through. It does not merely seem so, it is so; and, faced with this fact we must dismiss the psychology of feelings, experiences, and consciousness.\(^ {172}\)

Whereas emotions and feelings are psychological states in us, moods transcend the boundaries of inside and outside to determine Dasein’s way of Being-in-the-world. Like meaning, mood has its origin neither solely in Dasein nor solely in the world.\(^ {173}\) But unlike meaning, mood does not appear to be generated in the relation between Dasein and world, rather it is what makes this relation possible, in turn making it possible for Dasein to encounter the world in a meaningful way. Heidegger argues that ‘attunements are ways of being-there of Da-sein... that sets the tone for such being i.e. attunes and determines the manner and way of this being’.\(^ {174}\)

As a fundamental way of Being open to the world, Heidegger argues that:

> ‘attunement is not something inconstant, fleeting, merely subjective. Rather because attunement is the originary way in which every Dasein is as it is, it is not what is most inconstant, but that which gives Dasein subsistence and possibility in its very foundations’.\(^ {175}\)

This is not to say that moods cannot change, but rather that because Dasein is always in some mood, Dasein is always attuned to the world. Being attuned is the possibility of Being-in-the-world, of being open to the world as a fundamental structure of our existence, and it is this which is constant.


\(^{171}\) with the notable exception of anxiety as we shall see in section 4.3.


\(^{173}\) See Knowles 2013 for more on the way meaning is generated in the relation between Dasein and world.


\(^{175}\) Ibid.
2.1. Shame as a Particular Orientation to the World

Mood explains how an agent comes to be oriented to the world in a particular way, which in turn will enable us to explain how an agent can become oriented to an understanding of itself or a fact about the world in such a way as to conceal it, rather than illuminate it. Approached in this way, Heidegger’s analysis of mood can be seen to provide an account of concealment, one of the key concepts underlying analyses of complicity drawn from theories of self-deception. To further this analysis, let us now consider an example, and turn to a specific mood in order to shed light on the way in which agents can become oriented to the world and themselves in a particular way via their mooded attunement.

In many feminist and transgender tracts, one finds the idea that mood can play a central role in determining one’s understanding of oneself and one’s relation to the world and others. For example, in many works on gender, the mood of ‘shame’ plays a central role. In her book *Gender Outlaw*, Kate Bornstein describes the importance of shame for structuring many ‘alternative’ identities. Although Bornstein’s experiences of being a transsexual describe an extremely playful and subversive relationship with gender, she also acknowledges the part shame played in structuring her own experience and identity. Bornstein writes: ‘I didn’t feel like I was the gender I’d been assigned. I felt there was something wrong with me, something sick and twisted inside me, something very very bad about me’. Likewise, in *Stone Butch Blues*, Leslie Feinberg’s semi-fictionalised account of the development of her own transgender identity, the protagonist Jess structures many of the pivotal moments of her life around a narrative of shame, commenting ‘Shame suffocated me’. Similarly, in *Femininity and Domination*, Sandra Lee Bartky argues that shame is the defining orientation for many women’s experiences of the world. Drawing on Heidegger, Bartky notes that many women’s experiences of the world, of themselves and their relations with others are oriented by the mood of shame. In contrast to analyses of self-deception, which often focus on a problem with a single belief, Bartky argues that shame should not be understood as an agent having a belief that they are unworthy, nor should it be rendered in terms of an agent lacking self-esteem. If this were the case, we could understand the mood of shame as a passing phenomenon, just a ‘blip across the face of an otherwise undisturbed consciousness’. What Bartky encounters in the class of adult learners she considers, however, is that ‘the shame of some of these women was not a discrete occurrence, but a perpetual attunement, the pervasive affective taste of a life.’

Shame becomes a way of Being-in-the-world, a pervasive phenomenon that determines an

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176 Bornstein 1994: 12.
177 Feinberg 2003: 19.
180 Bartky 1990: 96.
181 Ibid.
agent’s way of understanding themselves, others and the world around them. This is because, in the words of Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick – and as is also noted by Bartky – ‘shame attaches to and sharpens the sense of what one is’. I become oriented to myself through this mood of shame and this subsequently determines how I come to relate to the world and others around me.

As shame is not a belief or feeling, but a way of Being-in-the-world, one cannot easily rid oneself of it. One may not even be aware that shame is what is orienting one’s way of Being-in-the-world. As Bartky argues, shame is ‘...a mode of Being-in-the-world wherein their [the agent’s] inferiority is disclosed to inferiorized subjects, though, paradoxically, what is disclosed fails, in the typical case, to be understood’. This begins to indicate how the mood of shame involves a kind of concealment. Elaborating this point, Bartky cites Heidegger’s claim that ‘[p]henomenally, we would wholly fail to recognize both what mood discloses and how it discloses, if that which is disclosed were to be compared with what Dasein is acquainted with, knows and believes ‘at the same time’ when it has such a mood.’ (BT, 175) What we believe or feel when we are in a particular mood is not the same as what the mood itself discloses. In the case of the female students Bartky considers, we might say that their expressed belief is that they rushed this piece of work and it’s not quite up to the standard they would have wanted. However, the mood of shame in which they make these statements discloses a feeling of inferiority with regard to the other students in the class, albeit a feeling of inferiority that is concealed from the students themselves, and if directly attributed to them, they might very well deny. The way in which mood discloses something about the agent and their actions that they may not be aware of themselves echoes the implication of the self-deception theorist that in cases of complicity in one’s own unfreedom, the concealment involved can be characterised as a kind of ‘not-knowing’. Here the mood of the agent reveals something about themselves that they may not realise is the case. The way in which moods can determine what Dasein comes to know or not-know is accounted for by the fact that ‘an attunement [Befindlichkeit] always has its understanding’ and ‘understanding always has its mood’. (BT, 182) Thus with any mood there is disclosed a corresponding way of understanding (or failing to understand) the world.

The particular way in which we can identify this concealment or ‘not-knowing’ as rooted in mood in Heidegger’s ontology, enables us to further explain a case of complicity

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182 Sedgwick 2003: 37. Bartky also discusses this common distinction: ‘Shame, then, involves the distressed apprehension of oneself as a lesser creature. Guilt, by contrast, refers not to the subject’s nature but to her actions’. Bartky 1990: 87.
183 Here we can see that the self is the object of the mood of shame, but nevertheless shame can come to determine Dasein’s way of Being-in-the-world as a whole.
184 Bartky 1990: 97.
185 We shall examine the claim that moods can conceal certain interpretations of the world, oneself and others more closely in section six.
considered in Chapter One. Here we analysed the case of the subservient housewife, an agent who was not kept in her subordinate position by another, but instead appeared genuinely committed to her subordinated way of life. The implication in this example was that although the subservient housewife knew other options and ways of life were available, she claimed that she was content with her way of life and thus that these other options were not for her. Heidegger’s analysis of the way in which mood orients us towards the world, others and ourselves, offers us a way of explaining why the subservient housewife may think that other possibilities and ways of life are not for her. If oriented towards the world by a mood of shame, for instance, she may feel in a generalised way that she is unworthy or does not have the capabilities to embark upon these other possibilities. Like the case of the female student above, the subservient housewife does not have a particular belief about herself. Rather, she is oriented in a shameful way towards possibilities. This shameful mood serves to conceal certain possibilities that might otherwise have presented themselves as relevant. In developing this analysis, we are led towards another claim regarding the function of mood. It not only opens us to the world as a meaningful context, determining how we come to understand and experience ourselves, others and the world in general. Mood also determines the way we are oriented with regard to particular possibilities.

In addition to having a general attunement to the world, the specific moods in which we come to encounter things determine how those things come to matter to us. (BT, 176) Although Dasein may be constantly attuned to the world in some way because it is always in a mood, this does not mean that the particular meaningful way Dasein encounters the ‘world’ is constant. Mattering explains the way in which moods can orient us to entities, possibilities and understandings in different ways, even whilst maintaining a more general overarching attunement to the world. Heidegger’s claim that moods determine the way things matter to us and thus determine how we interact with the world captures many important instances of our Being-in-the-world. For example, this account of mattering explains cases where a situation or a person may not actually be threatening and yet we encounter them through a fearful mood. The stranger in the alleyway might not mean me any harm, but because I have been taught to experience strangers in alleyways through a mood of fear, I encounter them as threatening. Analysing moods in this way suggests that many of our ways of encountering entities, situations and other people are socially determined, and that mood plays a key role in making this the case.

186 ‘World’ in inverted commas signals ‘world’ as it refers to the totality of entities within the world. (BT, 93)
3. The Function of Moods

For Heidegger, the meaning of entities is always a shared and social meaning. Dasein does not decide by itself what things mean, but ‘has grown up both in and into a traditional way of interpreting itself’ and the entities around it. (BT, 41) One way in which meaning comes to be shared in this way is through mood. There are common moods that give us common ways of being oriented towards and understanding entities, situations and others within the world. For example, for snakes to be commonly understood as dangerous, Dasein must be commonly oriented towards them through the mood of fear. Heidegger’s claim about the way in which moods can determine how things matter to us, explains the way in which moods serve this social and regulative function with regard to our behaviour and way of Being-in-the-world.

The social function of moods is highly instructive with regard to our account of complicity. When approaching complicity through analyses of self-deception we are, for the most part, limited to individual cases of complicity, for example the subservient housewife. However, approaching complicity via Heidegger’s account of mood enables us to broaden our analysis and consider cases where a whole group of agents may be complicit in their own unfreedom. For example, rather than singling out a particular housewife we can look at the way in which the moods and attunement of a culture or society orient women towards themselves and their situations in particular ways. To further clarify the social function of moods let us return to the phenomenon of das Man.

Heidegger argues that ‘[p]ublicness, as the kind of Being which belongs to das Man, not only has in general its own way of having a mood, but needs moods and ‘makes’ them for itself’. (BT,178) In this claim Heidegger gestures towards a long philosophical and theological tradition regarding the social function of moods, a tradition we find expressed with regard to the mood of shame. Evidence for the social and regulative role shame can play within societies can be found in the Western tradition as far back as Plato. In the aetiology of morality given to us in the Protagoras, we see that it is the mood of shame along with justice that is first given to us by the gods so that we can live socially and productively together. In the Christian tradition, also, we find the centrality of shame in the story of Adam and Eve as one of the defining moods that determines our way of Being-in-the-world.

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187 This is because self-deception is mostly analysed as pertaining to an agent’s particular belief. Baghramin and Nicholson 2013: 1019. Even when it is broadened to a subject matter, as in Holton’s account, the subject matter still concerns an individual in isolation i.e. I am self-deceived about myself. Holton 2001.
188 Plato 1997: 758.
189 It is also worth noting that in this context, shame is brought upon humanity by the erring of woman. According to Bartky, shame tends to be a predominantly female mood in contemporary society. Bartky: 1990: 84.
Although in certain cases shame may be a ‘useful’ emotion – ‘shame and guilt, on the standard story, make us better persons: They mark a recommittal to principles’\(^{190}\) – they can also serve a more pernicious regulatory function. In *The Cultural Politics of Emotion* Sara Ahmed argues that shame can be understood as ‘the failure to live up to a social ideal’, whether that ideal be one of race, class, gender or sexuality.\(^{191}\) For many women this is the root of the shame around which their Being-in-the-world is oriented. In the transgender texts discussed in section 2.1, both Bornstein, and Feinberg’s protagonist Jess, experience shame at not being ‘proper girls’. Their awareness of not living up to a societal ideal of what girls should be like manifests itself in the mood of shame which comes to determine their attunement to and way of Being-in-the-world.

We can also find this double significance of mood in Heidegger’s ontology. For Heidegger, moods serve both a productive and a limiting function with regard to Dasein’s everyday existence. The way moods help to explain how Dasein comes to find itself in a world of shared meaning that it always already understands was examined in section two.\(^{192}\) To speak of moods in this way explicitly draws attention to their public nature. It suggests that Dasein is born into a world that already possesses public moods which accompany public interpretations, thus furnishing Dasein with certain ways of understanding and Being-in-the-world. However, moods can also be understood to regulate Dasein’s behaviour. Public moods keep Dasein attuned to the world in a particular way. As we have seen in the previous chapter, the characterisation Heidegger offers of the social world is one in which Dasein is unfree. Rather than the moods of *das Man* enabling us to live well together, in a way we can identify for example in Plato, we might think that the moods of *das Man* have more in common with Bartky’s analysis, where moods such as shame are understood as ‘profoundly disempowering’.\(^{193}\)

Accepting that moods such as shame serve a disempowering, regulatory function we can see how the moods of *das Man* may cause Dasein to hold itself accountable to social norms that are not necessarily beneficial, and thus in turn be thought to be complicit in its own unfreedom.\(^{194}\) In his discussion of *das Man* Heidegger argues that:

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\(^{190}\) Bartky: 1990: 96.
\(^{191}\) Ahmed 2004: 106.
\(^{192}\) ‘Attunement is in each case already there, so to speak, like an atmosphere in which we first immerse ourselves in each case and which then attunes us through and through’. Heidegger [1929] 1995: 67.
\(^{193}\) Bartky 1990: 97.
\(^{194}\) This of course raises the question ‘beneficial to whom?’ which in turn begs the question of the origin of the norms of *das Man*. However, Heidegger’s concern in *Being and Time* is simply to show that it is the case that our everyday existence is determined by shared norms, behaviours, practices and traditions, rather than establishing how these come about. Although Heidegger does not analyse *das Man* in terms of a ruling ideology, such an analysis does not appear to be barred by what he does say. Leland 2001 and Holland 2001, suggest that interpreting *das Man* in terms of a dominant ideology is a productive analysis to pursue, although not one I am able to develop here.
*das Man* maintains itself factically in the averageness of that which belongs to it, of that which it regards as valid and that which it does not, and of that to which it grants success and that to which it denies it. In this averageness with which it prescribes what can and may be ventured, it keeps watch over everything exceptional that thrusts itself to the fore. (BT, 165)

Tying this statement to the idea that *das Man* and its kind of Being as publicness needs moods and makes them for itself, we can get a clearer picture of how *das Man* functions as a dictatorship in the way described in the previous chapter. It enables us to conceive of the way in which *das Man* is able to regulate Dasein, how it is able to ‘[prescribe] what can and may be ventured’ and decide what is a valid way of Being and what is not, not by imposing this from without, but by constraining us from within. Discussions of the mood of shame in many gender narratives show the way in which we hold ourselves accountable to social norms of gender, sexuality and race. No one needs to be directly shaming us from without, rather we regulate our own behaviour in accordance with these norms because of the way in which we become attuned to the world when we transcend or fall short of these standards of everydayness. In so doing, agents can therefore be considered complicit in their own unfreedom.

Moreover, this elaboration of the regulatory function of mood enables us to account for another aspect of self-deception as developed in relation to complicity. As just suggested, the way in which the regulatory aspect of mood functions is by making us hold ourselves accountable to certain norms. In other words, we take these norms to be binding on us. However, in section eight of Chapter Two, it was argued that the only norm binding on Dasein *qua* Dasein is that there are no norms binding on Dasein *qua* Dasein. To believe otherwise is to fail to understand oneself as Dasein, or rather, to misunderstand oneself. As we saw in Chapter One, Richard Holton has argued that self-deception can be productively conceived of as a kind of misunderstanding about the self. This conception of self-deception, it was suggested, usefully sheds light on the phenomenon of complicity, since it broadens the scope of our analysis to take in the agent’s self-understanding as a whole. By appealing to the regulatory function of moods, we can now place Holton’s insight in a Heideggerian context. By making us believe that certain norms are binding on us, moods, such as shame, engender a kind of misunderstanding about the self. By concealing the fact that, in essence, we are beings who are not existentially bound by norms, moods such as shame conceal our understanding of ourselves as Dasein. If we do not understand ourselves as Dasein, this means we have misunderstood ourselves. The regulatory function of mood thus regulates our existence by concealing a more authentic understanding of our own Being. In addition to reflecting the phenomenon of concealment more generally, moods thus also reflect the further insight drawn from self-deception that the concealment involved in complicity is the concealment of a genuine self-understanding.
4. Moods, Concealment and Responsibility

We have now seen how an appeal to mood in a Heideggerean context accounts for the insights drawn from theorises of self-deception regarding concealment. However, we might still have reservations about the extent to which moods can help to illuminate the idea that this concealment is something for which the agent can be held responsible. If the social function of moods signals an attunement to an atmosphere into which we are all immersed without choice, we might worry that this analysis will jeopardise our Heideggerean account of complicity. Heidegger’s analysis suggests that the social moods of das Man can function in a regulatory way.\textsuperscript{195} They can, for example, keep women ‘in check’ by associating the mood of shame with a feminine way of Being, thus restricting women’s options and limiting their possibilities. As noted in section two of Chapter Two, for Dasein to be complicit in its own unfreedom in the way in which we are interested, there has to be a choice, an alternative, a possibility that things could be otherwise. If Dasein is simply immersed into an atmosphere of unfreedom, in what sense can Dasein be understood to be complicit in such unfreedom? In order to answer this question we will need to examine how moods arise. Are moods inevitable and unpredictable, rendering our way of Being-in and understanding the world determined and out of our control? Or do we have some control over moods and as such can be held responsible for our particular way of Being-in-the-world?

4.1 How Moods Arise

Heidegger’s analysis of moods suggests both that they are something over which we have no control and that moods are something that can be mastered. Heidegger argues that ‘mood assails us’. (BT, 176) Although Dasein can be enculturated into experiencing the world, itself and others via certain moods, Heidegger is also interested in the way moods impose themselves on Dasein suddenly and without explanation. This is not to say that moods are completely random. Heidegger does intimate that certain situations are characterised by certain moods. For example, Heidegger suggests that in some instances the experience of the breakdown of a tool can be characterised in a similar way to the mood of anxiety. (BT, 105-106)\textsuperscript{196} However, there appears to be no necessary or predetermined connection between this event and this mood. Just because Dasein previously encountered a situation in a certain way, this does not mean the same situation will be met with the same mood next time round. Thus it seems that moods are essentially unpredictable and beyond Dasein’s control.

However, in contrast to this, Heidegger also claims that: ‘Factually, Dasein can, should and must, through knowledge and will, become master of its moods’. (BT, 175) This

\textsuperscript{195} Heidegger’s analysis does not offer an account of why certain moods, e.g. shame, may become attached to certain ways of Being. Unfortunately I also do not have the space to explore this relation here.

\textsuperscript{196} We shall examine the mood of anxiety in more detail in the following sections.
suggests that Dasein is not completely at the mercy of its moods. It suggests that moods are something Dasein can to some extent determine. This apparent tension between Dasein’s passivity and activity with regard to moods can be clarified by exploring in what way Dasein can be said to master, and thus change its moods.

4.2 How Moods Change

It is important to distinguish between a change in mood at an ontical level and a change in mood (or rather attunement) at an ontological level. The first gives a new way of encountering an entity, the second a new way of Being-in-the-world. Heidegger writes:

“If that which threatens has the character of something altogether unfamiliar, then fear becomes dread [Grauen]. And where that which threatens is laden with dread, and is at the same time encountered with the suddenness of the alarming, then fear becomes terror [Entsetzen]. There are further variations of fear, which we know as timidity, shyness, misgiving, becoming startled. All modifications of fear, as possibilities of attunement, point to the fact that Dasein as Being-in-the-world is ‘fearful’ [”furchtsam”]. This ‘fearfulness’ is not to be understood in an ontical sense as some factual ‘individualized’ disposition, but as an existential possibility of the essential attunement of Dasein in general, though of course not the only one. (BT, 182)

Heidegger’s assertion that fearfulness as a way of Being-in-the-world should not be understood as ‘some factual ‘individualized’ [vereinzelten] disposition’ suggests that he is not concerned with the way specific entities may give rise to certain moods or emotions in particular Dasein. To carry out an investigation on this level would be to analyse moods ontically. For example, although dread may signal a particular way of encountering an entity distinct from that of terror, this distinction resides only at the ontical level. Ontologically, both dread and terror, as modifications of fear, share a way of disclosing the world and thus are characterised by the same (fearful) way of Being oriented towards the world. However, the distinction between fear and, for example, joy is ontologically significant, as joy is characterised by a different way of disclosing the world and thus gives rise to a distinct way of Being oriented in the world. This suggests why Heidegger’s analysis primarily concerns general moods, rather than their specific modifications. Heidegger wants to establish that moods are an ontologically basic phenomenon for Dasein, which determine the way Dasein is oriented in the world. Thus Heidegger’s concern with moods pertains primarily to the way they differ in their disclosure of the world.

Clarifying Heidegger’s concern with mood also helps us to understand why he adheres to the seemingly conflicting statements that moods assail us and that we can master our moods. One might argue that I can sometimes explain why, for example, I am angry – e.g. because of a specific event or situation in the world – and that I can sometimes master and thus rid myself of my anger by deep breathing or rationalising my rage. One might argue

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that this contradicts Heidegger’s statement that moods essentially ‘assail’ [überfällen] us, which suggests an attack, something unexpected, sudden and out of our control. An understanding of moods that echoes the traditional view that moods or affects are passive passions. However, this criticism can be countered by noting that this ‘mastery’ of moods is a purely ontical phenomenon. Many moods can pertain to the same attunement (timidity, shyness, dread and terror are all modifications of fear), and thus many moods may be characterised by the same general way of disclosing the world and orienting Dasein within it. Therefore even if one’s mood changes, this does not necessarily mean that one’s way of Being attuned to the world changes.

We can now see that although Dasein may not be able to choose the way in which it is attuned to the world, it does, to an extent, have some control over the particular moods in which it encounters entities. However, this distinction does not yet provide us with enough analytical tools to fully account for the roles mood and attunement play in Dasein’s complicity in its own unfreedom. As has been argued in the two previous chapters, we want to approach complicity in terms of an analysis of Dasein’s Being. That is, we want to approach it at an ontological level and thus be able to explain the way in which overcoming complicity engenders a new way of Being-in-the-world and not just a new orientation to particular acts, choices or states of affairs. To stop now would be to suggest that Dasein’s complicity consists in a failure to master its moods at an ontical level, an analysis which would obscure the role attunement plays in Dasein’s complicity.

4.3 Attunement and Complicity
In addition to distinguishing between general moods or attunements and their specific modifications, there is an important further distinction to be made between anxiety and all other ways of Being attuned to the world. Anxiety does not so much give Dasein a new way of Being-in and Being oriented towards the world. Rather, anxiety fundamentally disorients Dasein and dislocates it from the world. In so doing, anxiety has the ability to unconceal what has previously been concealed, thus presenting a way to theorise how moods and attunements can play a key role in Dasein overcoming its complicity in its own inauthenticity and unfreedom. Heidegger argues that:

In anxiety that which is environmentally ready-to-hand sinks away, and so, in general, do entities within-the-world. The ‘world’ can offer nothing more, and neither can the Dasein-with of Others. Anxiety thus takes away from Dasein the possibility of understanding itself, as it falls, in terms of the ‘world’ and the ways things have been publicly interpreted. (BT, 232)

Anxiety is distinctive among all moods and ways of Being attuned to the world in performing this disorienting function. Heidegger aligns anxiety with the phenomenon of Being-towards-

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998 In Heidegger [1929] 1995 extreme boredom, as opposed to anxiety, comes to play this role.
death, both of which unconceal Dasein’s more authentic relation to itself and its world.\textsuperscript{199} Anxiety turns Dasein away from things that are available for use, i.e. ready-to-hand – this is the primary way in which Dasein encounters entities in the everyday world – and instead directs Dasein towards its own Being.\textsuperscript{200} Unlike other moods and attunements, which allow Dasein to cover over and flee from an authentic understanding of its own Being and hand itself over to \textit{das Man},\textsuperscript{201} ‘anxiety individualises Dasein’, (BT, 233) offering Dasein an altered perspective on the social world, itself and others. Heidegger argues that through anxiety, Dasein is ‘freed’ from the public world and opened on to the fact that it is an individual who must determine its own way of Being. (BT, 232) Because of the unique disclosures associated with anxiety, we should distinguish between Dasein’s anxious attunement to the world, which can unconceal a more authentic way of Being-in-the-world, (BT, 232) and the general or overarching attunement of everydayness. That is, an attunement which encompasses all other moods – both specific and general – and tells us something about inauthentic everyday modes of Being-in-the-world.

Just as we can situate the specific modifications of timidity, shyness, dread and so on, within the more general mood of fear, I suggest that we can situate all the general everyday moods – fear, joy, shame, etc. – and their particular ways of disclosing the world and orienting Dasein within it, within the overarching everyday attunement of \textit{das Man}, which can be contrasted with the not-so-everyday attunement of anxiety. Falling back onto \textit{das Man} and inauthentic modes of Being, as we have seen, ‘constitutes all Dasein’s days in their everydayness’ (BT, 224) and the attunement which Heidegger explicitly associates with falling back on to \textit{das Man} is ‘tranquillity’. (BT, 222)\textsuperscript{202}

With regard to complicity, then, we can say that the modes of Being in which Dasein is complicit in its own inauthenticity and unfreedom, are those modes of Being in which Dasein has a tranquil attunement to the world, because tranquillity is the attunement in which Dasein’s explicit understanding of its own Being remains concealed.\textsuperscript{203} By contrast, overcoming complicity and coming to Be-in the world in a freer and more authentic way will involve coming to be attuned to the world through anxiety, because anxiety has the potential to unconceal Dasein’s Being and engender a freer and more authentic way of Being-in-the-world. Indeed, this will be the argument put forward in section five. However, before we can

\textsuperscript{199} We shall examine Being-towards-death in more detail in Chapter Six.

\textsuperscript{200} The notion of readiness-to-hand will be elaborated further in Chapter Four, section 2.2.

\textsuperscript{201} For example, Heidegger argues that ‘[f]ear discloses Dasein predominantly in a privative way. It bewilders us and makes us ‘lose our heads’. Fear closes off our endangered Being-in, and yet at the same time lets us see it’. (BT, 181)

\textsuperscript{202} Further evidence for characterising the distinction as one between anxiety and tranquillity can be found in Heidegger’s contrast between the “not at home”, which is characteristic of anxiety and the “at-home” of publicness... That kind of Being-in-the-world which is tranquillized and familiar’. (BT, 234)

\textsuperscript{203} ‘explicit’ here is meant in the sense of becoming transparent to oneself as Dasein, as developed in Chapter Two section 8.1.
advance this position we must tackle a potential problem for our analysis. We might worry that characterising the attunements of complicit and non-complicit modes of Being in terms of the distinction between tranquillity and anxiety will narrow the focus of our analysis, limiting complicity to those ways of Being-in-the-world that are calm, peaceful and soothing. As a result, we might think, that our analysis of complicity will only be able to pertain to those agents who feel some benefit from their complicit way of Being, thus ruling out agents, such as those considered in section 2.1, who become complicit in their own unfreedom by being attuned to the world through a disempowering mood, such as shame.

4.4 The Tranquillity of Dasein’s Inauthentic, Everyday Attunement to the World

In order to overcome this problem, I shall clarify the ‘essence’ of the mood of tranquillity. In so doing I shall propose a way to resolve the tension and account for both our everyday ways of Being-in-the-world and Heidegger’s own claims about the attunement of Dasein’s inauthentic everydayness.

Although Heidegger may appear to describe tranquillity in a soothing, calming and peaceful way, (BT, 222) this characterisation clashes with many of his other claims about inauthentic everydayness. For example, he argues that:

Being for, against, or without one another, passing one another by, not “mattering” to one another – these are all possible ways of solicitude. And it is precisely these last-named deficient and Indifferent modes that characterise everyday, average Being-with-one-another. (BT, 158)

Heidegger reiterates this disharmonious way of Being-with-one-another in the everyday world when he writes: ‘The Being-with-one-another of those who are hired for the same affair often thrives only on mistrust.’ (BT, 159) Further intimating that everydayness is not necessarily ‘peaceful’ when he suggests that ‘this tranquillity in inauthentic Being does not seduce one into stagnation and inactivity, but drives one into uninhibited ‘hustle’ [“betriebs”]. (BT, 222)

As William Blattner suggests, the essence of Dasein’s inauthentic everyday attunement to the world is not a peaceful, soothing tranquillity, but a “‘stubbornness [Versteifung] about the existence one has achieved.’ To be stubborn is to have a sort of tunnel vision or to be inflexible.” This stubbornness, Blattner goes on to suggest, leads to a misinterpretation, namely, ‘taking the possibilities that the public insists upon as being somehow unchallengeable.’ This characterisation again suggests a notion of concealment: in inauthentic modes of Being Dasein’s stubborn attunement to the world conceals the fact

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204 We could also add to this list of the ‘un-tranquillity’ or everydayness Heidegger’s characterisation of das Man as a ‘dictatorship’ (BT, 164) and everyday falling as characterised by a kind of ‘turbulence’. (BT, 223)

205 Blattner 2013: 325. Blattner modifies the translation from Macquarrie and Robinson, who phrase this as ‘tenaciousness [Versteifung] about the existence one has achieved.’ (BT, 308)

206 Blattner 2013: 326.
that no norms are binding on Dasein _qua_ Dasein, and thus Dasein has the ability to question all norms. Building on Blattner’s analysis that the core tenet of inauthenticity is a kind of stubbornness, we can view the characterisation of tranquillity as a soothing way of Being as incidental to Heidegger’s broader point that the tranquillity of everydayness is an attunement that engenders a kind of stubbornness that prevents Dasein from questioning its everyday mode of Being, thus concealing the fact another way of Being is possible. As Heidegger suggests at various points in _Being and Time_, it is not so much that everyday inauthentic Being-in-the-world is tranquil. Rather, everyday inauthentic Being-in-the-world is ‘tranquillized’ (BT, 234) and ‘tranquillizing’. (BT, 222) Tranquillity, as the overarching attunement of inauthentic everydayness should therefore be taken as a way of Being attuned to the world in which the ‘ultimate’ questions do not get asked, and the structural elements of our lives do not get put into question.

By identifying stubbornness or a kind of dogmatism as the core element of tranquillity, we can see how the mood of shame can coexist with a tranquil attunement to the world. Heidegger characterises tranquillity in terms of the idea ‘that there is no need of authentic understanding or the attunement that goes with it... everything is ‘in the best of order’ and all doors are open.’ (BT, 222) Although in the mood of shame the agent’s own self is encountered as somehow deficient, the norms of the social world are encountered as fixed and unchallengeable. Returning to the experience of transgender individuals and Bornstein’s text, we can detect this tranquil _qua_ fixed and static attunement to the world and its social structures. She writes: ‘I didn’t feel like I was the gender I’d been assigned. I felt there was something wrong with me, something sick and twisted inside me, something very very bad about me’.  

Here Bornstein’s attunement to her environment suggests that she does not see a problem with the world. Rather, she feels that there is something wrong with her. Although in the mood of shame Bornstein may not feel that ‘everything is in the best of order’ in the sense that she is contented with her lot, she does appear to feel that everything is in the best of order in that it is simply the way things are and it is _her own self_ rather than the world that is somehow deficient. Accordingly, even with regard to a conflictual or disempowering mood such as shame we can see that the core attunement of inauthentic everydayness – that everything is fixed and decided – is maintained.

We can still say that the tranquillity of everydayness is ‘soothing’ in that Dasein is able to disburden itself of the question of its own Being by concealing its understanding of itself as Dasein and immersing itself in _das Man_ and inauthentic everydayness. (BT, 165) However, although Dasein is able to side step the ultimate question of its own existence, it

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207 Bornstein 1994: 12.
208 We might worry that this characterisation clashes with what we have said about the self-dissection of inauthentic modes of Being in the previous chapter. We shall address this worry in section 5.1.
can still be plagued by ontic worries and concerns about its existentiell way of Being. Accordingly, shame, as that which attaches to our sense of self, can still be understood as one of the predominant moods of female existentiell experience, whilst Dasein’s existentiale attunement to the world is understood as one of inauthentic tranquillity. Indeed, the fact that tranquillity – as a kind of stubbornness about one’s existence and one’s way of Being-in-the-world – is the overarching attunement of das Man and inauthentic everyday ways of Being, explains the prevalence and seeming inescapability of inauthentic modes of Being. The moods that are compatible with tranquillity are multiple and varied. One can be angry, sad or joyful and still be attuned to the world in a tranquil way by failing to question one’s way of Being.

Moreover, taking this tranquil, inauthentic attunement to the world to be the attunement associated with complicity also suggests that in many cases it will be very difficult for an agent to overcome their complicity in their own unfreedom. Nevertheless, although it may be difficult for Dasein to break away from the stranglehold of das Man, and come to Be-in the world in a freer and more authentic way, it is always possible. Having now clarified how Dasein’s everyday inauthentic attunement to the world should be understood, we can now examine how Dasein can be taken to be complicit in this attunement and how such complicity can be overcome by becoming attuned to the world in a different way.

5. Readying Oneself for Anxiety

All mastery of moods occurs only within the ontical, as opposed to the ontological, sphere. But although Dasein may not be able to choose its attunement to the world, it can ready itself (BT, 434) for a new attunement – specifically that associated with the mood of anxiety – that will be more conducive to a freer way of Being-in-the-world. Accordingly, we can understand moods and attunements to play a crucial role in our analysis of Dasein’s complicity in its own unfreedom not only at an ontic level, but also at an ontological level. Dasein can either ready itself for anxiety, thereby unconcealing an authentic understanding of itself in its Being as Dasein and overcoming its subservience to the dictatorship of das Man. Or, by refusing to ready itself for anxiety, Dasein can ensure that it remains immured in the inauthentic attunement of tranquillity, enamoured with das Man, concealing its understanding of itself as Dasein, and can thus be understood to be complicit in its own unfreedom.

209 Indeed, these may indicate that ontologically Dasein is shirking its responsibility for its own existence, since, there is always an interplay between the ontic and the ontological.
210 Heidegger argues that ‘Anxiety makes manifest in Dasein its Being towards its ownmost potentiality-for-Being – that is, Being-free for the freedom of choosing itself and taking hold of itself. Anxiety brings Dasein face to face with its Being-free for (propensio in...) the authenticity of its Being, and for this authenticity as a possibility which it always is.’ (BT, 232)
Being ready for anxiety has two aspects: openness and choice. In order to elucidate this dual characterisation we can turn to the call of conscience. In *Being and Time*, the ‘call of conscience’ functions in a similar way to anxiety. It describes the ‘transition’ of Dasein from inauthenticity and its lostness in the everyday world of *das Man* to authentic resoluteness and its ownmost potentiality for Being. In order to hear the call of conscience Dasein must already be attuned to the world in the right way. Accordingly, an ‘openness’ to the phenomena is what characterises hearing in Heidegger’s discussion of conscience: ‘Hearing is constitutive for discourse... hearing constitutes the primary and authentic way in which Dasein is open for its ownmost potentiality-for-Being’. (BT, 206) Similarly, Heidegger argues that ‘Dasein’s openness to the world is constituted existentially by the moodedness of attunement’. (BT,176) This suggests that Dasein has to be in the right mood, i.e. attuned to the world in the right way, in order to hear the call of conscience. The appeal to ‘openness’ again echoes the theme of unconcealment: opening oneself onto an authentic understanding of one’s world and one’s own Being, rather than closing oneself off from this.

However, being in the right mood is not enough. Heidegger stresses there must also be a ‘choice’, a ‘wanting to have a conscience’ (BT, 343) if Dasein is to be brought back to itself in its ownmost potentiality-for-Being-itself. Sharin Elkholy argues that ‘it is not enough that Da-sein tarry with the nothing in order to access the ground of its existence. Da-sein must want to take up its ground and it must do so by existing in the nothing of Angst.’ This suggests that authentic ‘transformations’ can be partial and that the process of being in a mood, hearing and understanding do not follow from one another without some kind of active ‘intervention’ on Dasein’s part. In order for its ownmost self-understanding to come to the fore, Dasein must ‘allow’ the mood of anxiety and ‘embrace it’ in the correct way. Dasein must want to unconceal its understanding of itself as Dasein, it must want to ‘[clear] away [the] concealments and obscurities... with which Dasein bars its own way.’ (BT, 167) This is what Heidegger means when he says that ‘wanting to have a conscience is a readiness for anxiety’ (BT, 342) or that resoluteness is ‘an exacting anxiety of oneself’. (BT, 353) This idea of wanting to overcome one’s inauthenticity, begins to illuminate the kind of responsibility Dasein can be thought to have for its complicity in its inauthenticity. If the mood of anxiety is understood – at least in some sense – as a ‘choice’, this reflects the insight discussed in Chapter Two that for something to be a case of complicity there must be the possibility that things could be otherwise. However, as we saw in section 4.2, Dasein cannot simply choose how it is attuned to the world, so what more can we say about the choice element of becoming authentic *qua* readying ourselves for anxiety?

‘Wanting to have a conscience’ cannot be understood as wanting to have the mood of anxiety. This will not cause anxiety to be brought about. Here Heidegger trades on the

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familiar point that moods and affects in general are often not directly subject to the will. A mood cannot arise from ‘wanting’ a specific mood, as moods are a manifestation of thrownness and thus necessarily something which Dasein did not choose.\footnote{We shall examine the phenomenon of thrownness in the next section.} However, Dasein can want to have a more authentic understanding of itself, which of course is always accompanied by a mood, namely the mood of anxiety, and thus it is in this sense that wanting to have a conscience manifests as a ‘readiness’ for anxiety. Dasein wants to have a conscience and readies itself for anxiety, not by putting itself in an anxious mood, but by no longer resisting the mood of anxiety, no longer fleeing in the face of it. As Heidegger argues, ‘anxiety is always latent in Being-in-the-world’. (BT, 234) It is the ‘more primordial phenomenon’ than the ‘tranquilized familiarity’ of publicness and the everyday world of das Man. (BT, 234) This means that as Being-in-the-world, Dasein is always already ‘fleeing’ from the mood of anxiety and the freer and more authentic mode of Being with which it is associated. (BT, 234) It is in this flight from anxiety that Dasein can be understood to be complicit in the tranquil attunement of everyday inauthentic modes of Being and, by extension, overcome this complicity by readying itself for anxiety and the authentic attunement that it brings about.

Resisting moods is achieved, as Elkholy notes, ‘in busying itself with taking care of everyday matters that are given their significance by the They [das Man], Da-sein manages to stave off the angst that “pursues” it’.\footnote{Elkholy 2008: 74.} Thus it would seem that in order to stop resisting the mood of anxiety one must no longer be content with das Man and the tranquillized way of Being it prescribes. To become ready for anxiety, means something like to no longer be satisfied concerning oneself only with everyday inauthentic matters, to become ‘dissatisfied’ with the way of disclosing and interpreting the world, oneself and others sanctioned and disseminated by das Man. Although Heidegger argues that: ‘mood assails us. It comes neither from ‘outside’ nor from ‘inside’ but arises out of Being-in-the-world, as a way of Being’, (BT, 176) there does seem to be a sense in which some element of Being-in-the-world may ‘spark off’ a mood.\footnote{Heidegger gestures towards this in his discussion of the breakdown of a tool and the way in which it can bring about disclosures similar to that of anxiety. (BT, 105-6)} Accordingly, from a ‘dissatisfied’ relation to das Man, the mood of anxiety can arise and a freer and more authentic mode of Being-in-the-world can articulate itself.

5.1 Anxiety and the Breakdown of das Man

So how should this ‘dissatisfaction’ be understood? As we have seen in section 4.4, Dasein can have an agonistic relation to social phenomena and yet still exist in an inauthentic mode of Being. The ‘self-dissection’ associated with falling, distinguishing the ‘characterologies’
and ‘typologies’ (BT, 222) of, for example, different forms of femininity or ways to be a woman does suggest a certain kind of ‘dissatisfaction’ with the social world. However, this dissatisfaction serves to cover up a more authentic understanding of our own Being, rather than unconceal it. Although Dasein does ‘self-dissect’ itself in inauthentic modes of Being, (BT, 222) this can be squared with a picture of inauthenticity where Dasein does not fundamentally question its own existence. The ‘self-dissection’ of inauthentic everydayness operates only at the ontic level and not on the ontological level. Heidegger argues that Dasein ‘tempt[s] itself with all the possibilities of explanation, so that the very ‘characterologies’ and ‘typologies’... [lead to an] alienation [Entfremdung] [that] closes off from Dasein its authenticity and possibility, even if only the possibility of genuinely foundering’. (BT, 222)

The particular kinds of self-dissection associated with inauthentic modes of Being therefore shut down the possibility of putting my existence into question in a more fundamental way. This is because such dissatisfaction and the questioning that accompanies it, can occur unproblematically within the everyday understandings of das Man. Forgoing one role in favour of another does not lead us to challenge the ultimate dictatorship and boundaries which limit self-understandings to publicly available, levelled down and generic possibilities, public possibilities that conceal an understanding of ourselves as Dasein.

However, if an agent comes to be dissatisfied, not only with the particular role they understand themselves in terms of, but with that which structures and determines our role-governed self-understanding more generally, Dasein’s dissatisfaction may be able to engender a more authentic way of Being-in-the-world. This kind of dissatisfaction is characterised by the feeling that one can never find a satisfactory understanding of oneself in terms of social roles and publicly prescribed self-understandings alone. To call into question, not only a particular social role, but social roles as such is a kind of dissatisfaction that cannot be accommodated within the bounds of das Man, since it fundamentally challenges the kind of self-understandings that are prescribed and promoted by das Man.

Becoming dissatisfied with socially prescribed self-understandings and public interpretations of the phenomena can engender the mood of anxiety and thus has the ability to unconceal a more authentic mode of existence. In the mood of anxiety, Dasein’s dissatisfaction with the public world becomes generalised to the extent that ‘the world has the character of completely lacking significance (Unbedeutsamkeit)’. (BT, 231) Just as Dasein’s initial ‘dissatisfaction’ with das Man was characterised by a feeling that no social role could define us, or, in the words of Jonathan Lear, that ‘we do not fit without remainder into socially available practical identities’,215 in anxiety all entities and all existentiell understandings become meaningless. They recede into insignificance, allowing what they

concealed to come to the fore. We can see this in relation to the world where Heidegger argues that:

[T]he obstinacy of the “nothing and nowhere within-the-world” means as a phenomenon that the world as such is that in the face of which one has anxiety. The utter insignificance which makes itself known in the “nothing and nowhere”, does not signify that the world is absent, but tells us that entities within-the-world are of so little importance in themselves that on the basis [Grund] of this insignificance of what is within-the-world, the world in its worldliness is all that still obtrudes itself. (BT, 231).

In this new orientation, or rather dis-orientation, Dasein gains a new perspective on the world, itself and perhaps most significantly on the social world. By getting some distance from the roles it occupies, Dasein can begin to see that there is a world beyond das Man.216 Anxiety, engendered by a generalised dissatisfaction with das Man, dislocates Dasein from das Man so that the norms, practices, roles and behaviours that make up everyday life and have covered over Dasein’s authentic understanding of itself as Dasein, recede. As the existentiell contents of existence slip away, what has been concealed becomes revealed and ‘[a]nxiety brings Dasein face to face with... authenticity as a possibility which it [Dasein] always is.’ (BT, 232) In anxiety Dasein comes to see that it is more than just the roles, norms, practices and ways of Being of inauthentic everydayness. It is more than just a they-self it is also an authentic potentiality-for-Being itself.217

6. Thrownness
When Dasein becomes dissatisfied with das Man and puts into question the public, everyday interpretations of itself and the phenomena in this fundamental way, it can overcome its complicity in its inauthenticity and unfreedom by unconcealing an understanding of itself as Dasein and readying itself for a freer and more authentic mode of Being-in-the-world; a mode of Being-in-the-world which reflects the anxious questioning which engendered it.218 In authentic as opposed to inauthentic modes of Being, we do not relate to das Man (and thus neither to ourselves, others, or the world) in the same way. Instead of concealing our understanding of ourselves as Dasein by taking the average, levelled down interpretations of das Man’s inauthentic discourse.

The feeling of dissatisfaction and restriction in das Man as the final word on the phenomena, we come to realise that we can discover the world in our ‘own way’. (BT, 167) An aspect of overcoming complicity qua becoming authentic is thus being open to, and critical of, one’s situation in the right way. At the end of

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216 I mean this in a metaphorical sense. As Being-in-the-world, Dasein always exists within das Man. The transformation in authentic modes of Being is not that Dasein transcends das Man, but that it comes to have a new relation to the social world, coming to understand that there are ways to understand itself that cannot be captured in the generic, levelled down self-interpretations of das Man’s inauthentic discourse.

217 The notion of Dasein as an authentic potentiality-for-Being will be developed in the next chapter.

218 The feeling of dissatisfaction and restriction in das Man is both ‘caused by’ the repressed understanding of oneself as Dasein and is also the occasion for this identity to announce itself. This is captured in the idea of Dasein’s understanding of itself in authentic resoluteness, which is both brought about by the moment of anxiety and ‘is’ the moment of anxiety.
Chapter Four of *Being and Time*, Heidegger argues that becoming authentic is constituted by a ‘clearing-away of concealments and obscurities, [and] as a breaking up of the disguises with which Dasein bars its own way’. (BT, 167) As the self-deception theorist has suggested, unconcealing what has been concealed is a key aspect of overcoming complicity. What this means in terms of Heidegger’s analysis is putting into question the average, levelled down interpretations of *das Man* that serve to conceal rather than reveal the phenomena. (BT, 165) However, in so doing Dasein can no longer surrender its responsibility for its understanding of the world, itself and others to *das Man*. Rather, Dasein must take responsibility for itself. What exactly this means for Heidegger is a complex matter, a matter which is elucidated in his discussion of thrownness.

In *Being and Time*, taking responsibility for oneself is associated with ‘choosing to choose oneself.’ Broadly speaking, this means taking responsibility for what I am. However, what I am is not necessarily something I have chosen. Heidegger argues that I am thrown into a particular way of Being-in-the-world. The fact that there are aspects of my life I did not choose and cannot control is captured in the notion of thrownness, and it is in moods that Dasein’s thrownness is revealed to it. Thrownness is the idea that Dasein has been thrown into a world, a set of circumstances and a way of Being that it did not choose. I do not choose my gender, my race, my sexuality, my disability or lack thereof, I do not choose my nationality or who my parents are, and yet these are all facts about me that form a part of who I am. Thrownness is therefore said to reveal Dasein in its facticity:

> Facticity is not the factuality of the factum brutum of something present-at-hand, but a characteristic of Dasein’s Being – one which has been taken up into existence, even if proximally it has been thrust aside. The “that-it-is” of facticity never becomes something that we can come across by beholding it. (BT, 174)

This account of facticity begins to hint at the way in which thrownness is bound up with responsibility. I can ‘live’ my facticity by ‘taking it up into my existence’ or by ‘thrusting it aside’, I can take responsibility for what I am, or deceive myself about this.

For the most part, Heidegger suggests that Dasein resists taking responsibility for itself. It turns away from its facticity and its thrownness and it does this in terms of moods: ‘the first essential characteristic of attunements is that they disclose Dasein in its thrownness, and – proximally and for the most part – in the manner of an evasive turning-away.’ (BT, 175) Although moods may disclose us to ourselves as we really are, that is as Dasein, they can also allow us to conceal this understanding and turn away from it.²¹⁹ Indeed, Heidegger argues that ‘[t]he ‘bare mood’ discloses the “there” more primordially, but correspondingly it closes it off more stubbornly than any not-perceiving.’ (BT, 175) Heidegger’s comment that mood can at once open us onto, but for the most part closes us off

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²¹⁹ This turning away is enabled by the inauthentic attunement of tranquillity discussed in section three.
from our own Being-in-the-world more ‘stubbornly’ than simply not noticing, or ignoring our situation, offers us a further insight into the concealment and ‘not knowing’ that it was argued characterises cases of an agent’s complicity in their own unfreedom.

Rather than imagining an agent simultaneously and intentionally holding a contradictory dual belief, as on the standard account of self-deception,\(^{220}\) we can understand the agent who is complicit in their own unfreedom as being in a mood in which they are not even aware of what their situation is. Heidegger offers us a generalised account of concealment which pertains to the whole of Dasein’s Being-in-the-world, as opposed to the self-deception theorist for whom concealment is directed towards a specific belief or subject matter. Heidegger argues that ‘attunement always has its understanding... [and] understanding always has its mood’. (BT, 182) Therefore if Dasein is not in the right mood to understand its situation ‘properly’ then it will not do so. However, as we have seen in section five, although moods ‘assail us’ Dasein can still be understood as responsible for its failure to understand itself and its situation, as it can ‘ready’ itself for moods such as anxiety that will unconceal a more authentic understanding of one’s world and one’s Being as Dasein.

For Heidegger, moods and attunements fundamentally explain the way in which Dasein is able to flee from and turn away from itself by concealing a more authentic understanding of its own Being:

> In an attunement Dasein is always brought before itself, and has always found itself, not in the sense of coming across itself by perceiving itself, but in the sense of finding itself in the mood that it has. As an entity which has been delivered over to its Being, it remains also delivered over to the fact that it must always have found itself – but found itself in a way of finding which arises not so much from a direct seeking as rather from a fleeing. The way in which the mood discloses is not one in which we look at thrownness, but one in which we turn towards or turn away. For the most part mood does not turn towards the burdensome character of Dasein which is manifest in it...It is always by way of an attunement that this turning-away is what it is. (BT, 174)

Complicity, constituted by Dasein’s fleeing from an understanding of itself and a more authentic way of Being, is rooted primarily in Dasein’s mooded attunement to the world. Most moods allow Dasein to conceal its understanding of itself in its own Being and flee into \textit{das Man}, to turn away from itself and the possibility of a more authentic mode of existence. As we have seen in section 4.4, tranquillity is the fundamental attunement of inauthentic everydayness, an attunement in which Dasein does not see the possibility of relating to the world in a more authentic way because it conceals such a possibility from itself. This analysis is stressed also in Heidegger’s comments on ‘bad moods. In these, Dasein becomes blind to itself, the environment with which it is concerned veils itself, the circumspection of concern gets led astray.’ (BT, 175) Here we see that, for Heidegger, the concealment or ‘not knowing’ of cases of complicity is even more pervasive than in analyses of self-deception. Dasein not only lacks some particular piece of self-knowledge, such that regaining that knowledge would

\(^{220}\) Baghramin and Nicholson 2013: 1019.
enable Dasein to overcome its complicity in its own unfreedom. Rather, Dasein conceals the possibility of a more authentic mode of Being in such a way that Dasein is understood as ‘blind’ to itself and its situation. For Heidegger, Dasein’s complicity in its own unfreedom should not be understood as an isolated event, but a pervasive way of Being-in-the-world. In order to overcome its complicity in its own unfreedom Dasein would have to unconceal its more authentic understanding of itself. But it would only be able to do this by becoming attuned to the world in a way that would engender such unconcealment.

6.1 Thrownness and Responsibility

For the most part, what turning away from thrownness enables Dasein to do is to conceal from itself an understanding of itself as Dasein, thus disburdening itself of its own Being and enabling it to be complicit in its own inauthenticity and unfreedom. Dasein’s complicity in such concealment is further elaborated in the idea that Dasein does not face up to itself and the fact that it is guilty. Guilt is often associated with shame, but whereas ‘shame attaches to and sharpens the sense of what one is... guilt attaches to what one does’. However, this characterisation does not straightforwardly apply in Heidegger’s case. The fact that Dasein is guilty is that of which the call of conscience makes Dasein aware. Being-guilty is bound up with the idea that Dasein has not yet taken hold of itself in its own way and embraced a more authentic mode of Being. However, Heidegger makes clear that Being-guilty is not to be understood in the everyday sense of having debts, a lack, or even as a relation which one has to others. (BT, 327) Rather, Being-guilty is defined as: ‘being the basis of a nullity’. (BT, 329) Understanding that one’s existence is based on a “nothingness”. There is no deep metaphysical truth to discover at the core of Dasein’s existence. There is only the fact of Dasein’s thrownness which is the basis for its existence.

The fact that Dasein did not choose its thrownness is what accounts for the nullity, the “not” which belongs to the existential meaning of “thrownness” (BT, 330) and is the basis for Dasein’s existence. Thus the “not” is what should ultimately be understood to characterise Dasein, as Francoise Raffoul suggests:

I must make myself the origin or basis of this existence of which I am not the origin... Dasein exists as thrown, that is to say, it did not bring itself into existence by first projecting itself on the basis of a pre-existing self. Is it then deprived of selfhood? Precisely not. Dasein’s proper self is constituted from this “nullity”; it at once belongs to itself and yet did not give itself to itself. The idea that I must make myself the origin or basis of this existence of which I am not the origin suggests a strong anti-foundationalist conception of the self, reiterating Heidegger’s claim that the only ‘essence’ Dasein can be said to have is the fact of its existence. Coming face to face with the “nothingness” at the core of Dasein’s Being manifests itself as an

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221 Sedgwick 2003: 37.
understanding of the burden of Being: ‘Although it has not laid that basis itself, it reposes in the weight of it, which is made manifest to it as a burden by its mood’. (BT, 330) As Dasein does not have an essence it comes to understand that it itself has sole responsibility for determining and understanding the whole of its existence. However, this is a burden in another sense. If Dasein is to take responsibility for the whole of its existence it must also take responsibility for that for which it is fundamentally not responsible: its thrownness. At the core of Dasein’s existence, then, there appears to be a contradiction, even a negation – another reflection of the nullity at the basis of Dasein’s Being: an impetus to take responsibility for every aspect of one’s existence and at the same time the impossibility of doing this, as one is always projecting oneself from a thrown basis which one did not choose.\textsuperscript{223}

Nevertheless, taking responsibility for one’s thrownness is essential if Dasein is to be its authentic own self, rather than an inauthentic they-self: ‘in being its Self, Dasein is, as a self, the entity that has been thrown. It has been released from its basis, not through itself but to itself, so as to be as this basis’. (BT, 330) This therefore begs the question of what kind of responsibility one can have for aspects of one’s existence that one did not choose. To take an example from Nancy J Holland:

\begin{quote}
We are not responsible for the language that we are born into, for the fact that we die, or for whether we are male or female in a society in which gender still yields huge disparities of power and freedom. But we are responsible for how we use language, what we create with it, how we harm or nurture others with our words... we are responsible for our own authenticity... for the effort to make the scripts that limit us less painful, less oppressive, less destructive to human life in all forms.\textsuperscript{224}
\end{quote}

Holland suggests that one need not be responsible for one’s thrownness in the sense of causing it or choosing it, as this is clearly impossible, but one can be responsible for one’s thrownness in the way one understands it, takes it up or appropriates it.

Following Holland, overcoming one’s complicity in one’s own unfreedom \textit{qua} becoming authentic and taking responsibility for oneself, will manifest itself in terms of the way in which Dasein relates to its possibilities. As she presents it, taking responsibility for my thrownness will consist in coming to have a particular kind of self-relation. At an everyday level we can understand this with regard to Heidegger’s claim that Dasein cannot choose its way of Being attuned to the world, itself and others, but it can, to an extent, master its moods. (BT, 175) In so doing Dasein can come to alter the way it feels about a situation. Rather than, for example, feeling defeated by my gender and viewing it as a barrier to ever achieving my dream of thriving in traditionally male dominated occupations, I can try and see my gender in a more positive light, something that I must attempt to take up into my existence and my particular way of Being-in-the-world, rather than thrust aside. What

\textsuperscript{223} We shall clarify Heidegger’s notion of projection in the next chapter.

\textsuperscript{224} Holland 2001: 143.
Dasein’s lack of essence – the nullity at the basis of its Being – communicates, is not that it is free from all constraints and can be whatever it wants to be as long as it simply tries hard enough. Rather, the point is that there is no necessary, essential and fixed significance of, for example, an agent’s gender or any other factual aspect of their existence. The fact that I am a woman does not mean that I am naturally nurturing or that I am irrational or that I am driven by my emotions. These may be cultural significations of my gender and they may be very difficult to overcome, but as I qua Dasein have no essential essence, there is no possibility of existence that is by definition ruled out, simply in virtue of my being a woman.225 Taking responsibility for myself will involve attempting to live my understanding of myself as Dasein in my everyday life.

However, this mode of facing up to and taking responsibility for my thrownness may begin to sound contradictory. On the one hand, facing up to my thrownness means recognising the nullity at the basis of my Being and accepting that I must take responsibility for myself because nothing can define me. On the other hand, facing up to my thrownness means taking up the facts of my life into my existence and not thrusting these aside. While the former seems to be a case of recognising I have no limitations, except for those limitations I impose on myself, the latter appears to be the recognition that I am always limited by those things I did not choose and cannot control. And yet this should not be seen as a limitation of Heidegger’s account. What Heidegger articulates in his analysis of thrownness and Dasein’s existential responsibility for itself is something like Beckett’s ‘I can’t go on. I’ll go on.’226 Ontologically I am free. However, ontically I will always be limited by the concrete situation in which I find myself. It is this recognition that I am always both free and not free that will constitute one of the ways in which I begin to overcome my complicity in my own unfreedom. Overcoming my complicity will involve trying to reconcile these two facts and live accordingly. I can try and lessen the hold of das Man and view the situation into which I have been thrown in terms of the possibilities it opens up, whilst not feeling disheartened by the possibilities that have already been shut down. In order to overcome my complicity in my own unfreedom, I must attempt to ‘live’ my freedom qua an authentic understanding of myself as Dasein in my concrete factual situation as best I can.

This account of responsibility returns us to the idea of authenticity as a critical and engaged way of Being-in-the-world, an account which is reflected in Dorothy Leland’s suggestion that we ‘can link authenticity to struggles over social meanings and see it as taking shape as part of a political practice.’227 On Leland’s reading, becoming authentic involves coming to recognise how, by prescribing and promoting a dominant way of Being, the public interpretations disseminated by das Man often serve to exclude minority groups.

225 Apart from, of course, things that are physically impossible for Dasein e.g. flying unaided.
and the everyday experiences of marginalised peoples in society. With regard to our analysis, this suggests that in authentic modes of Being Dasein will come to realise the way in which it has been complicit in promoting and endorsing these narratives by continuing to hand itself over to das Man, disburdening itself of its responsibility by accepting levelled down ways of Being-in and understanding the world. As Dasein gains a new perspective on das Man in authentic modes of Being, however, Dasein will come to appreciate its ability to transform the social world and the inauthentic everyday modes of Being and understanding in which it has been complicit. In authentic modes of Being, Leland suggests, Dasein will attempt to subvert the dictatorship of das Man by transforming the social world and the public discourses of everydayness, replacing the idea of das Man as a ‘monolithic totality’ ‘with talk of multiple and overlapping histories and practices.’

This authentic way of Being-in-the-world is strongly bound up with the notion of taking responsibility, not only for oneself, but for one’s world and others. As Holland suggests, the responsibility disclosed to us in thrownness should be understood not only in terms of being ‘responsible for our own authenticity’, but also as an understanding that we are responsible ‘for the effort to make the scripts that limit us less painful, less oppressive, less destructive to human life in all forms.’ This interpretation of what it is to take responsibility and become authentic, intimates that overcoming one’s complicity in one’s own unfreedom may not only be an individual project, but can also – and perhaps has to be – a collective project: a transformation of the social world.

In this chapter I have demonstrated how the insight into complicity drawn from the self-deception theorist can be accounted for in a Heideggerean analysis. I have offered an interpretation of tranquillity as the primary attunement of inauthentic everyday modes of Being and demonstrated how even ‘conflictual’ moods, such as shame, can be understood as compatible with, and able to be incorporated into, this overarching attunement. I have argued that tranquillity and the moods it incorporates serve to conceal Dasein’s understanding of its own Being as Dasein. I have also shown how such concealment can make Dasein complicit in its own inauthenticity and unfreedom by elaborating the regulatory function of moods. I then contrasted this analysis with an account of anxiety as the mood in which Dasein conceals an understanding of itself as Dasein. Through this analysis, I examined the way in which anxiety unconceals the phenomena and, together with a discussion of thrownness, demonstrated the role moods and attunements can be thought to play in helping Dasein overcome its complicity in its own unfreedom and engender a freer and more authentic way of Being-in-the-world. In so doing I have introduced the first element of what a Heideggerean account indicates overcoming complicity will involve. When

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228 Leland 2001: 123.
229 Holland 2001: 143.
Dasein unconceals a more authentic understanding of itself, it will take responsibility for itself by coming to have a new self-relation. This new self-relation will reflect an understanding of ourselves as Dasein, as in and through this relation agents will grasp the interplay between existential freedom and existentiell limitation that characterises their existence as Dasein. In the next chapter we shall continue to build up this picture of the self-relation, or what we might also term the self-understanding, that characterises non-complicit modes of Being in our examination of understanding, the second aspect of Dasein’s disclosedness.
Understanding and Dasein’s way of Being: The Insight from Autonomy

In the previous chapter it was argued that overcoming complicity involves the unconcealment of Dasein’s authentic self-relation. This unconcealment was characterised in a preliminary way in terms of uncovering oneself in one’s Being as Dasein. In this chapter we shall develop this analysis by turning to the insight of the autonomy theorist and the idea that an agent’s complicity in their own unfreedom should be approached in terms of the agent’s way of Being. By taking heed of this insight in a Heideggerean context, we shall be able to shed further light on what it means to uncover oneself in one’s Being as Dasein and how this can serve to help Dasein overcome its complicity in its own unfreedom and inauthenticity. This chapter aims to show that a Heideggerean approach to complicity reflects the insight of the autonomy theorist that we should understand complicity not just in terms of the acts an agent performs, but instead offer an analysis of complicity that says something about the agent in terms of their Being. Moreover, it aims to show that understanding oneself simply in terms of what one does – the acts one performs – characterises a mode of understanding in which Dasein is complicit in its own inauthenticity and unfreedom, since such a self-understanding conceals an understanding of oneself in one’s Being as Dasein. This conclusion shall be pursued by turning to the second aspect of disclosedness: understanding, and attempting to establish that, for Heidegger, understanding is something Dasein ‘is’ and not simply something Dasein ‘does’. By situating understanding in the broader context of the way of Being of the agent, we shall come to see how failing to understand can ground a complicit and unfree way of Being-in-the-world, whilst understanding ‘properly’ opens up the possibility of a freer and more authentic mode of existence.

1. Understanding as a Competence
Understanding is never purely cognitive for Heidegger. In *History of the Concept of Time* he writes: ‘understanding cannot be conceived as knowing, certainly not primarily, even when knowing is taken as a mode of being of Dasein’. Rather, for Heidegger understanding speaks of the more interactive engagement with the world that is described in the notion of concern. Dasein relates to the world not in terms of ‘bare perceptual cognition, but rather [with] that kind of concern which manipulates things and puts them to use’. (BT, 95)

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Heidegger develops this interactive account of understanding in section thirty one of *Being and Time* where he speaks of understanding as a competence. He writes:

When we are talking ontically we sometimes use the expression ‘understanding something’ with the signification of ‘being able to manage something’, ‘being a match for it’, being competent to do something’. In understanding, as an *existentiale*, that which we have such competence over is not a “what”, but Being as existing.(BT, 183)

Rather than using ‘understanding’ to signal the idea that Dasein knows some set of facts or propositions, Heidegger uses ‘understanding’ to designate an ability or capability of Dasein. Richard Schmitt takes this to mean that understanding in its most primordial form is a ‘knowing how to –’ and that ‘this sort of knowing of oneself and the world is “prior” to theoretical knowing’. However, as we see from the quotation above, Heidegger’s claim is not simply that Dasein has know-how with regard to particular activities, situations or people. Rather, he suggests that, at a more fundamental or ontological level, understanding reflects the fact that Dasein has some know-how or competence over ‘Being as existing’ (*Sein als Existieren*). (BT, 183) Examples of where Dasein has understood may manifest themselves in terms of practical knowledge – being able to use a hammer, construct a shed, ‘deal’ with the Germans – but these are only ontic, particular, concrete instances of understanding which do not fully express the ontological claim of having a competence over Being.

Understanding as a competence, then, seems to be something which encompasses, but is not necessarily reducible to practical knowledge. Indeed, the ontological question with regard to understanding becomes ‘in what way must the notion of competence be conceived such that it enables Dasein to understand the world in the practical, interactive way that it does?’ In order to investigate this we must ask what it could mean *ontologically* for understanding to be a competence which pertains not to a ‘what’, but to Being. Moreover, getting clear on the answer to this question will be key to our discussion of complicity. As we shall aim to establish, when Dasein has a competence over Being as existing, Dasein can Be-in the world in a freer and more authentic way. However, when Dasein understands in a deficient mode – that is, when it is ‘incompetent’ with regard to its understanding *qua* Being as existing – Dasein can be understood to be complicit in an inauthentic and unfree way of Being-in-the-world.

1.1 Competence as an Ability-to-be

One way of ontologically rendering the kind of competence or ‘know-how’ which is existentially characteristic of understanding is to take understanding as an ability-to-be.

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Heidegger clarifies the notion of understanding as a competence by arguing that ‘[t]he kind of Being which Dasein has, as potentiality-for-Being, [Sein-können] lies existentially in understanding’. (BT, 183)\textsuperscript{233} The key term here is ‘Sein-können’, later appearing without the hyphenation. It is translated by Macquarrie and Robinson as ‘potentiality-for-Being’, (BT, 183) Stambaugh renders it as ‘potentiality of being’\textsuperscript{234} whereas Richard Schmitt and William Blattner both argue it should be translated as ‘ability-to-be’.\textsuperscript{235} ‘Seinkönnen’ is a key term for Heidegger and is used frequently. It is that in terms of which the understanding is essentially understood, as Heidegger describes understanding ‘as a disclosive Seinkönnen’, (BT, 183) and later argues that ‘Understanding is the existential Being of Dasein’s own Seinkönnen’. (BT, 184) Therefore the way one understands the notion of Seinkönnen has a knock-on effect for the way one understands understanding, and ultimately Dasein itself.

By rendering ‘Seinkönnen’ as ‘ability-to-be’, Blattner helps to shed light on the idea that understanding should be thought of as a competence (Gekonnt).\textsuperscript{236} We can clearly see the etymological similarity in the German between competence (Gekonnt)\textsuperscript{237} and an ability-to-be (Seinkönnen) – können being the relevant verb stem in both cases. Blattner’s translation, however, brings out this relation more clearly for English readers, as the connection between a competence and an ability – rather than a competence and a ‘potentiality’, as Macquarrie and Robinson render it – is much more explicit.\textsuperscript{238} Furthermore, if we read understanding in this way, as an ability-to-be, we bring to light the connection of understanding and activity at an ontological level. An analysis which ties in with Schmitt’s initial claim that understanding is essentially a kind of know-how, as well as appearing to be a connection Heidegger himself wants to establish.

Heidegger argues that ‘everyday Dasein understands itself in terms of that with which it is customarily concerned. ‘One is’ what one does’. (BT, 283) We see, then, that understanding refers not only to something in my mind, but also to some practical way of Being in the world. For example, to understand myself as a teacher cannot just mean that I hold certain propositions. Rather, it appears to necessarily entail some corresponding actions (teaching), which in turn contribute to my way of Being-in-the-world (I am a teacher). In other words, I do not properly understand myself as a teacher unless I actually teach. Understanding as a competence elaborated in terms of an ability-to-be is not simply

\textsuperscript{234} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{235} Blattner, 1999: 34.
\textsuperscript{236} ‘Das im Verstehen als Existenzial Gekonnte ist kein Was, sondern das Sein als Existieren’. Heidegger 1927: 143.
\textsuperscript{237} Or as Stambaugh translates it ‘the thing we are able to do’. Heidegger [1927] 2010:139.
\textsuperscript{238} However, as I will argue shortly, although this connection is instructive it also covers up a useful distinction between doing and being.
understanding as practical knowledge then. It makes an existential claim about what I am, because for Heidegger – at least in the everyday world – the actions I perform have an existential significance.\(^{239}\) For Heidegger, what I do – at least in the everyday world – determines what I am, and what I do is dependent on the way I understand myself. Thus suggesting that, ultimately, the way I understand myself affects the way I exist.

Heidegger suggests that if I fail to understand myself properly then I am not able to ‘fulfil’ my potentiality-for-Being (Seinkönnen):

> In understanding, one’s own potentiality-for-Being [Seinkönnen] is disclosed in such a way that one’s Dasein always knows understandingly what it is capable of. It ‘knows’ this, however, not by having discovered some fact, but by maintaining itself in an existentiell possibility. The kind of ignorance which corresponds to this, does not consist in an absence or cessation of understanding, but must be regarded as a deficient mode of the projectedness of one’s potentiality-for-Being. (BT, 385)

Because understanding determines what Dasein thinks it is capable of, if we do not understand properly we do not realise what we can do and, perhaps more significantly, what we can be. Deficient modes of understanding do not just involve lacking some piece of knowledge. Rather, Heidegger implies that if we do not understand ourselves, others and our world ‘properly’,\(^{240}\) we may close off certain ways of Being-in-the-world. Namely, those freer and more authentic modes of Being of which Dasein is always capable, but of which it may not be aware.\(^{241}\)

To summarise, the way I understand myself affects the way I exist in two senses. To understand myself as something cannot just mean to hold certain propositions. To understand myself as something I must enact this knowledge: I must do certain things that reflect my self-understanding, or rather, justify me having such a self-understanding.

Secondly, regardless of what I understand myself as – a teacher, a friend, a kind person, etc. – a failure to ‘properly’ understand not only what I am in terms of what I do, but what I am capable of may close off not only certain acts, but those freer and more authentic ways of Being which are associated with properly understanding my existential potential as Dasein.

As was argued in Chapter Two, all other things being equal, if Dasein is inauthentic,\(^{242}\) this means that Dasein is complicit in its inauthenticity.\(^{243}\) This idea is articulated even more explicitly with regard to understanding, as fleeing is characterised as the flight from a more authentic understanding of one’s own Being. A failure to understand

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\(^{239}\) This claim finds further support in the idea that Dasein has no essence other than the facts of its existence. (BT, 67) It is only at the end of its life that it becomes a ‘whole’ in the sense of something determinate.

\(^{240}\) I mean ‘properly’ at an existential level. Dasein can make ontical mistakes – taking that cow to be far away, when it is in fact actually just a small model cow that is close up – without falling foul of the inauthentic and problematic ways of Being with which Heidegger associates deficient modes of understanding.

\(^{241}\) A lack of awareness that, as we have seen in the previous chapter, is explained in terms of the way moods can conceal certain understandings from Dasein. See Chapter Three, section six.

\(^{242}\) i.e. exists in a predominantly inauthentic mode.

\(^{243}\) Chapter Two, section four.
oneself properly is thus a form of Dasein’s complicity in its own inauthenticity and unfreedom. What our analysis now seeks to clarify is the particular way of understanding oneself that can be identified with a complicit and unfree way of Being-in-the-world. And, conversely, the kind of understanding that is conducive to Dasein overcoming its complicity and Being-in-the-world in a freer and more authentic way. In order to do this we must attempt to further clarify what it means for understanding to be taken as an ability-to-be and how the way I understand myself affects the way in which I am ‘in’ the world.

1.2. Understanding and Existence: Ability-to-be and the For-the-sake-of-which

Although it is clear that Heidegger thinks that the way I understand myself affects the way I exist, we may still want to ask why this should be the case. Is there anything more we can say about how understanding is bound up with existence and an ability-to-be? The relation between understanding and existence, it seems, is to be found in the relation between understanding and the for-the-sake-of-which:

In the “for-the-sake-of-which”, existing Being-in-the-world is disclosed as such, and this disclosedness we have called “understanding”. In the understanding of the “for-the-sake-of-which”, the significance which is grounded therein, is disclosed along with it. (BT, 182)

Here Heidegger suggests that to understand is to understand a for-the-sake-of-which. For-the-sake-of-whichs are one of the reference relations that constitute the world. For Heidegger, the term ‘world’ primarily refers not to the totality of entities in the world, but to a system of reference relations that give entities their meaning. (BT, 93) As Being-in-the-world, Dasein not only finds itself among these reference relations, it also finds itself already involved in them. The reference relations that constitute the world not only designate relations between entities that are used in combination with one another (‘in-order-to’ (BT, 97)), they also refer back to natural entities (‘whereof’ (BT, 100)), forward to that which can be produced (‘towards-which’ (BT, 99)), and ultimately point to Dasein itself (‘for-the-sake-of-which’ (BT,116-117)). The for-the-sake-of-which is defined as ‘the interconnection by which the structure of an involvement leads to Dasein’s very Being’. (BT, 117) This description again brings out the connection between understanding and ‘doing’ that we have attempted to establish above in the characterisation of understanding as an ability-to-be, because further defining an ability-to-be in terms of understanding a for-the-sake-of-which explicitly connects understanding with Dasein’s worldly involvements.

The for-the-sake-of-which defines a possibility of Dasein, something Dasein can do. Dasein builds a shed for-the-sake-of-sheltering; Dasein cooks for-the-sake-of-eating. For-the-sake-of-whichs should be understood as the lynch pin of the world, as it is the purposeful activity of Dasein defined by this term, that gives all the other reference relations their meaning. For example, it is only in relation to a for-the-sake-of-sheltering that the towards-which of building a shed, or the in-order-to of hammering makes sense. We see this idea
affirmed in Heidegger’s claim that ‘[i]n the understanding of the “for-the-sake-of-which”, the significance which is grounded therein, is disclosed along with it’. (BT, 182) Here Heidegger seems to suggest that it is only by understanding a for-the-sake-of-which that Dasein is able to grasp the significance [Bedeutsamkeit] or meaningfulness of the rest of the world and the entities in it.

Moreover, it is in understanding a for-the-sake-of-which that Dasein comes to understand itself, as Heidegger argues that ‘... understanding throws itself primarily into the “for-the-sake-of-which”; that is, Dasein exists as itself’. (BT, 186) It seems, then, to understand oneself in terms of a for-the-sake-of-which can be seen as a further clarification of understanding as an ability-to-be. In understanding a for-the-sake-of-which Dasein expresses its Being as Dasein and its distinctive ability to understand the world, others and itself in terms of a meaningful system of reference relations. It therefore seems that understanding can be understood as Dasein’s ability to understand for-the-sake-of-whichs.

1.3 Consequences of Reducing Dasein’s Ability-to-be to a For-the-sake-of-which

However, interpreting understanding in this way raises some problems with regard to our analysis of complicity. We have moved from the notion of understanding as a competence to the idea that understanding is an ability-to-be, and finally to the idea that understanding is an ability to understand for-the-sake-of-whichs. It may be tempting, then, to argue that we can reduce Dasein’s ability-to-be (Seinkönnen) to the for-the-sake-of-which as such, suggesting that all understanding fundamentally is, is Dasein’s ability to understand (itself) in terms of for-the-sake-of-whichs. Such a reading would suggest that what I am/what I could be is determined by the for-the-sake-of-whichs in terms of which I understand myself. For example, this reading implies that it is only by understanding myself in terms of a for-the-sake-of-teaching that I can then come to understand myself in terms of my ability-to-be-a-teacher.

Although this interpretation does find some textual support,\textsuperscript{244} it raises some problems with regard to Dasein’s possibility to become authentic, because it implies that all Dasein essentially is at a fundamental level is a collection of roles.\textsuperscript{245} This is a line of argument to which John Haugeland seems committed. Haugeland argues that, for Heidegger, understanding should ‘first and foremost’ be taken as ‘self-understanding’ which is a ‘casting oneself into roles’.\textsuperscript{246} Haugeland writes: ‘part of my self-understanding, for

\textsuperscript{244} For example, Heidegger argues that the for-the-sake-of-which points towards Dasein’s Being (BT, 117) and suggests that within the everyday world Dasein is what it does (BT, 163), intimating that Dasein’s understanding of itself in terms of a specific for-the-sake-of-which is an understanding which captures something important about Dasein’s Being.

\textsuperscript{245} Dreyfus argues that ‘As a first approximation, we can think of the for-the-sake-of-whichs to which Dasein “assigns itself” as social “roles” and “goals”.’ Dreyfus 1991: 95.

\textsuperscript{246} Haugeland 1992: 39.
instance, might be casting myself as a school teacher or a chess-player. These roles which a
case of Dasein plays determine not what but who it is. Here Haugeland makes explicit an
argument that can be implicitly found in Blattner’s take on the relation between
understanding as a competence and understanding as an ability-to-be. Haugeland suggests
that what Dasein does, i.e. its competence, its ability to play certain roles, determines who it
is. That is, he seems to suggest that we can understand Dasein’s ability-to-be in terms of
roles. Although Haugeland recognises that ‘self-casting into roles... can never be simple’, and
that '[e]ven so focussed a commitment as keeping a single promise [i.e. casting oneself in the
role of a promiser] entails anticipating and satisfying prerequisites, recognizing and
overcoming obstacles, being able to tell when it has been kept, and sticking with it until
done’. He nevertheless implies that Dasein is nothing more than a collection of roles.

There are two problems with this analysis. Firstly, this understanding of what Dasein
essentially is gives primacy to the for-the-sake-of-which over an ability-to-be, as it is the for-
the-sake-of-which that is explicitly bound up with the world and these kind of role
relations. Dasein’s ability-to-be (Seinkönnen), however, seems to be something in excess
of roles, and thus to understand what Dasein essentially is – to render Dasein’s ability-to-be
as merely something Dasein can do – misses the complexity of understanding defined in
terms of an ability-to-be (Seinkönnen). Secondly, but relatedly, to suggest that Dasein is
nothing more than a collection of roles jeopardises Dasein’s ability to overcome its
complicity and Be-in the world in a freer and more authentic way. As was argued in Chapter
Two, to understand oneself primarily in terms of the roles one occupies can alienate an agent
from their own agency and make them complicit in their own inauthenticity and
unfreedom. This issue is intimately bound up with the first problem. Just as grasping
understanding as an ability-to-be qua an ability to understand for-the-sake-of-whichs
obscures the significance of understanding as a Seinkönnen, so understanding oneself in
terms of the roles one occupies obscures an understanding of ourselves as Dasein.

Accordingly, rather than taking this account of understanding qua an ability-to-
understand-for-the-sake-of-whichs as the primary way in which we should grasp Heidegger’s
account of understanding, I contend that it is better taken as an interpretation of inauthentic
modes of understanding. That is, an interpretation of what is distinctive about modes of
understanding in which Dasein is complicit in its own inauthenticity and unfreedom. This
claim can be drawn out further by turning to the work of Stephen Mulhall and his
interpretation of inauthenticity as undifferentiatedness (Indifferenz).

248 Ibid.
250 Chapter Two, section six.
1.3.1 Social Roles and Inauthenticity

In his book *Inheritance and Originality*, Mulhall focuses on the undifferentiatedness of everydayness. In contrast to Hubert Dreyfus, Mulhall argues that undifferentiatedness is not something distinct from inauthenticity, but rather constitutive of it. Mulhall writes:

Inauthenticity... involve[s] Dasein’s disowning of itself, being oblivious to its mineness (to the fact that it is in each case mine and not yours to live)... this indifference to itself is realized in an essentially undifferentiated existence. 252

In his reading, Mulhall emphasises the connections between ‘inauthenticity’ (*Uneigentlichkeit*), literally ‘un-ownedness’, as a way of relating to oneself and ‘undifferentiatedness’, or ‘indifference’ 253 (*Indifferenz*), as an everyday way of Being. Mulhall suggests that we should not distinguish between inauthentic and undifferentiated modes of Being, but instead see them as one and the same. Accordingly, he argues that ‘authentic modes of existence... appear as essentially differentiated’, 254 concluding that inauthenticity and authenticity should be associated with undifferentiatedness and differentiatedness, respectively, and therefore that throughout Division I of *Being and Time* Heidegger is elucidating Dasein in and through inauthentic modes of Being. 255

Mulhall’s interpretation of inauthenticity *qua* undifferentiatedness enables us to clarify the status of everydayness within *Being and Time*, thus illuminating the scope of inauthentic modes of existence. 256 However, it does not fully elaborate what it means to exist in an undifferentiated mode. Accordingly, I shall now attempt to elucidate the notion of undifferentiatedness in order to further expound what is distinctive about those modes of Being and self-understanding in which Dasein is complicit in its own inauthenticity and unfreedom. In our everyday usage, ‘undifferentiated’ means roughly (1) that two or more things are not different from one another, or (2) that we do not – or are unable to – distinguish between these things. For undifferentiatedness to be a mode of existence or, as William Blattner puts it, ‘a manner in which Dasein can lead its life’, 257 undifferentiatedness will have to characterise the way Dasein is ‘in’ the world. That is, the way it relates to entities, others and itself. Accordingly, I suggest that the second characterisation – undifferentiatedness as not making distinctions – is the more promising option. 258 In this sense, undifferentiatedness implies an inattentive way of Being-in-the-world and encountering entities, a characterisation which reflects the kind of inauthentic, ‘average’ and

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251 Dreyfus 1991: 27.
256 See Knowles *forthcoming* for an account of the status of everydayness with regard to authentic and inauthentic modes of Being.
257 Blattner 2013: 322.
258 Whereas (1) suggests a state of affairs or fact about the world, (2) suggests that the lack of differentiation is in some way attributable to the agent encountering the phenomena.
generic way of Being-in-the-world described in Chapter Four of *Being and Time*. (BT, 165) Moreover, to interpret inauthenticity *qua* undifferentiatedness in this way coheres well with the inauthentic, everyday way in which Dasein relates to itself and others via social roles, norms and practices, as is described at the outset of Division II of *Being and Time*.\(^{259}\) It also intimates that social roles manifest the inauthentic aspect of Dasein’s Being, thus echoing my analysis from Chapter Two, that to understand oneself primarily in terms of social roles can engender an unfree and inauthentic mode of existence in which Dasein is alienated from its own agency.

Social roles are not unique to us, as they are roles that any other Dasein could occupy and in so doing, ‘within certain limits, ‘be’ another Dasein’. (BT, 284) This suggests that social roles manifest a necessarily undifferentiated aspect of our existence, an idea which finds support in Heidegger’s claim that in the everyday social world of *das Man* ‘representability is not only quite possible but is even constitutive for our being with one another’. (BT, 283-4) That is to say, in the everyday social world another Dasein can always stand in for us and perform the roles we perform. For example, we might say that we do not differentiate one bus driver from another – I do not relate to the person who drives me to work as a particular person. Rather, I relate to them in an undifferentiated and inattentive way, encountering them primarily via the social role they perform. Heidegger suggests such an analysis when he first introduces encounters with other Dasein into his ontology: ‘they *are* what they do’. (BT, 163) Accordingly, just as I relate to the bus driver primarily *as* a bus driver, the bus driver does not encounter me as the unique individual that I am. Rather, she encounters me as just another passenger, part of the crowd. When we are in the world and relate to others in this way, we exist in an inauthentic undifferentiated mode of Being, where ‘every Other is like the next’. (BT, 164)\(^{260}\)

More significantly for our analysis, however, in addition to relating to others in this undifferentiated way, I can also relate to myself in an undifferentiated mode. For example, as was suggested in Chapter Two, in inauthentic modes of Being I understand myself via the generic social roles I perform: I relate to myself as a teacher, as a housewife etc. We can now say that when I do this I am relating to myself in an undifferentiated way. Understanding myself via this inauthentic and undifferentiated mode, and acting simply in accordance with the roles I perform, means that I will act in a situation in the same way as anyone else.

\(^{259}\) Heidegger himself does not use the terms ‘norms’ or ‘social roles’. However, it has become common practice in the secondary literature to talk in this way. See for example, Dreyfus 1991: 20, 24, 44, 152 and Haugeland 1992: 31.

\(^{260}\) One might object that we do differentiate people when we relate to them via their roles and thus that role play is not inherently inauthentic *qua* undifferentiated. In response we can note that there are degrees of undifferentiatedness, an analysis which is in-keeping with the claim that there are degrees of inauthenticity and authenticity, as argued in Chapter Two section 3.1.
performing the same role would act. As was argued in Chapter Two, when an agent relates to and understands themselves in this way they are complicit in their own inauthenticity and unfreedom, since they alienate themselves from their own agency and do not appreciate their ability to act otherwise than in accordance with the generic and levelled down dictates ‘prescribed’ by das Man and their social role. (BT, 165)

Given this analysis of social roles and the way in which they are bound up with inauthentic qua undifferentiated modes of existence, we should take the interpretation of understanding as reducible to understanding for-the-sake-of-whichs to be characteristic – not of Dasein’s understanding in general – but of a particular undifferentiated and inauthentic mode of understanding.

2. An Alternative Conception of Understanding

To summarise, I have argued that our first interpretation of understanding as a competence over Being as existing has led to a way of conceiving of modes of understanding in which Dasein is complicit in its own inauthenticity and unfreedom. In such modes Dasein understands itself and others in an undifferentiated way by relating to itself and others, primarily in terms of social roles. This mode of understanding, I have suggested, is explained at an ontological level by reducing understanding qua Seinkönnen to understanding for-the-sake-of-whichs. In order to grasp what is characteristic of modes of understanding in which Dasein is not complicit in its own unfreedom, then, we must resist this reduction and look more closely at the distinction between understanding as an ability to be (Seinkönnen) and understanding as the ability to understand for-the-sake-of-whichs.

The reduction of understanding as an ability-to-be, to understanding as understanding for-the-sake-of-whichs (a reduction that I have argued is implied on Haugeland’s account of understanding as role casting), is problematic because it misconstrues the relation between the for-the-sake-of-which and Dasein’s ability-to-be (Seinkönnen). In contrast to Haugeland’s account, it appears that it is only because Dasein is essentially an ability-to-be (Seinkönnen) that Dasein is able to understand itself in terms of for-the-sake-of-whichs, or roles. Heidegger describes Dasein as an ability-to-be in terms of Being-possible. He writes:

The Being-possible which is essential for Dasein, pertains to the ways of its solicitude for Others and of its concerns with the ‘world’, as we have characterised them; and in all these, and always, it pertains to Dasein’s potentiality-for-Being [Seinkönnen], for its own sake [umwillen seiner]. (BT, 183 translation modified)

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261 This may appear to suggest that in inauthentic modes of Being we are all just unthinking automata. Again we must remember that undifferentiatedness can exist in degrees. Even when Dasein is dominated by an inauthentic and undifferentiated mode of Being, it will still manifest a glimmer of authenticity and differentiatedness.
Here Heidegger is not simply equating Dasein’s ability-to-be with an ability to understand for-the-sake-of-whichs. Rather, as we shall see, he is saying that Dasein’s ability-to-be (Seinkönnen) should be understood as a Being-possible (Möglichsein).

If this is the case, Dasein’s ability-to-be (Seinkönnen) cannot be exhausted by roles or for-the-sake-of-whichs, not only because this would render Dasein essentially inauthentic, but also, because of the particular way in which Heidegger understands possibilities. In the following sections I shall develop an alternative interpretation of understanding and examine how emphasising the relation between Dasein’s ability-to-be (Seinkönnen) and Dasein as Being-possible suggests a way of overcoming the problem I have identified with Haugeland’s approach. I shall also examine how this enables us to develop an account of what is distinctive about modes of understanding in which Dasein is not complicit in its own inauthenticity and unfreedom. I shall explore the way in which understanding Dasein in terms of its ability-to-be (Seinkönnen), or ‘potentiality-for-Being’ as I shall now translate it,262 is a key aspect of grasping Dasein’s in its authenticity, thus supporting the claim that complicity should be analysed in terms of an agent’s way of Being and not just in terms of the acts they perform. I shall aim to establish that it is only when Dasein properly understands itself in terms of its potentiality-for-Being (or Seinkönnen) as a Being-possible – which is something distinct from the specific roles in terms of which it understands itself – that Dasein can overcome its complicity in its inauthenticity and unfreedom and come to Be-in the world in a freer and more authentic way.

2.1 Possibility

The key to grasping what is distinctive about modes of understanding in which Dasein is not complicit in its own inauthenticity and unfreedom and is thus able to Be-in the world in a freer and more authentic way, is to recognise that Dasein’s ‘potentiality-for-Being’ (Seinkönnen) is not essentially defined in terms of roles or for-the-sake-of-whichs, but in terms of possibilities. As Richard Schmitt notes, ‘[w]hereas, traditionally, human beings were thought to have possibilities, Heidegger wants us to think that they are their possibilities’.263 Accordingly, the possibilities that characterise Dasein’s Seinkönnen are not simply possibilities Dasein has, but possibilities that Dasein is. As such, Dasein’s does not simply have a Seinkönnen, an ability-to-be or a potentiality-for-Being; rather, Dasein is this ability-to-be or potentiality-for-Being. Heidegger makes it clear early on in Being and Time that he is rejecting a substance ontology. (BT, 72-73) Dasein is not a ‘thing’ with properties,

262 I choose to translate Seinkönnen as potentiality-for-Being both to instigate a break from an interpretation where Seinkönnen is reduced to understanding a for-the-sake-of-which, but also because the notion of ‘potentiality’, rather than ‘ability’ helps get us closer to the way in which Heidegger grasps understanding as signalling an excess, something not-yet, or something undecided at the base of Dasein’s Being.

or even a ‘thing’ with possibilities, as this would leave the underlying notion of the ‘thing’ that Dasein is – the substance – unexplained. Rather than posit a substance ontology, Heidegger claims that ‘the substance of man is existence’, (BT, 362) an understanding which is elaborated via the various ‘existentialles’ or ‘state[s] of Dasein’s Being’ (BT, 79) examined in Being and Time.

As Dasein is a ‘who’ rather than a ‘what’, (BT, 71) it would be inappropriate to understand Dasein as a thing with properties. Rather, Heidegger understands Dasein as a way of Being with possibilities. This translation of property talk into possibility talk, again emphasises that Dasein is not to be understood as a static entity, but should be understood as a way of Being. To elaborate this distinction we can draw a parallel with Marx’s analysis of commodities.264 For Marx, a commodity is a form of congealed labour. It is the outcome of a process that will feed into another process. Similarly, for Heidegger Dasein can be understood as congealed possibilities. That is to say, what Dasein essentially is, is the possibilities into which it was thrown and the possibilities that it projects from this position.265 This characterisation of possibilities as something Dasein is, rather than something Dasein has, further problematises a reading where understanding is fundamentally construed in terms of understanding for-the-sake-of-whichs. As we have seen, the for-the-sake-of-which primarily characterises possibilities as things Dasein can do. Accordingly, these possibilities are particular possibilities Dasein could have or actualise. They are often defined in terms of roles, as we have seen in section 1.3. However, the possibilities Dasein is in terms of its Seinkönnen are not definite or particular possibilities, rather they are ‘possibilities as possibilities’. (BT, 185)

But how should we understand this claim? Richard Schmitt argues that Heidegger ‘wants to use a concept of possibility that is different from either logical or physical possibility’.266 This alternative kind of possibility, embodied in Dasein as a Seinkönnen, is a weaker sense of possibility than possibility thought in terms opposed to actuality or necessity, as it is defined as the ‘merely possible’, (BT, 183) but it is also the most primordial sense of possibility. To say that Dasein is essentially possibility, is not to oppose possibility to actuality in Dasein’s Being, nor to claim that there is some possible way Dasein could be which is aimed towards and actualised, thus ridding Dasein of possibility and bringing it into actuality. This may be a construal of possibility in the context of roles or a for-the-sake-of-which, but this does not capture the fundamental relation between possibility and understanding that Heidegger imagines at an ontological level. The idea that ‘Dasein is its possibility’ (BT, 68) suggests that Dasein is not only its future possibilities, but rather its whole Being is comprised of possibilities – possibilities it pressed ahead into, possibilities it

265 We shall examine what exactly it means to project possibilities in the next section.
partially realised, possibilities it rejected or avoided, possibilities it was thrown into. Every element of Dasein’s existence – past, present and future – can be understood in terms of possibilities, and indeed Heidegger goes on to say that ‘possibility as an existential is the most primordial and ultimate positive way in which Dasein is characterized ontologically’.

(BT, 183)

Coming to grasp Dasein’s Being in terms of possibilities and, in turn, comprehending the way in which understanding must also be interpreted in terms of possibilities, furnishes us with a way to grasp understanding qua Seinkönnen without reducing it to Dasein’s ability to understand for-the-sake-of-whichs. An analysis which, in turn, offers us the means to characterise modes of understanding in which Dasein is not complicit in its own inauthenticity and unfreedom and can thus come to Be-in the world in a freer and more authentic way.

2.2 Projection

In order to offer an account of modes of understanding in which Dasein is not complicit in its own inauthenticity and unfreedom, we must come to understand what ‘possibilities as possibilities’ are, how they are distinct from the particular possibilities articulated in for-the-sake-of-whichs, and how Dasein’s potentiality-for-Being as a ‘Being-possible’ plays a key role in Dasein coming to Be-in the world in a freer and more authentic way. To do this we must turn to projection as the structural aspect of Dasein’s understanding.

Heidegger argues that ‘the understanding always press[es] forward in to possibilities’ because ‘the understanding has in itself the existential structure which we call “projection” [Entwurf]’. (BT, 184-185) We see, then, that the fundamental relation between understanding and possibilities is to be found in the structure of understanding as the projection of possibilities. But what does this term mean? As Macquarrie and Robinson note in their translation of Being and Time, the meaning of projection (Entwurf) ‘and the cognate verb ‘entwerfen’ is that of ‘throwing’ something ‘off’ or ‘away’ from one’. (BT, 185, n.1) This suggests that the temporal orientation of understanding is one directed towards the future. The process of projecting possibilities means roughly laying out a number of different ways Dasein could be and then pressing ahead into certain ways of Being – certain possibilities – and closing off others. However, this need not be the projection of a definite life plan.

Projection does not only characterise, for example, my desire to be a mountain climber and the consequent actions I take to achieve this goal or for-the-sake-of-which. Rather, Heidegger suggests that the projection of possibilities characterises every way of Dasein’s Being-in-the-world. (BT, 185) Projection describes both the way Dasein comes to understand itself and what it is capable of, but also the way it comes to grasp and interact with entities in the world. Accordingly Heidegger argues that: ‘with equal primordiality the understanding
projects Dasein’s Being both upon its “for-the-sake-of-which” and upon significance, as the worldhood of its current world’. (BT, 185)

The projection of possibilities is the structure by which Dasein’s meaningful encounter with, for example, a hammer is made possible. In order to use the hammer, Dasein projects the possibility of hammering – a possibility of Dasein’s Being – on to the significance of the hammer, i.e. on to the hammer understood as ready-to-hand. Clearly this cannot be understood as a linear process, because in order for Dasein to grasp hammering as a possibility of its own Being, Dasein must have already grasped the hammer as a hammer, i.e. Dasein must have grasped the hammer in terms of the possibility of Being ready-to-hand for hammering. This suggests, then, that understanding as the projection of possibilities is something which is always occurring, and indeed has always already occurred. Dasein cannot get outside of projecting possibilities, or be said to begin projecting possibilities, because to be Dasein is to project possibilities. (BT, 185)

Moreover, we see that to understand anything is to understand it in terms of possibilities. To understand the hammer is to understand it as ready-to-hand, which means to understand it in terms of its possibility to be used in-order-to-hammer. This implies that the referential totality of the world, should be taken as a system of referential possibilities. It is these possibilities which make up the meaning of an entity and allow Dasein to interact with entities in the way that it does. Indeed, Heidegger argues that ‘the totality of involvements is revealed as the categorical whole of a possible interconnection of the ready-to-hand’. (BT, 184) Thus we see that to understand anything – whether that be entities, other Dasein, or indeed oneself – is to understand it in terms of possibilities.

However, the possibilities Dasein projects in understanding are not possible for-the-sake-of-whiches. Rather, Dasein projects onto for-the-sake-of-whiches as Heidegger argues that ‘with equal primordiality the understanding projects Dasein’s Being both upon its “for-the-sake-of-which” and upon significance, as the worldhood of its current world’. (BT, 185 emphasis added) This idea is further clarified in the claim that:

The character of understanding as projection is such that the understanding does not grasp thematically that upon which it projects – that is to say, possibilities. Grasping it in such a manner would take away from what is projected its very character as a possibility, and would reduce it to the given contents which we have in mind; whereas projection, in throwing, throws before itself the possibility as possibility, and lets it be

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267 To encounter entities as meaningful qua ready-to-hand is to encounter them as useful, (BT, 98) and this in turn is only possible because Dasein encounters entities in a totality of relations. (BT, 97) Put simply, a piece of equipment or a ‘useful thing’, such as a pen, cannot be what it is (i.e. useful) in abstraction from other useful things. (BT, 97) The pen is of no use for writing if there is nothing to write on. To understand what the pen is, to grasp it as meaningful, is just to understand the particular set of ‘reference’ relations that characterise it. (BT,105) These reference relations were elaborated in section 1.2.

268 Indeed, Heidegger argues that the structure of understanding is circular. (BT, 194-195)
as such. As projecting, understanding is the kind of Being of Dasein in which it is its possibilities as possibilities (BT, 185).

This further clarification of understanding qua potentiality-for-Being enables us to distinguish more explicitly between complicit and non-complicit interpretations of understanding at an ontological level. Whereas non-complicit modes of understanding are those in which Dasein grasps itself as projecting possibilities as possibilities; in modes of understanding in which Dasein is complicit in its own inauthenticity and unfreedom, it only grasps itself as projecting particular for-the-sake-of-whichs.

2.2.1 Projection and Interpretation

We have now seen how we can distinguish complicit from non-complicit modes of understanding at an ontological level in terms of an emphasis on possibility rather than on for-the-sake-of-whichs. However, we have not yet seen how these different modes of understanding manifest themselves in terms of different ways of understanding the world. In order to do this we must turn to interpretation. Heidegger argues that interpretation is the ‘development of the understanding… in it the understanding appropriates understandingly that which is understood by it. In interpretation, understanding does not become something different. It becomes itself’. (BT, 188) We should therefore take Heidegger’s discussion of interpretation as a way of clarifying exactly how the understanding functions.

Heidegger develops the notion of interpretation in a similar way to understanding, again emphasising that it is not a theoretical kind of knowledge, but that it is the basis for Dasein’s engagement and interaction with the world. He writes: ‘Nor is interpretation the acquiring of information about what is understood; it is rather the working-out of possibilities projected in understanding’. (BT, 188-189) This ‘working out of possibilities’ manifests itself as the particular type of ‘sight’ characteristic of Dasein’s Being which always sees things as things. Heidegger argues that ‘that which is disclosed in understanding – that which is understood – is already accessible in such a way that its ‘as which’ can be made to stand out explicitly’. (BT, 189) However, this does not mean that interpretation is reducible to assertion. Interpretation is not simply the claim that ‘this hammer is heavy’; rather, it is a way of interacting with the world on the basis of interpreting the hammer as heavy. For example, if I interpret myself as a carpenter I spend my days using tools to make things from wood, similarly if I interpret the fruit as ripe I pick it from the tree. This is a further clarification of the claim discussed in section 1.1 that the way I understand myself and the world around me affects the way I exist, since the way I understand the world, myself and others in terms of the ‘as’ structure of interpretation affects the way I interact with and am ‘in’ the world. Heidegger argues that understanding the world through the lens of this ‘as’

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269 Ripeness example taken from Polt 1999: 71.
structure is not something Dasein has to consciously do, or indeed something it can escape. Rather, it is the most primordial way in which Dasein encounters the world. (BT, 190)

Although Dasein may not be able to escape from interpretation, there are different modes of interpretation. In Being and Time Heidegger outlines two different ways in which Dasein can encounter and interpret the world. Whereas the interpretations and ways of disclosing the world associated with das Man are ones which ‘pervert the act of disclosing [Erchliessen] into an act of closing off [Verschliessen]’, (BT, 213) authentic modes of interpreting and disclosing the world are ones in which Dasein is genuinely opened onto the world, itself and others. Whilst the former are modes of interpretation that are characteristic of understanding as it manifests Dasein’s complicity in its own unfreedom and inauthenticity, the latter characterise modes of interpretation in which Dasein is not complicit in its own inauthenticity and thus can come to Be-in the world in a freer and more authentic way.

The way in which interpretations can either disclose or close off, conceal or unconceal the phenomena is fleshed out in Heidegger’s discussion of ‘fore-conception’, one of the three structural elements of interpretation. In developing this analysis we shall build on the argument of the previous chapter that complicity involves a kind of concealment, whilst overcoming complicity is characterised by an unconcealment. In what follows I shall examine how the concepts of concealment and unconcealment articulate themselves in two different forms of interpretation, thus elaborating the modes of understanding that accompany the moods in which the phenomena are either concealed or unconcealed.

Turning to fore-conception as an aspect of interpretation, Heidegger writes:

In such an interpretation, the way in which the entity we are interpreting is to be conceived can be drawn from the entity itself, or the interpretation can force the entity into concepts to which it is opposed in its manner of Being. In either case, the interpretation has already decided for a definite way of conceiving it, either with finality or with reservations, it is grounded in something we grasp in advance – in a fore-conception. (BT, 191)

Fore-conception, then, is the process of ‘forcing an entity into a formal concept’, explicitly conceptualising an entity as something. As Richard Polt argues, the fore-structure of interpretation expresses the view that ‘[t]here is no knowledge or experience free of

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270 This mode of understanding is associated with a ‘closing off’, which echoes the notion of concealment, developed in the previous chapter as one of the key aspects of complicity.
271 The fore-structure of the understanding has three interdependent moments. Firstly, ‘fore-having’. (BT, 191) the idea that ‘one has already understood one’s environment and takes it for granted in an unreflective way’. Nagel 2001: 292. Secondly, fore-sight, which “takes the first cut” out of what has been taken into our fore-having’. (BT, 191) This is the process of picking out an entity from the totality of relations, and moving towards interpreting it as a definite thing. And lastly fore-conception, elaborated above.
272 As we saw in Chapter Three, ‘an attunement [Befindlichkeit] always has its understanding’ and ‘understanding always has its mood’. (BT, 182)
prejudices, that is, prejudgments’.\textsuperscript{273} Whilst this is certainly a claim to which Heidegger is committed, more can be said about the way in which these prejudgments are formed, and how some are characteristic of modes of interpretation where Dasein is complicit in its own inauthenticity and unfreedom, whilst others reflect a more authentic way of interpreting the world.

In modes of interpretation in which Dasein is considered complicit in its own inauthenticity and unfreedom, Dasein remains in thrall to \textit{das Man} and the public way in which things have been interpreted. This echoes the stubborn, dogmatic relation to \textit{das Man} and the norms of everydayness, developed in the previous chapter as one of the core tenets of inauthentic modes of Being.\textsuperscript{274} In modes of understanding\textsuperscript{275} where Dasein remains in thrall to \textit{das Man}, Dasein often comes to misunderstand and thus close off the phenomena, since in these modes of understanding:

We do not so much understand the entities which are talked about; we already are listening only to what is said-in-the-talk as such. What is said-in-the-talk gets understood; but what the talk is about is understood only approximately and superficially. (BT, 212)

This mode of interpreting and understanding the world involves a kind of concealment – it conceals the entity talked about – thus bolstering the claim that this mode of interpretation is characteristic of complicity.

By contrast, in more authentic modes of interpretation Dasein discloses rather than closes off the phenomena. This is because Dasein is attentive not only to the public way in which things have been interpreted, but is also open to the things themselves and thus does not attempt to ‘force the entity into concepts to which it is opposed in its manner of Being’. (BT, 191) As we have seen in Chapter Two, this more attentive engagement with the phenomena is fleshed out in what Heidegger terms ‘letting be’, a way of encountering the world, oneself and others, that does not attempt to fit the phenomena into pre-existing moulds, but instead allows the things themselves to speak.

Letting be, as an alternative mode of interpretation to that offered by \textit{das Man}, presents itself as a good candidate for a non-complicit and thus freer and more authentic way of interpreting the world, oneself and others. As we have seen in Chapter Two, letting be is explicitly identified as a mode of interpretation in which Dasein frees entities. (BT, 117) Moreover, letting be is a possibility which is distinctive of Dasein’s Being-in-the-world: to Be-in the world as Dasein is to let entities be. However, in inauthentic modes of Being, Dasein’s ability to let entities be is concealed by \textit{das Man}. Thus although Dasein is always letting entities be, in predominantly inauthentic modes of Being Dasein does not realise this

\textsuperscript{273} Polt 1999: 71.
\textsuperscript{274} See Chapter Three, section 4.4.
\textsuperscript{275} I am using interpretation and understanding interchangeably, as interpretation is a further clarification of understanding, not something totally distinct from it.
is the case, instead deferring to *das Man* and taking the social world to be the ultimate source of, and last word on, the interpretations of the phenomena. In more authentic modes of Being, however, when Dasein comes to grasp itself as Dasein, the role of letting be in meaning generation is unconcealed. In this unconcealment, letting be can be understood to manifest not only Dasein’s ontological freedom – freedom¹ as Sacha Golob terms it,²⁷⁶ but also Dasein’s everyday freedom – that which we are concerned with in our analysis of complicity, freedom² – is able to articulate itself more fully.

When Dasein comes to discover the phenomena more explicitly in terms of letting be, rather than listening away to *das Man* (BT, 315) it also comes to view itself differently and question its understanding of *das Man*. Rather than understanding *das Man* as the ultimate source of meaning and intelligibility, Dasein unconceals the role it itself plays – *qua* Dasein – in generating meaning.²⁷⁷ In so doing Dasein can come to resist interpretations that are ‘presented to us by fancies and popular conceptions’ (BT, 195)²⁷⁸ and instead take responsibility for its own interpretations of the phenomena. Letting be, as a more authentic way in which Dasein can come to grasp the world as meaningful, describes a mutual relationship of meaning generation, where Dasein allows the meaning of entities to ‘show up’.²⁷⁹ Accordingly, Dasein can come to see that it is only because it is the interpreting entity that it is – i.e. an entity that can grasp other entities in terms of their Being (BT, 118) – that there can be any meaning at all. (BT, 371) As a result, Dasein comes to understand that meaning is not endowed from on high – from some ‘other’ source such as *das Man*²⁸⁰ – but rather shows itself in every interaction between Dasein and the world.²⁸¹

Understanding letting be as a more authentic mode of interpretation, enables us to develop an account of modes of understanding in which Dasein is not complicit in its own inauthenticity and unfreedom, and can thus come to Be-in the world in a freer and more authentic way. In these non-complicit modes of interpretation and understanding Dasein is released (at least to an extent) from the dictatorship of *das Man*, and its inauthentic understanding of itself solely in terms of socially sanctioned roles and the public way in which things have been interpreted. In these more authentic modes of interpretation Dasein

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²⁷⁶ See Chapter Two, section eight.
²⁷⁷ See Knowles 2013 for a fuller discussion of letting be and an elaboration of the way in which Dasein is implicated in the way the world can be said to be meaningful.
²⁷⁸ i.e. by *das Man* and its misleading way of rendering the phenomena in terms of average and levelled down interpretations.
²⁸⁰ I put ‘other’ in scare quotes because *das Man* is not something separate from Dasein; it is an essential aspect of Dasein’s Being. However, Dasein’s everyday inauthentic understanding of *das Man* as a ‘dictatorship’ that prescribes every way of Being and interpreting the phenomena (BT, 164-5) is an understanding which is alienated from this fact, viewing *das Man* as something ‘other’ over which Dasein has no control or input.
²⁸¹ For example, new meaning can be uncovered by engaging with entities in a different way e.g. using a hammer to kill someone enables the hammer to become meaningful as a weapon, rather than just as a tool with which to hammer in nails.
comes to appreciate the fluidity of interpretation and the space of possibility that always exists for coming to encounter the world in new ways. The freedom and authenticity of non-complicit modes of understanding the world is not characterised in terms of a freedom from all constraints. Rather, such modes of understanding are free and authentic in virtue of the fact that they involve properly grasping the phenomena and being able to distinguish what is a real constraint on interpretation, from that which is merely imposed by the levelled down form of interpretation associated with das Man.

2.2.2 Characterising Non-Complicit modes of Self-Understanding

We have now seen what is distinctive about modes of understanding the world in which Dasein is complicit in its own inauthenticity and unfreedom, and those modes of understanding in which Dasein interprets the world in a freer and more authentic way. We have also seen what is distinctive about modes of self-understanding in which Dasein is complicit in its own inauthenticity and unfreedom. However, we have yet to fully grasp what is distinctive about non-complicit modes of self-understanding. In elaborating this we shall move beyond the emphasis on concealment and unconcealment, and foreground the insight of the autonomy theorist that the complicity or non-complicity of the agent must be understood with regard to their way of Being. In section 1.1 it was argued that the way Dasein understands itself affects the way it exists. Accordingly, elaborating the mode of understanding in which Dasein is not complicit in its own inauthenticity and unfreedom will also mean elaborating the mode of Being in which Dasein is not complicit in its own inauthenticity and unfreedom.

In non-complicit and thus freer and more authentic modes of self-understanding, Dasein understands itself, not just in terms of its roles and the public way in which things have been interpreted, but in terms of an authentic potentiality-for-Being, that is as Being-possible. Understanding oneself in this way involves not only understanding oneself in terms of particular possibilities, but also coming to recognise that one is something over and above the particular possibilities one presses ahead into. This idea is further articulated in the notion of Spielraum. Heidegger argues that ‘[t]he character of understanding as projection is constitutive for Being-in-the-world with regard to the disclosedness of its existentially constitutive state-of-Being by which the factual potentiality-for-Being gets its leeway [Spielraum]’. (BT, 185) The notion of ‘Spielraum’ literally ‘play-room’ intimates the idea of a space of pure possibility, suggesting that Dasein’s potentiality-for-Being captures what cannot be expressed simply in terms of a for-the-sake-of-which: Dasein’s ability to

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282 This understanding need not be a propositional understanding. Rather, this understanding articulates itself in Dasein’s way of Being-in-the-world.
choose between for-the-sake-of-whichs. 283 No possibility could ever define Dasein, since Dasein is its possibilities: even up until the moment of death it could press ahead into a different possibility and thus come to Be-in the world in a different way.284

The notion that no possibility could ever define Dasein is summed up in the idea that ‘Dasein is constantly ‘more’ than it factually is’. (BT, 185) This echoes the understanding that there is something in Dasein’s Being that always remains possible, an idea reinforced when Heidegger argues that there is always something still outstanding in Dasein’s Being in the sense that Dasein’s existence is never settled, it is never decided. He writes: ‘as Being-possible... it [Dasein] is existentially that which, in its potentiality-for-Being, it is not yet’. (BT, 185-6) Dasein could always be different to how it currently is, it always has the possibility to project a different way of Being and forge ahead into this, as Dasein is essentially a potentiality-for-Being i.e. characterised by possibility as possibility.

We can develop our account of Dasein’s authentic, non-complicit self-understanding by heeding the insight of the autonomy theorist and turning our attention to the way in which Dasein is ‘in’ the world. As was argued in Chapter Two section 8.1, we can analyse the self-understanding of the agent by attending to their way of Being-in-the-world. Therefore by being mindful of the interplay Heidegger imagines between Dasein’s self-understanding and its existence, we shall be able to deepen our analysis of non-complicit modes of Being. In the previous chapter we began to develop an interpretation where inauthenticity was understood as a static or ‘stubborn’ way of Being-in-the-world.285 By contrast, it was suggested that authentic modes of Being are characterised by Dasein’s engagement in and openness to its own situation and to the possibilities it suggests. We can now see that this analysis is also justified by our account of understanding, since an open and engaged way of Being-in-the-world reflects the ‘not-yet’ of authentic self-understanding.

2.2.3 Freer and more Authentic ways of Being-in and Understanding the World

Being engaged in and attentive to one’s situation is something Heidegger explicitly associates with authentic ways of understanding and thus with a freer way of Being-in-the-world in which Dasein is not complicit in its own inauthenticity and unfreedom. In authentic modes of Being, Dasein moves away from the generic undifferentiatedness of inauthentic everydayness and the stubborn understanding that all one is, is the role(s) they perform. In so doing Dasein is opened onto a world of possibilities that test the boundaries of the levelled

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283 In a later text Haugeland does explicitly distinguish between the way an entity occupies a role and the way Dasein occupies roles on the basis that Dasein, unlike equipmental entities, has the ability to ‘choose’ their role. Haugeland 2013: 128. However, Haugeland does not identify choice with Dasein’s potentiality-for-Being in the way I am suggesting.
284 Death is defined as ‘the possibility of the absolute impossibility of Dasein.’ (BT, 294) It is the end of Dasein’s possibilities.
down existence prescribed by *das Man*, thus revealing to Dasein that it is something over and above the roles it performs and that in order to understand itself fully it cannot appeal solely to the everyday roles it plays and the generic ways of Being and understanding oneself prescribed by *das Man*. Heidegger argues that ‘*[f]or *das Man*... the Situation is essentially something that has been closed off. *Das Man* knows only the ‘general situation’, loses itself in those ‘opportunities’ which are closest to it’. (BT, 346) By contrast, in freer and more authentic modes of Being, Dasein is ‘called[ed] forth into the Situation’ and is said to ‘take action’. (BT, 347) In these freer and more authentic modes of Being, Dasein no longer drifts along in undifferentiated modes of Being, doing what ‘one’ does, conforming unquestioningly to the norms of *das Man*. Instead, Dasein exhibits a genuine mode of concern with its own existence and its way of Being-in-the-world. This does not mean that in more authentic modes of Being Dasein will necessarily do anything different (i.e. perform different acts or take up different roles) than it did in inauthentic modes of Being. Rather, the point is that Dasein’s relation to what it does and its understanding of itself will have changed, thus engendering a new way of Being-in-the-world.

We can find examples of this more authentic mode of understanding and the freer and more authentic way of Being it engenders in literature. For example, in Virginia Woolf’s *To the Lighthouse*, Lily Briscoe is presented as a passionate artist, committed to her work. Lily does not simply understand herself in terms of the roles she performs and the generic ways of Being prescribed by *das Man*. Rather, she exhibits engagement in and care for her Being, thus manifesting her understanding of herself as Dasein, an understanding of herself as a potentiality-for-Being, a ‘not-yet’. For example, she resists the societal pressures of traditional femininity embodied by Mrs Ramsay and her belief that ‘an unmarried woman has missed the best of life.’ In contrast to the inauthentic Dasein, Lily’s commitment and ‘steadfastness’ (BT, 369) with regard to her way of life and her self-understanding is not a stubbornness or a belief that the life she leads is the only life she could lead. Rather, it is an authentic resolve, a ‘resoluteness’, (BT, 355) embodied in her critical openness to her way of Being and her understanding of herself. Lily experiences moments of doubt both about her artistic ability and her way of life. In these moments Lily is open to and engaged in her situation in a way in which the stubborn, inauthentic Dasein who understands only in a

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286 Woolf [1927] 1996: 77. This is not to say that engaged or authentic modes of existence necessarily involve rejecting the norms of everydayness. Rather, the point is that engaged and authentic modes of existence involve an attentive and critical relation to one’s situation.

287 Heidegger argues that authentic Dasein is characterised by a ‘constancy of the Self, in the double sense of steadiness and steadfastness, [which] is the authentic counter-possibility to the non-Self-constancy which is characteristic of irresolute falling.’ (BT, 369) We shall return to this in Chapter Five, section four.

288 Heidegger presents resoluteness as a kind of openness to the world and as an essential characteristic of authentic Dasein. When Dasein is resolute ‘it simply cannot become rigid as regards the Situation, but must understand that the resolution, in accordance with its own meaning as a disclosure, must be held open and free for the current factual possibility.’ (BT, 355)
deficient mode, is not. Lily becomes attentive to the possibilities she is pressing ahead into and the choices she has made:

Why then did she do it? She looked at the canvas, lightly scored with running lines. It would be hung in the servants’ bedrooms. It would be rolled up and stuffed under a sofa. What was the good of doing it then, and she heard some voice saying she couldn’t paint, saying she couldn’t create… Can’t paint, can’t write, she murmured monotonously, anxiously considering what her plan of attack should be. For the mass loomed before her; it protruded; she felt it pressing on her eyeballs.

Like the authentic Dasein, Lily returns from a moment of anxiety, a moment in which everything is put into question, (BT, 233) and from this engages in the world in a new way. Having manifested a critical openness to her situation, Lily is able to see things more clearly, and in the final pages of the novel she finishes her painting.

In Woolf’s characterisation of Lily we can discern a concrete example of a Dasein who understands itself authentically in terms of a potentiality-for-Being. Heidegger argues that ‘[u]nderstanding is the Being of such potentiality-for-Being, which is never something still outstanding as not yet present-at-hand, but which, as something which is essentially never present-at-hand ‘is’ with the Being of Dasein, in the sense of existence’. (BT, 183-184) If Dasein’s potentiality-for-Being were reducible to a for-the-sake-of which or roles, then it would arguably be possible to render Dasein as something present-at-hand. That is, one could list all the roles that Dasein casts itself within, or that it would in the future cast itself within, and one would somehow ‘have’ that Dasein. Heidegger, however, suggests that there is always something still outstanding in the Being of Dasein. Lily reflects this in her understanding of the world and of herself, as she does not take anything for granted, constantly calling into question the roles into which she has cast herself and her way of Being-in-the-world. Lily does not occupy her possibilities as something not yet present-at-hand, possibility as opposed to actuality, but rather seems to relate to her possibilities as possibilities. That is, as a kind of ‘excess’, something over and above what she currently is. Here we see her potentiality-for-Being being cast, not just in terms of the for-the-sake-of whichs she could press ahead into, but as reflecting the Spielraum with which Heidegger associates Dasein’s authentic potentiality-for-Being: the choice between possibilities, the possibility of projecting possibilities, and thus ultimately the possibility to Be-in-the world. This more authentic mode of understanding engenders a freer way of Being-in-the-world, a mode of Being where Dasein begins to resist the inauthentic mode of understanding, a mode where its potentiality-for-Being was reduced to grasping itself in terms of the average and generic roles prescribed by das Man. In more authentic modes of understanding, Dasein’s potentiality-for-Being, comes to articulate itself as Dasein’s ‘Being-free [Freisein] for the freedom [Freiheit] of choosing itself and taking hold of itself’. (BT, 232)

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3. Free and Authentic Modes of Understanding as a Competence over Being as Existing

In order to complete our analysis of modes of understanding in which Dasein is complicit (and, conversely, not complicit) in its inauthenticity and unfreedom, we must draw together the different strands of our analysis and return to our initial characterisation of understanding as a competence over Being as existing. In this final section we shall clarify the way in which a Heideggerean analysis of complicity vis-à-vis understanding accounts for the autonomy theorist’s insight that complicity should be analysed in terms of an agent’s way of Being, rather than just in terms of what an agent does or the acts they perform. The complicity of an agent can only be analysed in context. That is, in terms of the full scope of the agent’s situation, their self-understanding and their relations with others.

Understanding is an existentiale, a fundamental constituent of Dasein’s Being. (BT, 182) Accordingly, as existing, Dasein is always understanding. However, as we have seen, this does not mean that Dasein always understands ‘correctly’. Dasein never lacks understanding, but it can understand deficiently. In History of the Concept of Time, Heidegger discusses ‘pseudo-understanding’: ‘a semblance of understanding, a look-alike, as though this incomprehension were still genuine comprehension’.290 To take an example, Don Quixote may understand himself as a knight and even attempt to carry out certain tasks that reflect this understanding, but nevertheless he is not a knight. This returns us to our initial contention that understanding is more than merely a ‘doing’,291 as even though Don Quixote does things knights do he is, nevertheless, not a knight. What this tells us is that, like mood, understanding is not simply something ‘in my head’, but rather extends beyond the isolated individual and necessarily involves the world.

If we return to our original claim that understanding should be taken as a competence over Being as existing, this suggests that to comprehend what it is to understand competently (i.e. in a way that is not characteristic of Dasein Being complicit in its own inauthenticity and unfreedom) we must bear in mind the interrelation of Dasein, world and others. Don Quixote’s understanding of himself as a knight does not appear to fulfil what Heidegger means by understanding because it does not properly pertain to ‘the whole basic state of Being-in-the-world’, (BT, 184) which for Heidegger, understanding always does. Don Quixote’s understanding of himself as a knight does in some sense rely upon or at least implicate the world and others around him, but it is somehow out of sync with these other elements. His understanding is not affirmed by his social situation, and thus does not really reflect something he can be. Don Quixote is able to fulfil understanding as a for-the-sake-of-which, carrying out certain tasks etc, (and thus can be said to understand in an inauthentic mode), but he does not meet the grade with regard to understanding as a potentiality-for-

291 Instead understanding should be interpreted in terms of a way of Being.
Being and thus does not understand the world in a way that is compatible with a freer and more authentic way of Being-in-the-world.

The example of Don Quixote suggests that ‘competence’ is something in excess of a ‘doing’. To understand in such a way as to authentically express your competence over Being as existing, one will not only have to perform certain roles, one will also have to be able to match the possibilities of one’s Being with the possibilities of entities, the world and others. This is a further clarification of the kind of attentiveness involved in authentically interpreting the world discussed in section 2.2.1. As we have seen, projection not only involves understanding the possibilities of Dasein’s Being, it also involves understanding the ready-to-hand possibilities of entities and the possibilities of other Dasein. We saw this with the example of the hammer, as in order to grasp the possibility of hammering (a possibility of Dasein’s Being) Dasein had to already have grasped the possibility embodied by the hammer: the possibility of Being ready-to-hand for hammering. Understanding, as the projection of possibilities, thus appears to be the ability to ‘match up’ Dasein’s possibilities with the possibilities of entities and others so that Dasein can Be-in the world in a meaningful way. This seems to be what is lacking in the case of Don Quixote and thus we can say he is not competent in this sense.

We might not want to say that Don Quixote is complicit in his misunderstanding of himself and his world, as Cervantes specifies that Don Quixote is mad. Nevertheless, we can interpret the way in which he fails to manifest understanding as a competence over Being as existing as characteristic of an inauthentic mode of understanding and one in which an agent with all of their faculties could be complicit. In order for Dasein to understand in a mode where it is not complicit in its own inauthenticity and unfreedom, it will need to express its competence over Being as existing by choosing appropriate for-the-sake-of-whichs that accurately reflect the relation between Dasein’s Being, the world and others. If an agent, all other things being equal, fails to do this, their mode of understanding can be grasped as one in which they are complicit in their own incompetence and thus, by extension, complicit in their inauthentic mode of understanding and Being-in-the-world.

Let us take an example. Consider a man with very anachronistic views on gender. He might project an understanding of himself as the head of the family, someone who must be obeyed and not questioned. He might take women to be inferior to him or believe it is their natural duty to serve him. He might see his daughter as his property and his wife as his personal servant. However, the rest of his family, and indeed society at large, might have far more progressive views on gender. His daughter might refuse to bow to his authority and his wife might refuse to wait on him hand and foot. This patriarch is out of sync with the world in which he finds himself in the same way as Don Quixote. His (mis)understanding of himself and the social situation is explained by a failure, or an unwillingness, to project
possibilities appropriate to his situation. This agent can therefore be considered complicit in his failure to manifest understanding as a competence over Being as existing. He could revise his views on gender, he could modify his behaviour to reflect more progressive social tides, and yet he refuses. He remains stuck in the past and thus can be considered complicit in his inauthentic mode of understanding and Being-in-the-world.\(^\text{292}\)

Just as mood is not simply something inside Dasein, but rather pertains to Being-in-the-world as a whole, understanding does not function in isolation from the world, others and Dasein’s social context. To understand myself in a certain way is not merely to have thoughts within my head, or even to do things in the world that reflect this understanding. Rather, for understanding to fully reflect a potentiality-for-Being (Seinkönnen) Dasein must have this understanding somehow recognised or affirmed by others around it. The idea that Dasein’s understanding implicates both world and others is reflected in Heidegger’s claim that: ‘understanding, always extends to the full understandability, which means to world co-Dasein, and one’s own Dasein’.\(^\text{293}\) This claim suggests that I never understand myself in isolation from a worldly context, or from others, and builds on the idea expressed in section 6.1 of the previous chapter, that overcoming complicity may have to be a collective project of social transformation. To return to our example of the teacher, to understand myself as a teacher I must be involved with books and blackboards and chalk and lesson plans; these are the ‘equipment’ that support my understanding of myself as a teacher. But in addition to these things my self-understanding necessarily implicates other people. I cannot be a teacher without any students to teach. This suggests that the world and others are both necessary in order for me to understand myself in a certain way. There must be certain entities and social roles that support my self-understanding. But it also suggests that the way I understand myself affects the way I understand the world and other Dasein I encounter within it. In understanding myself as a teacher I necessarily cast others in particular roles and understand entities in terms of certain use possibilities. For me to manifest an authentic mode of understanding as a competence over Being as existing, these entities and others must be amenable to the roles in which I cast them. If they are not, as was the case with the patriarch, we fail to be what we take ourselves to be and thus manifest a deficient or inauthentic mode of understanding \textit{qua} the lack of a competence over Being as existing.\(^\text{294}\)

\(^{292}\) This analysis has not yet considered cases where an agent’s self-understanding does not cohere with the social world or the views of others because the social setting in which the agent finds themselves is too restrictive to allow such an understanding. These situations would not mark the agent out as lacking a competence over Being as existing, rather they tell of an inauthentic social situation or a world in which inauthentic ways of Being and understanding dominate. We shall briefly consider the way in which the situation of the agent can impact their ability to become authentic in Chapter Six.

\(^{293}\) Heidegger [1925] 198: 258.

\(^{294}\) In the case of the patriarch, he fails to be the ‘boss’ of his family.
Accordingly, we now have further reason to believe that becoming authentic and overcoming complicity may not only be an individual project, but will involve a process of collective social transformation, as was suggested in the previous chapter. However, this extended scope also implies that I am implicated in the inauthenticity of others and that my inauthenticity may reinforce theirs.\textsuperscript{295} Heidegger can be understood to make a similar point when he argues that:

\begin{quote}
[I]t is indisputable that a lively mutual acquaintanceship on the basis of Being-with, often depends upon how far one’s own Dasein has understood itself at the time; but this means that it depends upon how far one’s essential Being with Others has made itself transparent and has not disguised itself. (BT, 162)
\end{quote}

Here Heidegger implies that Dasein will be unable to Be-with others in an authentic way if it has not yet understood itself authentically. Dasein’s mode of understanding, therefore, not only has implications for Dasein’s own way of Being-in-the-world, it also has implications for how others will be able to Be-in the world.\textsuperscript{296}

In this chapter I have developed the analysis of Chapter Three regarding the concealment of complicit modes of existence, and the unconcealment associated with overcoming complicity. In my elaboration of Dasein as a potentiality-for-Being I have offered an account of what is unconcealed when the social roles, norms and practices of das Man are cleared away, thereby illuminating what it is to authentically understand oneself as Dasein. This analysis has also demonstrated the way in which the insight of the autonomy theorist is accounted for in a Heideggerean context, as in this chapter I have sought to establish that we should analyse the complicity or non-complicity of the agent in terms of their way of Being, and not just in terms of the acts they perform. Building on this insight, I have argued that the modes of understanding in which Dasein can overcome its complicity in its own inauthenticity and unfreedom are those in which it grasps its distinctive way of Being as Dasein. By contrast, I have argued that those modes of understanding in which Dasein is complicit in its own inauthenticity and unfreedom are those associated with understanding oneself simply in terms of what one does, thereby concealing what one is, i.e. Dasein. I have advanced a conception of inauthentic modes of Being and self-understanding as those characterised by undifferentiatedness, developing this in the context of the account of the potentially self-alienating nature of social roles offered in Chapter Two. I have also proposed an interpretation of authentic modes of Being as those in which Dasein is engaged in, and open to, its situation. I have been mindful of the triad of Dasein, world and others, and have offered an interpretation of authentic modes of Being and self-understanding in which Dasein must be attentive to all of these elements in order to overcome its complicity, understand competently and thus Be-in the world in a freer and more authentic way. The

\textsuperscript{295} This also means that the inauthenticity of others may hinder my ability to become authentic.

\textsuperscript{296} We shall analyse this idea in more detail in Chapter Six.
outcome of this analysis is that Dasein will be less likely to overcome its complicity in its own inauthenticity and unfreedom and fulfil its potential for authentically Being-in-the-world if authentic understandings are not available to Dasein in its world. Dasein’s ability to become authentic will be restricted in a world in which the possibility of authenticity is, for the most part, ruled out in the public domain by the dominance of average, generic, levelled down and hence inauthentic understandings of the phenomena, a claim to which we shall turn our attention in the following chapter.
Discourse and the Situation of the Agent: The Insight from Adaptive Preference

In addition to mood and understanding, disclosedness is constituted by a third element: discourse (Rede), which ‘is existentially primordial with attunement and understanding’. (BT, 203) Heidegger describes discourse as ‘the Articulation of the intelligibility of the “there”’. (BT, 204) As Mark Wrathall suggests, this characterisation of discourse as an ‘articulation’ intimates that it performs two functions in the structure of disclosedness, since ‘articulation’ can be understood both as a joining together/differentiating, and as an expressing or communicating. It also directs us towards the world in which Dasein always dwells. This is because the ‘there’, which discourse makes intelligible, is the situation of the agent, the ‘da’ of Da-sein. Accordingly, it is through the phenomenon of discourse that we shall be able to analyse the insight of the adaptive preference theorist and their emphasis on the situation of the agent. The adaptive preference theorist implies that in order to analyse an agent’s complicity in their own unfreedom we must attend to the agent’s relations with others, the institutions that structure their social world and the public discourses that influence how phenomena come to be interpreted. To heed this insight in a Heideggerean context we shall examine how different modes of discourse affect the meaningful way in which Dasein is in the world. We shall explore how the social world of das Man and the everyday mode of Being – characterised by curiosity, idle talk and ambiguity – promotes a way of Being-in-the-world in which Dasein is complicit in its own inauthenticity and unfreedom. We shall then examine in what way the everyday setting of the agent may be transformed with regard to discourse at both an individual and a collective level, in order to engender a freer and more authentic way of Being-in-the-world. However, before embarking on this analysis let us first turn our attention to discourse as Heidegger understands it.

1. The Function and Scope of Discourse

Although we have not yet addressed discourse explicitly, we have already been tacitly employing the concept, something which Heidegger also notes in relation to his own analysis. (BT, 203) In Chapter Three we examined how public moods can regulate how groups of Dasein become oriented towards the world, themselves and others. In Chapter Four we considered social roles as a public means of inauthentic self-interpretation, and examined how, by contrast, agents must grasp the world and others in a genuine way in order to understand themselves properly. These analyses employ the concept of discourse, because they speak to the meaningful way in which Dasein is in the world. Moreover, they
speak to the insight of the adaptive preference theorist, as they implicitly articulate the idea that to understand the way in which an agent may be complicit in their own unfreedom we must analyse the agent ‘in context’, that is, in relation to the social world they inhabit and the others they dwell among. Although our analysis of discourse will demonstrate how the insight of the adaptive preference theorist is accounted for in a Heideggerean context, it will also elaborate the analyses of the previous two chapters. This is because discourse functions as the ‘concrete mode’ in which to interpret the disclosures of understanding and mood. (BT, 172)

At various points in Being and Time Heidegger appears to imply that discourse is nothing beyond the disclosures of mood and understanding, serving only to unify these aspects of disclosedness. However, although discourse does unify these disclosures, depending on the way in which discourse gathers, i.e. the way in which it puts and holds together the disclosures of mood and understanding, different things will be communicated and different intelligible ways of engaging with the world will arise. Thus in addition to reflecting the disclosures of mood and understanding, discourse also has the ability to modify them.

Discourse describes the way we are engaged with the world (articulation as a communication), but it is also the aspect of disclosedness which makes meanings determinate (discourse as a joining together/differentiation, or what I will come to call the ‘gathering’ function of discourse). Discourse can be seen to perform these functions with regard to meaning: it is the meaningful way in which Dasein communicates its understanding of itself, its world and others. And discourse is also the way meaning is gathered and made determinate, or, as Wrathall puts it, discourse plays the role of ‘establishing and stabilizing the referential relations of meaningfulness’. To analyse discourse we must therefore turn to the question of meaning and the way in which it is conceived in Being and Time, before examining how discourse manifests itself in terms of Dasein’s everyday Being-in-the-world.

It may be tempting to suggest that the way discourse articulates disclosedness, as Dasein’s distinctive, meaningful engagement with the world, is simply through language: we

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297 See for example (BT, 172, 400). William Blattner also notes that it appears that discourse is not something beyond the disclosures of mood and understanding. Blattner 1999: 67.
298 Blattner also makes this point. Blattner 1999: 67.
301 Ibid: 130.
302 Wrathall argues that discourse has two aspects: the ‘communicative aspect’ and the ‘meaning articulating aspect’. Wrathall 2011: 131. What underpins both of these aspects, he suggests, is ‘a common structure – the structure of gathering or collecting references into a coherent context’. Ibid: 132. Although I am broadly in agreement with Wrathall, I wish to emphasise more strongly the connection between the way relations are gathered together and how this affects what meanings arise. Overall I see my departure from Wrathall merely as a difference in emphasis.
talk and write and in so doing describe our meaningful interpretation of the world, ourselves and others. However, meaning resides not simply in theoretical or linguistic relations, but rather is found in its most primordial form in Dasein’s active practical engagement with the world.

Heidegger writes: ‘Interpretation is carried out primordially not in a theoretical statement but in an action of circumspective concern – laying aside the unsuitable tool, or exchanging it, ‘without wasting words’’. (BT, 200) He continues ‘[f]rom the fact that words are absent, it may not be concluded that interpretation is absent’. (BT, 200) This builds on the ‘practical’ account of understanding examined in the previous chapter. For Heidegger, understanding is not simply knowing, rather it describes a more interactive engagement with the world. Similarly, discourse is something in excess of language, which must now be understood as ‘dependent on and derivative of’ this more primordial sense of discourse, which is essentially Dasein’s specific kind of meaningful engagement with the world.303 To analyse Dasein’s complicity in its own inauthenticity and unfreedom in terms of discourse, will thus not simply be to analyse complicity as it manifests itself linguistically in propositions or statements. Rather, it will be a matter of attending to the distinctive way in which complicity manifests itself in terms of Dasein’s meaningful engagement with the world. We shall do this by examining the different ways in which the intelligibility of the ‘there’, i.e. Dasein’s situation, may be articulated. In the process we shall be able to grasp the specific way in which a Heideggerean account of complicity highlights the insight drawn from the adaptive preference theorist that in analysing complicity we must examine the agent’s social setting. So let us now return to the phenomenon of falling and examine how discourse – as Dasein’s meaningful engagement with the world – manifests itself in an inauthentic way in terms of ‘the everyday kind of Being’ of Dasein. (BT, 224)

2. Dasein’s Everyday Engagement with the World: Curiosity, Idle Talk and Ambiguity

As was argued in Chapter Two, it is in falling that we can most clearly discern the way in which Dasein is complicit in its own inauthenticity and unfreedom.304 Here we examined the ‘movement’ of falling as it is characterised by ‘temptation, tranquilizing, alienation, and entanglement’. (BT, 224) We shall now examine the ‘everyday kind of Being’ of falling, (BT, 224) as it is manifested in curiosity, idle talk and ambiguity. These phenomena can be understood as instances of discourse because through an analysis of them we are able to

303 ‘language was for him [Heidegger] dependent on and derivative of the meanings we encounter as we inhabit an intelligible world.’ Wrathall 2011: 130.
304 Although in Chapter Two, section four it was argued that it is fleeing, as a particular response to falling, that manifests Dasein’s complicity in inauthentic modes of Being, I shall continue to use the term ‘falling’ to signal Heidegger’s take on complicity. This is because falling elaborates the features of Dasein’s complicity. Fleeing, as a response to falling, just signals that Dasein has embraced or become dominated by these features in its way of Being-in-the-world.
illuminate the meaningful way in which Dasein is in the world. By returning to falling and analysing it in more detail we shall therefore be able to further clarify what is characteristic of Dasein’s inauthentic mode of Being, and thus shed further light on what is distinctive about inauthentic modes of discourse, thus articulating the meaningful way of Being-in-the-world in which Dasein is complicit in its own inauthenticity and unfreedom.

2.1 Curiosity
The first aspect of falling, as Dasein’s everyday kind of Being, is curiosity. Heidegger’s argues that curiosity (Neugier) ‘expresses the tendency towards a peculiar way of letting the world be encountered by us in perception.’ (BT, 214) In curiosity, Dasein ‘lets itself be carried along solely by the looks of the world; in this kind of Being, it concerns itself with becoming rid of itself as Being-in-the-world’. (BT, 216) This characterisation brings us back to the claim that ‘Dasein in its everydayness is disburdened by das Man.’ (BT, 165) In terms of curiosity, such disburdening takes the form of not actively engaging with the world, but instead being content with a cursory or average understanding of the phenomena. Engaging with the world in a curious way means that Dasein does not get to ‘the heart of the matter’ – a characterisation which, as we have seen, is one befitting of the disclosedness associated with das Man and the public way in which things have been interpreted. (BT, 165) Curiosity characterised as a ‘becoming rid of itself as Being-in-the-world’ is thus a way of handing oneself over to das Man and the average, levelled down discourse of publicness. Curiosity, Heidegger continues, ‘concerns itself with seeing, not in order to understand what is seen (that is, to come into a Being towards it) but just in order to see.’ (BT, 216) This implies that the sight associated with curiosity is a deficient way of engaging with the world, one in which Dasein does not encounter entities unconcealedly, but rather fails to fully unconceal them, thereby failing to understand them.305

This characterisation of curiosity as a deficient mode of understanding helps to clarify the knowing and not-knowing and the concealment involved in a Heideggerean account of complicity. It suggests not only that Dasein conceals certain understandings from itself, as was argued in Chapter Three, it also implies that Dasein may know certain things without fully understanding them. For example, I might know that some particular road is closed this weekend, without having fully understood the way in which this will affect my travel plans. To apply this to our analysis of complicity we might, for example, say that an agent knows that wearing high heels has the potential to bring foot problems later in life,306 but they do not really understand what this means with regard to their day to day choice of footwear.

305 For sight in which Dasein does understand see transparency, Chapter Two, section 8.1 and concern, Chapter Four, section one.
306 Example taken from Chambers 2008: 2.
The particular way in which Dasein is said to know, but not understand in curiosity is explained by the fact that ‘curiosity is concerned with the constant possibility of distraction [zerstreuung]’.

Curiosity ‘does not seek the leisure of tarrying observantly, but rather seeks restlessness and the excitement of continual novelty and changing encounters.’

Curiosity is a familiar aspect of modern life. When one sits down to write a philosophy paper it is easy to get distracted by checking one’s emails, looking at social media, browsing online newspapers, phoning a friend, etc. But distraction can also characterise our way of Being more generally. Distraction is Dasein’s constant concern with ‘novelty’ and ‘new possibilities’.

Those who are obsessed with the newest trend or the latest fad can thus also be said to be distracted. This constant concern with novelty in turn reflects Dasein’s absorption in ‘things’, and it is in this way that in curiosity Dasein can be said to know, but not understand. Distraction conceals a more primordial grasp of the phenomena, because it does not let Dasein tarry long enough to really get to grips with anything.

Curiosity is everywhere and nowhere. This mode of Being-in-the-world reveals a new kind of Being of everyday Dasein – a kind in which Dasein is constantly uprooting itself. Distraction conceals a more primordial grasp of the phenomena, because it does not let Dasein tarry long enough to really get to grips with anything.

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dictate its way of Being. *Das Man* is no one in particular, it is constituted by a multiplicity of norms, possibilities and average ways of Being, which do not necessarily hang together as a coherent whole. Accordingly, as a dispersed, inauthentic they-self, Dasein’s way of Being mirrors this structure of multiple and dispersed possibilities. Imagine someone in a clothes shop picking up a leather jacket, trying it on and then discarding it in favour of a delicate floral dress, then discarding the dress and picking up a tailored tweed suit and so on and so on. The dispersed self of everyday Dasein is characterised by its inconstancy and lack of commitment to a singular identity. *Zerstreung* is explicitly linked to Dasein’s complicity in its own inauthenticity and unfreedom when Heidegger argues that Dasein ‘seek[s] new ways in which its dispersion in its affairs may be further dispersed’. (BT, 422) Here Heidegger makes it clear that curiosity *qua* distraction and dispersion are (inauthentic) ways of engaging with the phenomena and Being-in-the-world that Dasein itself helps to perpetuate.

### 2.2 Idle Talk

We can see now that in Dasein’s everyday kind of Being it is curious, meaning it is dispersed among, and distracted by, the possibilities disseminated by *das Man*. However, to understand fully the meaningful way in which Dasein encounters and is engaged with these possibilities we must turn our attention to idle talk, since Heidegger argues that ‘idle talk controls... the ways in which one may be curious.’ (BT, 217) Idle talk turns us to a more common place understanding of discourse, since idle talk is discourse as it is ‘expressed by being spoken out’. (BT, 211) Heidegger begins by describing idle talk (*Gerede*) as ‘a positive phenomenon which constitutes the kind of Being of everyday Dasein’s understanding and interpreting’. (BT, 211) The link between discourse and interpretation illuminates the way in which discourse may shape the way in which we come to encounter the world, as well as simply communicating our understanding of the world. This is because the mode of discourse through which we interpret the world affects how we come to understand it. As we saw in the previous chapter, Heidegger defines interpretation as ‘the working-out of possibilities projected in understanding’. (BT, 189) Here it was suggested that whilst in authentic modes of interpretation Dasein actively attends to the phenomena for itself, in inauthentic modes Dasein passively accepts what it is told. Whilst this is, broadly speaking, the case, we can now offer a more nuanced account of the kind of ‘passivity’ associated with inauthentic modes of interpretation.

In characterising idle talk, Heidegger argues that, ‘[p]roximally, and within certain limits, Dasein is constantly delivered over to this interpretedness, which controls and distributes the possibilities of average understanding and of the attunement belonging to it’. (BT, 211) The notion of being ‘delivered over’ (*überantworten*) suggests a kind of passivity that is not evident in Heidegger’s general discussion of understanding and interpretation and
that echoes the way in which, in fleeing, Dasein gives itself over to das Man and disburdens itself of its responsibility for its existence. Indeed, as Jean Graybeal notes, idle talk ‘predigests what might otherwise be up for question’. This suggests that in inauthentic modes of interpretation qua idle talk, rather than working possibilities out for itself, the possibilities of everyday understanding have already been worked out for Dasein. This ‘pre-digestion’ comes to be an instance of Dasein’s unfreedom because it detaches Dasein from its own agency (it does not work out the possibilities projected in understanding for itself) as well as detaching Dasein from a more genuine or ‘primordial’ understanding of the phenomena.

Heidegger argues that idle talk ‘serves not so much to keep Being-in-the-world open for us in an articulated understanding, as rather to close it off, and cover up entities within-the-world.’ (BT, 213) However, Heidegger argues that in order to conceal the phenomena in this way, ‘one need not aim to deceive. Idle talk does not have the kind of being which belongs to consciously passing off something as something else.’ (BT, 213) This statement differentiates Heidegger’s analysis of the concealment involved in everyday modes of Being-in-the-world from analyses of self-deception. Whereas the self-deception theorist suggests that agents intentionally believe one thing in order not to believe another, Heidegger argues that there is no deception occurring in idle talk. Rather, it is the groundlessness of idle talk that leads to a covering up of the phenomena.

Heidegger argues that the problematic nature of idle talk is ‘[t]he fact that something has been said groundlessly [bodenlose], and then gets passed along in further retelling, amounts to perverting the act of disclosing [Erschliessen] into an act of closing off [Verschliessen].’ (BT, 213) The argument here is that the very nature of idle talk is one that is superficial (BT, 212) and this superficiality only gets exacerbated as idle talk gets disseminated further. Heidegger argues that idle talk ‘communicates... by gossiping and passing the world along – a process by which its initial lack of ground to stand on [Bodenständigkeit] becomes aggravated to complete groundlessness [Bodenlosigkeit].’ (BT, 212) It is important not to confuse the groundlessness (Bodenlosigkeit) which characterises idle talk, curiosity and, as we shall come to see, ambiguity, with the groundlessness (Abgrund) that we have encountered in Chapter Three in our discussion of thrownness and the idea that Dasein’s Being is based on a “nothing”. Whereas the groundless (Abgrund) at the basis of Dasein’s Being is the source of Dasein’s responsibility for itself and its

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310 ‘a subject is self-deceived when he believes one thing in order not to believe another.’ Gardner 1993: 19.
311 The Groundlessness of curiosity is signalled in the description of curiosity as a mode in which Dasein is constantly uprooting itself. (BT, 217)
freedom, the groundlessness (Bodenlosigkeit) of everyday modes of Being-in and understanding the world relates to their ‘uprootedness’ from Being and from a more primordial understanding of the phenomena.

The groundlessness of idle talk is related to the inattentiveness of inauthentic modes of Being-in-the-world. The understandings disseminated in idle talk constitute the ‘public way in which things have been interpreted’, (BT, 213) they are therefore characterised by being ‘average’ and ‘levell[ed] down... [and] insensitive to every difference of level and of genuineness and thus never [get] to the ‘heart of the matter’.’ (BT 165) An example of this kind of discourse can be found in generics. For example, ‘women are bad at maths’ or ‘people on benefits are lazy’. The point here is not that in idle talk and everyday modes of discourse we are inattentive in the sense that we fail to make distinctions. Indeed, in many instances of everyday discourse the problem is that we make too many distinctions. Rather, the point is that idle talk is inattentive to the complexity or nuance of the situation, idle talk is inattentive to the phenomena about which the claims are made. (BT, 212)

Heidegger makes it explicit that this kind of inattentive relation to the phenomena serves to conceal rather than reveal the phenomena. However, we can now see that this process of concealment has a dual aspect. In detaching from the phenomena and concealing a more primordial understanding, the average understandings of idle talk and public modes of discourse also conceal their own averageness. Rather than showing itself as simply an average intelligibility, the disclosedness of das Man passes itself off as a genuine disclosedness. Heidegger writes: ‘What is said-in-the-talk as such, spreads in wider circles and takes on an authoritative character. Things are so because one says so.’ (BT, 212) Heidegger describes idle talk almost as a contagious spread of (mis)information, (BT, 212) ultimately leading Dasein into confusion where it cannot distinguish average from genuine understandings:

The average understanding of the reader will never be able to decide what has been drawn from primordial sources with a struggle and what is just gossip. The average understanding, moreover, will not want any such distinction, and does not need it, because, of course, it understands everything. (BT, 212)

In addition to not encountering or ‘knowing’ the phenomena in a primordial way, in idle talk Dasein does not know that it does not know. There is thus a double concealment at work, a

312 There is only one direct mention of Abgrund in Being and Time, which occurs in Heidegger’s discussion of meaning, where he argues that ‘a ‘ground’ becomes accessible only as meaning, even if it is itself the abyss of meaninglessness [der Abgrund der Sinnlosigkeit]’. (BT, 193-4) This idea of the groundlessness of the ground is developed in ‘What is Metaphysics?’ and ‘On the Essence of Ground’, both 1929. It also underpins the notion of the nullity at the basis of Dasein’s Being discoverable in the “‘not” which belongs to the existential meaning of “thrownness”’ (BT, 330) and the idea that Dasein has no essence other than its existence. (BT, 67)
313 ‘idle talk has been uprooted existentially, and this uprooting is constant’. (BT, 214)
314 This idea will be elaborated in the discussion of ‘distantiality’ in section 2.3.
315 We see a similar structure in both curiosity and ambiguity, which both offer the illusion of understanding without really understanding anything. (BT, 214-219)
double concealment that is constitutive of complicity and that is essential to the endurance of the dictatorship of *das Man* and inauthentic modes of Being. As Heidegger argues, in ‘inconspicuousness and unascertainability, the real dictatorship of *das Man* is unfolded.’ (BT, 164) This is constitutive of complicity because if Dasein, at least in a day to day sense, does not know that it is inauthentic and unfree, then it will not strive to overcome this unfreedom. It will continue to engage in idle talk, gossiping and passing the word along and, in so doing, further conceal the possibility of understanding and Being—in the world in more authentic ways, *never be[ing] able* to decide what has been drawn from primordial sources and how much is just gossip.’ (BT, 212)

However, as we have seen, Dasein is distinctive in being able to understand the phenomena in terms of their Being and thus encounter them in a primordial way. On some level, then, Dasein must be aware that by handing itself over to the levelled down interpretations of *das Man* it is failing to do this.\(^\text{316}\) Why, then, would Dasein not strive for a more authentic form of discourse and a more genuine encounter with the phenomena? To understand this we must return to the idea that stubbornness characterises Dasein’s attitude to itself, its world and others in inauthentic modes of Being. In her essay ‘Projection and Objectification’, Rae Langton discusses the phenomenon of dismissing evidence that flies in the face of one’s current world view, examining how people can in fact even alter the world to make it fit their beliefs.\(^\text{317}\) This ability to dismiss as well as manipulate counter evidence illuminates the kind of stubbornness that characterises inauthentic modes of discourse, such as idle talk, and further explains the complicity involved in inauthentic modes of Being, since it describes mechanisms by which we can come to resist certain understandings.\(^\text{318}\) An implication of Langton’s analysis is that people do not like to challenge the status quo, especially if it benefits them in some way.\(^\text{319}\) Similarly, on a Heideggerean account we find

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\(^{316}\) As was argued in Chapter Four, section 2.2, to encounter anything as ready-to-hand Dasein must encounter it in terms of its Being *qua* readiness-to-hand. The point here, then, is not that in inauthentic modes of Being Dasein fails to encounter entities as ready-to-hand. Rather, the point is that in inauthentic modes of Being Dasein does not transparently understand the Being of the entity in question and is thus at greater risk of going wrong and projecting possibilities onto entities that ‘force the entity into concepts to which it is opposed in its manner of Being’. (BT, 191)

\(^{317}\) See particularly Langton 2009: 261–266.

\(^{318}\) The kinds of arguments Langton makes in this work are also found in Thomas Khun’s famous 1962 work *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. It is not only everyday idle chatter that is resistant to challenging the status quo, but also supposedly truth seeking scientific discourses. As Khun suggests, scientific theories are formulated within a paradigm i.e. within a set of assumptions that people unquestioningly accept. Theories survive in the face of all sorts of contrary evidence because people are blind to the anomalies that do not cohere with the paradigm. Khun’s analysis provides us with an example of how attention can be stubborn even in a theoretical context and thus we need not think that idle talk is confined to ‘gossipy housewives’, as it were. Khun 1962. Stephen Mulhall also draws attention to the parallels between Heidegger’s rethinking of Being and that of paradigm shifts in scientific revolutions, as both put into question the underlying assumptions and structures of the entities with which we are dealing. Mulhall 2005: 4–5.

\(^{319}\) Langton discusses cases of sexual assault where the assaulting agent convinces themselves that the assault was in fact what their victim desired. Langton 2009.
the ‘temptation’ of accepting public views, (BT, 222) implying that Dasein may not want the public interpretations to be challenged, as it would mean abandoning the ‘tranquillity’ of everyday, inauthentic ways of Being-in-the-world. (BT, 222) In both accounts, stubbornness about one’s current world view presents itself as a motivation for misunderstanding the phenomena and thus Being complicit in one’s own inauthenticity.

However, it is not only Dasein’s own stubbornness that is a factor in helping to perpetuate inauthentic modes of discourse; it is also the stubbornness of others. If people are fundamentally stubborn about their world view, they are unlikely to respond to challenges or criticisms kindly. To evidence this one need only think of any liberation movement – feminism, anti-racism, gay rights – they are all movements that try to transform how we think about people and certain phenomena, they are all movements that have challenged, and continue to challenge, the status quo and although in many cases they have made progress, they have also been met with animosity. Accordingly, the stubbornness of others may act as a reason why inauthentic discourse endures and authentic transformations of the social world are hard to achieve.320 Coupled with Dasein’s own stubbornness and a desire to maintain itself in the tranquillity of inauthentic modes of Being, this explains why Dasein remains complicit in inattentive modes of discourse that close off, rather than unconceal the phenomena.

2.3 Ambiguity

This way of understanding and relating to the phenomena is further clarified in Heidegger’s discussion of ‘ambiguity’, which ‘extends not only to the world, but just as much to Being-with-one-another... and even to Dasein’s Being towards itself...’ (BT, 217) ‘Ambiguity’, Heidegger argues, ‘has already established itself in the understanding as a potentiality-for-Being, and in the way Dasein projects itself and presents itself with possibilities.’ (BT, 217) Heidegger suggests that ambiguity is the source of inaction in everyday inauthentic ways of Being, thus further clarifying the way in which Dasein is alienated from its own agency in inauthentic modes of existence, and cementing the idea that the way Dasein understands itself affects the way it exists.

In his discussion of ambiguity Heidegger argues that:

Everyone is acquainted with what is up for discussion and what occurs, and everyone discusses it; but everyone also knows already how to talk about what has to happen first – about what is not yet up for discussion but ‘really’ must be done. (BT, 217) Applying this to our analysis of complicity, suggests that to be complicit does not mean simply not to know that one is living an inauthentic or unfree life (although this may be the case), but also that complicity can manifest itself in terms of a certain attitude towards oppressive or unfree states of affairs. For example, to be aware that the situation of women

320 We shall return to the notion of social transformation in section three.
in a patriarchal society is one of unfreedom and yet to do nothing about this – to relate to the unfreedom of women in such a way as to understand it ‘simply as the way things are’ – is itself a form of complicity.

Heidegger continues:

Already everyone has surmised and scented out in advance what Others have also surmised and scented out. This Being-on-the-scent is of course based upon hearsay, for if anyone is genuinely ‘on the scent’ of anything, he does not speak about it; and this is the most entangling way in which ambiguity presents Dasein possibilities so that they will already be stifled in their power. (BT, 217–8)

Here Heidegger presents a way in which a genuinely transformative idea, if co-opted by das Man in inauthentic modes of Being, may be deprived of its power.321 Once something becomes part of inauthentic public discourse in an ambiguous way, it loses its force, it becomes common knowledge, something everyone vaguely accepts without ever acting on.

The idea that inauthentic public discourse leads to inactivity and bars a more authentic engagement in one’s situation where Dasein would ‘take action’ (BT, 347) is cemented in Heidegger’s claim that:

In the ambiguity of the way things have been publicly interpreted, talking about things ahead of the game and making surmises about them curiously, gets passed off as what is really happening, while taking action and carrying something through gets stamped as something merely subsequent and unimportant. (BT, 218)

It is important to note that the ‘taking action’ associated with authentic modes of Being does not straightforwardly just mean ‘doing things’. Indeed, one of the characteristics of inauthenticity is the hustle and ‘hubbub’ of everyday life, (BT, 68, 223, 316) a busyness which conceals the inauthentic mode of this existence and the possibility of Being-in-the-world in a different way.322 Rather, Heidegger suggests that the ‘taking action’ of authentic modes of Being must be ‘taken so broadly that “activity” will also embrace the passivity of resistance.’ (BT, 347) Again, this emphasises that in authentic modes of Being Dasein will not necessarily ‘do’ anything different to what it did in inauthentic modes of Being. Rather, authenticity is manifested in a particular way of Being engaged in one’s situation and relating to the phenomena. In Heidegger’s discussion of ambiguity we find Dasein’s distinctive inauthentic engagement with the phenomena articulated particularly with regard to Dasein’s relation with others.

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321 We might be tempted to interpret this passage in the negative sense that people who come to discover the world in a more authentic way do not share their discoveries, either because they are afraid to do so, or because they are fundamentally isolated from one another. However, such an attitude clashes with authenticity as we have come to understand it. Authenticity is not about transcending or escaping the social world, it is about transforming it. Thus if one did come to encounter and understand the world in a more authentic way, Dasein would want to communicate these ideas to help engender an authentic transformation of the social world. We shall return to this idea in section four.

322 In inauthentic modes of Being, ‘[t]he supposition of das Man that one is leading a full and genuine ‘life”, is communicated to Dasein. (BT, 222)
Heidegger argues that in inauthentic modes of Being Dasein’s relations with others are characterised by ‘an intent, ambiguous watching of one another, a secret and reciprocal listening-in. Under the mask of “for-one-another”, an “against-one-another” is in play.’ (BT, 219) This way of first encountering others functions, in a sense, to divide and conquer, to keep Dasein isolated from one another and from a genuine understanding of its own Being.\(^3^{323}\) Rather than encountering the other directly, Dasein encounters others through the filter of das Man. Dasein comes to understand others primarily ‘in terms of what “they” [das Man] have heard about him, what “they” say in their talk about him, and what “they” know about him’. (BT, 219) Such a way of Being-with and encountering others is explained by distantiality (Abständigkeit), a phenomenon of everyday modes of Being, which Heidegger argues ‘is grounded in the fact that Being-with-one-another concerns itself as such with averageness, which is an existential characteristic of das Man.’ (BT, 164) Distantiality is a means by which Dasein polices everyday modes of Being, suppressing ‘everything exceptional that thrusts itself to the fore’. (BT, 165) Like the dictatorship of das Man ‘the more inconspicuous this kind of Being is to everyday Dasein itself, all the more stubbornly and primordially does it work itself out.’ (BT, 164)

Accordingly Dasein may not realise that it is Being-with-others in a distantial way, i.e. in a way that maintains and upholds the status quo. This characterisation of ambiguity and distantiality builds on our analysis of idle talk and the stubbornness of inauthentic modes of Being developed in the previous section. But it also suggests that in addition to Dasein being complicit in its own inauthenticity, it can also be complicit in the inauthenticity of others. If others were to become authentic this could potentially disrupt das Man and thus threaten Dasein’s own ability to effectively flee from authenticity and remain in a tranquilised, inauthentic state. This is why then, as Heidegger writes, ‘[i]nto primordial Being-with-one-another idle talk first slips itself in between.’ (BT, 219)\(^3^{324}\) We need these public discourses and this policing of the social realm in order to sustain das Man and the possibility of fleeing into inauthenticity.

This ambiguous way of encountering others is further explained by an account of inauthenticity qua undifferentiatedness. It is the Indifferenz of inauthenticity that grounds such relations with others, but, as I shall argue, not simply in its signification as undifferentiatedness. Rather, we must remember that ‘Indifferenz’ can be translated both as ‘undifferentiatedness’ and as an ‘indifference’. And, as I shall demonstrate, it is an appeal to

\(^3^{323}\) Such antagonistic relations with others function to cover up the more primordial Being-with that characterises Dasein’s Being at an ontological level. (BT, 155)

\(^3^{324}\) Although Heidegger goes on to suggest that these suspicious ways of encountering others are ‘already implied in Being with one another’, (BT, 219) this does not mean that relations with others are inherently inauthentic or problematic. Rather, what Heidegger is suggesting, as Stephen Mulhall argues, is that Dasein always starts from a position of inauthenticity, a position from which it must break away, and thus authenticity should always be understood as an achievement. Mulhall 2005: 73.
this latter signification of indifference that allows us to fully explain the inauthentic, ambiguous and distantiol way we relate to ourselves and others in everyday modes of Being.\footnote{325}

Indifference suggests a lack of care, a characterisation which elucidates the example already considered in the previous chapter: the person who just wants the bus to take them to work, regardless of which driver is driving it. This lack of care, or rather, this ‘deficient [mode] of solicitude’, (BT, 158)\footnote{326} is one which Heidegger explicitly associates with our everyday, inauthentic relations with others. He writes:

\begin{quote}
Being for, against, or without one another, passing one another by, not “mattering” to one another – these are possible ways of solicitude. And it is precisely these last-named deficient and Indifferent [Indifferenz] modes that characterise everyday, average Being-with-one-another. (BT, 158)
\end{quote}

We can say, then, that Dasein relates to others in an undifferentiated and inauthentic way not simply when it relates to others primarily via the social roles they perform, but when Dasein is indifferent to the particular person performing the role. This characterisation of inauthentic relations with others echoes the ambiguous way we encounter and relate to others in everyday modes of Being. Coming to understand others primarily ‘in terms of what “they” [das Man] have heard about him, what “they” say in their talk about him, and what “they” know about him’, (BT, 219) suggests an indifference to the particular individual performing the role. Conceptualised in this way, we can also see how even ‘an intent, ambiguous watching of one another, a secret and reciprocal listening-in’ (BT, 219) can be thought, at base, to be an indifferent way of relating to others. If to be indifferent is to relate to others primarily in terms of the public discourses and the social roles prescribed by das Man, and thus not to care about the particular person performing the role, or the unique individual to which the discourse pertains,\footnote{327} then even an ‘intent watching’ can be a way of Being indifferent, since it is intent on the wrong aspects of the other Dasein, it attends only to the way they have been publicly interpreted and not to the unique individual they are.

However, indifference not only characterises the way we relate to others in inauthentic modes of Being, I shall aim to show that it also characterises the way Dasein relates to itself in inauthenticity, even though the very definition of Dasein suggests a care for, or a concern, with one’s own existence. (BT, 32) We can understand how Dasein can be indifferent to itself by returning to Chapter Five of Being and Time, where it is argued that this care for one’s own existence manifests itself as a ‘burden’. (BT, 173) As we have seen in

\footnote{325} The analysis of undifferentiatedness in Chapter Four did not indicate how we should distinguish inauthentic ways of occupying (and relating to others in terms of) social roles, from more authentic ways of so doing. Even in more authentic modes of Being Dasein must continue to occupy social roles, since it does not transcend das Man. An appeal to the indifference of inauthentic modes of Being can help to clarify the inauthentic and, by contrast, the authentic way of occupying social roles.

\footnote{326} Solicitude is the particular type of care Dasein has for others. (BT, 157)

\footnote{327} For instance, the gendered example of generics in section 2.2, implied an indifference to the women picked out by the statement ‘women are bad at maths’.

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Chapters Two and Three, Dasein attempts to relieve itself of this burden by fleeing into the everyday world of *das Man*. (BT, 165) In Being disburdened by *das Man*, Dasein reposes in the ‘tranquillity’ of everydayness, a way of Being attuned to the world in which Dasein feels that all matters are settled and that ‘everything is ‘in the best of order”. (BT, 222) In this tranquillity, Dasein’s Being is no longer an issue for it. Dasein is able to stop caring about its existence because it has handed its existence over to *das Man*: Dasein comes to think, feel and act as one (*Man*) does. (BT, 164) This way of being disburdened feeds back into our analysis of undifferentiatedness: in acting I ask not what I should do, but what, e.g., a teacher, a housewife, a mother should do. I act in this way because I have become indifferent to the question of my own existence. I have become indifferent to myself as a unique individual and relate to myself primarily via the average, generic and levelled down roles I perform.

This indifference manifests itself not only in our own self-understanding, but also in terms of our meaningful way of Being-in-the-world. For example, George Bowling, the protagonist of Orwell’s 1936 novel *Coming up for Air* is a perfect example a man who has fallen foul of the average, levelling effects of everyday life: ‘I was in the usual downtrodden five-to-ten-pound-a-weeker in a semi-detached villa in the inner-outer suburbs.’ George trundles through life in a haze of indifference. However, towards the end of the text George begins to see more clearly the levelling effects of everydayness:

> In this life we lead – I don’t mean in human life in general, I mean life in this particular age and this particular country – we don’t do the things we want to do. It isn’t because we’re always working… It’s because there’s some devil in us that drives us to and fro on everlasting idiocies. There’s time for everything except the things worth doing. Think of some of the things you really care about. Then add hour to hour and calculate the fraction of your life that you’ve actually spent in doing it. And then calculate the time you’ve spent on things like shaving, riding to and fro on buses, waiting in railway junctions, swapping dirty stories, reading the newspapers.

Orwell’s text, like Heidegger’s analysis, suggests that indifference comes about as a result of handing our lives over to *das Man*: doing what one does, behaving how one behaves, thinking how one thinks. Orwell, like Heidegger, also suggests that agents can be complicit in this inauthentic mode of Being. Orwell’s protagonist has brought about his own inauthenticity (or at least failed to break out of an initial inauthentic mode of Being) by allowing himself to be carried along in inauthentic modes. The further into these generic ways of Being he gets, the harder it is for him to extricate himself from them. As he states: ‘I’d got a job and the job had got me.’ As with undifferentiatedness, indifference, as a further clarification of inauthentic modes of Being, exists in degrees. Dasein can be more or less indifferent to its own existence. The more indifferent it is, the more inauthentic it is.

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329 Ibid:82.
Whereas the more it cares about its existence – the more engaged it is in its situation and its way of Being – the more authentic Dasein is said to be.

A final aspect of the indifference of inauthenticity is the indifferent relation Dasein has to das Man. Although in inauthenticity Dasein relates to das Man as a dictatorship, prescribing ways of Being that must be blindly adhered to, it is in ‘inconspicuousness and unascertainability [that] the real dictatorship of das Man is unfolded.’ (BT, 164) As I interpret it, this implies that it is the unquestioning or indifferent way of relating to social norms that truly characterises inauthentic modes of Being and ensures Dasein remains immured in these. It is the way in which Dasein assumes there is a dictatorship, a status quo, that exists somewhere out there and cannot be challenged, that forms the central core of inauthentic modes of Being. We can find an example of this kind of indifferent relation to the social world by returning to Orwell’s text. He writes:

I remembered reading that they were making sausages out of fish, and fish, no doubt, out of something different. It gave me the feeling that I’d bitten into the modern world and discovered what it was really made of. That’s the way we’re going nowadays. Everything slick and streamlined, everything made out of something else. Celluloid, rubber, chromium-steel everywhere, arc-lamps blazing all night, glass roofs over your head, radios playing the same tune, no vegetation left, everything cemented over, mock-turtles grazing under the neutral fruit trees. But when you come down to brass tacks and get your teeth into something solid, a sausage for instance, that’s what you get. Rotten fish in a rubber skin. Bombs of filth bursting in your mouth.

Here we find an example of a lack of questioning regarding who the ‘they’ of everydayness actually are. Although George uses the word ‘we’ in his description of the modern world, he simultaneously situates himself outside of the decay of modern life. He does not see himself as part of the problem, but instead implies that the modern world is declining around him and there is nothing he can do about it. However, if he were to question who ‘they’ were, who was responsible for making fish sausages, cementing over everything, playing the radio constantly, he would find that there was no one. Similarly, Heidegger tells us, ‘it ‘was’ always “they” [das Man] who did it, and yet it can be said that it was ‘no one’.’ (BT, 165) If George did dig a little deeper, if he ceased to be indifferent to who ‘they’ were, he would discover the no one, the groundlessness (Bodenlosigkeit) of das Man and the norms of everydayness. In so doing George would then be able to appreciate the way in which he has been (passively) responsible for maintaining the norms he viewed as inevitable, and appreciate how he could ‘take action’ and transform the social world, by beginning to take responsibility for himself and his everyday way of Being, rather than disburdening himself onto das Man.

3. The Transformation of the “there” and Dasein’s Meaningful Engagement in the World

Through my analysis of curiosity, idle talk and ambiguity as phenomena that constitute the ‘everyday kind of Being’ of the “there” – the situation of Dasein, (BT, 224) I have further
elaborated Heidegger’s conception of falling and demonstrated the way in which discourse, as Dasein’s meaningful engagement with the world, manifests itself in terms of everyday inauthentic modes of Being. Curiosity, I have suggested, describes the dispersion and distraction which characterise everyday ways of Being-in and encountering the world, indicating the way in which Dasein comes to only partially understand the phenomena. Idle talk, as I have interpreted it, elaborates the way in which interpretations of the world have been pre-digested, and illuminates the stubbornness which serves to conceal both a more genuine understanding of the phenomena and the uprootedness of these inauthentic interpretations. Finally, ambiguity, I have argued, indicates the indifference of everyday modes of Being and the inaction of Dasein, who fails to care about others and itself, or to discover what lies behind the supposed ‘dictatorship’ of das Man. Each of these three phenomena emphasise the inattentive nature of everyday modes of Being, highlighting the way in which everydayness is characterised, at least in the first instance, as the concealment of, and a failure to understand, one’s situation in a primordial manner. This analysis has brought together and further illuminated the arguments regarding complicity developed in Chapters Three and Four, as well as furthering our understanding of inauthentic modes of Being in a more concrete way. Moreover, the more in-depth analysis of the everyday kind of Being characteristic of falling, reflects an approach to complicity shared with the adaptive preference theorist, because in this analysis we have examined the phenomena which structure the situation of Dasein in modes of Being in which it is complicit in its own unfreedom and inauthenticity. The final two sections of this chapter are also guided by the insight of the adaptive preference theorist, as I shall examine in what way discourse, as Dasein’s meaningful engagement with the world, can be transformed in order to help Dasein overcome its complicity in its own inauthenticity and unfreedom, and Be-in the world in a freer and more authentic way. In order to do this I shall return to the two aspects of discourse – gathering and communication – and clarify what they tell us about discourse as a mode of disclosedness and how authentic modes of discourse can arise.

3.1 Gathering and Social Transformation
Gathering signifies discourse both as a joining together/differentiating, and a making determinate. Depending on the way in which discourse gathers, i.e. the way in which it puts and holds together the disclosures of mood and understanding, different things will be communicated and different intelligible ways of engaging with the world will arise. Dasein is always gathering meanings and making them determinate, whether this is by putting the disclosures of mood and understanding into words, (BT, 400) bringing together a set of meanings in a work of art,332 or simply by using entities and comporting oneself in the

world. (BT, 200) Accordingly, gathering can be understood in terms of Dasein’s Being-in-the-world: as Being-in-the-world, Dasein gathers.

Through this characterisation of gathering, we can begin to see the way in which discourse can be used to transform the social setting of the agent. If gathering is present in all of our engaged activity in the world then this means that in all our meaningful, engaged worldly activity we have the ability to communicate a new meaning, to gather relations and make them determinate in a new way, thereby opening up new possibilities for understanding ourselves, relating to the phenomena and, ultimately, Being-in-the-world. As Judith Butler argues in her 1990 feminist work *Gender Trouble*, to combat oppressive social structures we should not seek to get outside them, rather we should seek to subvert them.333 Gathering meaning in a different way, through our engaged and meaningful activity in the world is a way of doing this.334 One such way of gathering meaning and allowing it to surface in a new way is by placing things in different contexts. This enables Dasein to reconceptualise the displaced entity and reflect on it in a fresh way. Duchamp’s urinal is a perfect example of this. Placed in an art gallery rather than a public restroom, the urinal becomes a piece of art, no longer just a functional object. It invokes a different context of significance that allows us to find new meaning and new possibilities within the entity. The way in which meaning is gathered in the urinal-as-art-work also makes us reflect differently on the broader context of art and the art world, disrupting our conceptions of what it takes for something to count as a piece of art.

To take a more political example, the subversion of the heterosexual matrix Butler examines in *Gender Trouble* – for example, a woman behaving in a typically masculine way, or a man desiring another man – is a new way of gathering meaning that opens up new possibilities and may also lead us to question our assumptions about gender or the hegemony of heteronormative discourses.335 By showing that typically masculine ways of Being can also pertain to a female gendered body, we put into question the meaning of ‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’ and thus potentially reveal new ways to ‘be’ a woman. However, as has been suggested in both Chapters Three and Four, coming to Be-in-the-world in a new way cannot be achieved in isolation from others. In order to see how this idea is articulated in discourse we must turn to its communicative function.

333 Butler 1990.
334 In order to gather meaning in this new way Dasein will have to be in the right mood to do so, as well as being attentive in its understanding of the phenomena. Discourse must always be thought in conjunction with mood and understanding to get the full picture of Dasein’s disclosedness and its Being-in-the-world.
335 The heterosexual matrix is the idea that women are feminine and desire men, whilst men are masculine and desire women.
3.2 Discourse as Communication

Communication may seem a straightforward concept to grasp, but as is so often the case within Heidegger’s ontology, everyday concepts acquire new meanings. Heidegger argues that: ‘[c]ommunication is never anything like a conveying of experiences, such as opinions or wishes, from the interior of one subject to the interior of another’. (BT, 205) Rather, as William Blattner notes, the kind of ‘communication’ characteristic of discourse should be understood as a shared directedness towards entities, in which Dasein participate jointly, coming together in their understanding of something. Blattner writes: ‘communication is going on all the time without even any thematic awareness of one’s distinctness from the next person... To communicate is to share a being-toward some phenomenon’. Communication therefore articulates the gathering aspect of discourse, but, as I shall argue, it does so not only with regard to the different way entities can be interpreted, it also does so with regard to others. It is in and through communication that Dasein are brought together with other Dasein.

What is distinctive about communication for Heidegger is not that it involves the transmission of ideas or knowledge, but rather that in communication the ability to transgress boundaries manifests itself. Heidegger writes:

In talking, Dasein expresses itself [spricht sich... aus] not because it has, in the first instance, been encapsulated as something ‘internal’ over against something outside, but because as Being-in-the-world it is already ‘outside’ when it understands. What is expressed is precisely this Being-outside. (BT, 205)

Recall that disclosedness was initially presented as a clarification of ‘Being-in’ – the distinctive way in which Dasein is in the world. Dasein is not in the world as water is in a glass or clothes are in a cupboard. Dasein’s ‘Being-in’ is first and foremost a concernful dwelling, an engaged interaction. Dasein does not have to, as Heidegger says, ‘[return] with one’s booty to the ‘cabinet’ of consciousness after one has gone out and grasped it’. (BT, 89) Rather, as Dasein, one is always already out there, dwelling in the shared world of meaning. Dasein’s ‘Being outside’, which manifests itself in discourse, and in particular in its communicative aspect, suggests we should not think of Dasein as possessing its own private world of meaning, but rather as always participating in the shared world of meaning that is the referential totality of the world. All of Dasein’s experiences, at least at first, are mediated through the public way in which things have been interpreted, understood, and disseminated through discourse. It is in this sense that Dasein is always outside itself, in the world, and with others. Discourse, therefore, not only opens us on to a meaningful world, but necessarily connects us with others, as the meanings we are opened on to are public.

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336 Blattner 1999: 72.
337 See Chapter Three.
The ‘Being outside’ which manifests itself in the communicative aspect of discourse also makes an ontological claim about Dasein’s Being. The idea that in the communicative aspect of discourse ‘Dasein expresses itself [spricht sich... aus]’, (BT, 205) suggests not only that Dasein is ontically with others or engaged with entities, but that at an ontological level this is also true. Ontologically Dasein is not an isolated Being, but as existing is already ‘outside of itself', Being-with others and Being-alongside the world. Accordingly, the communicative aspect of discourse signals that any transformation of Dasein’s way of Being-in-the-world must take this into account. As was argued in section three of Chapter Four, and as is implied in the analysis of complicity qua adaptive preference, in order for an agent to Be-in the world in a different way, the transformation to freer and more authentic modes of Being must be something that is done in conjunction with others and taking account of the specific social world in which the agent finds themselves.

4. The Authentic Transformation of Idle Talk, Curiosity and Ambiguity

Discourse reiterates much of what was said in the previous chapter with regard to understanding. The gathering aspect of discourse suggests that if we can come to understand ourselves and the phenomena in a new way, we can come to Be-in the world in a new way. Whereas the communicative aspect of discourse signals that this new way of understanding and Being-in-the-world must be something we do with others, as Dasein does not exist in isolation from others or from its social context.\footnote{338 This echoes the analysis of Chapter Four, section three, where it was argued that I cannot just assert that I am some way and then be that way, I must have a certain amount of ‘uptake’ from others and my social context in order for this to really be the case.} In order to shed further light on the way in which our transformation to freer and more authentic modes of Being-in-the-world involves others, let us turn our attention to a specific mode of authentic discourse: the call of conscience. In so doing, we shall also see how, in this mode, the inauthentic aspects of discourse – idle talk, ambiguity and curiosity – are transformed.

As we have seen in Chapter Three, section five, the call of conscience describes the transition from inauthentic to more authentic modes of Being. Moreover, Heidegger argues that ‘the call [of conscience] itself is a primordial kind of discourse for Dasein’, (BT, 342) but not because it is an actual utterance. (BT, 342) Rather, the call of conscience is a silent call. (BT, 343) This strongly differentiates the call of conscience from the gossip and chatter of idle talk. This is important because the purpose of the call of conscience is to take Dasein away from the they-self and open up its ‘potentiality-for-Being-itself’. (BT, 313) Conscience manifests itself as an ‘interrupt[ion]’ to Dasein’s ‘listening-away’ to das Man, (BT, 316) and thus is able to call Dasein back to itself and its potential for authentic modes of Being. Accordingly, conscience must call in a way that has ‘a character in everyway opposite’ to idle...
talk, it must call ‘without any hubbub and unambiguously, leaving no foothold for curiosity’; (BT, 316) thus giving us to understand that it is conscience which calls.

It is in the characterisation of the call itself that we are presented with an alternative mode of discourse to the inauthentic idle talk of everydayness. In what way, then, are the other aspects of everyday discourse transformed in the call of conscience? We can offer an alternative to the ambiguous relations we have with others in inauthentic everydayness by appealing to Stephen Mulhall’s suggestion that the other is the voice of conscience – that which calls Dasein to its ownmost potentiality-for-Being itself. Casting the other in this role, need not mean that the call of conscience is no longer silent. Indeed, Heidegger argues that ‘in talking with one another, the person who keeps silent can ‘make one understand’ (that is, he can develop an understanding), and he can do so more authentically than the person who is never short of words’. (BT, 208) With this picture of the other, we have a strong contrast to the indifferent and deficient modes of solicitude that characterised ambiguous and distantial ways of Being-with-others. Instead, in such silence, we find the suggestion of an attentive and engaged mode of Being-with-others, which echoes our more general account of authentic modes of Being and the means by which Dasein can overcome its complicity in its own inauthenticity and unfreedom. Mulhall argues that the call of conscience comes from ‘someone else who diagnoses us as lost in the they-self and has an interest in our overcoming that inauthenticity and freeing our capacity to live a genuinely individual life’. This characterisation therefore also reflects the communicative aspect of discourse, since I will need the other to lift me out of purely inauthentic modes of Being and recognise my ownmost potentiality-for-Being myself. However, such an account has significant consequences for our analysis of complicity.

If the other is the voice of conscience this suggests that it is only through a particular kind of relation with others that Dasein will be able to drag itself away from inauthenticity and overcome its complicity. This is at odds with our initial characterisation of complicity. In the first instance complicity was defined as an agent helping to perpetuate their own unfree way of Being. This characterisation stressed the agent’s responsibility for their complicity, suggesting that they had rendered themselves unfree. If complicit agents have the ability to render themselves unfree, it is arguable that we would also want to claim the reverse: that they have the ability to render themselves free by overcoming their complicity and pulling themselves out of inauthentic modes of Being. Although Heidegger states that ‘when Dasein is resolute, it can become the ‘conscience’ of Others’, (BT, 344) this appears to be a derivative mode of becoming the voice of conscience – derivative of the more primordial mode of Dasein being its own conscience – which Heidegger signals by putting ‘conscience’ (‘Gewissen’ (SZ, 298)) in scare quotes. The use of ‘becoming’ (werden) the voice of

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conscience, as opposed to ‘being’ the voice of conscience for other Dasein also reiterates this point.

Rather than understanding the other as the voice of conscience, I argue that we should take Heidegger at his word when he suggests that Dasein can be both the caller and the hearer of conscience and that ‘the possibility of another kind of hearing which will interrupt [the idle chatter of das Man], must be given by Dasein itself.’ (BT, 316) But what does this mean for the status of the other in authentic modes of discourse and the way in which our inauthentic ambiguous relation with them can be transformed? If we accept that conscience is Dasein calling itself to its ownmost potentiality-for-Being itself this may appear to imply that the other drops out of the picture altogether and thus the project of combatting one’s inauthenticity and unfreedom and overcoming complicity is in fact not a collective process, but an individual one. However, this need not be the case.

Although the other may not be the voice of conscience, Dasein is still brought together with others through this authentic mode of discourse, and thus our ambiguous relation with them is transformed. In authentic modes of discourse Dasein is brought together with others in the most primordial sense of communication, that is, as a shared being-towards an entity, namely that entity which we all are: Dasein. Heidegger argues that ‘[o]nly by authentically Being-their-selves in resoluteness can people authentically be with one another’. (BT, 342) Here Heidegger echoes a claim discussed in the previous chapter, that ‘it is indisputable that a lively mutual acquaintanceship on the basis of Being-with, often depends upon how far one’s own Dasein has understood itself at the time.’ (BT, 162) As was argued in Chapter Four, this implies that in order to Be-with others in an authentic way, Dasein must first have become authentic itself. With regard to our discussion of conscience this suggests a priority of myself as Dasein over the Dasein of others in bringing me to my authenticity. However, this does not mean that others are irrelevant to authentic modes of discourse. When I come to understand myself in authenticity I am brought together with others because I understand myself as Dasein and, in so doing, come to recognise the Dasein in others. An authentic understanding of myself thus overcomes the isolation and indifference of ambiguous and inauthentic modes of discourse, which play out as ‘an “against-one-another”’, (BT, 219) because in authentic modes of discourse and disclosedness I come to appreciate the ontological identity between myself and others.

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340 I do not have space to develop this line of argument in detail. However, it seems to me that a productive line of argument would be to adopt Michael Inwood’s claim that ‘everyone has a Conscience and it calls to them continuously’. Inwood 1997: 70. Connecting this with the relation Heidegger posits between hearing and mood, and the idea that once in the right mood Dasein will be able to hear itself call itself to its authenticity, we can suggest that when Dasein is in the right mood (i.e. anxiety) it can come to hear the call of conscience. Dasein can be put in the right mood through a ‘breakdown’ of das Man, as has been argued in Chapter Three.
The implication of this analysis reiterates the claims of Chapters Three and Four that to understand oneself authentically just is to understand oneself as Dasein,341 an observation which can illuminate the way in which curiosity can be transformed in more authentic modes of discourse. In Division II of Being and Time, the flighty, inconstant dispersion of inauthentic everyday Dasein that was discussed in section 2.1, is contrasted with the steady, constant self of authentic resoluteness.342 Heidegger argues that the dispersed self of inauthenticity has ‘los[t] itself in such a manner that it must, as it were, only subsequently pull itself together out of its dispersal, and think up for itself a unity in which that “together” is embraced.’ (BT, 442) This suggests that in more authentic modes of Being Dasein overrides its dispersion in das Man and unites the disparate elements of itself in a more unified manner. In these authentic modes of Being, rather than rejecting one possibility in favour of another, Dasein attempts to pull all the disparate threads of its life together. Moreover, this analysis sheds light on the specific type of gathering that characterises authentic modes of discourse. My interpretation suggests that in authentic modes of discourse, Dasein not only gathers meaning in new ways, and brings itself together with others, it also gathers itself. On my reading, conscience, as an authentic mode of discourse, gathers Dasein’s Being in an understanding of itself as Dasein. This mode of gathering is elaborated in the ‘self-constancy’ of authentic modes of Being. (BT, 369)

The sense in which authentic modes of Being gather Dasein into a self-constancy ‘in the double sense of steadiness and steadfastness’, (BT, 369) manifests itself in Dasein’s self-understanding. The self-constancy of authentic modes of Being is characterised by continuing to understand oneself as Dasein,343 and thus Being Dasein in its fullest manifestation. As Heidegger argues, ‘Dasein becomes ‘essentially’ Dasein in that authentic existence’. (BT, 370) Through the authentic discourse manifested in the call of conscience Dasein itself is gathered. This does not mean that in authentic modes of Being Dasein’s existence becomes fixed. As I have argued, this is characteristic of inauthentic modes of Being, in which Dasein becomes stubborn about the existence it has achieved. Rather, in authentic modes of Being Dasein’s self-understanding is ‘steady’ in the sense that it understands itself as Dasein, and does not fall away from this understanding as it does in inauthentic modes of existence. This steadiness is also manifested in Dasein’s relation to the world. Whereas in curious modes, Dasein’s attention is flighty and inconstant, the silence of authentic modes of discourse does not distract Dasein from the phenomena with what is said. Whereas curiosity ‘flees in the face of a definite potentiality-for-Being and closes it off... never-dwelling-anywhere’, (BT, 398) conscience is characterised by a kind of attentiveness, a

341 We shall analyse the argument for this claim in more detail in Chapter Six.
342 This self was explored in the previous chapter with regard to Lily Briscoe in To the Lighthouse.
343 Continuing to understand oneself as Dasein in the sense of resisting the temptation of falling back into das Man and the public way in which things have been interpreted.
dwelling in the phenomena in a more constant way. This further illuminates the kind of attentiveness that, as I have argued in Chapter Four, is characteristic of those modes of Being-in and understanding the world in which Dasein is able to overcome its complicity in its own inauthenticity and unfreedom.

The way in which the self-constancy of authentic modes of discourse and self-understanding is not a kind of fixity or staticness is elaborated in Heidegger’s discussion of resoluteness, another component of authentic existence. Here we also begin to see how such a self-understanding connects to a freer way of Being-in-the-world and aids Dasein overcoming its complicity in its own inauthenticity and unfreedom.\(^{344}\) Heidegger argues that:

> One would completely misunderstand the phenomenon of resoluteness if one should want to suppose that this consists simply in taking up possibilities which have been proposed and recommended, and seizing hold of them. *The resolution is precisely the disclosive projection and determination of what is factically possible at the time.* To resoluteness, the indefiniteness characteristic of every potentiality-for-Being into which Dasein has been factically thrown, is something that necessarily belongs. (BT, 345)

Resoluteness, as a recognition of the indefiniteness of every potentiality-for-Being, further clarifies the idea appealed to in the previous chapter that Dasein’s potentiality-for-Being articulates itself as ‘Being free for the freedom of choosing itself and taking hold of itself.’ (BT, 232) When Dasein comes to understand the unfixity and indeterminacy of its existence, when it comes to understand the nullity at the basis of its Being, when it comes to understand itself as Dasein, Dasein grasps the possibility and freedom that fundamentally characterise its way of Being at an ontological level. Having grasped this, Dasein can come to express this understanding in its way of Being-in-the-world.\(^{345}\)

### 5. The Role of the Other in Dasein’s Authentic Transformation

This analysis does not seek to deny the role of the other in Dasein becoming authentic. Rather, it aims to suggest that just as Dasein is complicit in its own unfreedom, it always has the resources within itself to resist such unfreedom and begin to overcome its complicity in inauthentic modes of Being.\(^{346}\) If an agent’s possibility for freedom and authenticity were totally dependent on the other calling them to their authenticity, then this would mean that agents who existed in oppressive societies or situations in which the status quo relied on keeping their authenticity suppressed, would have no hope of becoming authentic.\(^{347}\) Thus

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\(^{344}\) We shall turn to this in more detail in Chapter Six.

\(^{345}\) As argued in Chapter Four, if Dasein understands itself as something free and essentially characterised by possibility it will reflect such an understanding in its way of Being-in-the-world and relating to others.

\(^{346}\) This is not to underplay the role a society has in rendering its citizens unfree. Rather, once again my analysis is focussed on cases of unfreedom where the agent believes they are free, but we still view their situation as somehow problematic.

\(^{347}\) As argued in Chapter Three, we should posit a certain kind of ‘dissatisfaction’ with *das Man* and the public way in which things have been interpreted as that which ‘sparks off’ Dasein’s desire for a more authentic mode of Being. We shall return to this idea in Chapter Six.
whilst my analysis seeks to heed the insight of the adaptive preference theorist, that in order for an agent to overcome their complicity in their own unfreedom their social setting and their relations with others must be transformed, it also seeks to extend it. My analysis indicates that without some kind of change – or, as I have argued, ‘unconcealment’ – on the part of the agent themselves, the change in the agent’s social setting or in their relations with others will not be enough to engender a freer and more authentic way of Being that will enable the agent to overcome their complicity in their own unfreedom.

With regard to our relations with others, Dasein will not be able to appreciate the authenticity of the other – the other as Dasein – until the Dasein in question has realised such authenticity within itself. However, in a sense Mulhall’s interpretation of the role of the other in authentic modes of Being is still correct. The other does have an interest in helping me become authentic, but primarily so that they may Be-with me authentically. This is because if Dasein can Be-with others authentically, it is expressing its own authentic potentiality for Being more fully. Because Dasein, world and others are essentially bound up with one another at an ontological level, the other’s lack of authentic self-understanding limits Dasein’s own ability to Be authentic. Similarly, if I fail to understand myself authentically as Dasein, I am therefore limiting the other’s capacity to Be-with me authentically. (BT, 162) It is in this sense, then, that the other calls me to my authenticity: they call me to my authenticity for the sake of their own authenticity, just as I call them to their authenticity for the sake of my own.

Once such authentic relations with others have been realised in terms of a shared Being-towards ourselves as Dasein, a transformation of the social world can more easily occur. If authenticity means understanding oneself and others as Dasein and recognising the freedom and possibility that characterise us all at an ontological level, we cannot fully realise our authenticity without transforming the social world so that it reflects our understanding of ourselves as Dasein. For example, an authentic society will not be one structured around racial divisions or oppressive social structures. To divide society arbitrarily along these lines clashes with the authentic understanding that we are all Dasein. As has been noted at many points, authentically transforming the social world of das Man does not mean transcending it. In authentic modes of Being the public interpretations disseminated may continue to be characterised by being average and levelled down, simply in virtue of their publicness. However, these public interpretations of the phenomena, having been transformed in line with an understanding of ourselves as Dasein, will not hinder authenticity in the same way.

Heidegger suggests this is possible when he argues that ‘Authentic Being-one’s-Self does not rest upon an exceptional condition of the subject, a condition that has been

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348 This is similar to Wollstonecraft’s argument that men cannot be truly free whilst women are subservient. Wollstonecraft [1792] 1994.
detached from *das Man*; it is rather an existentiell modification of *das Man* – of *das Man* as an essential existential.’ (BT, 168) I argue this implies that although the overarching structure and the fundamental characteristics of *das Man* – publicness, averageness, levelling down – may remain intact in its authentic modification, the contents of *das Man* and the contingent ‘outcomes’ of its inauthentic manifestation will be transformed. What is contingent about publicness is that such interpretations ‘[obscure]’ and ‘[cover] up’ a more genuine understanding of the phenomena. (BT, 165) As we have seen, in authentic modes of Being Dasein ‘clear[s] away... the concealments and obscurities... with which [it] bars its own way’. (BT, 167) This suggests that it clears away the concealments and obscurities of public modes of interpretation. However, we also know that in authentic modes of Being Dasein does not ‘detach’ from *das Man*. (BT, 168) Therefore it appears that Dasein can jettison the obscurities and concealments of publicness without transcending the social world of *das Man* and the public way in which things have been interpreted. Accordingly, as I interpret them, public modes of interpretation are only contingently linked to concealment. Although public modes of interpretation may never offer the full, attentive, engaged understandings of the world that accompany more authentic modes of interpretation such as letting be, publicness need not conceal the phenomena and Dasein’s authentic potentiality for Being in the way it does in inauthentic modes of existence. My interpretation suggests that the authentic modification of *das Man* will be one in which the public interpretations of the phenomena and of Dasein – if not promote then at least do not hinder – a free and authentic mode of Being-in-the-world for all Dasein.  

Of course all of these achievements, like authenticity itself, will for the most part be partial. Dasein may have periods of authentic self-understanding, it may engage in some authentic relations with others, or help to transform certain pockets of the social world, or particular institutions so that they more strongly reflect an understanding of ourselves as Dasein and the freedom that such an understanding should engender. However, Dasein is always at risk of falling away from these understandings, these relations, and these ways of Being, and allowing the transformations it has helped to bring about be corrupted by an inauthentic public discourse which obscures and conceals the phenomena. Dasein is always in danger of falling back into inauthenticity, losing its grip on its understanding of itself as Dasein, failing to be attentive to its distinctive way of Being or the possibilities that characterise the phenomena. This is because the understanding Dasein has of itself as Dasein is not a ‘knowing’ in the sense of propositional knowledge something that, once known, is

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349 This will be something that will find further explanation outside of Heidegger’s ontology, in things such as solidarity movements and political protests. For example, the public rejection of slavery in the 19th century and the ensuing American civil war and, more recently, the legalisation of gay marriage. Both can be interpreted in terms of a transformation of *das Man* to be more in line with an understanding of ourselves as Dasein.
always known. Rather, Dasein’s understanding of itself as Dasein is manifested in Dasein’s way of Being in the world.\textsuperscript{350} That is, in discourse as Dasein’s meaningful engagement with the world. If asked, the Dasein who is ‘in’ the world in an authentic way may not ‘know’ that it is authentic, just as Dasein does not always ‘know’ that it is inauthentic or that it is complicit in its inauthenticity. This is what makes authenticity so precarious and why the freedom or unfreedom of Dasein must be continually re-evaluated.

In this chapter I have put forward an interpretation of discourse that accounts for the insight into complicity drawn from the adaptive preference theorist. I have argued that the everyday way of Being promoted by the social world of \textit{das Man} and characterised by curiosity, idle talk and ambiguity, promotes a way of Being-in-the-world in which Dasein is complicit in its own inauthenticity and unfreedom. In so doing I have developed the analyses of Chapters Three and Four in a more concrete form, elaborating the concealment and inattentiveness of modes of Being in which Dasein is complicit in its own inauthenticity and unfreedom. I have advanced the account of inauthenticity \textit{qua} undifferentiatedness, begun in Chapter Four, by developing it in relation to indifference, thus offering a fuller and more detailed account of inauthentic modes of Being. I have also developed the analyses of Chapters Three and Four with regard to the idea that overcoming complicity should be understood as a collective process of social transformation. I have argued that it is in discourse that the collective nature of such an endeavour most explicitly articulates itself by examining the way in which discourse is said to ‘gather’ and how in communication Dasein expresses itself and its ability to Be-with others at an ontological level. By drawing together the analyses of complicity carried out with regard to mood and understanding in my examination of discourse, I have gestured towards the way in which a Heideggerian approach to complicity provides a unified and systematic account of this phenomenon. An approach via disclosedness will necessarily be unified, because of the essential unity Heidegger identifies between mood, understanding and discourse in their ability to articulate Dasein’s disclosedness. However, it will be in the final chapter that we shall see explicitly how a Heideggerian approach to complicity unifies the insights of the self-deception theorist, the autonomy theorist and the adaptive preference theorist, and thus enables us to analyse complicity in a more thoroughgoing and systematic way than is currently on offer within the philosophical literature.

\textsuperscript{350} We have seen this already in Chapter Two in the idea of ‘transparency’ as Dasein’s’ pre-reflective grasp of its own ontological make-up.’ Han-Pile 2013: 303.
Becoming Authentic, Overcoming Complicity

So far in our investigation we have analysed complicity in terms of the discrete insights drawn from the self-deception theorist, the autonomy theorist and the adaptive preference theorist, without fully examining the way in which these insights may be integrated. Although such an approach is warranted by Heidegger’s own methodology, we are now in a position to turn our attention to the way in which a Heideggerean approach to complicity can offer us a unified account of this phenomenon and how it may be overcome. As has been noted at various points throughout our analysis, becoming authentic involves understanding oneself as Dasein. In this chapter we shall proceed by examining the way in which such a self-understanding unites the insights into overcoming complicity drawn from the self-deception theorist, the autonomy theorist and the adaptive preference theorist, thus providing the basis for a unified and systematic account of how agents can be understood to overcome their complicity in their own inauthenticity and unfreedom. We shall then examine some of the broader implications of approaching complicity via a Heideggerean ontology.

1. Self-Deception and Unconcealment
Firstly, let us return to the self-deception theorist, as it is the insight from self-deception that is most easily accounted for in an understanding of oneself as Dasein. The self-deception theorist suggested that self-deception – and thus complicity as analysed in this light – should be characterised as an agent ‘believ[ing] one thing in order not to believe another.’ This idea was developed in a Heideggerean context in Chapter Three by examining the way in which inauthentic modes of Being are characterised as ways of Being-in-the-world that involve a form of concealment: Being attuned to the phenomena in one way and in so doing concealing a more primordial relation. The implication for overcoming complicity drawn from the self-deception theorist, then, is that overcoming complicity will involve unconcealing what has been concealed, sweeping away the belief or the self (mis)understanding that has been used to cover up that to which one did not want to face

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351 Heidegger argues that Dasein’s Being-in-the-world ‘is not pieced together, but is primordially and constantly a whole. It affords us, however, various ways of looking at the items which are constitutive of it. The whole of this structure always comes first; but if we keep this constantly in view, these items, as phenomena, will be made to stand out.’ (BT, 65) Thus although Heidegger wants to ‘prevent a splitting of the phenomena’ of Dasein, world and Being-in, (BT, 170) he nevertheless recognises its necessity in order to embark on a detailed enquiry.

up. One can identify such unconcealment in an understanding of oneself as Dasein by returning to the call of conscience.

In a Heideggerean context, becoming authentic qua understanding oneself as Dasein involves unconcealment because, as Heidegger argues, ‘that understanding which follows the call of conscience’ functions to ‘basically disperse[e] all fugitive Self-concealments.’ (BT, 357) As Heidegger presents it here, the authentic Dasein (the Dasein who has been called back to itself by the call of conscience) has unconcealed itself. It has come to understand itself as Dasein and thus dispersed the concealments and obscurities of the everyday interpretations disseminated and prescribed by *das Man*.

The unconcealment involved in becoming authentic qua understanding oneself as Dasein is characterised in terms of a freeing relation. Heidegger argues that becoming authentic in this way involves uncovering oneself in terms of ‘a freedom which has been released from the Illusions of *das Man*, and which is factual, certain of itself and anxious.’ (BT, 311)\(^{353}\) Here Heidegger implies that when Dasein becomes authentic it unconceals a genuine understanding of itself as free. As we saw in Chapter Two, to be Dasein is to be free because Dasein’s transcendence and freedom are identical.\(^{354}\) In authentic modes of Being when Dasein understands itself as Dasein it unconceals this understanding of itself as essentially free in the sense of freedom\(^1\). Dasein has always been free in this way but, in failing to understand itself as Dasein, may not have fully realised this in inauthentic modes of Being. In authentic modes of Being, however, Dasein becomes certain of itself in its freedom as Dasein. This certainty reflects the steadfastness and self-certainty of authentic modes of Being, (BT, 369) and lies in stark contrast to the ambiguity, which, as we have seen in Chapter Five, characterises inauthentic everyday modes of understanding and Being-in-the-world. However, in the passage quoted above, we can clearly see that the freedom in which Dasein uncovers itself is not only an ontological freedom, i.e. an understanding of oneself as essentially free at an existential level in one’s ability to free entities for a totality of meaning. The claim that the freedom which has been released from the illusions of *das Man* is ‘factual’ suggests that an understanding of oneself as free has implications for Dasein’s everyday way of Being-in-the-world. This implies that understanding oneself as Dasein will enable Dasein to manifest its freedom in its everyday life, as was argued in Chapter Four. Accordingly, in authentic modes of Being Dasein recognises itself as essentially free in terms of freedom\(^1\), but it also realises its freedom in the sense of freedom\(^2\).

In authentic modes of Being we overcome the concealment involved in the knowing-and-not-knowing of inauthentic modes of Being to achieve just a knowing: living in light of an understanding of ourselves as Dasein by ‘clearing away... the concealments and

\(^{353}\) Here Heidegger is describing Dasein’s ‘freedom towards death’ (BT, 311), we shall turn our attention to the analysis of death in the following section.

obscurities, and... breaking up... the disguises with which Dasein bars its own way.’ (BT, 167) Becoming authentic *qua* understanding oneself as Dasein thus reflects the insight drawn from the self-deception theorist that overcoming complicity will involve coming to understand ourselves in a way that we previously concealed from ourselves.

### 1.1 Adaptive Preferences and the Transformation of the Social World

The analysis drawn from the self-deception theorist indicates that when we unconceal what has been concealed we will be able to Be-in the world in a freer way. As we saw in the previous chapter, it is via the insight drawn from the adaptive preference theorist that we are able to analyse the particular way in which the agent is ‘in’ the world, as the adaptive preference theorist directs us explicitly towards the social setting of the agent. The adaptive preference theorist suggested that to analyse the unfreedom of an agent and the reason for their complicity, we should attend to the ‘social distortions’ present in the agent’s environment. The implication here for our analysis is that in order to help an agent overcome their complicity in their own unfreedom, we must transform their social setting, ridding it of any social distortions. In her analysis of adaptive preferences, Elizabeth Barnes argues that by ‘social distortions’ we should understand things like ‘abuse of power relationships, exertion of dominance, forcible removal by one party of another party’s resources or freedoms etc.’

Accordingly, Barnes’s characterisation of social distortions suggests that the main way in which the social setting of the agent will be transformed is by transforming the relations they have with others. This insight implicitly informed our analysis in Chapter Five, where we began to contrast inauthentic with authentic relations with others in our discussion of ambiguity. Following on from this, we can now shed further light on how overcoming complicity *qua* transforming the social world and our relations with others is grounded in authentically understanding oneself (and others) as Dasein by appealing to Heidegger’s notion of Being-towards-death and reconstructing the sense in which death is non-relational.

As we saw briefly in Chapter Three, Being-towards-death, like anxiety, opens Dasein onto the possibility of becoming authentic *qua* understanding oneself as Dasein, because in Being-towards-death, Dasein is confronted with its Being as Dasein. But Being-towards-death also emphasises that the transformation to authenticity begins with a transformation of the individual. Heidegger argues that ‘death reveals itself as that *possibility which is one’s ownmost, which is non-relational, and which is not to be outstripped.*’ (BT, 294) This signifies that death is a possibility that cannot be taken away from Dasein. Another can sacrifice themselves for me, but that does not take my death away

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355 Barnes 2009: 13
356 Heidegger argues that ‘Being-towards-death is essentially anxiety.’ (BT, 310)
357 ‘Dasein’s existence, facticity, and falling reveal themselves in the phenomenon of death.’ (BT, 293)
from me. (BT, 284) As such, death is Dasein’s ‘ownmost’ possibility. Heidegger also argues that the anticipation of death ‘individualizes’ Dasein, and allows it, in this individualization of itself, to become certain of the totality of its potentiality-for-Being’. (BT, 310 emphasis added)

One might worry, then, that death – perhaps more than other elements of authentic modes of Being – makes a connection between authenticity and individuality and, by contrast, inauthenticity and sociality. This would imply that far from furthering our unified analysis and offering another way to justify the insight of the adaptive preference theorist in our Heideggerean account of complicity, Being-towards-death contradicts the idea that becoming authentic can be a collective process and instead suggests that to authentically understand oneself as, and ‘Be’, Dasein, one must separate oneself from others. Alison Stone suggests such a reading when she argues that ‘Heidegger’s conceptual framework’ prioritises ‘mortality and individuation’ over ‘natality and sociality’.

If Stone is correct, this is problematic for our analysis of complicity not only because it suggests that understanding oneself as Dasein fails to account for the insight of the adaptive preference theorist, but also because it suggests that becoming authentic will not involve a transformation of the social world, so much as the transcendence of it.

However, as I interpret them, Heidegger’s claims about the ‘individualizing’ nature of death need not be taken as an indication that authentic modes of Being involve breaking away from society or isolating ourselves from others. Indeed, interpreting Being-towards-death and becoming authentic in this way fails to make sense of certain key aspects of Heidegger’s text, such as the claim that das Man is an existentiale, which is not transcended in authentic modes of Being, but merely modified. (BT, 167–8) To avoid this issue, I argue that we can better understand the claims about the ‘individualizing’ nature of authentically Being-towards-death by deploying them in the context of the idea that Dasein needs to come to an understanding itself – calling itself to its own authenticity – before any collective transformation to authenticity can take place. Reconstructing the individualising nature of death in this way will enable us to see how Heidegger’s claims about the individuation of authentic modes of Being need not exclude the possibility of collective and social transformation, thus preserving the insight of the adaptive preference theorist in our account of overcoming complicity qua understanding oneself as Dasein.

Heidegger states that ‘as the non-relational possibility, death individualises’. (BT, 309) However, he quickly adds: ‘– but only in such a manner that, as the possibility which is

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359 The inauthentic modes of Being-towards-death is one in which an understanding of death is filtered through the public discourses of das Man. (BT, 297) In so doing, ‘[d]eath gets passed off as... something ‘actual’; its character as a possibility gets concealed’. (BT, 297) As a result death is neutralised and deferred, and thus cannot function to open Dasein onto the possibility of authenticity qua understanding itself as Dasein.
not to be outstripped, it makes Dasein, as Being-with, have some understanding of the potentiality-for-Being of Others’. (BT, 309) I argue that this suggests Being-towards-death teaches Dasein, not only something about itself, but also something about the other. This, as has been argued in the previous chapter, is the revelation of a similar self-understanding: Dasein relates to the other in terms of their Being as Dasein. Thus whatever Dasein discovers existentially and ontologically about itself in death, it also discovers about the other. Just as in Being-towards-death Dasein discovers its ownmost potentiality-for-Being itself (in contrast to a they-self), Dasein also comes to appreciate the other’s potential to be its own self, rather than a they-self.

If my interpretation is correct and we can rethink the individualization of Being-towards-death as revealing an existential identity between ourselves and others; then this gives us cause to return to Heidegger’s second point about Being-towards-death and attempt to reassess the sense in which it is said to be non-relational. Heidegger argues that death is ‘the possibility of the absolute impossibility of Dasein’, (BT, 294) it is the end of Dasein’s possibilities. However, as we have seen throughout, Dasein never exists in isolation from its world and others. For example, my possibility to be a spouse is dependent on the possibility of my partner (or at least another Dasein) to be in a relationship with me. I cannot ‘be’ this possibility without someone else. The non-relational nature of death therefore does not signify that at an existential level we are essentially isolated, but that we are essentially ‘with’ others, and that our possibilities are ones that are essentially bound up with others. Death is non-relational in the sense that it is the end of relational possibilities. Understood in this way we can say that with the death of the other some of my possibilities also die.

This idea is implicitly expressed by Stone when she intimates that the death of the other is a loss of possibilities for the Dasein who still exists. She argues:

In losing an other with whom I have been related, I lose real possibilities of meaning that were in the process of unfolding within my own life as lived before that other – and this is to lose a dimension of my life and actions…. I cannot recover that dimension by anticipating how the lost other might have seen me or remembering how they saw me, for this can only ever be my anticipation or remembrance, not the other’s perception from the perspective of their alterity.

Heidegger intimates, as commentators such as Lauren Freeman have suggested, that the other plays a role in constituting our Being. Freeman writes: ‘[g]iven the fundamental relation between Dasein and Mitsein, the others not only help to constitute what we know, they also help to constitute an essential part of who we are, who we were and who we can

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360 This also reflects the discussion from Chapter Three where it was argued that understanding always pertains to Dasein, world and others. I cannot be what I take myself to be unless my understanding is supported by all three elements.

361 Stone 2010: 364.
The consequence of this analysis is not that it establishes the priority of the individual over the social, nor the social over the individual. Rather, the relational nature of Dasein’s existence suggests that we should deconstruct the social/individual binary. Following Heidegger, we do not need to make such a strict distinction between individuality and sociality because to Be Dasein, just is to Be-in the world and Be-with others. To attempt to force these elements apart and prioritise one over the other would be to fundamentally misunderstand and misrepresent the kind of entity that Dasein is.

Appealing to Being-towards-death in order to demonstrate that others can affect the way we exist by both opening up and shutting down possible ways to be, does not mean that with regard to our analysis of overcoming complicity, Dasein must have an explicit relation to its own death. This analysis of death is not fundamentally distinct from the analysis I have developed in the previous chapters. Rather, it is the reaffirmation of what has already been established. Heidegger argues that ‘Being-towards-death is essentially anxiety’. (BT, 310) Thus Being-towards-death signifies a particular attunement that reveals Dasein to itself as itself, in its essentially relational nature. I am thus not ‘tagging on’ an extra element to my analysis by appealing to death in clarifying how the relationality of Dasein’s Being is accounted for in more authentic modes of existence. I am reiterating the way authentic modes of disclosedness can bring to light a more genuine understanding of ourselves and our relations with others. My analysis therefore demonstrates how we can account for the insight of the adaptive preference theorist in authenticity qua understanding ourselves as Dasein. In Being-towards-death and the authentic understanding of oneself as Dasein that accompanies it, Dasein appreciates the way that it is fundamentally bound up with others at an existential level, thus illuminating the fact that to truly transform its (unfree) situation Dasein will need to do so both with and alongside others, rather than in isolation from them.

1.2 Autonomy and the Existential Understanding of Dasein

By building on this conception of Dasein’s fundamentally relational nature and examining more closely the way our relations with others are transformed from inauthentic to authentic modes of Being, we can also connect the positive insight drawn from the autonomy theorist to our analysis of overcoming complicity in terms of becoming authentic qua understanding ourselves as Dasein. The autonomy theorist implies that we should analyse complicity not just in terms of the particular acts an agent performs, but that we should attend to their way of Being as a whole. By examining the distinction between authentic and inauthentic relations with others, we can see that what underpins the difference between these two

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362 Freeman 2011: 370. Even if one contests that it is difficult to see this in Heidegger’s work in a positive sense, it is undeniable that one finds evidence of this in everyday modes of Being in *das Man*. Here it is suggested that Dasein becomes completely constituted by a distinctive kind of Being-with Others, a Being-with which ‘dissolve one’s own Dasein completely into the kind of Being of ‘the Others’’. (BT, 164)
modes of Being-with is not the different acts agents perform, but the way in which they understand themselves and others at an existential level. We began an analysis of the different ways of relating to others in the previous chapter in the discussion of the contrast between indifferent and more attentive modes of Being-with others. I aim to show that by developing this analysis we shall be able to see in what way becoming authentic qua understanding ourselves as Dasein reflects the insight of the autonomy theorist that the complicity or non-complicity of the agent will be to do with the way they understand their own, as well as others’, way of Being.

In his analysis of Being-with others, Heidegger distinguishes between two extremes of solicitude.363 Firstly, he suggests that in Being-with others Dasein can ‘take away ‘care’ from the Other and put itself in his position in concern: it can leap in for him’. (BT, 158) This is the mode of solicitude associated with inauthentic modes of Being-with, it is a relation to the other that ‘disburden[s]’ them of their concern, (BT, 158) since it relates to the other only in terms of the projects they are undertaking, ignoring the particular individual undertaking the project. This mode of leaping in echoes our analysis from Chapters Four and Five of the undifferentiated and indifferent way Dasein relates to others via social roles in inauthentic modes of Being. In his analysis of this deficient, inauthentic mode of Being-with, Heidegger makes it clear that an indifference to the other constitutes an unfree and potentially oppressive way of Being-with them. This is significant with regard to the insight drawn from the autonomy theorist, as it implies that in order to develop a freer way of relating to and being-with others, we must attend to what they are and not just what they do.364 In inauthentic modes of Being-with, Heidegger argues that ‘the Other can become one who is dominated and dependent, even if this domination is a tacit one and remains hidden from him.’ (BT, 158) This is a key claim with regard to our analysis of complicity, as it indicates that the one who is dominated, who is rendered unfree in inauthentic modes of Being-with, may not be aware of their unfreedom. As a result of the concealed nature of the domination, it would seem that agents will be unlikely to realise that the relations in which they exist are problematic, thus making them more likely to be complicit in perpetuating and upholding such relations.

In his characterisation of leaping in, then, Heidegger offers a clear example of the way in which an agent may be complicit in their own unfreedom with regard to their relations with others. Moreover, as I interpret it, the unfreedom of the relation resides in a fundamental misunderstanding of what we are. We can only dominate others by ‘leaping in’ if we think that relating to others in terms of what they do, rather than who they are, is an

363 The type of care we have for others distinct from the concern we have for entities.
364 Dasein, of course, is not a ‘what’ but a ‘who’. (BT, 163) However, I say ‘what’ Dasein is here to indicate that we must be attentive to Dasein as Dasein, not just to Dasein’s particular factual concretions.
appropriate way of relating to them. Although Heidegger argues that in everyday modes of Being others are encountered and understood as ‘what they do’, (BT, 163) even to the extent that ‘they are what they do’, (BT, 163) this, as I have argued in Chapter Four, quickly proves to be an inauthentic and potentially oppressive way of relating to others. Such a relation conceals the other’s existence as Dasein, that is as a potentiality-for-Being, something that is as yet undecided and unfixed.

By contrast, in more authentic modes of Being Heidegger makes it clear that our relations with others will be characterised by freedom and liberation and that this freedom is grounded in an understanding of ourselves, and others, as Dasein. In authentic modes of Being Dasein does ‘not so much leap in for the Other as leap ahead of him in his existentiell potentiality-for-Being, not in order to take away his ‘care’ but rather to give it back to him authentically as such for the first time.’ (BT, 159) Heidegger argues that leaping ahead ‘pertains essentially to authentic care – that is to the existence of the Other, not to a “what” with which he is concerned; it helps the Other to become transparent to himself in his care and to become free for it.’ (BT, 159) As I interpret it, this indicates that authentic modes of Being-with others are ones in which we relate to the other as Dasein, since our care is not directed only to what the other does – the roles they perform or the projects they are engaged in – but to ‘the existence of the Other’, i.e. the other as Dasein. Such a relation is liberating because it does not dominate the other by defining them in terms of a fixed project or role, but rather relates to them authentically as someone with an existence that is unfixed, undecided and characterised by possibility. Whereas leaping in ‘leaps in and dominates’ leaping ahead ‘leaps forth and liberates’, ‘free[ing] the Other in his freedom for himself.’ (BT, 159)

This brings us back to the idea discussed in the previous section that Being-towards-death not only directs Dasein towards its ownmost potentiality-for-Being, but that it ‘makes Dasein, as Being-with, have some understanding of the potentiality-for-Being of Others’. (BT,309) This sentiment is echoed in Heidegger’s characterisation of leaping ahead. Once Dasein has appreciated the existential freedom of the other, to relate to them as if they could be defined by a role or a project would be to knowingly take up an inauthentic relation to them. As we have seen, for Heidegger, understanding cannot be separated from ways of Being, and thus if Dasein understands the other as Dasein and thus as essentially free, Dasein will not be able to engage in relations with others that do not reflect such an understanding of the other’s existential freedom.365 In authentic modes of Being, when Dasein has understood both itself and the other as Dasein, Dasein will be motivated (even if

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365 This is not to say that Dasein cannot slip back into inauthentic modes of understanding and Being-with others, but rather that when Dasein understands the other authentically as Dasein it will relate to (Be-with) the other authentically as Dasein.
only implicitly)\(^{366}\) to seek out ways of Being-in-the-world and Being-with others that reflect
the ontological freedom of Dasein. Therefore we can say, along with the autonomy theorist,
that overcoming the unfreedom of inauthentic and complicit modes of Being in order to Be-
in the world and Be-with others in a freer and more authentic way, will involve Dasein
‘correctly’ understanding its way of Being and the way of Being of others. That is, it will
involve grasping ourselves and others as Dasein.

2. The Specificities of Thrownness or Why Women Appear to be more Complicit than Men
We have now seen how understanding oneself as Dasein unifies the insights into overcoming
complicity drawn from theories of self-deception, adaptive preference and autonomy. I have
argued that unconcealment, a transformation in our relations with others, and an attention
to an agent’s way of Being, are all aspects of coming to understand oneself as Dasein. My
interpretation suggests that by coming to understand themselves in this way, agents
unconceal an understanding of themselves and others as ontologically free. Because of the
existential significance of understanding for Heidegger, this will mean that agents manifest
this understanding in their everyday way of Being and will thus be able to overcome their
complicity in their own inauthenticity and unfreedom. The analysis I have developed in this,
and the previous chapters, has aimed to show that it is both possible and productive to
approach complicity in a Heideggerean context. We shall now turn our attention to some of
the broader implications of this analysis of complicity. It was noted in the Introduction that
complicity has often been identified as a particular problem for women and, as such, an
analysis of complicity presents itself as a project with a feminist bent. One of the implicit
aims of this thesis was to demonstrate the usefulness of Heidegger’s early philosophy to
feminist scholars. As yet we have not explicitly set out the resources of a Heideggerean
ontology for a feminist project. This is the aim of the final chapter of this thesis.\(^{367}\)

As was suggested in both the Introduction and Chapter Two, for Heidegger,
complicity, as it manifests itself in falling and fleeing, is not a phenomenon particular to a
specific group of Dasein, but rather is a phenomenon common to all Dasein. It cannot be that
women, in virtue of some facet of their existential make up, are more complicit than men,
because Heidegger does not distinguish between men and women at an ontological level. In
*The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic* Heidegger makes it clear that the ‘neutrality’ of the
term ‘Dasein’ is not coincidental, but is ‘essential, because the interpretation of this being
must be carried out prior to every factual concretion.’\(^{368}\) Every claim Heidegger makes about

\(^{366}\) The authentic understanding of the other as Dasein and the drive to be with the other need not
manifest itself in a propositional form.

\(^{367}\) We shall not provide an exhaustive account of the use of Heidegger’s philosophy to further feminist
aims, rather we shall identify some of the ways in which a Heideggerean approach may be useful for
feminist projects.

Dasein is meant to be a claim that pertains to all people, men and women, regardless of factical matters such as gender, race, class, sexuality, (dis)ability, etc. Heidegger further clarifies this point in relation to gender and sexual difference by arguing that ‘[t]his neutrality also indicates that Dasein is neither of the two sexes.’

One might worry that the erasure of sexual difference at an ontological level via an appeal to the neutrality of Dasein obscures the particular plight of women and thereby compromises the usefulness of a Heideggerean ontology for analysing their complicity. Rosalyn Diprose, for example, argues that to retreat into neutrality is to do a disservice to women, as it obscures their difference and attempts to subsume them under the male norm. The idea that positing neutrality in a theory of gender ignores the oppression suffered by women in a society founded upon ‘gender hierarchy’. Moreover, she argues, it does them a further injustice by suggesting they must deny the harm done to them and embrace a system of neutrality. Throughout our analysis we have seen in what ways we are able to examine the phenomenon of complicity at an ontological level as a mode of existence, observing also the interplay between the ontic and the ontological, and thus the way complicity can play out in the everyday lives of Dasein. Does the ontological neutrality of Dasein jeopardise this analysis by concealing the particular plight of women and subsuming them under a male norm? Does saying complicity is a problem for all Dasein obscure the way in which it appears to be a particular problem for women?

Although Diprose’s comments may bear some weight with regard to a ‘standard’ conception of gender neutrality, Heidegger’s take on the neutrality of Dasein does not appear to fall foul of them. In his essay ‘Geschlecht’, Derrida argues that Heidegger neutralises gender as duality, but not the possibility of gender as an ontological constituent of Dasein. Heidegger himself argues that neutrality ‘is neither of the two sexes. But [that] here sexlessness is not the indifference of an empty void’. Derrida takes this to mean that neutrality is not to be interpreted in terms of sexlessness at all. Owing to Heidegger’s characterisation of neutrality as a ‘primordial positivity and potency’, neutrality can instead be understood as a ‘pre-differential, rather than a pre-dual, sexuality’. Following Heidegger’s lead, Derrida argues that the gender neutrality of Dasein should be understood in terms of dispersion, dissemination and multiplication rather than as a ‘unitary,

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371 Ibid.
373 Ibid: 137.
375 Derrida claims that dispersion is not only the clarification of an inauthentic way of Being, but is ‘marked twice, as a general structure of Dasein and as a mode of inauthenticity.’ Derrida 1983: 71. Zerstreuung as a general structure of Dasein’s Being is said to be an ‘originary dispersion’, which grounds Dasein’s ability to concern itself with a multiplicity of objects. Ibid: 65-66.
homogenous, or undifferentiated’ whole which is then divided into the two sexed instantiations of Dasein one finds in the world.\cite{376} Derrida takes the ‘positivity’ Heidegger associates with neutrality to mean that it is ‘sexual division itself which leads to negativity’.\cite{377} He concludes that Heidegger’s ontology neutralises ‘less sexuality itself than the “generic” mark of sexual difference, belonging to one of two sexes’,\cite{378} thus suggesting that gender can still be an ontological constituent of Dasein as long as it is not thought of in binary terms.

Far from being an obstacle to a feminist appropriation of Heidegger’s work, the neutrality of Dasein’s Being appears to be an enabling factor for feminist critique. With regard to our analysis of complicity, the neutrality of Dasein’s Being indicates that women cannot be thought to be essentially more predisposed to complicity, inauthenticity and unfreedom than men. Furthermore, it also indicates that overcoming complicity by becoming authentic will necessarily involve rethinking our gendered relations and the institutions around which they are structured. Rather than obscuring the plight of women, then, the ontological neutrality of Dasein provides an impetus to transform women’s situation. However, we might still ask, if Being complicit in one’s own inauthenticity and unfreedom is a problem for Dasein as such, why do some people, for example women, appear to be more complicit and less free than men?

2.1 Thrownness or how an Agent’s Situation can Impact their Authenticity

With regard to Heidegger’s ontology, the specificities of an agent’s sex and gender are ‘factual concretion[s]’ of Dasein in the world.\cite{379} As we have seen in Chapter Three, such facticity comes to light and is analysed via Dasein’s thrownness. In order to unearth the root of the unfreedom and complicity of women we must therefore attend to the specific situations into which they are thrown. As many feminist commentators over the years have argued, the situations into which women are thrown (including the general situation of being a woman) have historically been more limiting than those situations in which men find themselves. For example, Nancy Holland argues that Simone de Beauvoir’s *The Second Sex*: ‘offers a classic listing of the scripts available to women in twentieth-century European culture (wife, mother, prostitute, lesbian, narcissist, mystic, “independent woman’).\cite{380} These roles or ‘scripts’, as Holland terms them:

provide the feminist basis for an account of inauthenticity or “bad faith” that explains its differential moral weight in men and women, but without exonerating women completely from complicity in the perpetuation of the self-defeating scripts that they are compelled to live out.\cite{381}

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377 Ibid.
378 Ibid: 82.
381 Ibid.
The implication here is that women are no more or less inauthentic than men. It is just that the specific content of the inauthentic modes of Being and the average, everyday roles into which women flee are more limiting and limited than those open to men. Thus, in occupying these roles, women appear to be less free. By contrast, when men flee into inauthenticity they have a much wider range of possibilities into which to flee and there is more of a diversity (and a higher status) of social roles for them to identify with. Therefore, interpreted with regard to their social roles, men will, on the whole, appear to be freer than women.

However, the sense in which women are less free than men in their everyday, inauthentic modes of Being is not captured by ‘freedom’ as elaborated in Chapter Two. To exist in an inauthentic mode of Being and lack freedom\(^2\) is just to flee from one’s own authenticity and immerse oneself in the world of \textit{das Man}. Accordingly, men who take up traditionally male scripts may identify to the same degree and thus be to the same degree complicit in their inauthenticity and unfreedom\(^2\). A man who, for example, understands himself as essentially defined by his role as a high powered CEO could be as inauthentic, unfree\(^2\) and complicit in this inauthenticity and unfreedom\(^2\) as a subservient housewife who essentially understands herself as a housewife. It is at this point that the notions of unfreedom and inauthenticity may appear to come apart. It seems odd to suggest that a high powered CEO and a subservient housewife could be to the same extent inauthentic and hence unfree. Our intuitions tell us that the CEO is more free than the housewife. Accordingly, we must specify that when we say that the housewife and the CEO may be complicit in their own inauthenticity and unfreedom to the same extent, we mean unfree in the sense of lacking freedom\(^2\) — unfreedom as it relates to an inauthentic mode of Being — which is distinct from the everyday freedom or unfreedom we must analyse in terms of Dasein’s thrownness. As Sacha Golob notes, ‘Heidegger explains at length how freedom in general might be understood whilst recognising the social and historical limitations that are always operating on Dasein’.\(^{382}\) Accordingly, we can say that the CEO may be just as inauthentic and hence unfree\(^2\) as the subservient housewife because he does not understand himself as Dasein. However, when we turn to the specific social set-up in which the agents exist we find that the particular self-understanding of one of them (the housewife) engenders a more limited and limiting way of Being-in-the-world than the other (the CEO). The freedom or unfreedom of these agents in this sense is not related to the extent to which they flee from their own authenticity and self-responsibility. It is related to the particular content of the roles they occupy. Thus in discussing an agent’s freedom or unfreedom we must

\(^{382}\) Golob 2014: 251.
appeal not only to the extent to which they meet the criterion of freedom\textsuperscript{2}, but also to the specific socio-historical setting of the agent.\textsuperscript{383}

Nevertheless, although women will not necessarily be more unfree\textsuperscript{2} or complicit in their inauthenticity than men in the sense of being more immersed in their inauthentic way of Being, the more restrictive and limited nature of traditionally female social roles may make it more difficult for women to overcome their complicity in their own unfreedom\textsuperscript{2}. As I have argued in Chapter Four, the transformation to authenticity need not mean doing anything different than one did before. Rather, the transformation lies in an agent’s attitude, their way of understanding themselves, others and the world.

However, because the roles women traditionally occupy are comparatively restrictive, it may be difficult to manifest an authentic understanding of oneself whilst still occupying these limited and limiting roles. For example, to embrace the role of being a subservient housewife one would have to have an understanding of oneself that is fundamentally at odds with an understanding of oneself and others as Dasein.\textsuperscript{384} The role of the subservient housewife does not reflect the existential equality between oneself and others that is indicated at an existential level in terms of Being-with. Accordingly, for the subservient housewife to become authentic, she would have to give up her role. Although this may be an attractive proposition in the sense that she will no longer be subservient, it also constitutes a more difficult task than, for example, that of a teacher who, in becoming authentic can continue to occupy the same role whilst taking up a different attitude. For many women, then, becoming authentic will represent a massive overhaul in their way of Being, not only at an ontological level in terms of the way they understand themselves, but also at an ontic level in terms of the roles they occupy. Moreover, if none of the social roles available to women are compatible with an authentic understanding of themselves and others as Dasein, it may be almost impossible for some women to become authentic and manifest this understanding in their everyday way of Being.

We can see, then, that although women may not be essentially more inauthentic or more complicit in their inauthenticity and unfreedom than men, the particular factual situation of women may make it more difficult for them to realise their freedom. As Heidegger argues, ‘[freedom] is only in the choice of one possibility – that is, in tolerating one’s not having chosen the others and one’s not being able to choose them.’ (BT, 331)

\textsuperscript{383} Neither are women more unfree \textit{qua} freedom\textsuperscript{1}, as we have seen in Chapter Two, to be free in this sense is to exist as Dasein. Dasein may not grasp its freedom\textsuperscript{1} fully or explicitly, but it is always free in this sense. For an elaboration of the distinction between freedom\textsuperscript{1} and freedom\textsuperscript{2} see Chapter Two, section eight.

\textsuperscript{384} Golob also suggests that some roles or self-understandings may be fundamentally incompatible with Being authentic, arguing that authenticity can be understood as ‘a competitor with at least some of our practical identities’, for example where ‘my adopting some mode of self-understanding conflicted or obstructed the demand that I be authentic’. Golob 2014: 244.
elaborates a claim analysed in Chapter Two, that freedom\(^2\) involves not only recognising and acting in light of norms, but also having a genuine understanding of this normativity and the way in which it is binding on Dasein. Previously, I argued that being free in the sense of freedom\(^2\) meant taking up a questioning relation to the norms of everydayness. We can now see more clearly that, for Heidegger, Being free in the sense of freedom\(^2\) also means understanding the way in which our freedom is tempered by what has already been fixed. To elaborate this idea in a feminist context I shall return to the limits on women’s situation in patriarchal societies.

Holland argues that:

[T]he traditional upper- or middle-class script for women ends with marriage and motherhood. Once that happily-ever-after is accomplished, there is nothing more for a woman to do with her life... once married the feminine they-self no longer has any new possibilities to be realized.\(^{385}\)

Taking Holland’s analysis in conjunction with Heidegger’s claims regarding freedom and choice suggests that in many cases women will not be considered very free at all. If an agent only has a very limited sphere in which to choose one possibility and reject others, then that agent will only be free in a very limited sense. However, we might also think that in virtue of such limitations, women may sometimes be in a better position to become authentic and – social world allowing – to manifest this authentic understanding of themselves in terms of a freer way of Being-in-the-world.\(^{386}\) In the claim that freedom ‘is only in the choice of one possibility’, (BT, 331) Heidegger explicitly links freedom to Dasein’s ability to project possibilities. By contrast, thrownness represents a limit on Dasein’s possibilities, so that, together, projection and thrownness make up the dyad of freedom and determination.\(^{387}\) As Heidegger presents it here, and as I intimated in Chapter Three, to properly understand one’s freedom is to understand projection in the context of limitation and to grasp that the projection of one possibility is also always the shutting down of another. Any act of free projection is simultaneously an act of rendering oneself less free. By pressing ahead into one possibility, Dasein makes its existence more determinate and fixed. We might think that women, in virtue of their situation, are in a better position to grasp this than men, and thus may be able to more easily realise what it means to be free, what it means to take responsibility for oneself and ‘Be’ authentically in the world as Dasein. For example, the choice between pressing ahead with one’s career and having children will, for many women,

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\(^{385}\) Holland 2001: 136.  
\(^{386}\) The test case here has shifted. Whereas in the previous paragraph we were thinking about women in very restrictive patriarchal societies, such as Saudi Arabia, we have now shifted to an example of a still patriarchal, but less obviously restrictive society, such as America or the UK.  
\(^{387}\) Not that Dasein as such is determined, but rather the specific thrownness of any particular Dasein will mean that some possibilities have been shut down and others have been made more likely in virtue of Dasein’s thrownness.
comprehensively illustrate Heidegger’s characterisation of freedom as having to choose one possibility and live with the choice of not choosing, or not being able to choose, others.

My interpretation suggests that women may be in a unique position to appreciate their own answerability in making choices that both express and limit their freedom, because they are more commonly faced with such choices in everyday life. We can find a famous instance of such a choice in the Introduction to *The Second Sex*:

> In the midst of an abstract discussion it is vexing to hear a man say: ‘You think thus and so because you are a woman’; but I know that my only defence is to reply: ‘I think thus and so because it is true,’ thereby removing my subjective self from the argument.⁴⁸⁸

Here Beauvoir indicates that, in their everyday lives, women come up against certain choices or what we might call ‘double binds’⁴⁹⁰ that bring to light freedom as the choice of one possibility at the expense of another. In Beauvoir’s example, the agent can either deny her womanhood or she can embrace it. Each comes with a particular set of consequences that, whilst opening up some possibilities, will shut down others. Whereas women are often faced with these kind of choices in their everyday lives, the choices with which men are faced appear to be less obviously characterised by this kind of ‘double negative’.

However, this may actually disadvantage men by hindering their ability to become authentic. Men’s more appealing and multiple social roles may make inauthenticity hard to resist and thus in this way prevent men from articulating their freedom² and their authentic understanding of themselves as Dasein. As we saw in Chapter Three, the characterisation of inauthentic modes of Being-in and understanding the world is one in which ‘nothing is closed off’ (BT, 217) and ‘all doors are open’. (BT, 222) This characterisation articulates the temptation of inauthentic modes of Being. It suggests an appreciation of one’s freedom in the ability to project possibilities, but it also implies a lack of awareness of one’s thrownness and the way in which projecting any possibility also always means closing off others. Accordingly, agents who do not feel the restrictions of inauthentic modes of Being so keenly may be more likely to continue to exist in an inauthentic mode.⁴⁹¹

In this respect, the limiting nature of many of women’s social roles may actually be an aid to becoming authentic and overcoming complicity *qua* understanding oneself as Dasein. This is an argument that Holland also makes, suggesting that ‘precisely the fact that women’s scripts are banal and ultimately unrewarding can sometimes create a revealing distance between an individual woman’s consciousness and the larger social world in which she is

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⁴⁸⁹ Frye 1983.
⁴⁹⁰ Ibid.
⁴⁹¹ Again, as argued in Chapter Three this does not mean that the essential characteristics of inauthenticity are inherently masculine and fail to capture women’s experience. Rather, the suggestion is that in terms of some of the more specific comments Heidegger makes he may be elucidating a male experience of inauthentic modes of Being. As was argued in Chapter Three, the general characterisation of inauthenticity pertains to both male and female experience.
immersed.' We have encountered this idea already in Chapter Three in the dissatisfaction agents may feel with regard to das Man and the role based self-understandings it prescribes. If women are more likely to feel dissatisfied with, and restricted by, their social roles, they are more likely to be assailed by the anxious mood that can be engendered as the result of such dissatisfaction. Accordingly, women may be more likely to be confronted with their own Being as Dasein and thus opened onto the possibility of overcoming their complicity in their own inauthenticity and unfreedom by articulating their understanding of themselves as Dasein in their everyday existence.

However, whether the limitations of women’s factual situation come to have a positive or a negative significance with regard to a woman’s ability to become authentic and discover herself as Dasein will depend on the specific situation of the woman in question and her particular disposition. Whereas some situations may be too restrictive to allow women to manifest their authenticity, or may be fundamentally incompatible with realising oneself in authentic modes of Being, other situations will contain the right balance of freedom and limitation to spur the woman on to clear away the obscurities that conceal her possibility of Being-in-the-world in a more authentic way. Just as it will depend on the situation and its conduciveness to authentic modes of Being, authenticity will also depend on the ‘courage’ of the particular agent and her willingness to take the leap to discover herself.

The issue of what it takes for an individual to overcome their complicity in their own unfreedom is perhaps the biggest weakness in Heidegger’s account. There appears to be nothing to guarantee that an agent will come to discover themselves in more authentic modes. Although Heidegger offers an account of anxiety and Being-towards-death as ways in which we may be confronted with ourselves as Dasein and opened onto the possibility of authenticity, nothing in his ontology guarantees that such a moment will ever come about. Even if Dasein has a structural tendency towards authenticity, as Han-Pile and Carman claim, there is nothing to suggest that authentic modes of Being will necessarily be achieved. Indeed, Heidegger implies that genuine anxiety is rare and that many Dasein may never experience it. (BT, 234) Thus, whilst Heidegger offers us the resources to analyse complicity and even provides an account of the mechanisms by which complicity may be overcome, he does not give a clear or comprehensive account of how these mechanisms will be, or can be, ‘brought into action’. It will ultimately always be up to the individual Dasein to want to overcome its complicity and thus drive this transformation.

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392 Holland 2001: 37.
393 I mean situation in the broadest sense, taking into account an agent’s particular disposition, the particular relations they have with others and their social, cultural and historical setting.
395 By ‘mechanisms’ I mean the call of conscience, which is that by which Dasein is called to its own authenticity. However, we have not had the space to be able to examine this mechanism fully with regard to the question of an agent overcoming complicity.
This appears to be a serious deficiency, but Heidegger may be able to counter it. To give a clear account of how to set in motion mechanisms that will enable an agent to overcome their complicity in their own unfreedom, presupposes that there is something beyond the agent that can engender such a transformation. If there is something ‘outside me’ that can ultimately engender my transformation to freer and more authentic modes of Being, this implies that I am not ultimately responsible for remaining in unfree and inauthentic modes of existence. However, the idea that the agent is responsible for their own inauthenticity and unfreedom was one of the initial premises of our investigation. To take the agent out of the equation at this final stage and situate the ultimate reason for their unfreedom in something beyond their ‘desire’ to remain in an inauthentic mode would be to reduce the agent’s complicity in their own unfreedom to a case of structural or agent oppression. Accordingly, the idea that, at base, in order for an agent to overcome their complicity in their own unfreedom they must want to do so, appears to be not so much a limitation of a Heideggerean account, as an unavoidable conclusion of complicity as we have understood it.\footnote{One further reason for not providing a step-by-step guide of ‘how to become authentic’, could be that such a clear cut analysis would have the potential to be appropriated by das Man and thus become part of the public discourse of idle talk, in the way described in Chapter Five. This would deprive such an analysis of its force as a mechanism by which to overcome such inauthentic modes of Being and instead become a template for an inauthentic mode of Being.}

In this chapter I have demonstrated the unified and systematic approach to complicity that a Heideggerean analysis can provide. I have shown how the insights into overcoming complicity, drawn from theories of self-deception, adaptive preference and autonomy, can be unified in a Heideggerean account of overcoming complicity \textit{qua} understanding ourselves as Dasein. I have also explored the feminist potential of Heidegger’s philosophy. I have analysed the way in which women can be understood to be unfree in everydayness with regard to their thrownness, whilst demonstrating that women are not necessarily more inauthentic and unfree, nor more complicit in such unfreedom, than men. My analysis suggests that although women may be more unfree by virtue of the situations into which they are thrown, they are not somehow more predisposed to such unfreedom. Rather, they have had such unfreedom thrust upon them in unjust and unfree social settings, where sexist institutions, norms and practices still structure and determine much female experience. In this vein, I have offered an analysis of some of the barriers to authenticity, whilst also arguing that in some cases the limitations of women’s situation may afford them the opportunity to overcome their complicity. The ultimate conclusion of this analysis of thrownness should be taken as an account of the way in which an agent’s social setting may determine the \textit{extent to which} they can become authentic. Ultimately, as I have sought to establish throughout this work, a Heideggerean approach to complicity indicates that agents
always have within themselves the ability to begin to overcome their complicity in their own
unfreedom by unconcealing their ownmost potentiality-for-Being and uncovering the
authentic understanding of themselves as Dasein that they each possess in virtue of their
existence. Some social contexts may make it harder to unconceal this authentic self-
understanding or articulate it in terms of one’s everyday mode of existence, but no social
setting, no external factor, can totally extinguish an agent’s possibility of overcoming their
complicity in their own unfreedom. If it could, it would have the ability to extinguish our
existence as Dasein.³⁹⁷

³⁹⁷ I am not ruling out the possibility that this could happen. Rather, I am suggesting that these kind of
extreme social settings do not characterise the cases of complicity on which we have been focussing.
Conclusion

The aim of this work has been to establish that we can read *Being and Time* as dealing with the question of an agent’s complicity in their own unfreedom and, in so doing, be furnished with a novel approach that has consequences for how we conceive of complicity and how we analyse it. As was noted in the Introduction, complicity is an elusive notion. Therefore in order to undertake this investigation, my first task was to bring the phenomenon into view. I began Chapter One with a brief analysis of complicity as it has been appealed to in feminist contexts in the work of Wollstonecraft and Beauvoir. This enabled me to obtain a preliminary grasp of the phenomenon, which then informed my investigation of contemporary philosophical approaches to complicity. By examining the phenomenon as it is implicitly articulated in literature on adaptive preferences, autonomy and self-deception, I identified three insights that guided my analysis in subsequent chapters and enabled me to begin my Heideggerean investigation proper.

In Chapter Two I offered an overview of the Heideggerean account as a whole and the way in which Dasein’s complicity in its own unfreedom can be understood to manifest itself in Dasein’s falling and fleeing into inauthentic modes of Being. In developing this analysis, I suggested in a preliminary way how a Heideggerean approach can incorporate the insights into complicity identified in Chapter One. I also introduced certain key Heideggerean concepts such as *das Man*, along with Heidegger’s distinctive account of freedom, and of inauthenticity and authenticity as modes of Being. By developing Heidegger’s conception of inauthenticity in terms of a mode of Being in which Dasein can be understood to be unfree and complicit in this unfreedom, my interpretation allowed us to rethink complicity as a pervasive and enduring way of life. This laid the groundwork for examining complicity in terms of Dasein’s disclosedness and the way in which it is ‘in’ the world in an everyday manner. I argued that on a Heideggerean account, complicity *qua* inauthenticity is the dominant mode of existence for most agents, most of the time. By beginning to rethink complicity as a more commonplace phenomenon, my interpretation enabled us to be attentive to the way in which complicity can manifest itself in everyday occurrences, such as identifying too strongly with a social role, or failing to take full responsibility for one’s actions.

Developing the overview offered in Chapter Two, Chapters Three, Four and Five analysed complicity in greater detail. I turned to the phenomenon of disclosedness to provide a deeper account of complicity as it manifests itself in terms of Dasein’s Being-in-the-world, and broke disclosedness down into its constitutive elements of mood (Chapter Three), understanding (Chapter Four) and discourse (Chapter Five). However, I suggested that such a separation was only ever academic and that to fully understand how Dasein is ‘in’
the world, these elements must always be taken together. Accordingly, my appeal to
disclosedness not only provided us with a way to account for the insights into complicity
drawn from analyses of self-deception, autonomy and adaptive preference. It also provided
us with a way to unify them. I examined this unification explicitly in Chapter Six, arguing
that my Heideggerian analysis of complicity provides us with a new and more systematic
way to approach this phenomenon.

One of the key outcomes of my investigation has been the claim that it offers us a new
way to approach the phenomenon of complicity. My investigation has suggested that in order
to analyse an agent’s complicity we should focus on their self-understanding. However, as I
have argued throughout, taking Dasein’s self-understanding as the key indicator of its
authenticity or inauthenticity – and hence of Dasein’s complicity or lack thereof – does not
mean that Dasein’s freedom or unfreedom is simply a state of mind. As we saw in Chapter
Four, understanding, as Heidegger conceives of it, is never purely cognitive. Rather, it refers
to a ‘practical’, interactive way of Being-in-the-world. Depending on how Dasein
understands itself, it can Be-in the world in a free and authentic or an unfree and inauthentic
way. In this characterisation, Heidegger gestures towards a classical view that an agent’s
freedom or unfreedom is predicated upon the character of their activity. To Be free is not just
to understand oneself as free, it is to manifest this understanding in one’s activity, in one’s
way of Being-in-the-world. Accordingly, my interpretation suggests that in approaching
complicity through a Heideggerian lens, we must take on board this relation between
understanding and existence. Just as the way in which an agent understands themselves
affects the way they exist, how an agent is ‘in’ the world sheds light on how they understand
themselves. My interpretation has therefore proposed that in order to diagnose whether an
agent is complicit in their own unfreedom we must examine the way they understand
themselves, rather than simply focussing on the acts they perform.

Nevertheless, as I have argued in Chapters Four, Five and Six, this emphasis on
understanding does not push the social world out of the picture, excluding it from the
phenomenon of complicity. More essential to Heidegger’s characterisation of Dasein than
even the tripartite structure of disclosedness, is the tripartite relation between Dasein, world
and others. (BT, 65) Although not the concern of a specific chapter, this relation has been
kept in view throughout my analysis. Because of this existential relation, Heidegger’s picture
of Dasein’s authenticity and freedom as determined by its self-understanding never takes
Dasein in abstraction. Far from suggesting that we must isolate Dasein from its social
context and from others, his conception of understanding means that we must root Dasein in
its social world. My analysis has suggested that we must theorise an agent’s complicity, or
lack thereof, in terms of the way it is with others, and the manner in which this Being-with
affects Dasein’s mode of understanding and its existence. These concerns were addressed explicitly in Chapters Four and Five and further developed in Chapter Six.

In addition to foregrounding a particular conception of self-understanding, and emphasising the integral relation between agents, their world and their relations with others, my Heideggerean approach to complicity has also expanded the reach of this phenomenon. The Heideggerean account of complicity that I have offered has sought to theorise it as it manifests itself in terms of the ways of Being of ‘normal’ agents in unremarkable states of affairs. Rather than considering, for example, how the cooperative slave may be complicit in her own unfreedom and oppression, I have been interested in more nuanced cases, where the freedom or unfreedom of the agent is, as it were, ‘up for grabs’. Accordingly, my analysis has shown how complicity can be conceived as a more widespread and common phenomenon than it may first appear.

One of the aims of this thesis has been to illuminate the feminist potential of Heidegger’s philosophy. Many feminist commentators criticise Heidegger’s ontology for its ‘masculinist’ tendencies. Approaching Being and Time through the lens of complicity, along with its gendered significations, has meant attending in detail to those aspects of the text which, at first blush, may appear to reaffirm the idea that Heidegger’s work is unsuitable for feminist appropriation. Attending to a worry about the potentially gendered nature of inauthentic modes of Being in Chapter Three and Dasein’s neutrality in Chapter Six, I have offered ways to interpret these notions so that they do not exclude female experience, thus strengthening the idea that Heidegger’s ontology can be utilised as a resource for feminists and supporting Heidegger’s own claim that his analytic of Dasein is an ‘interpretation [that is] carried out prior to every factual concretion’.

In addition to offering us a an account of the ways Heidegger can be useful in a feminist context, interpreting Heidegger’s text through the lens of complicity has also opened up additional interpretive avenues within Being and Time more generally. In developing a Heideggerean account of complicit and non-complicit modes of Being, I have developed a distinctive understanding of Heidegger’s conceptions of inauthenticity and authenticity. I have drawn out the stubborn, indifferent and unquestioning nature of inauthentic modes of Being by building on the work of Mulhall and Blattner, whilst developing an account of authenticity as an engaged, attentive and critical mode of existence. I have offered an in-depth analysis of disclosedness and elaborated it in terms of concrete ways of Being-in-the-world. I have demonstrated the critical and political potential of moods such as anxiety and offered an account of how conflictual moods, such as shame, can be reconciled with Heidegger’s account of the ‘tranquil’ attunement of inauthentic modes of

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398 Diprose 1994, as we saw in Chapter Six, but see also Chanter 2001 and Nagel 2001.
Being. In addition to illuminating the feminist potential of Heidegger’s philosophy, my project has also served to elucidate Heideggerean concepts in a more ‘neutral’ context, beyond a concern with complicity, and thus can be seen to contribute to Heideggerean scholarship more broadly.

Beyond its interpretative aims, my project also has a wider critical potential. The arguments I have put forward in this work offer a mode of interpretation that we can bring to bear on a range of feminist problems and examples. This aspect of the project is not one I have yet undertaken, but it is one that can be briefly outlined to suggest how such a project might proceed. I have taken as my test case the subservient housewife who defends her way of life, but my analysis could equally be extended to the woman who elects to have breast enhancement surgery or the woman who insists on wearing cripplingly high heels because she feels this to be essential to ‘true womanhood’. Considering these examples in a Heideggerean context would illuminate the way in which agents such as these help to perpetuate a situation or state of affairs in which they are unfree. In addition to theorising their unfreedom in terms of their thrownness – whether that be perpetuating and upholding patriarchal norms, damaging one’s health, or limiting one’s mobility – their condition could also be rendered in terms of Heidegger’s sense of unfreedom as it is articulated in inauthentic modes of Being. An analysis in terms of unfreedom implies that these agents limit their own range of choices, failing to choose freely among possibilities because they fail to understand themselves as Dasein.

The sense in which women wearing cripplingly high heels or electing to have unnecessary cosmetic surgery manifest their unfreedom is by choosing possibilities in line with a binary gendered narrative, which, as we have seen in Chapter Six, fundamentally conflicts with an understanding of ourselves as Dasein. This analysis coheres with an issue that Ann Levey identifies in terms of adaptive preferences. The problem with adaptive preferences, she argues, is not so much that agents have them, but how they are distributed. It may not be problematic in itself that some people choose to wear very high heels, or have unnecessary cosmetic surgery, but when the people making these choices belong almost exclusively to one social group, a problem appears. Although the problematic distribution of certain preferences may be an insight into complicity shared with theorists of adaptive preference, it is through a Heideggerean lens that this issue can be more productively examined.

Heidegger offers us a way to analyse this distribution of choices in such a way that it does not straightforwardly paint the agents in question as victims, since to be Dasein is to be ultimately responsible for oneself. By contrast, analyses of complicity proceeding via

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400 Examples taken from Chambers 2008.
401 Levey 2005: 137.
adaptive preference tend to suggest that those agents who are complicit in their own unfreedom are simply victims of circumstance, thus obscuring the possibility of analysing the agent’s potential responsibility for perpetuating their own unfree way of Being. However, the Heideggerean analysis is also attentive to the reasons why an agent may have made choices that could be deemed problematic or sub-optimal. As we have seen throughout, the way in which Dasein is ‘in’ the world is determined to a large extent by the das Man of their social setting. A Heideggerean approach to complicity thus avoids victim blaming without, in Holland’s words, ‘exonerating women completely from complicity in the perpetuation of the self-defeating scripts that they are compelled to live out.’ As argued in the Introduction, theorists may have been unwilling to invoke the concept of complicity because of its connotations of blame. My Heideggerean analysis circumvents this difficulty, demonstrating how we can preserve the idea that an agent may, in some ways, be responsible for perpetuating their own unfree way of Being without appealing to the notion of blame.

My thesis has aimed to demonstrate that it is both possible and useful to understand Being and Time as dealing with the issue of an agent’s complicity in their own unfreedom. I have endeavoured to show how we can read Heidegger in this way and, by so doing, integrate the insights of contemporary approaches to complicity within a wider whole. The outcome of this analysis echoes the premise with which it began. If Being complicit in one’s own unfreedom describes the way in which agents help to perpetuate and maintain their own unfree way of Being, then the transformation to a freer way of life must also be something the agent themselves engenders. Just like complicity itself, overcoming complicity cannot be imposed from without, but rather must be embraced from within. This insight into complicity is one which the ontology of Being and Time illuminates in detail, thus providing a framework for theorising an agent’s complicity in their own unfreedom in a thoroughgoing and systematic way.

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